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I. Introduction
Does the United States have powers inherent in sovereignty? At least
since the 1819 decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, conventional wisdom has
held that the national government is one of limited, enumerated powers and
exercises "only the powers granted to it" by the Constitution and those
implied powers "necessary and proper" to the exercise of the delegated
powers.' All powers not delegated to the federal government are reserved to
the states and to the people. 2 In the 1936 decision in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., however, the Supreme Court asserted that federal
authority over foreign relations operated independently of the Constitution
and was inherent in the United States' existence as a sovereign, independent
nation.3  Specifically, the Court, at the height of its pre-1937 scrutiny of
federal authority, held that a joint resolution delegating to the President
authority to criminalize foreign arms sales4 did not violate the non-delegation
doctrine.5 This was true, Justice Sutherland wrote for the Court, because
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("This government is
acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the
powers granted to it... is now universally admitted.").
2. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
3. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
4. The joint resolution criminalized the sale of weapons to warring countries in South America,
if the President found that the prohibition "may contribute to the reestablishment of peace" in the
20021
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(t]he broad statement that the federal government can exercise no
powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and
such implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect
the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our
internal affairs.6
The foreign affairs powers existed prior to and independent of the
Constitution, as essential sovereign powers:
[T]he investment of the federal government with the powers of
external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the
Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace,
to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other
sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution,
would have vested in the federal government as necessary
concomitants of nationality.
7
The powers of the United States in this field were equal to those of other
states in the international community and derived from the law of nations:
"As a member of the family of nations, the right and power of the United
States in that field are equal to the right and power of the other members of
the international family. Otherwise, the United States is not completely
sovereign.",8 Justice Sutherland thus portrayed the foreign affairs powers as
independent of any constitutional delegation, deriving instead from inter-
national law concepts of sovereignty.
Having separated the source of the foreign affairs powers from the
Constitution, Sutherland asserted that the exercise of these powers was
unconstrained by other provisions of the Constitution: "Neither the
Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign
territory unless in respect of our own citizens . . . ,9 Instead, operations of
the United States in the international sphere were governed by "treaties,
international understandings and compacts, and the principles of international
law."'10 In so reasoning, Sutherland relied upon a principle of territoriality,
commonly held in the late nineteenth century, which viewed sovereignty as
coterminous with territory. A member of the community of nations was con-
sidered to exercise complete sovereignty within its territorial jurisdiction and
external sovereignty only (if at all) with respect to its own citizens. All other
external relations were governed by the law of nations. Sutherland's strict
region. Joint Resolution of May 28, 1934, 48 Stat. 811. The same day Congress adopted the
resolution, President Roosevelt barred the sale of weapons to Bolivia and Paraguay, and the Curtiss-
Wright Export Corporation was later indicted for conspiring to sell weapons to Bolivia in violation
of the prohibition. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 311-13.
5. Id. at 329.
6. Id. at 315-16 (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 318 (emphasis added).
8. Id.
9. Id. (citing Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909)).
10. Id.
[Vol. 81:1
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territoriality vision of the Constitution thus dovetailed conveniently with his
view that the nation's authority in external relations did not derive from the
Constitution, but rather from the law of nations and sovereignty.II
Finally, Sutherland contended that the exercise of these external powers
was largely isolated from judicial review. In light of the broad discretion
enjoyed by the political branches over foreign affairs, "participation in the
exercise of the power is significantly limited" 12 and "court[s] should not be in
haste" to condemn its practice. 
13
In sum, Justice Sutherland abandoned the traditional concept of a
limited national government derived from enumerated and reserved powers
and replaced it with a bifurcated vision of internal and external powers, in
which traditional enumerated-powers analysis applied only to U.S. domestic
relations. According to this vision, the Constitution, both as a source of
governmental authority and as a constraint on its exercise, stopped at the
water's edge, and the powers of the United States in the external realm
derived not from the Constitution, but from concepts of sovereignty shared,
recognized, and defined by the community of nations. Ordinary constitu-
tional constraints, such as the enumerated powers doctrine, separation of
powers, and federalism were largely inapplicable, and courts, Sutherland
surmised, should be reluctant to interfere with the exercise of the
government's sovereign external powers. 14 These three elements-an extra-
constitutional source of authority deriving from international law, relative
lack of constitutional constraint, and limited judicial review-comprise the
classic articulation of the inherent powers doctrine.
The theory that the national government may enjoy inherent,
extraconstitutional sovereign powers may astonish students of American
political theory. It is precisely the concept of a national government with
limited powers, based on a written constitution, and subject to constitutional
constraints and judicial review, that is supposed to distinguish the American
democratic experiment from authoritarian forms of government. Even
Justice Sutherland, six months earlier in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., had
rejected the possibility that Congress might possess an unenumerated,
"inherent" power to enact federal labor legislation, writing, "It is no longer
open to question that the general government... possesses no inherent
power in respect of the internal affairs of the states; and emphatically not
11. In an apparent concession to conventional analysis, Sutherland stated obliquely that the
President's power over foreign relations, "like every other governmental power, must be exercised
in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution." Id. at 320. This comment,
however, was in tension with his other statements, see supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text, and
he did not address what, if any, constitutional provisions he considered applicable.
12. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.




with regard to legislation."1 5  Commentators accordingly have criticized
Curtiss-Wright as "shockingly inaccurate,"' 16 for "mak[ing a] shambles out of
the very idea of a constitutionally limited government," 7  and for
"introduc[ing] the notion that [the] national government possesses a secret
reservoir of unaccountable power. '18 Harold Koh has argued that "Curtiss-
Wright painted a dramatically different vision of the National Security
Constitution from that which [had] prevailed since the founding of the
Republic."' 19 G. Edward White has portrayed the Curtiss-Wright decision as
a sharp break from the "nineteenth century orthodoxy" of the enumerated
powers doctrine and as presaging the Court's 1937 revolution of judicial
deference to national authority.20  Recently, several foreign affairs scholars
have criticized the Curtiss-Wright doctrine as a twentieth-century anomaly
and have urged that the foreign affairs power be brought back into the fold of
mainstream constitutional jurisprudence.2' Other critics have condemned
Justice Sutherland's inherent powers arguments as dicta.22 From various
15. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 295 (1936) (invalidating federal labor legislation as
exceeding Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause). In a little-noticed aside, however,
Sutherland had left open the possibility that inherent powers might exist over foreign affairs, noting
that "[tihe question in respect of the inherent power of that government as to the external affairs of
the nation and in the field of international law is a wholly different matter which it is not necessary
now to consider." Id.
16. CHARLES A. LOFGREN, The Foreign Relations Power: United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, in GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND
CHOICE 167, 205 (1986). See also David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of
Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); C. Perry Patterson, In re The United
States v. The Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 22 TEXAS L. REV. 286 (1944).
17. Levitan, supra note 16, at 497.
18. Id. at 493; see also James Quarles, The Federal Government: As to Foreign Affairs, Are Its
Powers Inherent as Distinguished from Delegated?, 32 GEO. L.J. 375 (1944) (criticizing Curtiss-
Wright for recognizing foreign powers extraneous to the Constitution).
19. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 94 (1990).
20. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 33-93 (2000); see also G.
Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L.
REV. 1, 5 (1999) (characterizing Curtiss-Wright as the culmination of a trend that had begun two
decades prior); G. Edward White, Observations on the Turning of Foreign Affairs Jurisprudence, 70
U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1118-20 (1999).
21. Professors Jack Goldsmith and Curtis Bradley have challenged Curtiss-Wright's role in
modem foreign relations jurisprudence in a number of articles calling for a greater role for
federalism in foreign affairs. Curtis Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1089, 1104-07 (1999) (predicting a shift away from foreign affairs exceptionalism); Curtis
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 816, 861-70 (1997); Jack L. Goldsmith,
Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1659-60 (1997) (rejecting
Curtiss-Wright as authority for a federal common law of foreign relations).
22. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). But see LOFGREN, supra note 16, at 204 (arguing that Sutherland's view of
independent executive power is not dictum). For further critiques of Sutherland's analysis, see, e.g.,
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 18-34 (1990); LOUiS HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 20 (2d ed. 1996) ("The Sutherland Theory
requires that a panoply of important powers be deduced from unwritten, uncertain, changing
[Vol. 81:1
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perspectives, all of these scholars view the Curtiss-Wright decision as a
radical break from established American legal theory. Nevertheless, Curtiss-
Wright has endured. As the recent foreign relations disputes over Elian
Gonzalez 23 and the Massachusetts Burma law 24 demonstrate, federal courts
continue to invoke Curtiss-Wright in support of relatively unlimited federal
authority over foreign affairs.
However sharply Justice Sutherland diverged from accepted American
political doctrines of popular sovereignty and limited government, careful
examination of the Court's decisions of the preceding century reveals that the
theory of inherent powers did not spring fully formed from Sutherland's
head. To the contrary, Sutherland's method of invoking inherent plenary
power was entirely familiar to Supreme Court jurisprudence and derived
directly from late-nineteenth-century judicial decisions addressing Indians,
aliens, and territorial expansion. Sutherland's theory drew extensively from
views of dual federalism, sovereignty, and the territorial scope of consti-
tutional power that the Court articulated in a series of decisions in these areas
between 1886 and 1910.
This Article examines the historical origins of the doctrine of inherent
powers over foreign affairs and the Supreme Court's ultimate ratification of
that doctrine in its late-nineteenth-century decisions concerning Indians,
aliens, and territories. The doctrine of inherent powers, as used in this
Article, is limited to powers sharing the three characteristics identified in
Curtiss-Wright. First, the source of the authority derives not from the
Constitution's enumerated clauses, but from the status of the United States as
a sovereign nation. The authority is one possessed by all sovereign nations,
as recognized by public international law. Consequently, the Article is not
concerned with powers implied from, or incidental to, any specific clause of
the Constitution. The focus is on powers derived from a source of authority
external to the Constitution, not on powers implied from the Constitution's
text.
25
concepts of international law and practice, developed and growing outside our constitutional
tradition and our particular heritage."); Sarah H. Cleveland, The Plenary Power Background of
Curtiss-Wright, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1127, 1133-35 (1999).
23. Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1353 (1 1th Cir. 2000) ("[I]n no context is the executive
branch entitled to more deference than in the context of foreign affairs.") (citing Curtiss-Wright,
299 U.S. 304 (1936)).
24. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 50 (1st Cir. 1999) ("When it comes to
foreign affairs, the powers of the federal government are not limited .... ) (quoting United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.,
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000)).
25. One could argue, of course, that a "power inherent in sovereignty," such as the immigration
power, was not entirely extraconstitutional, but instead was incidental to the national sovereignty
that the Constitution established. In other words, the Constitution created a sovereign national
government, which must be presumed to have certain additional, albeit unenumerated, powers. The
Court rejected this approach in Curtiss-Wright, which expressly states that the foreign affairs
powers exist independent of the Constitution. The theory that sovereign power is rooted in the
2002]
Texas Law Review
Second, the Constitution imposes few or no constraints, such as the
separation of powers or individual rights, on the exercise of the sovereign
power. This criterion is not necessary to all powers with an extiaconsti-
tutional source. It would be possible to conclude that a power derived from
international law, but nevertheless was limited by other provisions of the
Constitution. Such a power would pose fewer concerns for the doctrine of
enumerated powers and limited government. This Article, however, focuses
on powers that are neither derived from, nor substantially limited by, the
Constitution.
Finally, the inherent powers considered herein are relatively insulated
from judicial review. They are, in short, both inherent in their origin and
plenary in their exercise.26
Although James Wilson advanced a theory of inherent power in the pre-
constitutional era,27 there was little support in either the constitutional
Constitution could, however, be imputed to some of the late-nineteenth-century inherent powers
immigration decisions, which contain scattered language to that effect and also contain ambiguous
language about the source of the sovereign power. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 711 (1893) ("The Constitution of the United States speaks with no uncertain sound upon
this subject."); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) ("The power of
exclusion of foreigners [is] an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United
States, as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution .... ). Viewing the
Constitution as a whole as the source of such powers, however, does not significantly remedy the
difficulty that the concept of such unenumerated, inherent powers poses for the enumerated powers
doctrine.
26. As David Engdahl has noted, the term "plenary power" has been used to describe a number
of distinct constitutional concepts. David E. Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal
Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REv. 283, 363-66 (1976) (observing that plenary power may refer to a power
exclusively held by one branch of government, a power that preempts state action, or a power that is
unlimited). The term has been used in constitutional discourse to include such familiar powers as
the congressional spending and commerce powers, the President's pardon power, and the
impeachment powers of the House and Senate. These textually based powers share with the powers
discussed in this Article the characteristics of relative insulation from other constitutional
constraints and judicial review. They differ, however, in their express derivation from the
constitutional text and their assignment to a particular branch of government. It is to the concept of
national inherent powers rooted in international law and sovereignty that this Article is dedicated.
27. In 1785, James Wilson, a prominent Federalist who later became one of the first justices of
the United States Supreme Court, argued, in support of Congress's effort to establish a national
bank, that in addition to its enumerated powers, the national government possessed certain "general
rights, general powers, and general obligations" that were "incident" and essential to independent
states under the law of nations:
To many purposes, the United States are to be considered as one undivided,
independent nation; and as possessed of all the rights, and powers, and properties, by
the law of nations incident to such. Whenever an object occurs, to the direction of
which no particular state is competent, the management of it must, of necessity, belong
to the United States in Congress assembled. There are many objects of this extended
nature.
James Wilson, Considerations on the Bank of North America (1785), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON 829 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). See also Letter from George Mason to
Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 27, 1781), in 2 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, 1725-1792, at 697-99
(Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970) (critiquing arguments that the national government ought to possess
inherent sovereign powers). Wilson later abandoned this position and ultimately opposed a bill of
[Vol. 8 1: 1
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debates or the Federalist Papers for the concept of inherent, unenumerated
28sovereign federal powers. Moreover, few arguments based on powers
inherent in sovereignty emerged in the early nineteenth century, though
certain inroads on traditional enumerated powers and limited government
analysis were made. 29 From an early date, national power over Indians was
justified in part on theories of territorial discovery and of the Indians'
aboriginal status under international law,30 but this authority also was
generally viewed as limited to the scope of the federal war, treaty, and Indian
31commerce powers. Supporters of the 1798 Alien Act (which established a
broad executive power to expel aliens) consistently looked to the
Constitution for an enumerated source of the power, though some contended
that the power was otherwise unlimited because aliens were not entitled to
constitutional protections.32 Likewise, supporters of the 1803 Louisiana
Purchase generally looked to the Constitution for an enumerated source of
authority to acquire and govern territory, though some members of Congress
also suggested that the enumerated authority to govern territory, once found,
was not otherwise constrained by the Constitution.33 Moreover, these early
disputes were largely resolved in favor of traditional constitutional analysis.
The Alien Act was widely dismissed as unconstitutional, and the inhabitants
of Louisiana were ultimately placed on the road to statehood and citizenship.
The concept of inherent powers continued to appear sporadically in
congressional debates and legal arguments relating to Indians, aliens, and
rights as unnecessary surplusage on the grounds that the national government derived its power
solely "from the positive grant expressed in the instrument of the union." PENNSYLVANIA AND THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 143-44, 313-14 (John Bach McMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., 1888);
see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 540
(1969) (discussing the Federalists' arguments that a bill of rights was unnecessary). "[E]very thing
which is not given, is reserved," Wilson observed. 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 339 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981)
(Philadelphia address of James Wilson); see also 2 id. at 454-56 (statement to the Pennsylvania
Convention that the national government possesses only enumerated powers). Wilson, in particular,
abandoned his prior theory of inherent powers in favor of a theory of popular sovereignty. By 1787,
Wilson had developed a concept of sovereignty as ultimately held not by the national government
(as in the British Parliament) nor by the state governments (as under the Articles of Confederation),
but by the people. WOOD, supra, at 530-31.
28. Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 379 (2000). Professor Ramsey concludes, after an examination of the ratification
debates and other contemporaneous sources, that the constitutional generation believed "that foreign
affairs powers, like other powers, were allocated between the state and federal governments by the
terms of the nation's governing document." Id. at 386.
29. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-
1801, at 204-05 (1997) (suggesting that the Third Congress adopted the national flag under a theory
of inherent powers). It would be equally possible to conclude, however, that the creation of a flag
was an implied power, necessary and proper to maintaining an army and navy.
30. For a discussion of the discovery doctrine and Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823), see
infra notes 148-81 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 615-65 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 1152-228 and accompanying text.
2002]
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territories throughout the nineteenth century, but the theory was a distinct
minority position and was generally rejected by the courts.
3 4
In the late nineteenth century, however, the inherent powers doctrine
was embraced by the national political branches and ratified by a majority of
the Court. In the period from 1886 to 1910, the Court repeatedly asserted the
doctrine of inherent powers to uphold federal authority over Indians, and
over immigrants in entry and exclusion proceedings, and to justify the
exercise of U.S. power abroad. The decisions in United States v. Kagama
(1886), 35 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case)
(1889),36 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States
(1890), 37 Jones v. United States (1890),38 In re Ross (1891), 39 Nishimura
Ekiu v. United States (1892),40 Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1893),
41
Stephens v. Cherokee Nation (1899),42 Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock
(1902),43 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock (1903),
44 the Insular Cases (1901-1904),' 4
34. But see United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846), discussed infra notes 263-81
and accompanying text.
35. 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886) (upholding Congress's authority to adopt the Indian Major
Crimes Act as a result of the "exclusive sovereignty" in the national government).
36. 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (upholding the "power of exclusion of foreigners [as] an incident
of sovereignty").
37. The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136
U.S. 1, 42 (1890) (noting that Congress's powers over the territories "are those of national
sovereignty, and belong to all independent governments").
38. 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) (finding that Congress's power to legislate for territories derives
from "the law of nations, recognized by all civilized States").
39. 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) (finding that the Constitution does not protect citizens
extraterritorially).
40. 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) ("It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty .... to forbid the entrance of
foreigners ... ").
41. 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) ("The right to... expel all aliens... [is] an inherent and
inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation .. "); see also Oceanic Steam
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) ("[O]ver no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete [than immigration].").
42. 174 U.S. 445, 478 (1899) (recognizing Congress's "plenary power of legislation" over
Indian tribes).
43. 187 U.S. 294, 307-08 (1902) (noting that Congress has plenary power to lease tribal lands
without their consent).
44. 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) ("Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has
been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political
one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.").
45. The name refers to a series of decisions regarding the application of United States laws to
the territories of, inter alia, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, acquired in the Spanish-American War.
The cases involved the application of tariff laws, e.g., De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901);
Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901);
Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Dooley
v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Fourteen Diamond Rings, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); and
constitutional criminal provisions, e.g., Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (grand jury
indictment and jury trial); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904) (double jeopardy); Dorr v.
United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (right to jury trial).
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and United States v. Celestine (1909),46 all relied upon powers derived from
the status of the United States as a nation to hold that most basic consti-
tutional protections did not apply to these groups. The theory of inherent
plenary powers drew upon doctrines of customary international law regard-
ing the sovereign powers of the nation-state. International law principles
regarding territoriality were applied to the Constitution to limit its reach
abroad, while substantive rules regarding national authority to acquire Indian
lands and interact with aboriginal tribes, to admit and exclude aliens, and to
govern the inhabitants of newly acquired lands also were substantially
derived from international law. The inherent powers decisions thus stand as
important examples of the Supreme Court's application of customary inter-
national law principles and their incorporation into constitutional doctrine.
These controversies shared a number of characteristics that led the
Court to treat them as constitutionally exceptional. First, the Constitution is
relatively silent regarding the authority of the United States over all three
areas. The exercise of national power thus posed challenges for traditional
enumerated powers analysis. Second, all three doctrinal areas implicated
persons who were non-citizens and who were racially, culturally, and
religiously distinct from the nation's Anglo-Saxon, Christian elites. The
Court accordingly was less concerned with protecting individual rights in
these areas. Third, all three areas involved U.S. relations with lands outside
of the jurisdiction of the states-whether Indian lands, the foreign countries
of origin of immigrants, or U.S. territories. Concerns of federalism, which
might have led the Court to limit national power in areas touching on
relations with the several states, were thus not implicated. The approach to
foreign relations powers articulated in these cases provided the foundation
for the inherent powers thesis asserted in Curtiss-Wright. Indeed, Justice
Sutherland formulated his theory of inherent foreign affairs powers in 1909,
during the height of the inherent powers era,47 although he would not have
the opportunity to elevate it to Supreme Court doctrine until a quarter of a
century later.
The result was an inversion of the enumerated powers doctrine. At the
time of the framing, the sovereignty of the United States was viewed as being
46. 215 U.S. 278, 289-90 (1909) (finding that the citizenship status of Indians did not limit
Congress's plenary authority); accord United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 598 (1916); United
States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 48 (1913).
47. Sutherland first advanced the theory in 1909 as a Senator from Utah, see S. DOC. No. 61-
417 (1909), and reprinted the essay the following year. George Sutherland, The Internal and
External Powers of the National Government, 191 N. AM. REv. 373 (1910) [hereinafter Sutherland,
Internal and External Powers]. See WHITE, supra note 20, at 47. Sutherland further developed the
theory in a series of lectures published by Columbia University in 1919. GEORGE SUTHERLAND,
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 24-69 (Columbia U. Press 1919). His biographer
notes that he may have derived the theory from Judge James V. Campbell, one of his professors at
the University of Michigan Law School. JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A
MAN AGAINST THE STATE 226-28 (195 1).
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divided and shared among the national government, the state governments,
and the people.48 All powers were shared between the states and the people,
who ceded certain of their powers to the federal government. Together, this
collective sovereignty presumably possessed all the powers known to in-
dependent sovereign states. But the sovereignty of the national government
itself was imperfect--qualified both by the limited delegations of authority
and by express restrictions on the authority's exercise. By the end of the
nineteenth century, this image of the American government had substantially
transformed in areas touching on foreign relations. Nation-building, expan-
sionist impulses, international law doctrines of territoriality and sovereignty,
and ascriptivist, membership visions of American identity combined to craft
a new vision of the national government as a complete sovereign, possessing
all the powers enjoyed by authoritarian European states in its external
relations. Where relations with Indians, aliens, and foreign territories were
concerned, the United States, and Congress in particular, enjoyed practically
all conceivable powers of a fully sovereign nation rather than being a
government of limited powers derived from the enumerated clauses of the
Constitution.
The Indian, alien, and territory cases often have been ignored by
mainstream constitutional law scholars as late-nineteenth-century anomalies
of American constitutional jurisprudence. The doctrines developed during
this period, however, continue to be the controlling constitutional authority in
all three areas. Furthermore, as the ongoing importance of Curtiss-Wright
suggests, the decisions continue to exert a powerful influence over the
Court's approach to general foreign affairs jurisprudence. It is precisely the
convergence of these doctrines that provides the legal basis for the George
W. Bush Administration's current detention of alleged enemy aliens at the
Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba. The doctrines supporting the United
States' plenary power over aliens and territories beyond its borders combine
with Curtiss-Wright to render Guantanamo a "Constitution-free zone" in the
eyes of the Administration. 49  These doctrines thus stand as important
48. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 27, at 529, 558.
49. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (appeal pending) (dismissing claims of
Guantanamo detainees on the grounds that aliens on Guantanamo have no right to habeas corpus or
protection under the Fifth Amendment). The U.S. Naval Base on Guantanamo is subject to the
complete jurisdiction and control of the United States. It has been used by previous administrations
to detain Haitian and Cuban refugees with the expectation that ordinary constitutional rights would
not attach to aliens detained outside U.S. territory. Compare Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary,
969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992) (upholding a preliminary injunction based on the Fifth Amendment
claims of Haitians detained at Guantanamo), vacated as moot, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc.,
509 U.S. 918 (1993), and Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(applying the Fifth Amendment to Haitians indefinitely detained at Guantanamo), vacated by
Stipulated Order Approving Class Action Settlement Agreement (Feb. 22, 1994), with Cuban Am.
Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (1 1th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a constitutional challenge
under the Fifth Amendment by Cubans detained at Guantanamo), and Haitian Refugee Center, Inc.
v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1503 (1lth Cir. 1992) (rejecting First and Fifth Amendment claims of
[Vol. 81:1
2002] Powers Inherent in Sovereignty
exceptions to mainstream principles of American political theory and
national identity, and as a cornerstone of U.S. foreign affairs authority.
Until recently, scholars had generally overlooked the interrelationship
between the doctrines of sovereignty relating to Indians, aliens, and territor-
ies, and had failed to systematically connect these separate doctrinal areas to
modern foreign relations jurisprudence.50 Although immigration 5' and Indian
law 52 scholars have examined the plenary powers doctrine, their analyses
tend to be restricted to their individual doctrinal fields. While some
constitutional and foreign relations scholars have recognized the contribution
of immigration law to foreign relations jurisprudence, most have failed to
acknowledge the important contributions of the Indian and territorial law
doctrines. 3 Similarly, Professor Gerald Neuman's recent work on the scope
of the Constitution in the immigration and territorial expansion contexts does
not focus on inherent powers theories or consider the contribution of Indian
Haitians interdicted on the high seas). Cf Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1573 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (upholding a Fifth Amendment takings claim on Guantanamo).
50. This Article provides a thorough explication of the analysis first set forth by the author in
1999. See Cleveland, supra note 22. Since that date, at least two other authors have addressed
aspects of the inherent powers cases. Alexander Aleinikoff's important new book examines the
modem implications of the inherent powers cases for citizenship and constitutional rights. T.
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002). See also Natsu Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power Over the
"Other": Indians, Immigrants, Colonial Subjects, and Why U.S. Jurisprudence Needs to
Incorporate International Law, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 427 (2002) (arguing that international
law offers a remedy for the inherent powers cases).
51. Stephen Legomsky did the pathbreaking work tracing the evolution of the plenary power
doctrine in immigration. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY 177-222
(1987); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255. Other critics of the persistence of the plenary power doctrine in
the immigration area include: ALEINIKOFF, supra note 50; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal
Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862 (1989); Louis Henkin, The
Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100
HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990);
Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation ofImmigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984).
52. Nell Jessup Newton did the seminal work tracing the Indian plenary power doctrine. See
Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 195 (1984). See also Laurence M. Hauptman, Congress, Plenary Power, and the American
Indian, 1870 to 1992, in EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE: DEMOCRACY, INDIAN NATIONS, AND
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (Oren R. Lyons & John C. Mohawks eds., 1992); DAVID E. WILKINS,
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1997) [hereinafter WILKINS,
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY] (analyzing federal Indian law cases under Critical Legal
Theory); David E. Wilkins, The US. Supreme Court's Explication of "Federal Plenary Power ": An
Analysis of Case Law Affecting Tribal Sovereignty (1886-1914), 18 AM. IND. Q. 349 (1994); Philip
P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31 (1996) [hereinafter Frickey,
Domesticating] (discussing plenary power within the context of federal Indian law compared to its
usage in immigration law); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993).
53. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 22, at 16 (discussing Chae Chan Ping as a predecessor to
Curtiss- Wright).
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law.54 All three doctrinal areas, however, share important theoretical links,
as Professor Aleinikoff has noted,55 and their combined contribution is
critical to a comprehensive understanding of modem constitutional views of
sovereignty and federal power. The cases are both important predecessors to
the inherent powers doctrine in Curtiss-Wright and have a broader import as
examples of the Supreme Court's willingness not only to enforce customary
international law but to elevate international law principles to constitutional
status.
The decisions also raise profound questions regarding the ongoing
validity of the inherent powers doctrine in the Indian, alien, and territory
contexts, as well as in Curtiss-Wright. The nineteenth century history of the
inherent powers doctrine reveals that the doctrine cannot be justified by
mainstream forms of constitutional analysis. The inherent powers doctrine
cannot be vindicated as originalism. It was not accepted at the nation's
inception, is not supported by the Constitution's text and structure, and is
contrary to the principles of political theory which inform the American con-
stitutional system. It cannot be defended on doctrinal grounds, since most of
the late-nineteenth-century doctrines from which the theory derives have
long since been abandoned in other jurisprudential contexts. Nor can it be
defended as modernism. The doctrine's origins instead lie in a peculiarly
unattractive, late-nineteenth-century nationalist and racist view of American
society and federal power.
This Article examines the evolution of the doctrine of inherent powers
in cases involving Indians, aliens, and territories in an attempt to discern the
origins of the doctrine and its relationship to traditional constitutional
jurisprudence. Part II identifies the doctrinal principles of sovereignty,
territoriality, and membership that undergirded the late-nineteenth-century
Court's inherent powers analysis. Parts III through V consider the evolution
of the inherent powers doctrine in nineteenth century Supreme Court
jurisprudence regarding Indians, aliens, and territories, respectively. Part VI
explores the dichotomy between the inherent powers decisions and the
Court's stringent enforcement of enumerated powers doctrines in the
domestic sphere during the same period. This section argues that the
anomalous decisions in the inherent powers cases were the product of a
54. GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Constitutionalism and Individual Rights
in the Territories, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM,
AND THE CONSTITUTION 182 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001). Other
commentators on the implications of territorial doctrine for constitutional law include T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Puerto Rico and the Constitution: Conundrums and Prospects, 11 CONST. COMMENT.
15 (1994); Sanford Levinson, Installing the Insular Cases into the Canon of Constitutional Law, in
FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION
121 (Christina Duffy Bumett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
55. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 50, at 11-36.
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unique convergence of late-nineteenth-century ideological forces: doctrinal
obsession with federalism and dual sovereignty (concerns that were not
implicated in the foreign affairs realm) with peculiarly nativist, nationalistic,
and authoritarian impulses among the nation's political elites that justified
the subjugation of "inferior" peoples. Part VII briefly reexamines the
Curtiss-Wright decision and traces its origins in the nineteenth century
inherent powers cases. Finally, the Article concludes by offering some
thoughts about the implications of the inherent powers decisions for
contemporary constitutional jurisprudence and international law.
II. Sovereignty and the Constitution
The Supreme Court drew upon a number of legal doctrines to support its
inherent powers decisions. As discussed below, the Court invoked principles
of membership and territoriality to limit the Constitution's applicability to
alien populations or overseas territories. The Court also used substantive
rules regarding sovereignty and the authority of states over aliens, territories,
and aboriginal peoples to justify granting to the United States powers
equivalent to those held by other nations under international law.
A. Sovereignty
At the core of the Supreme Court's inherent powers decisions lies a
struggle to identify the relationship between international law conceptions of
sovereignty and the domestic authority created by the Constitution.
Sovereignty, in its most basic sense, refers to a recognized set of inter-
national rules regarding the definition and authority of a nation-state and its
interactions with other states. According to naturalist international law
scholars such as Emer de Vattel, 56 whose work was influential upon many
nineteenth century American jurists, all nations possessed certain powers
inherent in their existence as nations. These powers were defined, shared,
and recognized by all members of the family of nations and were essential to
a nation's identity as an independent state. Sovereign powers were not
subject to any external or positive constraints, save the rights of other
sovereigns under international law, and any effort to limit these powers
would undermine the nation's independence and equal status in the inter-
national community. 57 The U.S. Supreme Court early recognized, however,
that the specific sovereign powers actually held by any particular state were
determined by that state's domestic law, which might modify, or deny
56. EMER DE VATTrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (Joseph Chitty ed., T. & J.W. Johnson & Co.
1876) (1758). Nineteenth century publicists who examined the international law nature of
sovereignty include HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (James Brown Scott
ed., 1866), and HENRY W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW; OR RULES REGULATING THE
INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND WAR (1861).
57. VATTEL, supra note 56, bk. II, ch. IV, § 54, at 154.
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altogether, the powers otherwise bestowed by international law.58 Thus,
answering the question of what international law allowed did not resolve
what the Constitution allowed or.required. The Constitution could deny the
international power to the national government by reserving it to the states,
or even withhold the power from both levels of government by reserving it to
the people.
Chief Justice Marshall explored the relationship between international
concepts of sovereignty and the United States' system of limited government
early on in McCulloch v. Maryland.59 In support of its tax on the national
bank, Maryland argued that the creation of a corporation was an inherent
sovereign power. Maryland reasoned that, because the states possessed all
powers that had not been expressly delegated to the national government,
such an inherent power was reserved to the states.6° In his opinion for the
Court, Marshall acknowledged that the powers to create a corporation and to
tax were both powers "appertaining to sovereignty., 61  This fact, however,
did not determine where the power was located in the United States' system
of government. "[A]II legislative powers appertain to sovereignty,"
62
Marshall observed, but in the American political system, sovereignty was
shared.63 The national government held the power to incorporate a bank, not
because the power was an incident of sovereignty, but because the power was
reasonably implied from that government's enumerated powers.64 In other
words, the fact that a power was "sovereign" under public international law
did not determine whether it was held by the national government. The
people, as the ultimate possessors of sovereignty, delegated certain powers to
the national government.65 The national government, in turn, could exercise
only these enumerated powers and the implied powers necessary and proper
to them.
66
58. E.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) ("All
exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be
traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.").
59. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
60. Id. at 427.
61. Id at411.
62. Id. at 409.
63. Id. at 410 ("In America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the government of
the Union, and those of the states. They are each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed
to it, and neither sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to the other.").
64. Id. at410-12.
65. Id. at 403-05 ("The government proceeds directly from the people; is 'ordained and
established' in the name of the people; and is declared to be ordained, 'in order to ... secure the
blessings of liberty to themselves and to their posterity.'... The government of the Union,
then... is, emphatically, and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance, it
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Chief Justice Marshall specifically contrasted the "modest" authority to
create a bank, which reasonably could be implied from other enumerated
powers, with the "great substantive and independent power[s]," such as "the
power of making war, or levying taxes, or of regulating commerce. 67
Although these powers also appertained to sovereignty, Marshall observed,
they "cannot be implied as incidental to other powers, or used as a means of
executing them., 68 Unless enumerated, they could not be exercised by the
national government.
McCulloch thus reconciled sovereign international powers within the
framework of classical American concepts of limited government. The
"sovereign" powers of the United States, like all other powers, must be
determined according to the enumerated and reserved powers set forth in the
Constitution.
B. The Constitution's Scope
Does the Constitution, or do its specific provisions, apply to non-
citizens within the United States or to U.S. actions abroad? Questions about
the geographic and popular scope of the Constitution were central to the
nineteenth century inherent powers cases, and were not readily resolved by
the Constitution's text. As Gerald Neuman has eloquently observed, the
Constitution contains ambiguities regarding both its geographic scope and
the population to which it applies.
69
Some issues of the Constitution's geographic and popular scope appear
to be addressed explicitly in the text. For example, with respect to geo-
graphic scope, certain constitutional provisions refer only to the several
states. The Constitution expressly gives only states voting representation in
Congress7 ° and the Electoral College;71 only states are guaranteed a
republican form of government; 72 the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause is limited to "[t]he Citizens of each State"; 73 and the Full Faith and
Credit Clause applies to the "public Acts" of each "State. 74  These
provisions, on their face, appear to deny their protections to individuals who
reside in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and other
67. Id. at411.
68. Id.
69. See NEUMAN, supra note 54, at 4-15. Neuman traces four approaches to the Constitution's
scope that have evolved in American history: universalism, membership, mutuality of legal
obligation, and global due process. Id. at 4-8.
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
71. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. The Twenty-Third Amendment granted representation in the Electoral
College to the District of Columbia. Id. amend. XXIII.
72. Id. art. IV, § 4 (guaranteeing "every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government[] and protect[ion] ... against Invasion").
73. Id. art. IV, § 2.
74. Id. art. IV, § 1.
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territories outside of the organized states of the Union. Other provisions,
such as the Uniformity Clause,75 refer to the "United States" as the relevant
geographic region, leaving open the question, which was hotly contested in
the Insular Cases, whether the "United States" textually refers only to the
organized states and territories or also includes unorganized territories and
overseas possessions. 76  Finally, some constitutional provisions expressly
reach beyond the states, such as the Article III Jury Trial Clause 77 and the
Thirteenth Amendment,78 while others, such as the Article I power "[t]o
define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,"
expressly contemplate extraterritorial jurisdiction.79
Only a few provisions of the Constitution limit their application to
certain persons. The Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause is limited
to the citizens of states, as noted above, but few other constitutional
provisions are conditioned on citizenship. 80 The Constitution generally sug-
gests a more universal approach. Most provisions of the Bill of Rights refer
generically to "the people" or to persons, such as the Fifth Amendment's
mandate that no "person" may be deprived of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process, 81 and the Tenth Amendment's reservation of nondelegated
powers to "the people., 82  The Fourteenth Amendment for the first time
defined national citizenship and barred the states from abridging "the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. 83  Thus, as
Alexander Bickel noted, "the original Constitution presented the edifying
picture of a government that bestowed rights on people and persons, and held
itself out as bound by certain standards of conduct in its relations with people
and persons, not with some legal construct called citizen. ', 84
75. Id. § 8, cl. 1 ("[AII Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States.").
76. See infra Part V(G).
77. Id. art. Il, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes... shall be by Jury; ... when not committed
within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have
directed.").
78. Id. amend. XIII, § I ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude... shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
79. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
80. Citizenship is required to hold the federal offices of senator, id. art. 1, § 3, cl. 3, and member
of Congress, id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, and natural-born citizenship is required for the presidency, id. art. 2,
§ 1, cl. 5.
81. Id. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, ... nor shall any person.., be twice put in jeopardy.., nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... ) (emphasis added); see also id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[Nlor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... ").
82. Id. amend. X; see also id. amend. I ("the right of the people peaceably to assemble"); id.
amend. II ("the right of the people to keep and bear Arms"); id. amend. IV ("The right of the people
to be secure in their ... houses").
83. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
84. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, Citizen or Person? What is not Granted Cannot Be Taken Away,
in THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 33, 36 (1975).
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On the other hand, most of the Constitution's provisions are not
textually restricted by either the population or the geographic area to which
they apply. Instead, they define the general powers of the national govern-
ment or impose general limits on the exercise of these powers. Article I
unqualifiedly prohibits the suspension of habeas corpus85 and the adoption of
ex post facto laws or bills of attainder.86 The First Amendment simply
provides that "Congress shall make no law, ' 87 the Third Amendment
generally prohibits the quartering of soldiers,8 . and the Fifth Amendment
prohibits the taking of property.8 9 Structural provisions of bicameralism and
presentment are general in their application, as are the congressional taxation
power,90 the executive's Commander in Chief power,91 and so forth. These
general provisions, on their face, appear to apply to the national government,
regardless of where, and against whom, it acts.
In short, a purely textual reading of the Constitution suggests that, while
certain provisions apply only in the several states or to citizens, the majority
of the Constitution's provisions are not qualified with respect to either
geography or population. To deny the application of these general provisions
to Indians, aliens, African Americans, citizens abroad, or the peoples of
newly acquired territories requires an additional, non-textual, theory of the
Constitution's scope. In the nineteenth century, theories of membership and
territoriality were superimposed upon the constitutional text to restrict both
its popular and territorial application. As discussed below, the nineteenth'
century decisions reflect three approaches to the question of to whom the
Constitution applies: enumerated powers-limited government, social
contract-membership, and territoriality approaches.
1. Enumerated Powers-Limited Government.-Under classical
enumerated powers and limited government theory, the scope of the
Constitution's general provisions is considered from the perspective of the
government's authority to act in any given context. Where th government is
based on a written constitution of enumerated and reserved powers, the
Constitution operates, not as a bestower of certain rights on a designated
population, but as both the source of governmental authority and a constraint
on governmental power. Enumerated powers doctrine provides that the
government may exercise only those powers delegated to it (including all
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
86. Id. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.
87. Id. amend. 1.
88. Id. amend. III ('No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house ....
89. Id. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."); see also id. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law.... the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved .. "); id. amend. VIII ("nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted").
90. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
91. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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properly implied and incidental powers). Because the Constitution is viewed
as the creator and origin of all national government authority, the govern-
ment does not exist, and cannot operate, outside of the Constitution's reach.92
Limited government theory further provides that the government's
enumerated powers are constrained by the Constitution's prohibitions on
government action, such as the prohibition against the suspension of habeas
corpus,93 and by the Bill of Rights. In this Article, "enumerated powers" is
used to refer to the Constitution's delegated powers as a source of authority
to act, while "limited government" is used to refer to the positive constraints,
such as individual rights, that the Constitution imposes on governmental
power.
In addition to the general clauses of the Constitution, enumerated
powers-limited government approaches find support in the universalist, egal-
itarian language of the Declaration of Independence and the Reconstruction
Amendments. 94 Throughout the nineteenth century, these provisions were
invoked to oppose more contingent social contract and membership
approaches.
95
2. Social Contract-Membership.-Social contract or membership
approaches begin with the individual or entity being acted upon by the
government and consider whether that individual is one intended to be
protected by the Constitution. Social contract theory emphasizes the consent
of a particular population to be governed. A government is legitimate, not
because it is inherently limited, but because the members of the citizenry
have agreed to be governed in a particular manner. Membership approaches
in essence replace the concept of natural rights with a theory of positive
rights arising from the contract between the government and the governed.
This theory has significant implications for individuals subject to government
action who are not parties to that agreement. Only members and benefici-
aries of the so6ial contract are able to make claims against the government
and are entitled to the contract's protections, and the government may act
outside of the contract's constraints against individuals who are non-
members.
92. Contrast the enumerated powers theory of the Constitution with the constitutions of the
several states, which are not the source of state authority, but nevertheless constrain their power.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
94. Id. amend. XIII-XV.
95. See, e.g., ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY 36-37 (1997) (discussing the use of the natural rights view of the Declaration of
Independence to presumptively invalidate illiberal laws).
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Social contract approaches find support in the Constitution's Preamble,
which some read to suggest a membership vision.96 The Preamble provides
that "We the People of the United States," acting to secure the "Blessings of
Liberty" for "ourselves and our Posterity," establish the Constitution "for the
United States of America., 97 This language could be interpreted to mean that
the Constitution as a whole applies only to "the People of the United States"
and possibly only when they are physically within "the United States of
America." Under this approach, onlythe members of the constitutional com-
pact would be entitled to its protections. On the other hand, this restrictive
interpretation is not compelled by the Preamble. Even the Preamble speaks
of "the People" rather than "the citizens" or, as Alexander Bickel has noted,
"we the citizens of the United States at the time of the formation of this
union.
' 98
A consent or membership approach alone does not resolve the question
of who will be considered a member. "We the people" potentially could be
narrowly defined to include only citizens, only a subset of citizens (such as
whites, males, or property owners), or only residents of the existing states.
Or it could be more broadly defined to include aliens lawfully admitted to the
United States or those simply present in the U.S. territory for some period.
In the late nineteenth century, social contract approaches resolved the
question of membership in favor of a white, male, Protestant vision of the
national identity. Entitlement to constitutional protection was determined on
the basis of the ascribed characteristics of race, gender, nationality, and
religion.99 Under this ascriptivist approach, Anglo-Saxon, Christian heritage
was the touchstone for full membership in the American polity.
Enumerated powers-limited government and social contract-
membership approaches may yield different outcomes regarding the
Constitution's application to persons viewed as non-members. An
enumerated powers approach, for example, would maintain that federal
authority over Indians derived from, and was limited to, the government's
delegated powers.100 Likewise, under a pure limited government approach,
the general provisions of the Constitution would apply to constrain the
government regardless of where, and against whom, it acted. Both aliens' 1
96. See, e.g., NEUMAN, supra note 54, at 5 (noting that "[t]he Preamble arguably speaks the
language of social contract"). See also infra note 346 and accompanying text (argument of George
Canfield that "we the people" does not include Indian tribes).
97. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
98. BICKEL, supra note 84, at 36.
99. SMITH, supra note 95, at 3.
100. Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. 641, 657-58 (1890) (finding that the Commerce
Clause gives Congress authority to condemn Indian lands).
101. E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-70 (1886) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause applies to aliens in the United States); Wong Wing v. United
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and inhabitants of U.S. territories would constitute "persons" entitled to the
protections of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and the
Fourteenth Amendment's bestowal of citizenship on "all persons born in the
United States" would include the children of immigrants.1
0 2
A membership view, by contrast, could conclude that aliens, residents
of foreign territories, or Indians were not entitled to due process or other
protections because these groups were not intended to be beneficiaries of the
Constitution. The government accordingly could exercise absolute, plenary
power over them based on its inherent powers. Alternatively, a membership
approach could conclude that a lawfully admitted alien was entitled to due
process protections because her admission constituted consent to join the
U.S. polity.
Various members of the Court utilized enumerated powers-limited
government or social contract-membership approaches throughout the
nineteenth century, with radically different results. Jurists such as Chief
Justice Taney1 °3 and Justice Edward Douglass White were identified with
membership approaches, while Justices John Marshall Harlan, Brewer, Field,
and Chief Justice Fuller frequently, though not invariably, invoked
enumerated powers-limited government views. 10 4 These approaches to the
scope of governmental authority also overlapped during the nineteenth
century with a third consideration: the territorial scope of the Constitution.
3. Territoriality.-In addition to the Constitution's textual restrictions
on geographic scope discussed previously, a general theory of territoriality
was applied to limit the Constitution's application to the contiguous United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 235-38 (1896) (concluding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply to
aliens unlawfully within the United States).
102. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 696-704 (1898) (finding that Chinese
persons born in the United States are citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment).
103. Chief Justice Taney authored the most infamous articulation of constitutional social
contract theory in Dred Scott, in which he combined social contract and enumerated powers theories
to conclude that blacks were not members of the constitutional polity and that Congress, as an entity
of limited, delegated powers, lacked authority to make blacks citizens of the United States. Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1857). According to the Chief Justice:
The words "people of the United States" and "citizens" are synonymous terms, and
mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our
republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the
Government through their, representatives. They are what we familiarly call the
"sovereign people," and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member
of this sovereignty. The question before us is, whether the class of persons described
in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members
of this sovereignty? We think they are not ....
Id.
104. Notable exceptions from this approach were Justice Field's opinion for the Court in Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), and Chief Justice Fuller's dissent with Justice
Harlan in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 705 (Fuller, C.J., with whom Harlan, J.,
concurs, dissenting).
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States. Territoriality was integral to nineteenth century concepts of sover-
eignty because, under international law principles, a sovereign's jurisdiction
to legally regulate conduct was coterminous with its territory. 10 5  A state
enjoyed absolute jurisdiction to act within its territory, but was incompetent
to act outside of it, except possibly to exercise authority over its own
nationals. 106 Principles of comity directed states to respect the sovereign
jurisdiction of others and to avoid jurisdictional conflicts. Chief Justice
Marshall articulated this vision of the "perfect equality and absolute
independence of sovereigns"' 1 7 in The Exchange:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute .... Any restriction upon it, deriving validity
from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty
to the extent of the restriction.
This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of
every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extra-territorial
power, would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their
sovereign rights as its objects. 
10 8
In practice, territoriality was not an absolute rule. Nineteenth century writers
recognized that the principle of strict territoriality had been relaxed
somewhat, and Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that national laws were
being extended extraterritorially.
10 9
105. In 1866, Wheaton described the sovereign and mutual independence of nations as
establishing the principle that "[e]very nation possesses and exercises exclusive sovereignty and
jurisdiction throughout the full extent of its territory [and] that the laws of every State control, of
right, all the real and personal property within its territory, as well as the inhabitants of the territory,
whether born there or not ...... WHEATON, supra note 56, § 78. The principle of absolute
authority within a sovereign territory was accompanied by an absolute lack of authority beyond it.
"[N]o State can, by its laws, directly affect, bind, or regulate property beyond its own territory, or
control persons who do not reside within it, whether they be native-born subjects or not." Id.; see
alsoid §§84, 111, 118.
106. International law was unsettled regarding a state's authority to regulate the extraterritorial
.conduct of its nationals. Wheaton believed that states could not exercise such jurisdiction. Id. § 78.
In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909), Justice Holmes held
that U.S. statutes lacked effect in the territory of another sovereign, but he acknowledged that, "in
regions subject to no sovereign, like the high seas, or to no law that civilized countries would
recognize as adequate, such countries may treat some relations between their citizens as governed
by their own law, and keep to some extent the old notion of personal sovereignty alive." See also
The Hamilton (Old Dominion S.S. Co., v. Gilmore), 207 U.S. 398, 403 (1907) (asserting that state
laws apply to a state's own citizens on the high seas); Hart v. Gumpach, 4 L.R.-P.C. 439, 463-64
(1872) (granting English courts jurisdiction to try actions for libel and other personal wrongs
brought against British citizens living in China in the service of the Emperor of China); British S.
Aft. Co. v. Companhia de Mocambique, 1893 A.C. 602, 624 (H.L. 1893) (asserting that the English
court could inquire into an overseas title and award damages for any trespass committed).
107. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
108. Id. at 136-37.
109. Id. at 136 ("[A]I1 sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under
certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective
territories which sovereignty confers."); see also WHEATON, supra note 56, §§ 79, 113.
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Moreover, a strict territoriality vision of the Constitution is difficult to
reconcile with the constitutional text. The Constitution addresses the foreign
affairs powers at length and expressly gives the United States authority to act
with extraterritorial effect in declaring war,10 defining and punishing crimes
on the high seas,'1 ' granting letters of marque and reprisal,' 1 2 making
treaties,113 and adjudicating claims involving foreign states and foreign
nationals. 114  Other than the constitutional provisions that are expressly
limited to actions within the states or within the United States, there is little
reason to assume from the constitutional text that when the United States acts
abroad, the constitutional principles of enumerated powers and limited
government stop at the water's edge. Resort to strict territoriality as a limit
on the Constitution's extraterritorial application thus required the Court to
supplant traditional rules of textual construction with international law
principles. Nevertheless, the Court's vision of strict territoriality strength-
ened in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The principle was visible in
Justice Field's 1877 decision in Pennoyer v. Neff barring extraterritorial
jurisdiction among the several states, 1 5 in the Court's 1897 development of
the act of state doctrine,' 16 and in Justice Holmes's 1909 decision in
American Banana establishing the presumption against statutory
extraterritoriality.117
Theories of strict territoriality often combined with enumerated powers-
limited government or membership theories to constrain the application of
the Constitution to both geographic regions and people. For example,
limited government theories could combine with territoriality to hold that the
Constitution constrained government action with respect to aliens within the
United States but did not protect those outside the nation's borders seeking
entry. 118 Territoriality in its most extreme form would confine both limited
government and membership theories to the geographic United States,
depriving even U.S. citizens outside the United States of constitutional
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
111. Id. cl. 10.
112. Id. cl. 11.
113. Id. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
114. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
115. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 726 (1877).
116. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) ("Every sovereign State is bound to
respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.").
117. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) ("[T]he general and almost
universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the
law of the country where the act is done.").
118. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 738 (1893) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that although the. Constitution lacks extraterritorial effect, its constraints apply
to actions within U.S. borders).
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protections.119 Conversely, territorial sovereignty could combine with
membership theories to give the national government absolute authority over
non-members who were within the country's territorial jurisdiction. For
example, the government used the presence of Indians within U.S. territory
to justify the exercise of federal power over them.' 20  The power was as-
sumed to be necessary for the United States to be a complete sovereign.
These enumerated powers-limited government, social contract-
membership, and territoriality theories of the Constitution's scope appeared
repeatedly throughout the nineteenth century and proved critical to the
development of the inherent powers doctrine. The more restrictive the
Court's vision of the Constitution's popular and geographic scope, the
greater became the deconstitutionalized zone in which the government's
inherent powers could operate. Territorial and membership conceptions, ac-
cordingly, were manipulated to support the exercise of national power.
Indians were deemed subject to inherent, plenary congressional power due to
their physical presence within U.S. territory. Residents of overseas territories
were deemed subject to inherent, plenary power due to their non-membership
and their physical presence outside the United States. And aliens, whether
within or without the United States, were deemed subject to inherent, plenary
congressional power over membership to determine the conditions under
which aliens could enter or remain.
Ill. Inherent Power Over Indian Tribes
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding Indian tribes is generally
neglected in constitutional analysis, often on the grounds that the Indian
cases are sui generis. Chief Justice Marshall observed in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia that "the relation of the Indians to the United States [was] marked
by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no where else.'
' 2'
Nevertheless, the nineteenth century Indian cases presented the same
difficulties of applying constitutional text, and the concomitant reliance on
international law, that the Court confronted in the alien and territory cases.
From its earliest decisions, the Supreme Court established that national
power over Indians derived in part from extraconstitutional, inherent powers
relating to colonial discovery and the Indians' aboriginal status. 22  The
doctrine of inherent powers which evolved in the Indian cases also proved
important to the doctrine's development in the other two areas.
119. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).
120. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1886); United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S.
(4 How.) 567, 571-73 (1846).
121. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
122. E.g., id. at 22 (asserting that the discovery of the New World by the Europeans gave them
the right of dominion including absolute appropriation and annexation of the territory); Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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The first difficulty posed by the Indian cases was textual: the
Constitution does not bestow any general power on the national government
to regulate Indian affairs. Article IX of the Articles of Confederation had
provided for the United States to exercise "the sole and exclusive right and
power of... regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians,
not members of any of the states, provided that the legislative right of any
state within its own limits be not infringed or violated .... ,,' This
ambiguous proviso preserving some state authority over tribes became a
source of controversy in the pre-constitutional era.124 The Constitution elim-
inated the qualification and mentions Indians in only three places. The
Commerce. Clause authorizes Congress to. "regulate commerce with foreign
Nations.... [with the] States, .... and with the Indian Tribes" 125 and provides
the only express constitutional authority for Congress to legislate with regard
to Indian tribes. Article I and the Fourteenth Amendment both exempt
"Indians not taxed" from population enumerations for congressional
apportionment, suggesting either that Indians are non-members or are
separate sovereigns free from most congressional control. 126 Although the
Territory Clause 27 might have been a plausible basis for U.S. authority over
Indians in the western territories, as discussed in Part V, the scope and
meaning of the clause was uncertain in the early part of the century, and was
construed to exclude the western territories in Dred Scott. The other
constitutional clauses applicable to early Indian relations were those
associated with the foreign affairs powers, particularly the treaty and war
powers. 128
The absence of any express federal power to regulate internal Indian
affairs is not surprising given that, when the Constitution was drafted, Indian
tribes were highly autonomous and viewed as a serious external threat to the
security of the new nation. Fear of Indian raids on the western frontier was a
primary justification for the creation of a strong national defense under the
new Constitution.1 29 If not recognized as full sovereigns in the European
123. THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl. 4, reprinted in MAX FARRAND, THE
FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 219 (1913).
124. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 268 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The
regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is ... unfettered from two limitations in the Articles
of Confederation, which render the provision obscure and contradictory.").
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
126. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. XIV, § 2.
127. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
128. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (treaty power); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11-16 (congressional war powers); id.
art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (Commander in Chief power).
129. THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 161 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(discussing the need for garrisons on the western frontier to protect against "the ravages and
depredations of the Indians"); THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 163 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our
neighborhood.., encircle the Union from Maine to Georgia."). Like the powers over foreign
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sense, Indian tribes shared the respect due the nations of Europe as
formidable external adversaries that could entangle the weak and fragile
nation in expensive and protracted wars.' It was undisputed that most
Indians were non-members of the American polity.1 31 The tribes were simi-
lar to foreign states, and the three national powers of war, treaties, and
commerce were considered to "comprehend all that is required for the regu-
lation of our intercourse with the Indians."
1 32
The Constitution viewed Indian tribes as subject to regulation pursuant
to the Commerce and Treaty Clauses and the other foreign affairs powers of
the national government. The Constitution, however, was silent regarding
the position of the Indian as an individual other than to exclude members of
Indian tribes from congressional apportionment and taxation. Could Indians
be citizens? Were Indians "persons" entitled to due process and whose
property could not be taken under the Fifth Amendment, or were Indians
(unlike aliens) excluded from these protections? These questions remained
unanswered through much of the nineteenth century. 
133
relations, the Framers considered federal uniformity over Indian affairs necessary to prevent states
from aggravating tribes and embroiling the nation in Indian wars. Even Anti-Federalists conceded
that the national government's authority properly included "causes arising on the seas to commerce,
imports, armies, navies, Indian affairs, [and] peace and war." Letter from the Federal Farmer to the
Republican, I (Oct. 8, 1787), available at http://www.constitution.org/afp/fedfar0l.htm.
130. FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 44 (1962)
("The country, precariously perched among the sovereign nations of the world, could not stand the
expense and strain of a long drawn-out Indian war.").
131. FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 641 (1982 ed.) ("Prior to 1871, most
Indians were considered to be members of separate political communities and not part of the
ordinary body politic of the states or of the United States."); see also Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94,
112 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that at the Constitution's adoption, "Indians not taxed"
were not part of the American polity, while Indians not members of any tribe were counted to
establish representation in Congress and "constituted a part of the people for whose benefit the State
governments were established"). Cf Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (finding that tribes,
as sovereigns preexisting the Constitution, were not limited by the Fifth Amendment, which "had
for its sole object to control the powers conferred by the Constitution on the National
Government"); Lori F. Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L. REV. 483, 527-28
n.180 (1987) (outlining the argument that foreign states do not have rights protected by the
Constitution).
132. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). .
133. Unlike aliens and territorial inhabitants, whose individual constitutional rights were
addressed by the Supreme Court by the latter 1800s, the scope of constitutional protections
available to individual Indians was very unclear. Nell Newton, for example, suggested that under
the Court's analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649
(1898), tribal Indians might not have been within state jurisdiction for purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause. Newton, supra note 52, at 216 n. 109. A few state and lower federal court cases
recognized Indians as persons entitled to habeas corpus, United States ex rel. Standing Bear v.
Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695, 697 (C.C.D. Neb. 1879) (No. 14,891) (finding that the term "person" within
the habeas act "is comprehensive enough... to include even an Indian"), or recognized basic
property rights for Indians under state law. E.g., Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cullers, 17 S.W. 19 (Tex.
1891). The few cases considering individual rights claims of Indians were generally decided in
state courts, due in large part to the fact that Indians not granted citizenship could not sue in federal
court as aliens or citizens on diversity grounds, ef Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 332 (1892)
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A. Indians and Sovereignty under International Law
Prior to the Constitution's adoption, governmental relations with Indian
tribes turned on international law concepts of Indian sovereign capacity. 134 If
Indian tribes were sovereign nations, international law provided that relations
with the tribes must be pursued through treaties, conquest, and the purchase
of lands, as with other foreign sovereign powers. 135 They could not be gov-
erned, and their lands could not be taken, absent their conquest or consent.
The extreme competing view saw aboriginal peoples as heathens and
savages who existed outside the realm of civilized nations and who had no
sovereign or legal capacity. Under this view, which formed the basis of the
so-called discovery doctrine, relations with the Indians could be conducted
outside of the rules governing relations among civilized states. Their lands
were deemed legally uninhabited or vacant (territorium nullius) and could be
acquired by mere "discovery" and occupation. 136 A European power could
unilaterally assert sovereign jurisdiction over Indians, because such asser-
tions presented no conflicts between sovereign or territorial jurisdictions.
The discovery doctrine provided that the first European nation to
discover a territory that was vacant or populated by aboriginal peoples
(holding that, while Indians could not sue in federal court as citizens, they could sue in state court),
and federal question jurisdiction was not granted to the federal courts until 1875. Act of Mar. 3,
1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. The Court of Claims also lacked general jurisdiction over claims
against the United States for takings based on Indian treaties. See Newton, supra note 52, at 217,
218 n.118.
134. Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31
GEO. L.J. 1, 17 (1942) ("[W]e must recognize that our Indian law originated, and can still be most
clearly grasped, as a branch of international law ... ").
135. M.F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (1926). Fifteenth- and sixteenth-century natural law theorists, such as
Francisco Victoria, Dominic Soto, and Hefftier, held that any inhabitants that were organized into
some type of polity were entitled to sovereign status. Id. at 12-15. On the other hand, Vattel and
Blackstone concluded that lands occupied by populations that did not cultivate them were vacant
and unoccupied, and subject to acquisition by occupation. VATTEL, supra note 56, bk. I, ch. VII, §
81, at 35-36, bk. I, ch. XVIII, § 209, at 99-100; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *107-
08; accord Worcester, 31 U.S. at 579 (McLean, J., concurring) (discussing "[t]he abstract right of
every section of the human race to a reasonable portion of the soil, by which to acquire the means of
subsistence").
136. See, e.g., T.J. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 93 (1895)
(reprinted 1987) ("All territory not in the possession of states who are members of the family of
nations and subjects of International Law must be considered as technically res nullius and therefore
open to occupation. The rights of the natives are moral, not legal."); LASSA FRANCIS & LAWRENCE
OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW § 221 (2d ed. 1912) ("Only such territory can be the object of
occupation as is no State's land, whether entirely uninhabited.., or inhabited by natives whose
community is not to be considered as a State."); JOHN WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, pt. I, at
92-103 (1904) (detailing the Roman doctrine of res nullius as a means of possession through
occupation and the use of the doctrine in claims in the New World); see also Antony Anghie,
Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 24 (1999) ("In its most extreme form, positivist reasoning suggested that
relations and transactions between the European and non-European states occurred entirely outside
the realm of law.").
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acquired complete dominion over the region, and that dominion must be
recognized and respected by other European states.1 37  International law
scholars of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries developed this doctrine to
accommodate European expansionism and the assertion of European
sovereignty over non-European peoples. 38 The discovery doctrine turned on
the assumption, as Wheaton later wrote, that "the heathen nations of the other
quarters of the globe were the lawful spoil and prey of their civilized
conquerors.' ' 139 The doctrine was controversial, however, and the extreme
view of the discovery doctrine was not universally accepted even during the
early colonial period. In 1532, for instance, Francisco de Victoria advised
the Emperor of Spain that title over the lands of the New World could
lawfully be acquired only through purchase, with the aborigines' voluntary
and informed consent. 40  From this perspective, "discovery" simply regu-
lated competition among European powers and established no rights over
native inhabitants. "What the discoverer's State gained was the right, as
against other European Powers, to take the steps which were appropriate
(under international law] to the acquisition of the territory in question."'
4'
The doctrine of discovery also quickly fell into disfavor as European
powers asserted competing claims to vast regions of the globe merely as a
result of landing on or, in some cases, simply sighting, their shores. 142 Abuse
by competing colonial powers led to the erosion of the doctrine, and by the
1800s, discovery, unaccompanied by effective possession of the territory
through cession, conquest, occupation, or settlement, generally was in-
137. FRANCIS & OPPENHEIM, supra note 136, § 223 ("In the age of the discoveries, States
maintained that the fact of discovering a hitherto unknown territory was sufficient reason for
considering it as acquired .... ").
138. LINDLEY, supra note 135, at 24.
139. WHEATON, supra note 56, § 166, at 202; see also Robert T. Coulter & Steven M. Tullberg,
Indian Land Rights, in THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION 185, 190 (Sandra C. Cadwalader &
Vine Deloria, Jr. eds., 1984).
140. FRACIsCus VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE lvRE BELLI RELECTIONES 148 (Ernest Nys ed.,
John Pawley Nate trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1917) (1696).
141. LINDLEY, supra note 135, at 26. See also THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 53, at 79 (3d ed. 1874) (noting that a claim based on
discovery "was good only against those who acknowledged such right of discovery, but not against
the natives"); FRANCIS & OPPENHEIM, supra note 136, § 223 ("[D]iscovery gives to the State ... an
inchoate title; it acts as a temporary bar to the occupation by another State .... (citation omitted)).
142. Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that claims to dominion based on discovery, without
more, were often challenged by other European countries. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
543, 574-84 (1823) (discussing competing claims arising from the doctrine of discovery);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 546 (1832) ("[T]hough the discovery of one was
admitted by all to exclude the claim of any other, the extent of that discovery was the subject of
unceasing contest."). The plaintiff tribe in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia also challenged the
pretension that "a ship manned by the subjects of the king having, 'about two centuries and a half
before, sailed along the coast of the western hemisphere.., and looked upon the face of that coast
without even landing on any part of it' somehow limited the tribe's rights to the lands of Georgia.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 3-4 (1831) (statement of the case).
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sufficient to establish a title that would be recognized by other European
powers.143 Indeed, both during the colonial period and afterwards, most U.S.
lands were acquired from the Indians through cession and purchase, rather
than through either discovery or conquest.1
44
B. The Doctrine of Discovery and The Marshall Court
During the colonial period and the early constitutional era, relations
with Indian tribes were largely treated as matters of foreign relations,
governed by the constitutional treaty and war powers. Both the British and
the Continental Congress pursued relations with the Indians through
treaties. 145 Early treaties with the Cherokee and Delaware even provided for
tribal representation in Congress through nonvoting delegates, though these
provisions were never carried out. 146  The principle that Indian treaties
required formal ratification in the same manner as European treaties was
established by President Washington with the Fort Haramar Treaty of 1789,
overcoming Senate objections that treaties with aborigines did not require the
solemnities afforded to treaties with European sovereigns.
147
143. See Howard R. Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of
the United States, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 637, 651-53 (1978); LAWRENCE, supra note 136, § 92, at 144
("[l]n modem times few, if any, authorities would be prepared to say that a good title to territory
could be based by a state upon the bare fact that its navigators were the first to find the lands in
question."); FRANCIS & OPPENHEIM, supra note 136, § 294 (stating that discovery, without
effective occupation, is no longer a valid means of acquiring territory); see also Jones v. United
States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) (noting that discovery and occupation gives dominion under the
law of nations).
144. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 580 (McLean, J., concurring) ("The occupancy of [Indian] lands was
never assumed, except upon the basis of contract, and on the payment of a valuable
consideration."); COHEN, supra note 13 1, at 55 ("For all practical purposes, the Indians were treated
(during the colonial era] as sovereigns possessing full ownership rights to the lands of America.");
Berman, supra note 143, at 648 ("The historical record is quite clear that most of the lands alienated
to the United States were acquired by purchase rather than by warfare."); Felix S. Cohen, Original
Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 34-35, 45-46 (1947).
145. COHEN, supra note 131, at 57-58 (discussing treaty practices).
146. Article VI of the 1778 Delaware treaty provided:
It is further agreed on between the contracting parties should it for the future be found
conducive for the mutual interest of both parties to invite any other tribes who have
been friends to the interest of the United States, to join the present confederation, and
to form a state whereof the Delaware nation shall be the head, and have a
representation in Congress ...
Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, U.S.-Del. Nation, art. VI, 7 Stat. 13, 14. Article XII of
the Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokee Nation also gave the tribe a right "to send a deputy of
their choice" to Congress. Treaty with the Cherokees, Nov. 28, 1775, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, art.
XII, 7 Stat. 18, 20.
147. Washington sent the treaty to the Senate for ratification, but the Senate adopted a
resolution advising the President to execute the treaty without ratification. Washington maintained
that the Senate should give its formal advice and consent to ratification, as it did with treaties
involving European powers. The Senate did so, despite an earlier Senate committee report
concluding that formal ratification of Indian treaties was not required. I ANNALS OF CONG. 80-84
(Joseph Gales ed., 1789). See COHEN, supra note 131, at 71.
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1. Johnson v. M'Intosh.-U.S. inherent authority over Indian tribes has
its roots in the doctrine of discovery set forth by Chief Justice Marshall in the
1823 case of Johnson v. M'Intosh.14 8 The case involved a title dispute
between private land speculators and the U.S. government over former tribal
lands. 49 The litigants framed the dispute as turning on the nature of Indian
sovereignty. If Indians were full sovereigns, their initial sale to the private
land speculators was valid. If not, then the Indians' ability to alienate their
traditional lands was qualified, and the United States' title would prevail. 150
The oral argument focused largely on the international law capacity of
Indians to possess and transfer property as sovereigns. Daniel Webster
argued for the plaintiffs that the question of aboriginal sovereignty was not
presented, though he assumed that "their title by occupancy is to be
respected, as much as that of an individual.., in a civilized state." 151 Indian
authority to sell property had been recognized by various European treaties
and purchases by the United States, so the only question in the case, ac-
cording to Webster, was the ability of Indians to sell to private individuals.
15 2
The defendants, on the other hand, maintained that Indians, as aboriginal
peoples, were incapable of sovereignty. Invoking prominent international
law writers such as Vattel, Grotius, Marten, and Pufendorf in support of their
position, the defendants argued that Indians lived as nomads in a state of
nature, were not members of the general society of nations, and could not
hold title to land under any established legal authority. 53 Indians could not
be citizens of the United States because they were "destitute of the most
essential rights which belong to that character." They instead were merely
"perpetual inhabitants with diminutive rights." 154  The defendants further
contended that European discovery stripped the Indians of any land rights
148. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
149. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 52, at 29. Land speculators,
including Johnson, had purchased the lands in 1775 from the Illinois and Piankeshaw tribes at a
public auction at a British military post which was ratified by British officers. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at
550-58 (statement of the case). The tribe subsequently ceded the same lands to the United States,
who in turn sold them to M'Intosh. Id. at 593-94.
150. See id. at 572. As formulated, the case presented a difficult conceptual problem for the
Court. If the Indians were found to hold legal title to their lands, as full foreign sovereigns, the
ruling would invalidate large grants of Indian-held lands made to settlers by the British Crown
without tribal consent. It would also eliminate the U.S. government's power to control the
disposition of Indian lands, thus exposing Indian holdings to unscrupulous land speculators. On the
other hand, a ruling that the tribe did not hold title to the lands would contradict existing treaty
provisions that vowed to respect Indian property rights and potentially threaten U.S. title to large
tracts of land that had been ceded to the United States through Indian treaties. Cf Newton, supra
note 52, at 208 n.69 (describing Chief Justice Marshall's "Doctrine of Discovery" as a compromise
to satisfy these competing interests).
151. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 563 (argument for plaintiffs).
152. Id. at 562-63 (argument for plaintiffs).
153. Id. at 567 n.a, 569 n.b (argument for defendants).
154. Id. at 569 (argument for defendants).
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they previously held. 55 The sovereignty acquired by the nations of Europe
through discovery "necessarily preclude[d] the idea of any other sovereignty
existing within the same limits.
156
Chief Justice Marshall accordingly interpreted the case as presenting the
question of "the power of Indians to give, and of private individuals to
receive, a title which can be sustained in the Courts of this country."'
157
Marshall declined to embrace the defendants' extreme view of Indian non-
sovereignty. Instead, he crafted a compromise that would, to some degree,
protect both the interests of the national government and those of the tribes.
Marshall first acknowledged the Indians' sovereign right to possess their land
"and to use it according to their own discretion."' 58 Their "rights to complete
sovereignty, as independent nations," however, had been diminished by
European discovery.' 59 According to Marshall, the international law doctrine
of discovery--"that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it"'160 _
gave the first European power to discover new lands an exclusive right, as
against other European nations, to "acquir[e] the soil from the natives, and
establish[] settlements upon it.' 161 The principle was developed to resolve
territorial disputes among European powers, and discovery established "a
right with which no Europeans could interfere.' 62 Discovery rendered the
natives' title imperfect by limiting the Indians' ability to alienate their lands
to only the discovering power. 63 Indians, in other words, could sell their
lands only to the United States, and the United States had an "exclusive right
to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by
conquest."''
64
Drawing upon membership theory, Marshall elaborated that the
"excuse, if not justification," for this doctrine lay in "the character and
habits" of the Indians.' 65 The Indians were "fierce savages" who were incap-
able of being incorporated into the American polity. 66 Although ordinarily
conquest did not deprive existing inhabitants of their land rights, this rule did
not pertain where, as here, the inhabitants were "a people with whom it was
impossible to mix, and who could not be governed as a distinct society.' 67
Indians, then, did not share the property rights enjoyed by "civilized" whites.
155. Id. at 567-68 (argument for defendants).
156. Id at 568 (argument for defendants).
157. Id. at 572.
158. Id. at 574.
159. Id
160. Id
161. Id. at 573.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 574.
164. Id. at 587.
165. Id. at 589.
166. Id. at 590.
167. Id. at 590-91.
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Chief Justice Marshall concluded that however this result might offend
"the usages of civilized nations, '' 68 it was a political question that the courts
were powerless to examine. The U.S. claim to absolute title being long
recognized, Marshall held, "It is not for the courts of this country to question
the validity of that title, or to sustain one which is incompatible with it."
169
Chief Justice Marshall did not expressly cite any international law
authorities. In fact, his opinion is nearly devoid of citation support. His
invocation of the doctrine of discovery is also problematic from an
international law perspective. As noted above, the discovery doctrine had
fallen into disfavor, even among European powers, by the time Marshall
wrote.1 70 The opinion appears motivated more out of a sense of necessity
than an effort to accurately represent international law. The Indians' dif-
ferential treatment, Marshall reasoned, resulted from "inevitable necessity"
171
and the "superior genius" of European society.17 2 The alternative to enforc-
ing European claims over them had been to "abandon[] the country" and
"leave [it] ... a wilderness."'1 73 The Court, in fact, was simply enforcing the
de facto situation:
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an
inhabited country into conquest may appear, if the principle has been
asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has
been acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass of
the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and
cannot be questioned. So, too, with respect to the concomitant
principle, that the Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as
occupants, to be protected... but to be deemed incapable of
transferring the absolute title to others. However this restriction may
be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations, yet,
if it be indispensible to that system under which the country has been
settled, ... it may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and certainly
cannot be rejected by courts of justice.
1 74
The Chief Justice's opinion contained an internal ambiguity regarding
Indian sovereignty that played out throughout the Marshall trilogy. It is
unclear in M'Intosh whether Marshall intended to place absolute sovereign
title in the United States over all Indian lands. Marshall repeatedly stated
that discovery gave an "exclusive right to extinguish" Indian title to the
168. Id. at 591.
169. Id. at 589; see also id. at 591-92.
170. Furthermore, the United States had acquired most of its claim to U.S. lands through
purchase, not discovery or conquest. See sources cited supra note 144.
171. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 590.
172. Id. at 573.
173. Id. at 590.
174. Id at 591-92.
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discovering power. 175 The opinion is ambiguous, however, as to the means
of extinguishing title. Marshall frequently describes the right as an
"exclusive right to purchase" Indian lands, precluding purchase by other
European nations or private individuals. 176  Under this approach, Indians
remained "the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim
to retain possession of it."'177 Their sovereignty was diminished only in the
sense that if they chose to alienate the property, they could sell only to the
discovering power. This interpretation would be consistent with Victoria's
view that discovery at most created a preemptive right against other
European powers. 178
Chief Justice Marshall also maintained, however, that discovery gave
the European power "absolute," "exclusive title," "ultimate dominion," and
"a right to such a degree of sovereignty, as the circumstances of the people
would allow them to exercise."'' 79 He claimed that discovering powers had
consistently exercised "a power to grant the soil, while yet in the possession
of the natives."' 180  These passages suggest that discovery gave the United
States sovereign authority over the Indians without Indian consent, with the
Indians' right to occupancy existing solely as a matter of grace and power.
At any rate, as Professor Berman has observed, "the ambiguity of the Court's
reasoning in Johnson on the nature of aboriginal rights was fundamental and
extreme."
' 181
M'Intosh established that U.S. authority over tribes, or at least the
United States' exclusive right to acquire Indian property, originated from two
sources: colonial prerogatives deriving from discovery, and the nature of
Indians as savages and incomplete sovereigns. Neither of these sources was
based on the text of the Constitution. Instead, the U.S. powers resulting from
discovery and the Indians' aboriginal status were original, inherent powers,
arising from international law. By deriving U.S. authority over the Indians
from an extraconstitutional source and suggesting that Congress's exercise of
the power was inappropriate for judicial review, Johnson v. M'Intosh laid the
groundwork for the doctrine of inherent powers to come.
175. See, e.g., id. at 585, 587, 592.
176. Id. at 585 (emphasis added); see also id. at 587 (noting that discovery gives the right to
acquire through "purchase or by conquest"); Berman, supra note 143, at 645-46. Marshall himself
appeared to believe that most Indian lands were acquired by conquest. See M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at
589-90 (stating that European countries obtained title to land by conquest and maintained the claim
by force). Later cases from the Marshall era also suggest that the Chief Justice may not have
intended to give the United States absolute title but only "the exclusive right of purchasing such
lands as the natives were willing to sell." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544, 545
(1832); see also Newton, supra note 52, at 208, 209 & n.70.
177. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574.
178. VICTORIA, supra note 140.
179. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 587.
180. Id. at 574, 576, 592.
181. Berman, supra note 143, at 659.
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2. The Cherokee Cases.-The two competing views of Indian
sovereignty and U.S. power encompassed by the M'Intosh decision were
further elaborated in the other two cases of the Marshall trilogy: the
Cherokee cases of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia'82 and Worcester v.
Georgia.183 Cherokee Nation emphasized the view of Indians as dependent
subjects, while Worcester stressed their independent status as separate
sovereigns. The cases arose from an acrimonious conflict between the
Cherokee Nation, which numbered among the "Five Civilized Tribes,"'
184
and white citizens of Georgia, who sought the Cherokee's expulsion from the
State. 185 In the late 1820s the Georgia legislature took matters into its own
hands, by invalidating all Cherokee laws and extending Georgia's
jurisdiction over the Cherokee territory. 186  By the time Cherokee Nation
came to the Court, the Governor of Georgia had seized gold mines in the
Cherokee territory by force.' 87 Georgia enforced its criminal laws against a
Cherokee in Indian territory, and the Georgia legislature ordered the Indian
hanged, in defiance of a writ of error to the U.S. Supreme Court. 188 Georgia
invoked sovereign immunity in the litigation and refused to appear before the
Court in either case. 189
182. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
183. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
184. The Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole Tribes of the Southeastern U.S.
comprised the so-called "Five Civilized Tribes," who, together with the Pueblo, were viewed as
having more advanced societies and being more capable of living compatibly with Western society
than other nomadic, pagan tribes. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 52, at
13. The Cherokee embraced early U.S. efforts to domesticate the Indian tribes, including adopting
an agrarian lifestyle and developing a system of education, a government of separated powers, and a
constitution modeled on that of the United States. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 6 (statement of the
case); id. at 21 (noting that the Cherokee Nation government "must be classed among the most
approved forms of civil government"); Worcester, 31 U.S. at 581, 587-88 (McLean, J., concurring)
(contrasting the Cherokee with other "savage" tribes). See generally RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE
AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT (1975).
185. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 9. Georgia's 1802 cession of its western territory to the
United States was conditioned on a promise that the U.S. government would extinguish Indian title
within Georgia, through reasonable and peaceful means, as soon as possible. 28 Am. St. Papers,
Public Lands vol. 1, 7th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1802); see also Worcester, 31 U.S. at 586-87
(McLean, J., concurring). The Cherokee Nation held their lands by treaty, however, and had little
interest in accepting the United States' offers of voluntary removal to western lands. PRUCHA,
supra note 130, at 227-28; Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and
Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 503 (1969).
186. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 7-8 (statement of the case). The State intended to distribute
the Cherokee lands by lottery to the people of Georgia. Id. at 13 (statement of the case).
187. Id. at 14 (statement of the case).
188. Id. at 12-13 (statement of the case); see also Burke, supra note 185, at 513.
189. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 14; Burke, supra note 185, at 513. The Cherokee sought
support from the federal government, but the Jackson administration, which was a strong proponent
of the Indians' segregation and western removal, informed them that the President "ha[d] no power
to protect them against the laws of Georgia," Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 9, and local federal troops
indicated that they would cooperate with Georgia's enforcement efforts. Id. at 10; see also GRANT
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Cherokee Nation involved a direct suit by the tribe for injunctive relief
against Georgia's actions. The case presented the threshold question of
whether Indian tribes constituted "foreign states" within the meaning of the
Court's original Article III jurisdiction. 190 The Cherokee alleged that indi-
vidual Indians were aliens, 191 and that the tribe was entitled to sue in federal
court as a "sovereign and independent state[]; possessing both the exclusive
right to [its] territory, and the exclusive right of self-government within that
territory., 192 The tribe contended that U.S. statutes and treaties recognized
the tribe's sovereign status.'
93
The Court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds. In an "Opinion
for the court" which only Justice McLean joined, 194 Chief Justice Marshall
found that while the Cherokee had the character of "a state, as a distinct
political society,"'1 95 the tribe was "not a foreign state" within the meaning of
Article III, and thus could not sue in U.S. courts. 196 Marshall invoked the
narrow interpretation of the discovery doctrine, that the Indians held an
"unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be
extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government."' 197 The tribe nev-
ertheless resided "within the jurisdictional limits of the United States" and its
territory "compose[d] a part of the United States."'98  Thus, they were a
"domestic dependent nation[]" occupying "a territory to which we assert a
title independent of their will." 199 Marshall likened the Indians' relation to
the United States as "that of a ward to his guardian. 200  Indeed, the tribes
FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL 231-32 (1932) (discussing Jackson's refusal to provide federal
support for the Cherokee tribe in Georgia). The tribe instead sought relief from the United States
Supreme Court at the urging of Daniel Webster and other Jackson opponents. G. EDWARD WHITE,
THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 717 (1988).
190. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases... between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2
(permitting the Court to exert original jurisdiction over cases in which a state is a party).
191. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16.
192. Id. at 4 (statement of the case). The tribe's pleading stated that the Cherokee Nation was a
"a foreign state, not owing allegiance to the United States, nor to any state of this Union, nor to any
prince, potentate or state, other than their own." 1d. at 3 (statement of the case) (quotations omitted).
193. Id. at 5, 7 (statement of the case).
194. Marshall wrote on behalf of himself and Justice McLean. Justices Johnson and Baldwin
concurred in the judgment. Justices Thompson and Story dissented, and Justice Duval did not
participate. WHITE, supra note 189, at 724.
195. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16 ("[The Cherokee] have been uniformly treated as a state,
from the settlement of our country. The numerous treaties made with them by the United States,
recognise them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being
responsible in their political character for any violation of their engagements, or for any aggression
committed on the citizens of the United States, by any individual of their community .... The acts
of our government plainly recognise the Cherokee nation as a state ... .
196. Id. at 20.
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were "so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United
States, that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political
connection with them [by a foreign state] would be considered... an act of
hostility. 2 °1 Without explaining how the United States had acquired sover-
eignty over their lands, Marshall concluded that the physical presence of the
Indians within U.S. borders precluded their status as a "foreign state."202 He
also contended that the Commerce Clause, in distinguishing between Indians
and foreign states, made clear that the tribes were not foreign sovereigns
within the meaning of the Constitution. °f Thus, the federal courts were
unavailable to rectify wrongs against the tribes.0 4
The decision in Cherokee Nation crippled the ability of tribes to sue in
U.S. courts, and placed Indians-like free blacks under Dred Scott2°5-in a
"no-man's land" status of being neither citizens of the United States nor
aliens of a sovereign foreign state. Marshall's characterization of the federal-
Indian relationship as that of guardian and ward, based on Indian presence
within U.S. borders, would also later be used to justify expansive federal
power.
206
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion veiled a sharp disagreement among
members of the Court over the legal capacity of Indians that presaged the
Court's division over the legal status of free blacks and their ability to sue
that appeared in Dred Scott two decades later. The concurring Justices,
Johnson and Baldwin, were overtly hostile to the Indians' claim.20 7 Justice
Johnson adopted membership theories to stress the extreme non-sovereign
view of Indians. Indians were "hunter horde[s], '08 who occupied their lands
purely as a matter of grace.20 9 "[H]ow then can they be said to be recognised
as a member of the community of nations?" Justice Johnson asked.210
201. Id. at 17-18.
202. Id. at 18.
203. Id. at 18-19.
204. Id. at 20 ("If it be true, that the Cherokee nation have rights, this is not the tribunal in
which those rights are to be asserted. If it be true, that wrongs have been inflicted, and that still
greater are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the past or prevent the
future.").
205. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
206. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382-84 (1886) (upholding federal
criminal jurisdiction over Indian tribes); United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846)
(upholding federal criminal jurisdiction over a crime by a U.S. citizen who had been accepted as a
member of the Cherokee Tribe).
207. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 21-22 (Johnson, J., concurring); id. at 32-33 (Baldwin, J.,
concurring). Justice Baldwin made express his purpose of avoiding recognizing individual Indians
as "aliens, capable of suing in the Circuit Courts." Id. at 32 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
208. Id. at 28 (Johnson, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 24 (Johnson, J., concurring).
210. Id. (Johnson, J., concurring).
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"Would any nation on earth treat with them as such? ' 211 He concluded that
the Constitution underscored the Indians' aboriginal status:
I think it very clear that the constitution neither speaks of them as
states or foreign states, but as just what they were, Indian tribes...
which the law of nations would regard as nothing more than
wandering hordes, held together only by ties of blood and habit, and
having neither laws or government, beyond what is required in a
savage state.212
Both Justices Baldwin and Johnson assumed the United States enjoyed
absolute sovereignty over the tribes. Justice Baldwin rejected the claim that
discovery only established rights among Europeans, finding that the
M'Intosh opinion on this point was "too explicit to be misunderstood.2 13
Foreshadowing the Court's later cases involving both Indians and territories,
Baldwin portrayed the Territory Clause of the Constitution as giving
Congress plenary power over all Indians within U.S. borders. According to
Baldwin, the "territory" in this clause referred "to the formation of a govern-
ment whose laws and process were in force within its whole extent, without a
saving of Indian jurisdiction. 21 a The Clause, he reasoned, "leaves the juris-
diction and sovereignty of the Indian tribes wholly out of the question. The
power given... is of the most plenary kind.,
215
In a dissent solicited by the Chief Justice,216 Justices Thompson and
Story took the opposite view, contending that the Indian tribes were full
foreign states capable of invoking the Court's original jurisdiction. Justice
Thompson argued that international law recognized the ability of less power-
ful sovereigns to seek the protection of another,2 7 and that the Indians were
"foreign states" both within the meaning of international law and the
218Constitution. The Indians had always enjoyed "exclusive dominion" and
"self-government" over their lands, 2'9 and if they are foreign states for the
purposes of entering treaties with the United States, they should be foreign
states for the purposes of enforcing the treaty terms.220  He rejected the
211. Id. (Johnson, J., concurring).
212. Id. at 27-28 (Johnson, J., concurring).
213. Id. at 49 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
214. Id. at 44 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
215. Id. (Baldwin, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
216. Marshall requested that Thompson write the dissent, in response to the Johnson and
Baldwin opinions. WHITE, supra note 189, at 730.
217. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 53 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (citing VATrEL, supra note 56,
bk. I, ch. I, §§ 4-8, at 2-3).
218. Id. at 53-56, 80 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 53-55 (Thompson, J., dissenting) ("[T]he principle is universally admitted, that this
occupancy belongs to them as a matter of right, and not by mere indulgence. They cannot be
disturbed in the enjoyment of it, or deprived of it, without their free consent .....
220. Id. at 58-59 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
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suggestion that Indians could be neither citizens nor aliens. "[I]f not citizens,
they must be aliens or foreigners ....
The Cherokee Nation case thus reflected a stark divide between the
concurring Justices, who believed that Indians lacked sovereignty and were
subject to absolute United States authority, 222 and the dissenters, who viewed
tribes as full sovereigns over whom the United States exercised no inherent
authority and with whom relations should be conducted by treaty.223 The
opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, which characterized the Indians as
"domestic dependent nations," straddled these positions.
224
3. Worcester v. Georgia.-Cherokee Nation ended challenges by the
tribe to Georgia's policies, but the merits of the claim returned to the Court
the following term in Worcester v. Georgia.225 The plaintiffs in error,
Samuel Worcester and Elizur Butler, were missionaries sent by the federal
government to teach Christianity to the Cherokee Nation.2 6 The State of
Georgia prosecuted them for violating a state law that prohibited whites from
residing in Cherokee territory without a state license and sentenced them to
four years hard labor.227 The missionaries declined an offer of pardon and
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the federal rights of the
Cherokee Nation invalidated the Georgia statute. 228 While Cherokee Nation
had addressed the ability of the tribe to sue in U.S. courts as a foreign
sovereign, Worcester presented an alternative formulation, claiming that "a
citizen of the United States has been deprived of his liberty" by the state of
Georgia.2 9 The case presented a struggle between state and national author-
ity over the Indian tribes. Lacking a jurisdictional escape route, the Court
adjudicated the merits of the Indians' rights despite the absence of any tribal
member as a party.
Writing again for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall significantly
modified the view that he set forth in M'Intosh and Cherokee Nation.
Marshall offered a resounding affirmation of Indian sovereignty: "America,
separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people,
divided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest of the
world, having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their
own laws." 230 "The Indian nations," the Chief Justice wrote, "had always
221. Id. at 66 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 27-28 (Johnson, J., concurring); id at 47-48 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
223. Id. at 80 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 17.
225. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
226. Id. at 528-29 (statement of the case).
227. Id. at 529, 532 (statement of the case).
228. Id. at 535 (argument for petitioner).
229. Id. at 595-96 (McLean, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 542-43.
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been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining
their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from
time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible
power, which excluded them from intercourse with any. other European
potentate .... ,,23
Marshall ridiculed the "extravagant and absurd idea" that discovery
gave European states any power over the preexisting tribes.232 Instead, the
doctrine of discovery
was an exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition
among those who had agreed to it; not one which could annul the
previous rights of those who had not agreed to it. It regulated the right
given by discovery among the European discoverers; but could not
affect the rights of those already in possession ... as aboriginal
occupants.233
Discovery, and the colonial charters that ensued, simply gave "the exclusive
right of purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to sell. 234 The
Chief Justice thus affirmed the narrow reading of M'Intosh, that discovery
simply resolved rights between Europeans,235 and it did not alter the rights of
native tribes who had not consented.236
Marshall found that both Great Britain and the United States had always
treated the Indians as sovereigns and had never attempted to interfere with
internal Indian affairs.237 Marshall emphasized that relations with Indians
were the exclusive province of the national government, and were conducted
in the same manner as all other foreign relations. "The Constitution," he
reasoned, "by declaring treaties... to be the supreme law of the land, has
adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and
consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable of
making treaties. 238 Citing Vattel, Marshall observed that under the law of
nations, the acceptance by a weaker state of a stronger state's protection did
not surrender the weaker power's independence and right to self-government
or terminate its existence as a state.239 Thus, Indian sovereignty barred any
231. Id. at 559.
232. Id. at 544.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 545; see also id. at 546 ("[Royal charters] asserted a title against Europeans only,
and were considered as blank paper so far as the rights of the natives were concerned.").
235. Id. at 543.
236. Id. at 544.
237. Id. at 547-49.
238. Id. at 559. See also id. at 559-60 ("The words 'treaty' and 'nation' ... [have been
applied] to Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to
all in the same sense.").
239. Id at 561.
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intervention into Cherokee affairs by the State of Georgia and required
judgment for the plaintiffs.
240
Marshall could have resolved the case by recognizing an exclusive
federal power to regulate Indian affairs that preempted any state interference.
His conclusion that Georgia's laws were invalid, however, rested not on the
scope of federal power, but primarily on the sovereign independence of the
Cherokee tribe from both the United States and Georgia.
The Cherokee cases are important for introducing the Constitution into
the Marshall Court's analysis of federal-Indian relations. While M'Intosh
focused exclusively on the international law basis for U.S. rights of purchase,
Cherokee Nation suggested that U.S. relations with the Indians were
governed by the Constitution: Because tribes did not constitute "foreign
states" within the meaning of the Constitution, they could not sue in federal
241court. Worcester further established that the Constitution barred states
from interfering with Indian relations and that the relationship between the
federal government and the Indians was governed by the War, Treaty, and
Commerce Clauses, which "comprehend all that is required for the regulation
of our intercourse with the Indians. 242 To the extent the government en-
joyed extraconstitutional authority over the tribes, that power was limited to
an exclusive power of consensual purchase. It did not include authority to
intervene in internal Indian affairs.243
Thus, by the time of the decision in Worcester, two sets of legal
doctrines shaped U.S.-Indian relations: international law doctrines regarding
Indian sovereignty and discovery; and constitutional doctrines regarding
federalism and the national government's enumerated powers. Chief Justice
Marshall did not explore the relationship between these two regimes, but his
decision in Worcester suggested that the enumerated constitutional clauses
encompassed the totality of federal power over the Indians. The decisions in
the Marshall trilogy established the ambiguous position of the Indians as
extraconstitutional quasi-sovereigns, subject to U.S. foreign relations powers,
who were also domestic dependents of the United States. It would be
Marshall's successor, Chief Justice Taney, who would first transform the
Marshall Court's delicate compromise between U.S. and Indian sovereignty
into a doctrine of inherent plenary power.
The decision in Worcester provoked what Supreme Court historian
Charles Warren declared to be "the most serious crisis in the history of the
240. Id. ("The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory,... in
which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to
enter ... ").
241. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20.
242. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
243. Id.; accord Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835) (stating that the
Indian "right of occupancy is considered as sacred as the fee simple of the whites").
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Court.",244 Georgia refused to release the missionaries, and President Jackson
took no steps to enforce the Court's order.245 The Governor of Georgia ulti-
mately pardoned the missionaries under pressure from Jackson supporters
who wished to avoid embarrassing the President.246 In 1838, however, the
federal government resolved the conflict with Georgia by forcibly removing
12,000 Cherokees west of the Mississippi pursuant to a treaty hastily
negotiated with a faction of the tribe. 47 The forced removal of the Cherokee
Nation stood as testament to the executive branch's view of federal power
over the Indians. It was perhaps an early warning that in a rapidly growing
and land-hungry nation, the Court's solicitous view of Indian sovereignty
would be short-lived.
C. The Taney Court and U.S. Criminal Jurisdiction
Federal regulation of crimes committed by Indians in Indian country
248
became an important battleground for the inherent powers doctrine. Through
the first half of the nineteenth century, federal criminal legislation, like
commercial legislation, reflected the premise that Congress could regulate
interactions between whites and Indians, but that tribes retained control over
conduct between Indians in Indian territory. Until 1871, statutes and treaties
generally preserved tribal jurisdiction over even the most serious crimes if
both the perpetrator and the victim were Indians.249
In 1817, Congress adopted legislation extending U.S. criminal laws to
Indians who committed crimes against non-Indians within Indian territory.25°
244. 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 189 (1923).
245. Jackson was attributed with stating, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him
enforce it." Id. at 219; COHEN, supra note 131, at 83 & n.173. It is unclear, however, whether
Jackson's inaction was the result of active defiance of the Court or procedural difficulties with
achieving compliance. 2 WARREN, supra note 244, at 217-25.
246. See Burke, supra note 185, at 530 (explaining that Butler and Worcester eventually
dropped their case in exchange for the Governor's pardon, yielding to pressure from Jacksonians
and their own attorneys, who sought to present a united front against the now more important issue
of nullification); WHITE, supra note 189, at 737-38.
247. Treaty with the Cherokees, Dec. 29, 1835, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 478. Four
thousand Cherokees died during the trek. FOREMAN, supra note 189, at 312 n.3 1.
248. "Indian country" was defined in the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act as those lands in the
United States, not within any state or the territory of Arkansas, "to which Indian title [had] not been
extinguished." Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 1, 4 Stat. 729, repealed by Rev. Stat. § 5596 (1874).
See COHEN, supra note 131, at 30-31.
249. Robert N. Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: The
Historical Perspective, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 951, 957-62 (1975) (discussing jurisdiction during the
treaty period). The first trade and intercourse act of 1790 established federal criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians who committed crimes within Indian boundaries, while a 1796 act introduced
complementary federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians who committed certain federal crimes
outside of tribal boundaries. Id. at 958-59 (discussing early criminal legislation).
250. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, §§ 1-2, 3 Stat. 383 (1817), repealed by Act of June 30, 1834,
§ 29, 4 Stat. 729, 734 (1834). Section One of the Act provided for general federal criminal
jurisdiction over crimes in Indian territories committed by "any Indian, or other person," but Section
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The limits of congressional power over the tribes were tested in the 1834
circuit court case of United States v. Bailey, which challenged the 1817 Act
as unconstitutional to the extent that it authorized the United States to try
crimes committed between whites in Indian territory within a state.25" The
case considered first, whether Congress's Commerce Clause authority
extended to the regulation of Indian crimes, and, if so, whether that authority
authorized federal regulation of crimes between whites in Indian territories
that were located within a state.
Justice McLean, sitting as circuit judge, struck down the Act of 1817 in
a rare application of stringent enumerated powers analysis to the federal
Indian authority. 52 McLean rejected the possibility that the legislation could
be upheld under the United States' authority over the territories, which he
held did not extend to Indian country within the states.25 ' He then rejected
the Indian Commerce Clause as a basis for congressional authority, finding
that the crime charged bore no relation to trade with the Indians. 4 The case
arose as the debate over the scope of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Clauses was becoming entangled in the slavery debate,2 55 and Justice
McLean expressed concern about the implications of the proposed
construction of the Indian Commerce Clause:
Under the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, there is
undoubtedly a wide scope for legislation ....
... But may [Congress] by reason of this special power, assume a
general jurisdiction and prescribe for the punishment of all offences?
If this may be done under the power to regulate commerce with the
Indian tribes, why may it not be done in all other cases, where a
limited power is exercised by congress to effectuate a special object?
Congress have [sic] power to regulate commerce among the several
states; and if the same power, given in the same words, in relation to
the Indians, may be exercised as contended, why may not congress
legislate on crimes for the states generally? ... If this be a
constitutional provision, the jurisdiction by congress for the
Two provided that federal jurisdiction did not extend to crimes "by one Indian against another,
within any Indian Boundary." Id. See Clinton, supra note 249, at 959 (discussing the provisions of
the Act). An 1854 criminal statute withdrew federal jurisdiction over crimes by Indians against
whites who had been punished by the tribe. COHEN, supra note 131, at 126.
251. United States v. Bailey, 24 F. Cas. 937 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1834) (No. 14,495).
252. Id. at 938 ("That the federal government is one of limited powers, is a principle so obvious
as not to admit of controversy .... [T]he federal government can exercise no powers beyond those
which are expressly delegated to it.").
253. Id. at 940 (rejecting the proposition that "congress may exercise the same general and
exclusive jurisdiction over the Cherokee country [in Tennessee] as over a territory of the United
States"); see also id at 939 (arguing that the power of Congress over Indian territory within a state
cannot extend beyond the regulation of commerce).
254. Id. at 940.
255. See infra Part IV(C-D) (discussing antebellum efforts to isolate federal power over
commerce and immigration from state powers over slavery).
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punishment of offences in the Indian country, within the boundaries of
any state, is without limit.
256
Finally, Justice McLean rejected the government's claim that necessity
justified its jurisdiction:
It is argued that unless the defendant can be tried under the act of
congress, there is no law by which he can be punished. If on this
ground the federal government may exercise jurisdiction, where shall
its powers be limited? The constitution is no longer the guide, when
the government acts from the law of necessity .... If the state has no
jurisdiction, or has failed to exercise it, it does not follow that the
federal government has a general and unlimited jurisdiction over the
territory; for its powers are delegated, and cannot be assumed to
supply any defect of power on the part of the state.
257
The Commerce Clause eventually would be used to uphold a range of leg-
islation relating to the Indians, including early non-intercourse laws barring
whites from interacting with Indians and purchasing Indian lands, and later
restrictions on liquor sales to Indians.258 But according to Justice McLean,
the commerce power did not support enactment of a general criminal code
over the Indians. A similar question would soon be considered by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Rogers.
1. United States v. Rogers.-In 1834, Congress revised U.S. criminal
jurisdiction over the Indians, due in part to concerns over the 1817 Act's
legality.2 5 9  The 1834 Act, which Congress adopted under the Indian
Commerce and Territory Clauses, 260 recognized U.S. criminal jurisdiction
over all crimes committed in Indian country except "crimes committed by
one Indian against the person or property of another Indian.",26' The
provision was consistent with numerous treaty requirements that offenders in
crimes between Indians and non-Indians be relinquished to the United
States.262
256. Bailey, 24 F. Cas. at 938, 940.
257. Id. at 939. Because the crime involved whites and occurred within a state, McLean left
open the possibility that the state might have jurisdiction over the crime.
258. United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 416-18 (1865) (finding that Congress has
the power under the Indian Commerce Clause to regulate liquor sales to Indians within a state);
accord United States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 195 (1876) (agreeing with
Holliday).
259. The House Report read the 1817 Act as extending federal criminal laws "to all persons in
the Indian country, without exception," and stated, "[I]t is not perceived that we can with any justice
or propriety extend our laws to offences committed by Indians against Indians, at any place within
their own limits." H.R. REP. No. 23-474, at 13 (1834).
260. Id. at 10 (invoking "[t]he constitutional power 'to regulate commerce with the Indian
tribes,' and 'to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory of the United
States"').
261. Act of June 30, 1834, § 25, 4 Stat. 729, 733 (1834).
262. See COHEN, supra note 131, at 60-61 nn.85-87.
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In 1845, William Rogers, a white man who had lived with the Cherokee
Nation for a decade and was recognized as a member by the tribe, was
indicted under the 1834 Act in the federal district court of Arkansas for
murdering another Cherokee.263 The crime had occurred in Indian country,
on lands over which the tribe possessed nearly exclusive internal jurisdiction
by treaty.264 Rogers objected to federal jurisdiction on the grounds that both
he and the victim were citizens of the Cherokee Nation.265 The U.S. district
attorney argued in opposition that a U.S. citizen could neither relinquish his
citizenship nor become a citizen of an Indian tribe without federal
authorization.266 Rogers drowned in an attempt to escape from prison before
the Supreme Court heard his case, but the Court did not learn of his death
and considered the case without anyone appearing on Rogers's behalf.
267
Rogers involved an issue of statutory and treaty interpretation; no issue
was presented regarding Congress's underlying authority to legislate over the
tribes.268 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Taney opened his opinion for the Court
by asserting that Congress exercised authority over the Indian tribes as a
result of discovery, which placed Indian lands under U.S. control:
The country in which the crime is charged to have been committed is a
part of the territory of the United States, and not within the limits of
any particular State. It is true that it is occupied by the tribe of
Cherokee Indians. But it has been assigned to them by the United
States, ... and they hold and occupy it with the assent of the United
States, and under their authority. The native tribes who were found on
this continent at the time of its discovery have never been
acknowledged or treated as independent nations by the European
governments, nor regarded as the owners of the territories they
respectively occupied. On the contrary, the whole continent was
divided and parceled out, and granted by the governments of Europe
as if it had been vacant and unoccupied land, and the Indians
continually held to be, and treated as, subject to their dominion and
control.269
Chief Justice Taney thus revived the extreme version of the discovery
doctrine elaborated in M'Intosh.270 Taney offered no support for his position,
which echoed Johnson's and Baldwin's concurrences in Cherokee Nation
and patently contradicted Worcester. Indeed, the passage would also be
263. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 570-71 (1846).
264. See The Treaty of New Echota, art. 5 (1835), cited in Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573 (securing to
the tribe the right of internal governance, so long as its laws were consistent with the Constitution).
265. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 571.
266. Id. at 569 (argument for petitioner).
267. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 52, at 40.
268. Record at 4-7, Rogers (No. 114).
269. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 571-72.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 175-81.
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contradicted by Chief Justice Taney's later portrayal of Indian tribes in Dred
Scott as "a free and independent people" who had "always been treated as
foreigners not living under our Government" and who enjoyed the right to
occupy their lands "as long as [the Indians] thought proper.
' 271
The fact that Rogers's crime occurred in Cherokee territory was
irrelevant. Chief Justice Taney carved out a much broader authority for the
United States over Indians in the territories than Congress had ever claimed:
[W]e think it too firmly and clearly established to admit of dispute,
that the Indian tribes residing within the territorial limits of the United
States are subject to their authority, and where the country occupied
by them is not within the limits of one of the states, Congress may by
law punish any offence committed there, no matter whether the
offender be a white man or an Indian.
272
In short, discovery, and the resulting presence of the tribe within U.S. boun-
daries, gave Congress plenary authority to legislate a criminal code for the
Indians. Rogers's putative status as an Indian was accordingly irrelevant.
Where did this power to regulate intra-tribal conduct come from?
Taney's opinion did not mention the Constitution or make any effort to tie
federal power over the tribes to the treaty power, the Commerce Clause, or
any other enumerated constitutional power. Although some commentators
have interpreted Rogers as relying on the Article IV Territory Clause, the
Chief Justice did not invoke the provision.273 His sole justification for the
power was the extraconstitutional, inherent power arising from discovery, the
Indians' resulting presence within U.S. borders, and the Indians' status as an
"unfortunate race. 2 74  For Taney, the putative strict constructionist who
would hold that Congress lacked authority to outlaw slavery in Dred Scott
and who denied the existence of inherent wartime powers in Ex parte
Merryman,275 the claim of congressional power here was breathtaking.
271. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403-04 (1857). Chief Justice Taney asserted
that
neither the English nor colonial Governments claimed or exercised any dominion over
the tribe or nation by whom it was occupied, nor claimed the right to the possession of
the territory, until the tribe or nation consented to cede it .... Treaties have been
negotiated with them, and their alliance sought for in war; and the people who
compose these Indian political communities have always been treated as foreigners not
living under our Government.
Id. at 404.
272. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572 (emphasis added).
273. Newton, supra note 52, at 210 & n.73. It is unclear whether, at this point, Taney was of
the opinion that he asserted in Dred Scott that the Territory Clause only applied to the original
territories of the United States. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 432.
274. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 571.
275. In his Merryman opinion, Taney claimed:
Nor can any argument [that the President may suspend habeas corpus] be drawn from
the nature of sovereignty, or the necessity of government, for self-defense in times of
tumult and danger. The government of the United States is one of delegated and
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Chief Justice Taney then introduced a second cornerstone of the
inherent powers doctrine-a presumption against judicial review. Taney
noted that the United States presumably "exercised its power over" the tribes
"in the spirit of humanity and justice, '276 but that such benevolence was not
required. Even if Congress's actions were not in the interests of the tribe, he
reasoned, those actions were "a question for the law-making and political
department, and not for the judicial ....
Thus Chief Justice Taney offered a near-complete statement of the
inherent powers doctrine. Congress enjoyed inherent power, whose source
lay in the Indians' presence within U.S. borders and the international law
doctrines of colonial prerogative and aboriginal status, which treated Indian
lands as "vacant." Moreover, the question of U.S. authority vis-a-vis the
Indians was political and not a proper subject for judicial inquiry.
Rogers signaled the introduction, not the triumph, of the inherent
powers doctrine over Indian tribes. Most of the discussion was dicta, and
later decisions of the Taney Court reasserted the Indian sovereignty vision of
federal-tribal relations.278 Nevertheless, national political forces seeking to
extend U.S. criminal jurisdiction to all crimes in Indian country quickly
embraced the decision. In April 1846, President Polk proposed the extension
of federal jurisdiction to all Indians guilty of murder and similar felonies.
279
A few months later, a Senate Report observed that the Supreme Court had
"conclusive[ly]" established that the United States had "originalpower ... to
subject the Indian tribes within the limits of their sovereignty to any system
of laws having for their object the prevention or punishment of crime[s]. 28°
Legislation was introduced in Congress that would have accomplished this
goal, but was successfully opposed, for the time being, by the Cherokee and
others.281
limited powers; it derives its existence and authority altogether from the constitution,
and neither of its branches... can exercise any of the powers of government beyond
those specified and granted ....
ExParte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144,149 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
276. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 571.
277. Id. at 572.
278. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 403-04; cf. Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362, 374 (1850) ("The
Cherokees are in many respects a foreign and independent nation. They are governed by their own
laws and officers, chosen by themselves. And though in a state of pupilage, and under the
guardianship of the United States, this government has delegated no power to the courts of this
District to arrest the public representatives or agents of Indian Nations .... ).
279. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 666 (1846), quoted in WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 52, at 37.
280. S. REP. No. 29-461, at 2 (1846) (citing Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572).
281. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 1147 (1846). See also WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 52, at 37-38 (discussing Cherokee Principal Chief Ross's successful
appeal to the Senate not to extend U.S. criminal laws over Indian land).
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D. The End of the Treaty Era
Respect for Indian sovereignty, and the corresponding recognition of
limited national power, continued to dominate policy over the Indians in the
Civil War and early Reconstruction period. Congress continued to view
Indians as distinct nations with whom the United States dealt through trea-
ties, and no major statutory or treaty constraints were imposed on tribes prior
to the mid-1800s. 282  Membership theories were used at this point to limit
both the Indians' ability to become citizens and the United States' ability to
assert jurisdiction over them. The debates over the Civil Rights Act of
1866283 and the Fourteenth Amendment284 portrayed Indians as excluded
from U.S. citizenship based on the tribes' status as separate, self-governing
sovereigns and non-members in the U.S. polity. During the debates, Senator
Trumbull advocated the exclusion of "Indians not taxed" from the Civil
Rights Act's citizenship provisions:
Of course we cannot declare the wild Indians who do not recognize
the Government of the United States at all, who are not subject to our
laws, with whom we make treaties, who have their own regulations,
whom we do not pretend to interfere with or punish for the
commission of crimes one upon the other, to be the subjects of the
285United States in the sense of being citizens.
A Senate Judiciary Committee report on the impact of the Fourteenth
Amendment on Indian tribes likewise concluded that Indians who retained
tribal status were not subject to U.S. jurisdiction within the meaning of the
Amendment's citizenship provisions. 86 A review of U.S. treaties, statutes,
and judicial decisions, the report observed, established "that Congress has
never regarded the Indian tribes as subject to the municipal jurisdiction of the
United States.2 87 The United States had asserted only such jurisdiction over
Indians as it asserted over the alien members of any other sovereign foreign
state, and "[t]heir right of self-government, and to administer justice among
themselves ... ha[d] never been questioned. 288
282. PRUCHA, supra note 130, at 211; see also COHEN, supra note 131, at 68 ("From 1776 to
1849, all treaty limitations upon the powers of tribal self-government were related in some way to
intercourse with non-Indians."); Clinton, supra note 249, at 957 ("The later treaties continued...
earlier patterns by indicating that the tribes had complete sovereignty and jurisdiction over
intratribal crimes occurring on the reservations.").
283. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (providing "[t]hat all persons born
in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby
declared to be citizens of the United States").
284. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside.").
285. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 527 (1866).
286. S. REP. NO. 41-268 (1870).
287. Id. at 9.
288. Id. at 10. In his edition of Story's Commentaries, Judge Cooley agreed, finding that "it
would be obviously inconsistent with the semi-independent character of such a tribe, and with the
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Respect for tribal sovereignty in U.S.-Indian relations was eroding,
however. During the 1850s and 1860s, the United States substantially
increased federal power over Indian affairs through the exercise of the treaty
power. Some treaty provisions provided that "[the Indians] will submit to
and obey all laws and regulations which the United States may prescribe for
their government and conduct."289 During the Civil War, Congress gave the
President authority to abrogate U.S. treaties with tribes who allied with the
Confederacy29°-an authority that presumably was based on the war powers.
In the war's aftermath, tribes that had supported the Confederacy were
required to accept treaties relinquishing many promises previously made to
them by the federal government.291 Wars with the Sioux and other Plains
Indian tribes resulted in a series of peace treaties in 1867 and 1868 which
authorized increased federal intervention.292 Many of the treaties of this
period were obtained through fraud or duress, or negotiated with minority
factions of the tribes, and some were never ratified.293
Federal support for treaty relations with the Indians was also eroding
during this period. Resort to the treaty power was based on the recognition
of Indians as autonomous sovereigns, and federal removal policies, wars,
broken treaties, and increasing federal intrusion on internal Indian affairs
undermined this status. Thus, in 1862, Secretary of the Interior Caleb Smith
argued that Indians should not be considered "quasi-independent nations"
because "they have none of the elements of nationality; they are within the
limits of the recognized authority of the United States and must be subject to
its control. 294 The Reconstruction period was also an era of weak Presidents
and congressional ascendancy. Congress felt less obligated to engage in
treaty relations as Indian autonomy eroded, and the House of Representatives
was jealous of the treaty-making power bestowed on the Senate and
President.295
obedience they are expected to render to their tribal head, that they should be vested with the
complete rights-or, on the other hand, subjected to the full responsibilities-of American
citizens." 2 JOSEPH STORY, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARIES § 1933 at 654 (Thomas M. Cooley
ed., Little, Brown, and Co. 1873) (1833).
289. Treaty with the Klamath and Moadoc Tribes and Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians, Oct.
14, 1864, 16 Stat. 707, 709. Other provisions gave the President broad discretion to adopt "[r]ules
and regulations to protect the rights of persons and property among the Indians," to allot tribal lands
to individual Indians, or, in the most extreme cases, to provide that the tribe be dissolved and the
lands ceded to the United States. COHEN, supra note 131, at 69, 98-103.
290. Appropriations Act of July 5, 1862, ch. 135, § 1, 12 Stat. 512, 528 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
72).
291. COHEN, supra note 131, at 104.
292. Id. at 104 n.353. These included the Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867 that was at issue in
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
293. COHEN, supra note 131, at 63.
294. H.R. EXEC. DOc. NO. 37-1, 10-13 (1862).
295. George William Rice, Indian Rights: 25 US.C. § 71: The End of Indian Sovereignty or a
Self-Limitation of Contractual Ability?, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 239, 239-40 & n.24 (1977). In
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Thus, in 1871, Congress abolished the practice of treatying with Indian
tribes and provided that henceforth all relations between the United States
and the Indians would be conducted through simple legislation.296 The 1871
statute essentially stripped the Indians of any future treatying capacity,
providing that "no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe,
or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty. 297 Congress
thus asserted a unilateral authority to legislate over Indian affairs.
298
Some commentators have suggested that this change was of little
significance because the national government continued to seek tribal
consent for many congressional actions. 299  The abandonment of treaty-
making, however, terminated the primary basis for the recognition of tribal
sovereignty and thus of limited U.S. authority.300 As noted above, just one
year before the 1871 Act, a Senate Report examining the impact of the
Fourteenth Amendment on Indian citizenship relied heavily on the treatying
capacity of Indians to conclude that tribal members had never been "subject
to" U.S. jurisdiction and thus were not made citizens by the Amendment.30'
Indeed, the Report reasoned that "inasmuch as the Constitution treats Indian
tribes as belonging to the rank of nations capable of making treaties,.., an
act of Congress which should assume to treat the members of a tribe as
subject to the municipal jurisdiction of the United States would be
unconstitutional and void.
30 2
The abandonment of treaty-making was also extremely significant from
a constitutional perspective. Where did Congress's general constitutional
1867, Congress adopted legislation refusing to appropriate any further funds for Indian treaty-
making, but the act was repealed a few months later. Id. at 240.
296. Appropriations Act of 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
71).
297. Id. ("Provided, further, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or
impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian
nation or tribe."); see also Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 201-03 (1975) (discussing the
history of the 1871 Act).
298. Congress enforced the provision through the appropriations power by refusing to authorize
funds for the negotiation or enforcement of any future Indian treaties. Rice, supra note 295, at 240.
The Executive branch continued to pursue federal-Indian relations through executive agreements
until 1919, when Congress prohibited the practice. Appropriations Act of June 30, 1919, ch. 4, §
27, 41 Stat. 1, 34 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 150).
299. Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the Content and
Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 203, 221-22 (1989); Rice, supra note 295, at
247 (stating that the 1871 Act "did not destroy or decrease the political status of the Indian nations
and did not express a congressional intent that tribal governments were dissolved or weakened");
Wilkins, supra note 52, at 349-5 1.
300. See, e.g., The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 760 (1866) (noting that the national
government's recognition of Indians as a nation capable of making treaties precludes states from
regulating them as citizens or exercising jurisdiction over them).
301. S. REP. No. 41-268 (1870); see supra notes 286-88.
302. Id. at 9.
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authority to legislate relations with the Indians come from? The Commerce
Clause only allowed regulation of trade with the Indians, and the treaty
power was tribe-specific and sporadic; it did not grant Congress authority to
legislate beyond the existing treaties.30 3 Congress might have relied on the
Territory Clause, on the theory (based on the discovery doctrine and the
western removal of Indians) that the United States exercised sovereignty over
Indian lands.3°4 But the decision in Dred Scott construed the clause as
applying only to the original U.S. territories. 30 5 The end of treaty-making
accordingly suggested that respect for tribal sovereignty had so eroded that
Congress believed it enjoyed authority to legislate unilaterally for Indian
tribes without either enumerated constitutional authority or tribal consent.
The Court's later decisions in the inherent powers era also viewed the
legislation as heralding a significant change in U.S.-Indian relations. As the
Supreme Court noted in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, the statute "voiced
the intention of Congress thereafter to make the Indian tribes amenable
directly to the power and authority of the laws of the United States by the
immediate exercise of its legislative power over them., 30 6 The Court would
later assume that this power had always existed and that the power of
Congress to legislate derived from the United States' status as a "sovereign
nation," "limited only by its own constitution" and the law of nations.30 7 The
1871 statute, in short, supplanted the enumerated powers basis for legislation
over the Indians with a theory of federal power.
303. Furthermore, treaties were not always construed to support broad federal legislative
authority. See Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571-72 (1883).
304. George F. Canfield, The Legal Position of the Indian, 15 AM. L. REv. 21, 25-26 (1881)
(relying on the Territory Clause for authority over Indians). Canfield later became a professor of
law at Columbia University.
305. See infra notes 1318-28 and accompanying text
306. Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 305 (1902); see also In re Heff, 197 U.S.
488, 498 (1905) ("From that time on the Indian tribes ... have been subjected to the direct
legislation of Congress .. "); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566-67 (1903) (citing the
discussion of the 1871 Act in Kagama); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 483 (1899)
(noting that the 1871 Act "definitively expressed" the U.S. policy that Indians were not independent
nations with which the U.S. could contract by treaty); New York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S.
1, 33 (1898) (noting that the 1871 Act denied the right of Indian tribes to be recognized as
independent nations for treaty-making purposes); Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. 641,
655 (1890) (citing the discussion of the 1871 Act in Choctaw Nation); Choctaw Nation v. United
States, 119 U.S. 1, 27 (1886) ("[T]he Choctaw Nation [was]... subject to the power and authority
of the laws of the United States when Congress should choose, as it did determine in the [1871
Act] ... to exert its legislative power."); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886) (noting
that the 1871 Act constituted "a new departure" in U.S.-tribal relations); Brief for the United States
at 10, United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (No. 1246) ("[The 1871 Act] effects a
revolution in the policy of the Government respecting Indian affairs."). Compare Antoine v.
Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 201-03 (1975) (recognizing that the 1871 Act merely changed the
method by which the United States entered agreements with the tribes), with DeCoteau v. Dist.
County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 432 (1975) ("[A]fter 1871, the tribes were no longer regarded as
sovereign nations, and the Government began to regulate their affairs through statute ... .
307. Choctaw Nation, 119 U.S. at 27.
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1. The Cherokee Tobacco.-The next major case after Rogers to
address the power of Congress to regulate Indian affairs was the 1870 case of
The Cherokee Tobacco.308 The case presented the question of whether a gen-
eral federal tax on tobacco and alcohol309 applied to Cherokee territory,
despite a treaty that protected goods sold within the territory from federal
taxes.3  The Court thus had to determine (1) whether Congress could law-
fully tax Indian country; and (2) if so, whether Congress had properly
abrogated the Cherokee treaty to tax the property at issue.
A fragmented four members of a six-member Court upheld the tax in a
brief opinion.311 Writing for the Court, Justice Swayne found that Congress's
power to tax Indian country derived from the tribe's presence within U.S.
territorial boundaries.312 Citing M'Intosh, Cherokee Nation, and Chief
Justice Taney's dicta in Rogers, the Court reasoned that the "Indian territory
is admitted to compose a part of the United States" and is "subject to their
authority"; thus, "Congress may, by law, punish any offence committed
there." 313  Like Chief Justice Taney before him, Justice Swayne did not
attempt to tie this power to any constitutional source but simply asserted that
"[b]oth these propositions are so well settled in our jurisprudence that it
would be a waste of time to discuss them or to refer to further authorities in
their support.,
314
The case arose in the midst of the congressional debates over ending the
use of treaties in federal-Indian relations, and the Court facilitated that
development by holding that the tax statute's general language "embrace[d]
indisputably the Indian territories" 315 and finding, for the first time, that a
federal statute could supersede a prior treaty.316 This treaty termination
principle, which came to be known as the "last in time doctrine," would be
important to immigration cases of the late 1800s.3'7
308. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870).
309. The Internal Revenue Act of 1868 provided that alcohol and tobacco taxes "shall be...
construed to extend to such articles produced anywhere within the exterior boundaries of the United
States," and thus appeared to tax Indian country sub silentio. Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, 15 Stat.
125, 167.
310. Article 10 of the 1866 treaty with the Cherokee provided that the Cherokee "shall have the
right to sell any products [within the territory] ... without restraint, [or] paying any tax thereon
which is now or may be levied by the United States on the quantity sold outside of the Indian
territory." The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. at 618.
311. Justice Bradley dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Davis. Id. at 622. Justices
Nelson and Field and Chief Justice Chase did not take part in the decision. Id. at 624.
312. Id. at 619.
313. Id. (quotations omitted).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 620.
316. Id. at 621.
317. The last-in-time doctrine was definitively established in the immigration cases of the late
1800s. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 193-94 (1888); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884).
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Justices Bradley and Davis dissented, asserting that treaty stipulations
exempted Indian territory from federal jurisdiction.318 Even the dissenters,
however, assumed that the United States retained power "to make such
regulations as it may deem necessary in relation to that territory."319 The
members of the Court disagreed only on the degree of respect to be given
treaty promises, not on Congress's underlying power.
The Cherokee Tobacco ratified Chief Justice Taney's characterization of
Indian tribes as geographically incorporated into the United States and
subject to broad congressional power. The Court further undermined Indian
sovereignty by establishing that Congress could legislate over them in
abrogation of a preexisting treaty. Where treaties had once served as a
primary source of federal legislative authority over the Indians, the Court
now established that Congress could legislate, not only in the absence of a
treaty, but in abrogation of the instruments that had once been considered the
source of congressional power. The only justification for this authority
offered by the court was the Indians' physical presence within U.S.
boundaries. Taken together with the principle that the national government
would henceforth conduct Indian relations through legislation, rather than
through treaties, the effect on tribal legal status was devastating. The 1871
Act purported to preserve existing treaties, but the Court now established that
Congress could abrogate those treaties at will.
The Supreme Court again affirmed the Rogers vision of U.S. authority
over the Indians in the 1877 case of Beecher v. Wetherby. 320 Writing for the
Court, Justice Field cited M'Intosh for the proposition that Indians possessed
only rights of "occupancy" in their lands, while "[t]he fee was in the United
States. 3 21 Like Justice Taney in Rogers, and as Justice Brown would argue
in the Insular Cases, Justice Field reasoned that only internal conscience,
rather than legal constraint, limited congressional authority in regulating
Indian land rights:
It is to be presumed that... the United States would be governed by
such considerations of justice as would control a Christian people in
their treatment of an ignorant and dependent race. Be that as it may,
the propriety or justice of their action towards the Indians with respect
to their lands is a question of governmental policy, and is not a matter
open to discussion in a controversy between third parties, neither of
whom derives title from the Indians.
322
318. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. at 622 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
319. Id
320. Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877). The case involved a title dispute over
lands that the United States ceded to a state and subsequently reserved to an Indian tribe. Id. at
522-23,525.
321. Id. at 525.
322. Id. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 280, 282-83 (1890) (Brown, J.).
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Nothing in the opinion suggested any constitutional source of authority for
this power or any constraint on its exercise.
The period between 1845 and 1877 saw Congress use territorial
jurisdiction as a basis for the exercise of its power. This jurisdiction derived
from the discovery doctrine, but had significantly transformed by the 1870s.
Worcester portrayed the doctrine as giving Indian tribes ultimate possession
and control of their lands, with the United States enjoying a limited, exclus-
ive right to purchase with Indian consent.323 But by the 1870s, the emphasis
on Indian consent was disappearing, and the Court suggested that Congress
held a unilateral right to terminate Indian occupation.3 24 Still, the inherent
powers doctrine had not been firmly established. Chief Justice Taney's
language in Rogers was largely dicta, and the Cherokee Tobacco decision
had been reached by only four members of the Court.
325
E. Assimilation and the Inherent Powers Era
The last two decades of the nineteenth century saw an aggressive
assertion of U.S. jurisdiction over Indian tribes. Congress's new freedom to
legislate over Indian relations brought unprecedented federal intrusion into
internal tribal affairs. The Major Crimes Act of 1885 extended federal
criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands for seven serious crimes committed
between Indians. 326  The General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act)
327
abandoned the policy of obtaining consent for the allotment of Indian
lands,328 vastly expanded U.S. allotment policies for Indians other than the
Five Civilized Tribes, 329 and extended state civil and criminal jurisdiction
over allotted lands. 330 Finally, the Curtis Act of 1898331 and the Burke Act of
1906332 dissolved the Five Civilized Tribes and subjected them fully to the
laws of the United States.
Rapid western expansion and demands by settlers for Indian lands
spurred much of this increased intervention. Land hunger combined with
fervent assimilationist convictions that Indian tribes must be destroyed and
323. See supra text accompanying notes 232-36.
324. See, e.g., Beecher, 95 U.S. at 525 (stating that the Indians held only a right of occupancy
which the United States could transfer "whenever they chose").
325. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
326. Seven Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
1153 (1994)) (allowing federal criminal prosecution of murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with
intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny).
327. Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (current version at
25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341-342, 348-349, 354, 381 (1994)).
328. COHEN, supra note 131, at 613.
329. See Dawes Act § 8 (authorizing the President, inter alia, to allot Indian lands).
330. Id. § 6.
331. Act for the Protection of the People of the Indian Territory and for Other Purposes, ch.
517, 30 Stat. 495 (1898).
332. Burke Act, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (1906) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1994)).
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their members civilized, Christianized, and integrated into the white polity. 333
As the 1889 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs put it,
"tribal relations should be broken up, socialism destroyed, and the family and
the autonomy of the individual substituted. 3 34 Congress created courts of
Indian offenses in 1883 as "educational and disciplinary instrumentalities...
to improve and elevate the condition" of Indian tribes. 335  In short,
assimilation sought "extermination of the Indian as an Indian." 336 The assi-
milation of Indians included instilling them with values of private property,
and replacing nomadic lifestyles with agrarian lifestyles, practices which, it
was believed, would also open up Indian lands. Assimilation, allotment, and
civilization went hand in hand.337
The 1887 Dawes Act introduced the policy of Indian allotments on a
massive scale. Tribal lands were to be dissolved, with specific acreage given
to each tribal member, and the remaining lands transferred to the United
States, surveyed and opened for white settlement.338 Indians who had already
"adopted the habits of civilized life" separate from a tribe or who accepted
allotments were granted U.S. citizenship 339 and barred from alienation for
twenty-five years. 340  The remaining approximately eighty million acres of
Indian lands were opened to white settlement, with funds from the sales
placed in trust for the tribes' education and civilization.341 The Dawes Act
and its progeny became, as President Theodore Roosevelt observed
approvingly in 1901, "a mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal
mass." 342 In the period from 1881 to 1900, Indian lands were reduced by
half, from approximately 156 million acres to 78 million.343 During the same
period, courts upheld the legalized expulsion of Indians and the stripping of
Indian sovereignty through the inherent powers doctrine.344
333. COHEN, supra note 131, at 131-32.
334. COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS ANNUAL REPORT, H.R. EXEC. DOC., 51-1, at 3-4
(1889).
335. United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 577 (D. Or. 1888).
336. SMITH, supra note 95, at 392 (quoting Indian Commissioner William Jones).
337. See FREDERICK HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS,
1880-1920, at 42-81 (1984).
338. See COHEN, supra note 13 1, at 130-3 1, 613-14 (discussing the Dawes Act).
339. Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887 § 6, 24 Stat. 388 (current version at 25
U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341-342, 348-349, 354, 381 (1994)).
340. Id. § 6. Indian allotments were held in trust by the United States and barred from
alienation for 25 years. The trust status was intended to remedy the perceived flaw in prior
allotment policies, which had granted lands to individual Indians in fee simple with uniformly
disastrous results. Allotted lands were quickly alienated to white traders and land speculators, often
under fraudulent circumstances, and the failure of the policy had been attributed to the alienability
of the allotments. COHEN, supra note 13 1, at 130.
341. Dawes Act § 5. COHEN, supra note 131, at 131.
342. Theodore Roosevelt's First Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1901), in 2 THE STATE OF THE
UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1790-1966, at 2047 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1966).
343. SMITH, supra note 95, at 393.
344. See infra Part III(F).
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Indian allotment and assimilation reflected the increasing exercise of
authoritarian congressional power over the tribes. But assimilation also
raised new problems regarding membership of Indians in the constitutional
polity. The breakup of the tribes at least implied that Indians were to become
part of American society. Did it also make them citizens, entitled to the full
constitutional protections enjoyed by citizens? However eager the country
was to obtain Indian land, it was equally reluctant about the implications of
Indian membership in the American polity. This tension led some com-
mentators, such as George Canfield, to view the Indians' separate, inferior
status as critical to maintaining absolute federal authority over them. In his
1881 article, The Legal Position of the Indian, Canfield stressed the Indians'
status "as an inferior people, strangers to our laws, our customs, and our
privileges. '345 The Constitution had not been drafted to include the Indians
and offered them no protection:
It was for [we the people] that Congress was to legislate, and for such
men its power to legislate was to be restricted. To suppose that the
framers of the Constitution intended to secure to the Indians the rights
and privileges which they valued as Englishmen is to misconceive the
spirit of their age, and to impute to it an expansive benevolence which
it did not possess.
346
Canfield drew upon social contract theories to conclude that the United
States enjoyed unlimited power over the Indians because of the Indians'
separate sovereign status.347 He warned that extending federal legislation
over Indian tribes could eliminate this sovereignty and bring Indians into the
constitutional community as citizens:
We may.... by making an Indian a person subject to our laws,
withdraw him from the uncontrolled power of Congress, and place
him under the protection of the Constitution. But are things yet ripe
for this change? Are we quite sure that the Indian is yet prepared to be
invested with all our rights and privileges guaranteed by the
Constitution,-among others, the right of trial by jury and the right to
bear arms, and to enjoy one's property without restraint? Surely the
Constitution was not made for the Indian, and we may be acting
incautiously in now extending its provisions over him.
348
The question of how Indian assimilation affected their citizenship status soon
came to the Court in the case of Elk v. Wilkins.
1. Indians as Citizens? Elk v. Wilkins.-The question whether Indians
born within the territorial boundaries of the United States could be citizens
345. Canfield, supra note 304, at 27.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 27-29, 35.
348. Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added).
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by birth under the Fourteenth Amendment had been debated since the
Amendment's adoption. In the 1884 case of Elk v. Wilkins, the Court finally
resolved the question against citizenship for Indians born into tribes.
349
John Elk was an Indian who renounced his tribal membership, became a
resident of Nebraska, and fully submitted himself to the authority of the
United States. 350 The State of Nebraska rejected Elk's application to register
as a voter on the grounds that he was not a citizen, as required by state law.
351
The case thus came to the Supreme Court on the question whether Elk fell
within the Fourteenth Amendment's bestowal of citizenship on "all persons
born . . . in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof." '352
In a seven-to-two decision, the Court construed the Fourteenth
Amendment as bestowing citizenship only on persons who were
"completely" subject to U.S. jurisdiction at birth.353 Persons born into Indian
tribes did not qualify, the Court found, because tribes, while "within the
territorial limits of the United States," were "distinct political
communities. 354  Ignoring the dicta in Rogers and the reasoning of The
Cherokee Tobacco, the Court emphasized tribal sovereignty and autonomy
from U.S. authority.355 Even the 1871 Act did not alter this independent
status, according to the Court, but simply "require[d] the Indian tribes to be
dealt with for the future through the legislative and not through the treaty-
making power.', 356  Accordingly, Elk had not been born "subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States," and thus could not be a citizen.357 His
subsequent renouncement of tribal status was irrelevant to the inquiry.
Social contract and membership theories figured prominently in the
Court's analysis. "[N]o one can become a citizen of a nation without its
consent," the Court reasoned.358 The members of Indian tribes, as "Indians
not taxed," "form[ed] no part of the people entitled to representation,"
359
"were never deemed citizens," 360 and "were not part of the people of the
United States. The opinion made clear that determinations of mem-bership would be left to the discretion of the American polity and declined to
349. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884).
350. Id. at 98.
351. Id. at 96 (statement of the case).
352. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1; Elk, 112 U.S. at 99.
353. Elk, 112 U.S. at 102.
354. Id. at 99; see also id. at 102 ("Indians born within the territorial limits of the United
States... are no more 'born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof ... than the
children of subjects of any foreign government . .
355. Id. at 99.
356. Id. at 107.
357. Id. at 109.
358. Id. at 103.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 100.
361. Id. at 99.
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find that the Fourteenth Amendment constituted their consent. The resulting
status of Indians as entirely subject to U.S. authority, but excluded from the
benefits of citizenship, would later be used in the Insular Cases to justify the
non-citizen status of U.S. territorial inhabitants.
3 62
Justice Harlan dissented together with Justice Woods, and concluded
that Indians who renounced tribal membership became subject to U.S.
jurisdiction and thus fell within the Amendment's scope.363 Harlan noted
that Elk was subject to taxation in Nebraska, was a part of the state militia,
was counted for purposes of apportionment, and could sue and be sued in
Nebraska courts. 6 Justice Harlan also noted that Cherokee Nation, Rogers,
and The Cherokee Tobacco had all held that the tribes were subject to U.S.
authority.365 Like Justice Thompson in Cherokee Nation,366 Justice Harlan
rejected the notion that the Constitution tolerated a population that was
neither citizen nor alien. If the majority's interpretation was correct, Harlan
concluded,
then the Fourteenth Amendment has wholly failed to accomplish, in
respect of the Indian race, what, we think, was intended by it; and
there is still in this country a despised and rejected class of persons,
with no nationality whatever; who, born in our territory, owing no
allegiance to any foreign power, and subject, as residents of the States,
to all the burdens of government, are yet not members of any political
community nor entitled to any of the rights, privileges, or immunities
of citizens of the United States.367
The Elk majority thus resurrected the principle of Indian sovereignty to
justify the exclusion of Indians from the American polity. While prior
decisions relied on the Indians' increasing subjugation to justify the exercise
of ever-broader national authority, Elk invoked tribal independence to
withhold the benefits of citizenship from Indians. Ironically, Indian tribes'
exclusion from the national polity and resulting lack of citizenship, as
George Canfield argued, also left them subject to the plenary power of the
United States.
2. United States v. Kagama.-The Court soon made apparent just how
subject to U.S. jurisdiction the Indians actually were in the 1886 case of
362. See infra Part IV(G).
363. Elk, 112 U.S. at 114-15 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
364. Id. at 111 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
365. Id. at 121-22 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan's position was thus more faithful to the
Court's Indian law holdings, and to the longstanding view that Indians who were not tribal members
and were taxed were fully subject to U.S. jurisdiction, though his position that Elk could acquire
citizenship after birth by renouncing his tribal membership contradicted the Fourteenth
Amendment's background in the common-law tradition that citizenship attached at birth.
366. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 66 (1831).
367. Elk, 112 U.S. at 122-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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United States v. Kagama,368 which ushered in the inherent powers era.
Kagama involved a constitutional challenge to the 1885 Major Crimes Act,
which had finally extended complete U.S. criminal jurisdiction to seven
major crimes between Indians.3 69 The Major Crimes Act, which had been
adopted in reaction to the Court's decision in Crow Dog,370 reflected two
major innovations in the exercise of federal authority. The Act both
regulated crimes between Indians in Indian country 371 and extended federal
jurisdiction to crimes committed between Indians on reservations within the
states.72
Kagama involved the prosecution of an Indian for murdering another
Indian on a reservation in California.373 Kagama thus finally presented the
Supreme Court with the question of Congress's constitutional authority to
legislate a criminal code for Indian tribes.
Interestingly, neither the United States nor Kagama contended that
Congress's power derived from the doctrine of discovery, the Indians'
presence in U.S. territory, or any other inherent power. Both parties instead
relied exclusively on enumerated powers arguments and focused on whether
the Major Crimes Act could be upheld under the Indian Commerce Clause.
In its briefs to the Court, the United States argued that the commerce power
gave the federal government plenary power to regulate Indian affairs.7 4 The
Commerce Clause, the government maintained, had always authorized the
United States to legislate "intercourse" with the Indians, broadly defined, 375
and the power to regulate crimes was incidental to that power.376 The Major
Crimes Act related to commerce, the government argued, because "[i]f [the
Indians] are permitted to murder each other, it is certainly an interference
368. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
369. See Seven Crimes Act, 23 Stat. 362 (1885) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000)).
Congress adopted the Act in direct response to the Court's decision in Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S.
556, 567 (1883), which concluded that existing federal law, as drafted, did not authorize the United
States to prosecute a murder committed between two Indians. Clinton, supra note 249, at 963-64;
COHEN, supra note 131, at 300.
370. In Exparte Crow Dog, the Court held that a federal criminal statute did not apply to Indian
crimes committed in Sioux territory despite an 1877 agreement subjecting the Indians to the laws of
the United States. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571-72 (1883). In a late affirmation of
Indian sovereignty, the Court concluded that other language was intended to secure to the tribe the
right to "self-government, [and] the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs." Id. at
569.
371. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 377.
372. Id. at 377-78.
373. Id. at 375.
374. Brief for the United States at 14, United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (No.
1246) ("[T]here is no limitation upon the power of Congress to enact whatever laws may be
necessary to regulate the affairs of the Indian tribes .....
375. Id. at 5-6.
376. Id. at 22-23 (arguing that "the power of punishment appertains to sovereignty, and may be




with intercourse; because the number with whom intercourse will be held is
thereby diminished." '377 While the United States previously had declined to
regulate crimes between Indians, the Indians' shrinking numbers and
growing dependence had materially changed the U.S.-Indian relationship and
justified the present law.378 The United States maintained that United States
v. Rogers established that Congress possessed the criminal authority now
being exercised. 379 And although the government attempted to tie the crimi-
nal statute at issue to commerce, the government portrayed federal power as
reaching all aspects of Indian affairs, unconstrained by the Constitution. The
United States, counsel maintained, "can take from [Indians] their reser-
vations; it can move them to another Territory; it can, if it chooses, impose
upon them its municipal laws; it has not in many relations chosen to do so,
but its power nevertheless remains and is unchecked by any Constitutional
restraint."380  Moreover, the question was "purely [one] of policy, '381 "a
question of legislative discretion, and not of judicial cognizance."
382
The defendant, on the other hand, denied that the Commerce Clause
gave Congress the power to draft a criminal code for Indians. Citing United
States v. Bailey, Kagama argued from enumerated powers principles that the
federal government was one of limited, delegated powers. 383  If the
Commerce Clause authorized such general federal power over Indians within
the states, Kagama argued, "why may not Congress legislate on crimes for
the States generally'?"
384
A unanimous Court upheld the constitutionality of the Major Crimes
Act. Writing for the Court, Justice Miller began his analysis by eliminating
the possible enumerated bases for the federal power. The Constitution, he
noted, was "almost silent" with regard to relations between the federal gov-
ernment and the Indians.385 Neither of the textual references to "Indians not
taxed" justified Congress's regulation of internal Indian affairs. 386 Justice
Miller then rejected the government's reliance on the Indian Commerce
Clause, finding that "we think it would be a very strained construction...
that a system of criminal laws for Indians living peaceably in their
reservations... was authorized by the grant of power to regulate commerce
377. Id. at 24.
378. Id. at 19.
379. Id. at 27.
380. Id. at 27-28 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
381. Id. at 27.
382. Id. at 20.
383. Brief for Defendant at 11, Kagama (No. 1246) (citing United States v. Bailey, 24 F. Cas.
937 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1834) (No. 14,495)).
384. Id. at 12 (quoting Bailey, 24 F. Cas. at 940).
385. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378.
386. Id.
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with the Indian tribes." 387 Instead, Miller asserted that Congress had inherent
sovereign power to govern the territories.
Miller first established that Indians were present within the boundaries
of the United States and thus necessarily subject to either state or federal
power:
[T]hese Indians are within the geographical limits of the United States.
The soil and the people within these limits are under the political
control of the Government of the United States, or of the States of the
Union. There exist within the broad domain of sovereignty but these
two.
38 8
Miller's framework thus recognized only two sovereignties in the constitu-
tional structure: the national and state governments. All other authorities
389were the creation of, and ultimately subject to, the control of these powers.
Invoking the territory cases of Murphy v. Ramsey390 and American Insurance
Co. v. Canter,3 91 Miller linked the question to Congress's inherent power to
govern the territories:
[T]his power of congress to organize territorial governments, and
make laws for their inhabitants, arises, not so much from the
[territory] clause in the constitution.., as from the ownership of the
country in which the territories are, and the right of exclusive
sovereignty which must exist in the National Government, and can be
found nowhere else."
392
Quoting at length from Chief Justice Taney's sweeping dicta in Rogers,
Miller reasoned that federal authority over the Indians derived from
discovery,393 and that as a result, "Congress may by law punish any offence
committed there. 394
Kagama involved the power of Congress to criminalize Indian-on-
Indian conduct within the states, not the territories. But Miller concluded
that Congress's power over Indians in the territories "must in a large degree"
resolve Congress's power within the states.395 This, too, was "within the
competency of Congress," due to Congress's guardianship role in protecting
its Indian wards from hostile states. 396  "From their very weakness and
387. Id. at 378-79.
388. Id. at 379.
389. Id.
390. 114 U.S. 44 (1885); see also infra notes 1350-55 and accompanying text.
391. 6 U.S. (1 Pet.) 516, 542 (1828); see also infra notes 1237-59 and accompanying text.
392. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 380 (emphasis added).
393. Id. at 380-81.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 378.
396. Id. at 383.
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helplessness.. .," Miller reasoned, "there arises the duty of protection, and
with it the power."
397
Miller closed with a sweeping assertion of inherent federal power,
driven by necessity:
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race
once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to
their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they
dwell. It must exist in that government, because it never has existed
anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within the
geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been
denied, and because [the United States] alone can enforce its laws on
all the tribes.3 98
Kagama definitively established the first prong of the inherent powers
doctrine: an inherent source of federal power over the Indian tribes. The
most remarkable aspect of Justice Miller's analysis was the complete absence
of any reliance on the Constitution as the basis for national authority.
Although the question presented in the case was whether the Major Crimes
Act was "a constitutional and valid law of the United States," Miller made no
attempt to tie the power to any constitutional provision. The justifications
derived from the doctrines of discovery, inherent sovereign authority over
U.S. territories, Indian dependence, and a strong assertion of raw national
power. Despite the extraordinary departure from the enumerated powers
doctrine, no member of the Court dissented.
The other two prongs of the inherent powers doctrine remained
unresolved. It is unclear whether the Court viewed the power it upheld in
Kagama as limited by other provisions of the Constitution, since that case did
not allege any violation of individual constitutional rights. Could the United
States, for example, have tried Kagama without a grand and petit jury? It is
also unclear whether the Court believed that judicial review of federal actions
over Indians was appropriate. Justice Miller quoted in passing Chief Justice
Taney's assertion that the exercise was "a question for the law-making and
political department of the government, and not for the judicial,"'3 99 but did
not elaborate. It would be left to later cases to flesh out these latter two
prongs of the inherent powers doctrine.
Kagama ushered in the high plenary power era of U.S. Indian law, and
the inherent powers approach quickly infiltrated the Court's analysis even in
straight Commerce Clause cases. In the 1890 case of Cherokee Nation v.
Southern Kansas Railway Co.,400 the Court upheld the national government's
power under the Indian Commerce Clause to condemn tribal lands for a
397. Id. at 384.
398. Id. at 384-85 (emphasis added).
399. Id. at 380-81 (citing U.S. v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846)).
400. 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
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railroad right-of-way, finding that the railroad had a "direct relation to
commerce with the Indian tribes, as well as with commerce among the
states."' 0°  Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan rejected the Cherokee
Tribe's claim that it was a sovereign possessing the exclusive power of
eminent domain over its lands, quoting from Kagama, Rogers, and Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia at length to emphasize the Indians' dependent, ward-like
status, their presence within U.S. borders, and Congress's inherent power.40 2
F. The End of Sovereignty for the Civilized Tribes
In the 1890s, preserving American principles of democratic self-
governance became the justification for the final extension of plenary federal
authority over the Five Civilized Tribes. These tribes, including the
Cherokee Nation, had been exempted from the allotment provisions of the
Dawes Act 40 3 and retained a degree of tribal autonomy. An 1894 Senate
Report by the Dawes Commission,40 4 however, concluded that the Civilized
Tribes had failed to properly manage tribal lands, that the government of the
tribes was "non-American" and "radically wrong," and that congressional
intervention in this "deplorable state of affairs" was imperative.40 5 The
report invoked the United States' "constitutional obligation[]" "to see to it
that government everywhere within its jurisdiction rests on the consent of the
governed. ' '406 Applying a logic that would be central to U.S. acquisition of
the Insular territories, the Commission urged that the depraved and
undemocratic nature of tribal governance left "no alternative" to the United
States but to assume responsibility for the territory.40 7 Any treaties securing
lands to the tribes also did not qualify Congress's original, inherent authority:
"Whatever power congress possessed over the Indians as semi-dependent
nations, or as persons within its jurisdiction, it still possesses,
notwithstanding [that] several treaties may have stipulated that the
Government would not exercise such power."
40 8
Congress responded to the report with a series of statutes dissolving the
legal authority of the Five Civilized Tribes, allotting their lands, and
401. Id. at 657. Similar legislation had been debated for years but rejected as an unauthorized
intrusion on tribal powers. In 1886, for example, President Cleveland had vetoed legislation that
would have granted a railroad right-of-way through reservation lands in Montana without tribal
consent. See WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 52, at 81-82.
402. Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. at 653-55.
403. Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, §§ 1, 5, 6, 8, 24 Stat. 388 (current version
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341-342, 348-349, 354, 381 (1994)).
404. S. REP. NO. 53-377, at 12 (1894), quoted in Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445
(1899).
405. Stephens, 174 U.S. at 451.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 452-53.
408. Id. at 450.
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subjecting the entire Indian territory to complete U.S. authority. Responding
to assimilationist impulses, in 1901 Congress bestowed citizenship on inhab-
itants of the Indian territory.409 By 1906, however, Congress apparently
concluded that Indian citizenship was premature. That year, Congress
severely restricted the ability of the tribal legislatures to meet, subjected their
actions to presidential veto,410 and delayed citizenship for Indians until the
end of the twenty-five-year Dawes Act trust period.a1 In 1907, Congress
authorized the Indian Commissioner to sell allotments held by Indians
deemed "noncompetent" to work them.41 2
Three significant inherent powers cases decided between 1899 and 1903
addressed the dismantling of the Five Civilized Tribes.413 Stephens v.
Cherokee Nation involved a challenge by the Cherokee, Choctaw,
Chickasaw, and Creek nations to the constitutionality of the Indian
Appropriations Acts of 1896'4 and 1897,4' 5 which authorized the Dawes
Commission to determine the citizenship of the Five Civilized Tribes. The
tribes also challenged the Curtis Act of 1898, which abolished the tribal laws
and courts of the Five Civilized Tribes, provided for the allotment of tribal
lands, and subjected the tribes to the complete jurisdiction of the United
States.416 The tribes contended that both provisions exceeded Congress's
constitutional authority and violated various treaties with the tribes.417
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Fuller opened the opinion by
assuming that Congress possessed "plenary power of legislation [over Indian
tribes], subject only to the Constitution of the United States. 41 8 Fuller spent
little time examining the particular statutory provisions at issue and did not
identify any enumerated constitutional basis for the legislation. Instead, he
asserted an inherent powers argument based on the Indians' dependence on
the federal government and Congress's "paramount" authority over them.419
409. See SMITH, supra note 95, at 633-34 n. 168. Allotment of the lands of the Five Civilized
Tribes in the Oklahoma territory proceeded rapidly, and Oklahoma was admitted to the Union in
1907.
410. Five Tribes Act of 1906, ch. 1876, § 28, 34 Stat. 137, 148.
411. Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, § 6, 34 Stat. 182, 183 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 349
(1994)).
412. See SMITH, supra note 95, at 461.
413. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187
U.S. 294 (1902); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899).
414. Appropriations Act of 1896, ch. 398, 29 Stat. 321, 339 (1896).
415. Appropriations Act of 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 84 (1897).
416. Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, §§ 11, 26, 28, 30 Stat. 497 (1898).
417. Treaties with the Cherokee had secured the title and possession of their lands, the right of
self-government, and jurisdiction over their country, Stephens, 174 U.S. at 485, while another
agreement with two tribes had promised to continue tribal governance for a period of eight years.
Id. at 491.
418. Id. at478.
419. Id. at 488 ("[l~n view of the paramount authority of Congress over the Indian tribes, and of
the duties imposed on the Government by their condition of dependency, we cannot say that
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The Chief Justice observed that the present policy toward the tribes was
"definitively expressed" in the 1871 Act,420 which established that Indians
were not independent nations with whom the United States must contract by
treaty. 42  The opinion quoted at length from Justice Harlan's discussion in
Southern Kansas Railway4 22 of the Indians' dependent and ward-like status
without acknowledging that Congress's authority in that decision had derived
from the Indian Commerce Clause. Stephens now viewed Indian dependence
and congressional inherent power alone as sufficient. "Such being the
position occupied by these tribes," Fuller reasoned, "and the power of
Congress... having the plenitude thus indicated, we are unable to perceive
that the legislation in question is in contravention of the Constitution.
'A23
Congress had adopted the Curtis Act while the case was pending and that
Act's constitutionality thus was not clearly presented. 4  Nevertheless, Chief
Justice Fuller also purported to hold the "entire legislation" constitutional.425
Finally, he concluded that the 1871 renouncement of treaty-making and the
last-in-time doctrine rendered useless any treaty rights claimed by the
tribes.426
The next two major inherent power cases, Cherokee Nation v.
Hitchcock427 and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,428 proceeded through the courts
simultaneously and were decided one month apart. Both presented Fifth
Amendment challenges to Congress's efforts to manage or allot Cherokee
property without tribal consent. Cherokee Nation involved a challenge by
the Cherokee Nation to section 13 of the Curtis Act, 429 which authorized the
United States to lease Cherokee lands for mining, with proceeds to be used
for the tribe's benefit.
430
In its brief to the Court, the tribe asserted that the lease constituted a
taking without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment and deprived it
of its property rights without due process of law.431 The tribe's position was
Congress could not empower the Dawes Commission to determine.., who were entitled to
citizenship in each of the tribes.
420. Id. at 483.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 484 (quoting Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. 641, 653 (1890)).
423. Id. at 486.
424. Id. at 488-89.
425. Id. at491-92.
426. Id. at 483 ("[I]t is well settled that an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty and that
any questions that may arise are beyond the sphere of judicial cognizance, and must be met by the
political department of the Government." (quotations omitted)).
427. Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902).
428. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
429. Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, § 13, 30 Stat. 495, 498 (1898).
430. Id. § 16 ("[AllI royalties and rents hereafter payable to the tribe shall be paid.., into the
Treasury of the United States to the credit of the tribe .... ).




strong. The Cherokee Nation uniquely held its lands in fee simple.432
Furthermore, Congress made members of the tribe citizens of the United
States by a 1901 statute,433 and Congress in 1890 definitively provided that
the Constitution was in full force in the Indian Territory of Oklahoma.434
Whether or not this formal extension was legally required in order for the
Constitution to have full effect in Cherokee territory, the tribe noted that the
recent decision in the Insular case of Downes v. Bidwel 435 definitively
established that once Congress extended the Constitution to a territory,
"Congress ... [could not] enact laws inconsistent therewith. 436  The tribe
accordingly asserted that its members, as citizens, had been removed from
wardship status and were entitled to all the privileges and immunities of
citizens.437 Their property was as unassailable, the tribe argued, "as if they
were citizens of Massachusetts and descendants of the Pilgrim fathers. 43 8
Notably, the tribe did not challenge the constitutional source of Congress's
authority to legislate but argued in its brief to the Court that its lands were
not public lands, 439 and that the treaties and patents transferring title to the
tribe barred Congress from authorizing lease of the lands without tribal
consent.440 The tribe otherwise deferred to the arguments of the Indians in
Lone Wolf, who were represented by the same counsel.44'
Assistant Attorney General Willis Van Devanter, who later joined the
Court, represented the United States in both Cherokee and Lone Wolf The
government asserted that Congress enjoyed power to lease Indian lands,
citing the discussion of Congress's inherent powers from Kagama.442 Indians
were wards and dependents, over whom the state enjoyed parens patriae
authority to legislate on their behalf, as it did for minors and incompetents.443
This power was "inherent in the supreme power of every state., 444  The
United States argued at length that Congress enjoyed "exclusive sovereignty"
over the territories, citing the territory cases of National Bank v. County of
432. Treaties and a patent had "forever secured and guaranteed" the lands to the tribe and its
heirs. Id. at 8.
433. Id. at 15 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1447) (bestowing citizenship on Indians in
the Oklahoma Indian Territory).
434. Id. at 14.
435. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
436. Brief for the Cherokee Nation at 14, Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock (No. 340).
437. Id. at 15.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 8.
440. Id. at 7.
441. Id. at6, 16-17.
442. Brief for the United States, Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock (No. 340).
443. Id. at 19.
444. Id. at 25 (quoting The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890)).
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Yankton,445 Murphy v. Ramsey, and the Insular decisions of De Lima v.
Bidwell and Downes v. Bidwell.446  The bestowal of citizenship on the
Cherokee in no way altered the relationship between the federal government
and the tribe. Instead, it strengthened the government's ability to intervene
in Indian affairs, because not only did the government have the duty of
protecting them as Indians but also had the duty of protecting them as
citizens within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress.447 Furthermore, the
government argued, no taking of property was involved." 8 No individual
Indian owned the lands, which were held communally by the tribe, and the
leases were for the tribe's benefit.449 The tribe's title to the lands did not
mean that Congress had relinquished its authority over them,450 the
government maintained, and Congress's decisions regarding how to manage
the lands for the tribes were questions of "power" not subject to review in the
courts.
4 5 1
Writing for the Court in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, Justice Edward
White upheld the legislation. 52 The Court determined that Stephens v.
Cherokee Nation reaffirmed that the Indians remained "in a condition of
pupilage or dependency,.., subject to the paramount authority of the United
States., 453 "The plenary power of control by Congress over the Indian tribes
and its undoubted power to legislate ... directly for the protection of the
tribal property" were sufficient to uphold the authority.454 The power to
make tribal property productive, the Court concluded, was implicit in the
Stephens decision upholding the power of Congress to determine tribal
citizenship for allotment purposes.455
Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock for the first time squarely presented the
question of the scope of congressional power in the face of a competing
constitutional right. The Court rejected the tribe's Fifth Amendment takings
claim, however, finding that Congress's exercise of authority merely
involved the "control and development" of tribal property. 56 The Indians'
claim of title was of no avail, the Court held, because the title was in the
tribe, not individual Indians.457 "The lands and moneys of these tribes are
445. Id. at 17-18 ("[I]t is certainly now too late to doubt the power of Congress to govern the
Territories." (citing Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 133 (1880))).
446. Id. at 19.
447. Id. at 30.
448. Id. at 17, 32.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 37-38.
451. Id. at 39-43.
452. 187 U.S. 294, 307-08 (1902).
453. Id at 305 (citing Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 484 (1899)).
454. Id. at 306.
455. Id. at 306-07.
456. Id. at 307-08.
457. Id. at 307.
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public lands and public moneys," subject to the administrative control of the
government, even though Congress had made the tribe members citizens.458
Fully embracing the government's argument, Justice White finally held
that the exercise of the power was a political question dedicated to
congressional discretion:
We are not concerned in this case with the question whether the
[Curtis Act] ... is or is not wise, and calculated to operate beneficially
to the interests of the Cherokees. The power existing in Congress to
administer upon and guard the tribal property, and the power being
political and administrative in its nature, the manner of its exercise is a
question within the province of the legislative branch to determine,
and is not one for the courts.459
Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock thus extended the Kagama plenary power
doctrine to the denial of tribal land rights in the face of a challenge based in
part on the Bill of Rights. Not only did Congress's authority derive from its
inherent powers over the territories and the Indians' dependent status, but the
Court indicated that it would not subject that power to a great degree of
scrutiny even against other constitutional provisions. Indeed, Congress's
exercise of the power was not subject to review by the courts at all. The
Court had now articulated all three prongs of the inherent powers doctrine.
One month later, the Court handed down its decision in Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock.460 Lone Wolf involved a challenge by members of the Kiowa,
Comanche, and Apache tribes to a 1900 statute alloting tribal lands and
opening two million acres of "surplus" lands in the Oklahoma Territory to
white settlement in exchange for payment of one dollar per acre to be held in
trust for the tribes.461 The lands at issue had been set aside for the tribes'
"absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" in the Medicine Lodge Treaty
of 1867,462 which provided that tribal lands could not be taken without the
consent of three-fourths of the adult male members.463 Nevertheless,
Congress adopted the legislation based in part on an allegedly invalid
agreement with the tribe.464
458. Id. at 307-08.
459. Id. at 308.
460. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
461. See Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 813, § 6, 31 Stat. 672, 677.
462. Medicine Lodge Treaty, Oct. 21, 1867, U.S.-Kiowa and Comanche Tribes of Indians, 15
Stat. 581, 585.
463. Id. at 585.
464. In 1892, the United States negotiated an agreement with the tribe allotting a portion of the
tribal lands and relinquishing the remaining two million "surplus" acres to white settlement. While
Congress was considering legislation to enact the 1892 agreement, the tribes renounced it, arguing
that the agreement had been extracted with fraudulent representations by the government, that three-
quarters of the adult males had not accepted it, and that the legislation being considered by
Congress altered the agreement in material ways. The Secretary of the Interior confirmed that the
agreement had not received the requisite three-fourths consent, and the Commissioner of Indian
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Lone Wolf (who was Chief of the Kiowa Tribe) and other tribal
members challenged the Act, arguing that Congress's seizure of Indian lands
without their consent violated, inter alia, the Fifth Amendment. 465 The trial
court rejected the Indians' claim, 466 and on Independence Day, 1901, while
the appeal was pending, President McKinley issued a proclamation ordering
that the surplus reservation lands be opened to white entry and settlement.467
In their brief to the Court, the Indians asserted, more forcefully than in
Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, that the allotment and sale of their lands
without their consent would deprive them of property without due process of
law and would be an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.468
The Indians contended that the United States had never before asserted a
right to terminate Indian rights of occupancy without either Indian consent or
just compensation,469 that the Constitution was in force in the Oklahoma
territory and could not be rescinded (under the reasoning of Downes v.
Bidwel), 470 and that Indians were persons within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment.471  The Indians denied that the Act constituted a taking of
private property for public use; "[i]t was rather the taking.., of property
belonging to Indians and giving it to white men. ''472 The petitioners also
argued that the 1871 termination of treaty-making only altered the means of
ratifying agreements with the Indians and did not otherwise alter Indians'
legal status.473
Both parties in Lone Wolf drew substantially from the immigration and
territory inherent powers cases. Citing the decision in Chae Chan Ping,
Lone Wolf contended that the Medicine Lodge Treaty gave the tribe a vested
interest in occupying the property, which could not be disturbed by treaty
abrogation.474 The Indians noted that unlike the "political" right to enter the
United States at issue in Chae Chan Ping,475 their vested right at stake was a
Affairs opposed enactment of the agreement. Nevertheless, Congress adopted the legislation over
the tribes' objection. Lone Wolf 187 U.S. at 554-60 (statement of the case).
465. See id. at 561 (statement ofthe case) (detailing the Indians' claims that the Act "deprive[d]
said Indians of their lands without due process of law").
466. Id. at 562 (statement of the case).
467. Id. at 562-63 (statement of the case) (citing Proclamation No. 6, 32 Stat. 1975, 1977
(1901)).
468. Brief for Appellants at 36-40, Lone Wolf(No. 275); id at 16 ("Indians occupying lands in
this country, under the provisions of treaties or agreements with the United States, cannot be
deprived of the use and occupancy of such lands without their consent, except by due process of
law; and such lands cannot be taken from them, except in compliance with the provisions under
which such lands were acquired." (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889))).
469. Id. at 9-10, 62-66.
470. Id. at 37-38 (citing Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)).
471. Id. at 38-39.
472. Id. at 40.
473. See id. at 54.
474. See id. at 16.
475. Id. at 35-36.
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property interest, 476 which the Chae Chan Ping decision conceded was not
disturbed when the treaty creating it was broken.477 Congress's repudiation
of the treaty did not allow the government to disturb the Indians' property
rights.478 Invoking the Insular territories as an example, the plaintiffs noted
that abrogation of the treaty of peace with Spain would not alter the cession
of the Philippines and Puerto Rico to the United States.47 9
By the time the Court considered Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock and
Lone Wolf, the United States no longer sought enumerated constitutional
support for its power but simply asserted the power to legislate as a matter of
political necessity. Since Johnson v. M'Intosh, Van Devanter wrote for the
government, Indians had been subject "to the paternal supervision and
control of the United States., 480 "While sentimentality may characterize the
exercise of absolute authority over the affairs of the Indians as an arrogation
of power because of might," Van Devanter wrote in the government's Lone
Wolf brief, "the exigencies of the situation demanded its assumption and
results have justified it. '481' The 1871 Act terminated Indians' status as
independent powers capable of negotiating treaties.482 Now "Congress had
plenary power [to legislate] without any such consent. '483 Van Devanter also
argued that the State enjoyed a parens patriae authority over the Indians
484
and quoted Church of Latter-Day Saints for the proposition that "[t]his
prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every
state.
4 85
The government also discussed the litany of territory cases, including
Church of Latter-Day Saints, National Bank v. County of Yankton, and the
Insular decisions of De Lima v. Bidwell and Downes v. Bidwell, for the
proposition that Congress enjoyed "supreme" power over the territories as
"an incident of sovereignty.''486 The government cited Chae Chan Ping both
for the proposition that Congress could legislate in contravention of a
treaty487 and to reject the Indians' claim to vested rights.
488
476. Id.
477. Id. at 18-19 (quoting Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 611 (1889)).
478. See id. at 42-43.
479. Id. at71.
480. Brief for Appellees at 13, Lone Wolf(No. 275).
481. Id. at 19; see also id. at 15-16 ("[Tlo prevent as far as possible the evil consequences to
both parties which would necessarily flow from the clash between civilization and savageism, it was
necessary that the Government should intervene and assume complete control over the Indians.").
482. Id. at 12-13.
483. Id. at 56.
484. Id. at 45. Indians, Van Devanter wrote, were akin to "lunatics, minors, and other
incapacitated persons." Id. at 44-45 (quoting Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U.S. 613, 634 (1880)).
485. Id. at 49 (quoting The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890)).
486. Id. at 51-53.
487. Id. at 32.
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The United States did not contend that the Fifth Amendment was
inapplicable to Indians. Instead, it argued that the Indians were receiving just
compensation, given that they only enjoyed rights of occupancy,48 9 and that
the Due Process Clause was not triggered here because the sale of tribal lands
"merely changed the form of such property. '490 Congress's determination of
how to use these lands, moreover, was a political question.49  Whether the
dissolution of the reservation violated due process, therefore, was not for the
courts to determine.
The government closed by invoking a civilizing justification for its
power:
The Indians had not become self-supporting and had made no advance
in that direction which would justify a hope that they ever would
become so under the old system. It was not only the right, but the
imperative duty of the United States to change this condition of affairs
and to make such provision for these people as would start them upon
the road to self-support and civilization.492
The Supreme Court upheld the Act, embracing the government's
argument that Congress enjoyed plenary authority to unilaterally terminate
Native American land rights. Writing again for the Court, Justice Edward
White asserted that the Indians' claim "ignore[d] the status of the contracting
Indians and the relation of dependency they bore ... towards the government
of the United States. 493  White pointed to Beecher v. Wetherby and the
inherent powers discussion in Kagama 494 to hold "that Congress possessed a
paramount power over the property of the Indians, by reason of its exercise
of guardianship over their interests" even when the power violated Indian
treaties.495 White again offered no constitutional support for this position and
simply treated it as an historical fact:
Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been
exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always
been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the
judicial department of the government. Until the year 1871 the policy
was pursued of dealing with the Indian tribes by means of treaties,
and, of course, a moral obligation rested upon Congress to act in
good faith in performing the stipulations entered into on its behalf.
But, as with treaties made with foreign nations, (Chinese Exclusion
488. Id. at 66-68.
489. Id. at 69-70.
490. Id. at 70-71.
491. Id. at 71-73.
492. Id. at 93 (emphasis added).
493. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564 (1903).
494. Id. at 565-67.
495. Id. at 565.
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Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600, (1889)), the legislative power might pass
laws in conflict with treaties made with the Indians.
[I]t was never doubted that the power to abrogate existed in
Congress .... 496
The citation to the 1889 decision in Chae Chan Ping is revealing. The
alien plaintiff in that case invoked existing U.S. treaties and statutes to claim
that he had a vested right to return to the United States.497 The Court, in turn,
had applied the last-in-time and inherent powers doctrines to hold that
Congress had an absolute power to deny entry to aliens who were long-term
U.S. residents, in contravention of existing treaty and statutory promises.49 8
The Court held that Congress's control over "political rights," such as
membership in the American polity, could not vest because they involved a
core sovereign right that could not be bargained away by treaty.49 9 Only
property rights "vested" under treaties.
500
The Court in Lone Wolf, however, now held that tribal property rights
did not vest. The rationale was the same. To uphold the Indians' claim, the
Court reasoned, would be to hold that the treaty "materially limit[ed] and
qualitied] the controlling authority of Congress in respect to the care and
protection of the Indians, and to deprive Congress, in a possible emergency,
when the necessity might be urgent.. ., of all power to act, if the assent of
the Indians could not be obtained." 50 1
As in Chae Chan Ping, the Court refused to find anything in either the
Constitution or existing treaties that might constrain the power of Congress
over Indian affairs. Instead, the power derived from sovereign necessity.50 2
In light of Congress's power, White concluded, it was irrelevant whether the
Indians had validly consented to the 1892 agreement.
503
Justice White did not address the Indians' Fifth Amendment claims
other than to find that Congress's "full administrative power" over tribal
property had been resolved in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock.5 °4 Congress's
present policy of selling tribal lands without tribal consent was "a mere
change in the form of investment of Indian tribal property,... [whose
496. Id. at 565-66 (emphasis added).
497. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 584-89 (1889) (argument for appellants).
498. Id. at 600-06.
499. Id. at 609.
500. Id. ("The rights and interests created by a treaty, which have become so vested that its
expiration or abrogation will not destroy or impair them, are such as are connected with and lie in
property... not such as are personal and untransferable in their character.").
501. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 564.
502. Id. at 567-68.
503. Id.
504. Id. at 568 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902)).
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owners were merely] the wards of the government., 50 5 No deprivation of
property had therefore occurred, and the Fifth Amendment afforded no
protection where lands held in common by the tribe were concerned.
Finally, in language very reminiscent of Downes v. Bidwell, Justice
White held that the political question doctrine precluded the Court from
questioning Congress's exercise of its plenary power over the Indians:
We must presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith in the
dealings with the Indians of which complaint is made, and that the
legislative branch of the government exercised its best judgment in the
premises. In any event, as Congress possessed full power in the
matter, the judiciary cannot question or inquire into the motives which
prompted the enactment of this legislation. If injury was
occasioned... by the use made by Congress of its power, relief must
be sought by an appeal to that body for redress and not to the courts.
50
6
Lone Wolf was quickly recognized as a significant milestone with vast
implications for U.S.-Indian relations. Within a month of the decision, mem-
bers of the Senate called for the distribution of the opinion as a Senate
document.50 7 And Senator Matthew Quay, a Republican from Pennsylvania,
characterized the decision on the Senate floor as "the Dred Scott decision No.
2, except that in this case the victim is red instead of black. It practically
inculcates the doctrine that the red man has no rights which the white man is
bound to respect, and that no treaty or contract made with him is binding."' 8
With the decisions in Lone Wolf and Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, the
Court finally ratified the complete inherent powers doctrine over Indian
tribes. In the early 1800s, U.S. power over the Indians had been considered
limited to actions authorized by the Commerce, War, and Treaty Clauses,
and the early cases of Cherokee Nation and Worcester looked to the
Constitution as a possible source of authority over the Indians.509 The Court
largely abandoned this effort with the 1886 decision in Kagama for powers
other than those that could be readily sustained under the Indian Commerce
Clause. 510 Kagama upheld the inherent power of Congress to legislate a
criminal code for Indian tribes, but did not involve a claim of constitutional
constraint based on individual rights.51' Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas
Railway Co. upheld Congress's power to abrogate an Indian treaty and to
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. 36 CONG. REc. 2028 (1903) (statement of Sen. Platt).
508. Id. (statement of Sen. Matthew Quay).
509. See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
510. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); see also Dick v. United States, 208 U.S.
340, 359 (1908) (upholding a statute barring introduction of liquor into Indian lands within a state
under the Treaty and Indian Commerce Clauses); Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. 641,
657 (1890) (upholding the power of eminent domain under the Indian Commerce Clause).
511. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383.
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exercise the powers of eminent domain over tribal lands but did so pursuant
to Congress's Indian Commerce Clause authority.
12
By the end of the century, however, the Court upheld unilateral power
to legislate over every aspect of tribal life, including determining tribal
citizenship, terminating Indian land rights, and dissolving tribes, even in the
face of express treaty provisions to the contrary. The Court in Cherokee
Nation v. Hitchcock and Lone Wolf made absolutely no effort to ground this
extraordinary power in any constitutional clause. Instead, the power-like
that in M'Intosh-was inherent, derived from the Indians' status as
dependents and the United States' ultimate control over Indian lands. The
power was both unlimited and unreviewable. While it was "presumed" that
the United States would exercise its power "by such considerations of justice
as would control a Christian people in their treatment of an ignorant and
dependent race,"'5 13 as in the immigration and territory cases, the Court
recognized no specific constitutional limits on its exercise. Finally,
Congress's exercise of the power was "a question of governmental policy"
514
and Congress's decisions were "conclusive upon the courts. ' 515
G. Inherent Power and Citizenship
The final chapter of the Indian inherent powers decisions involves the
doctrine's relationship to citizenship. The dismantling of the tribes from the
1880s to 1900s resulted in a growing number of Native Americans who had
been granted American citizenship by treaty or statue.516 In the 1905 case of
Matter of Heff Justice Brewer contended that, although Congress determined
when and how to release Indians from guardianship status, the bestowal of
citizenship evidenced an effort to "endow them with the full rights of
citizenship. ,51 7  Brewer rejected the suggestion that "because one has
Indian... blood in his veins, he is to be forever one of a special class"
subject to extraordinary federal power, regardless of his citizenship status.
518
512. S. Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. at 657.
513. Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
514. Id.
515. Id. at 568.
516. As early as 1817, a treaty with the Cherokee Nation granted 640 acres of land to each
Indian head of family who resided on lands ceded to the United States and who wished to become a
citizen of the United States. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 66 (1831)
(Thompson, J., dissenting) (describing the provisions of the treaty). The Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo with Mexico declared that all residents of the territory ceded to the United States who did
not declare Mexican citizenship became citizens of the United States. Treaty of Peace, Friendship,
Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., art. 8, 9 Stat. 922,
929-30 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo]. The Dawes Act of 1887 bestowed citizenship
on Indians who were granted allotments by statute or treaty and on Indians who separated from their
tribes and "adopted the habits of civilized life." Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch.
119, § 6, 24 Stat. 388, 390; see also COHEN, supra note 131, at 643.
517. In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 501-02 (1905).
518. Id. at508.
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Although Indians continued to hold their lands in trust, Brewer concluded
that citizenship otherwise gave an Indian full civil and political status in the
community. 519 Thus, Justice Brewer concluded, the United States could not
enforce its criminal laws barring liquor sales to Indians against an Indian
citizen, who was subject instead to the jurisdiction of the state.
520
Heff was the high water mark for equal Indian citizenship rights during
the inherent powers era, but the decision was short-lived. Partly in response
to Heff, Congress in 1906 adopted the Burke Act, which deferred Indian
citizenship under the Dawes Act until after the close of the trust period.521 In
the 1909 case United States v. Celestine, Justice Brewer interpreted the Act
as indicating "that Congress, in granting full rights of citizenship to Indians,
believed that it had been hasty" and held that citizenship did not exempt an
Indian from exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction or grant him the
"privileges and immunities" of U.S. citizens. 22 Retreating from his position
in Heff Justice Brewer reasoned that "both [parties] remained Indians by
race" and that Congress had not intended, "by the mere grant of citizenship
to renounce entirely its jurisdiction over the individual members of this
dependent race. 523 Citizenship was in no way inconsistent with the Indians'
continuing ward status.
The assertion that race was more important than citizenship in
determining Indian rights became even more overt in the 1913 case United
States v. Sandoval, which again addressed federal authority to criminalize
liquor imports into Indian lands within state boundaries. 524 The people of the
Santa Clara Pueblo, where the case arose, claimed U.S. citizenship pursuant
to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.525 Justice Van Devanter, who had repre-
sented the United States in Lone Wolf, held that the claim of citizenship in no
way limited federal power. "[C]itizenship [was] not in itself an obstacle to
the exercise by Congress of its power to enact laws for the benefit and
protection of tribal Indians. 526 Instead, the United States' guardianship of
Indians turned upon other considerations, such as Indian dependence.527
519. Id. at 509 ("[W]hen the United States grants the privileges of citizenship to an Indian,
gives to him the benefit of and requires him to be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the
State, it places him outside the reach of police regulations on the part of Congress ... .
520. Id.
521. Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, § 6, 34 Stat. 182 (1906) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 349
(2000)).
522. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 290-91 (1909).
523. Id. at 290-91 (emphasis added).
524. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 38 (1913).
525. Id. at 33 (argument for the defendant). The Pueblo had been citizens of Mexico, id. at 45,
and thus presumably had become citizens under the treaty. The Court, however, considered the
question of their citizenship status as "open." Id. at 39. See also the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
supra note 516.
526. Id. at 48 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902)).
527. Id. at 45.
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"[A]s a superior and civilized nation," the United States had the duty of
protecting "all dependent Indian communities within its borders."5 28 In the
present case, protection was warranted, Van Devanter continued, because the
Pueblo were an "ignoran[t]," unassimilated and "degraded" race:
5 29
The people of the pueblos ... [are] Indians in race, customs, and
domestic government. Always living in separate and isolated
communities, adhering to primitive modes of life, largely influenced
by superstition and fetichism [sic], and chiefly governed according to
the crude customs inherited from their ancestors, they are essentially a
simple, uninformed and inferior people.
530
To support this pseudo-anthropological analysis of the Pueblo nation,
Van Devanter cited the works of ethnologists531 and a series of reports from
U.S. Indian superintendents that described the Pueblo as insufficiently
advanced to accept the burdens of citizenship, insufficiently informed to
vote, lacking marriage institutions, and engaging in cruel and unusual
punishments, polygamy, prostitution, and secret pagan customs amounting to
"a ribald system of debauchery. 53 2 "Until the old customs and Indian prac-
tices are broken among this people," the reports observed, "we cannot hope
for a great amount of progress." 533 In other words, the critical question for
the bestowal of rights was not whether the Pueblo were citizens but whether
they were civilized. Although the Court had previously recognized the
Pueblo nation as an advanced civilization, Justice Van Devanter concluded
that that case was not based on the complete information regarding the
Pueblo character that was now available.534
Finally, in the 1916 decision United States v. Nice, Justice Van
Devanter directly reversed the holding in Heft, concluding that "[c]itizenship
is not incompatible with tribal existence or continued guardianship, and so
may be conferred without completely emancipating the Indians or placing
them beyond the reach of congressional regulations adopted for their
protection.,
535
528. Id. at 46 (citing United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886)).
529. Id. at 45.
530. Id. at 39.
531. Id at 44.
532. Id. at 42, 41-44.
533. Id. at 42; see also id. at 43 ("As long as they are permitted to live a communal life and
exercise their ancient form of government, just so long will there be ignorant and wild Indians to
civilize." (quoting the opinion of the lower court)).
534. Id at 48-49 (rejecting United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 616 (1876)) ("[The Pueblos]
are a peaceable, industrious, intelligent, honest, and virtuous people." (internal quotations omitted)).
535. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 598 (1916). Following World War I, Congress
granted citizenship to those Native Americans who had served in the military. Act of Nov. 6, 1919,
ch. 95, 41 Stat. 350. Congress in 1924 bestowed statutory citizenship on most remaining Indians,
without altering their ward status. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 433 Stat. 253.
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In short, during the inherent powers era, citizenship was insufficient,
without more, to grant Indians full membership in the American polity.
Where the Court declined to assume, in Elk, that the Fourteenth Amendment
granted citizenship to tribal members, the Court now declined to second-
guess Congress's definition of the citizenship rights of Indians.
H. The Constitutionalization of Inherent Power over Indians
The Indian plenary power doctrine has proven remarkably durable in the
last century. From the 1890s on, the Court relied on inherent power over the
Indians in cases involving the condemnation of lands and the sale of liquor
that the Court acknowledged it could have otherwise decided under the
Commerce Clause.536 As late as 1942, well after Indians were granted
citizenship, lower courts continued to portray Congress's power over tribes
as "[f]ull; entire; complete; absolute; perfect; [and] unqualified., 537 And in
1955, the Court invoked the discovery doctrine at length to hold that the
government could take lands that Indians held under original Indian title
without just compensation, because Congress's power was "supreme.
538
Natural-born citizenship for Indians born as tribal members continues to be
bestowed by statute,539 rather than as a matter of constitutional right, and
commentators have questioned whether Congress, under the plenary power
doctrine, might retain power to de-naturalize Indians.54°
536. See Nice, 241 U.S. at 599-600 (finding that Congress enjoys both constitutional
(Commerce Clause) and extraconstitutional (tribal dependence) power over tribes); Perrin v. United
States, 232 U.S. 478, 482 (1914) (stating that Congress's power to regulate liquor sales "arises in
part" from the Commerce Clause "and in part from the recognized relation of tribal Indians to the
Federal Government"); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-46 (1913) ("Not only does the
Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, but.., the
United States as a superior and civilized nation [has] the power and the duty of exercising a
fostering care and protection over [the Indians]."); Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. 641,
657-58 (1890) (upholding federal condemnation of tribal lands for a railway on Commerce Clause
and inherent powers grounds).
537. Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 134 P.2d 976, 979 (Okla. 1942) (internal quotations
omitted).
538. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279-81 (1955) ("Indian occupation of
land without government recognition of ownership creates no rights against taking or extinction by
the United States protected by the Fifth Amendment or any other principle of law."); see also
United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941) (holding that the "[e]xtinguishment
of Indian title based on aboriginal possession" raises "political, not justiciable, issues").
539. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1994).
540. The plenary power doctrine would have to supersede the Fourteenth Amendment's
recognition of naturalized citizenship, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1, and the doctrine in
Afroyim v. Rusk that naturalized citizens are protected against expatriation. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387
U.S. 253 (1967) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits Congress from involuntarily
stripping a citizen of citizenship). As David Williams has noted, statutory Indian citizenship differs
from other forms of naturalized citizenship both because Indians do not possess all the
constitutional rights of other citizens, and because, under Elk, Indians who are tribal members are
not "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" like other naturalized citizens and thus may not
be as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against denaturalization under the reasoning of
Afroyim v. Rusk. Williams nevertheless concludes that withdrawal of Indian citizenship would be
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The Court, however, also began to bring the doctrine within the folds of
the Constitution and gradually relocated the power to the Constitution's
enumerated clauses. After the Insular Cases resurrected the Territory Clause
as a source of federal power, the Court began to rely on that clause to uphold
Indian regulatory power. 541 The Court also relaxed the Indian Commerce
Clause doctrine in the post-Schechter Poultry era, and in 1974, the Court
rejected any extraconstitutional basis of the authority, holding that the power
was "drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself."542 By
1989, the Court confirmed that "the central function of the Indian Commerce
Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of
Indian affairs.,
543
The Court has also recognized some constitutional constraints on
congressional power. In the 1914 decision Perrin v. United States, the Court
adopted a "not ... purely arbitrary" standard for review of Indian legislation,
holding that Congress's plenary power "does not go beyond what is
reasonably essential to [the Indians'] protection, and ... its exercise must not
be purely arbitrary, but founded upon some reasonable basis. '544 The Court,
however, simultaneously conceded that Congress had "wide discretion" in
determining what was reasonably essential, and that "its action, unless purely
arbitrary, must be accepted and given full effect by the courts. 545 The Court
has subsequently recognized that at least rational basis due process analysis
applies to congressional management of Indian affairs.54 6 The Court corre-
spondingly has retreated from the presumption that congressional decisions
pose political questions not subject to judicial scrutiny:
The statement in Lone Wolf that the power of Congress "has always
been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the
judicial department of the government," however pertinent to the
question then before the Court of congressional power to abrogate
improper. David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians As Peoples, 38
UCLA L. REv. 759, 859-61 (1991).
541. E.g., United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 284 (1909) (relying on the Territory Clause
to hold that federal courts have jurisdiction to try crimes committed on Indian lands).
542. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974); see also McClanahan v. Ariz. Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973) ("The source of federal authority over Indian matters has
been the subject of some confusion, but it is now generally recognized that the power derives from
federal responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and for treaty making.").
543. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989); see also Stuart M.
Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106
YALE L.J. 537, 543 (1996) ("[Rjecently, the Court has moved away from Kagama's suggestion of
extraconstitutional powers and has instead grounded Congress's power over Indians... in the
Indian Commerce Clause and, at least to some extent, the Treaty Clause of Article II.").
544. Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478, 486 (1914).
545. Id.
546. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 55 (noting that the Court will review, under the Due Process
Clause, whether congressional action was "tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique
obligation toward the Indians").
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treaties has not deterred this Court, particularly in this day, from
scrutinizing Indian legislation to determine whether it violates the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.
547
The Court accordingly has applied the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause to lands that the federal government bestowed by treaty or statute to
the Indians, finding that the plenary power doctrine did not allow the United
States to take tribal lands without compensation.58 And in 1977, the
Supreme Court held that federal action affecting Indians was subject to Fifth
Amendment equal protection principles.
5 49
Nevertheless, the Court has relaxed its equal protection scrutiny in this
context, treating Indian tribes as political, rather than racial, groups and
concluding that distinctions based on Indian status are accordingly reviewed
only for a rational basis. 550 Indians today benefit in some ways from this
relaxed review in that the courts have allowed Congress to pass "protective"
legislation that bestows benefits on tribes that would not survive equal
protection scrutiny in other contexts.55'
Most notably, in its 1996 decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the
Court surprisingly held that Congress's power under the Indian Commerce
Clause was insufficient to overcome Eleventh Amendment objections to a
federal statute authorizing tribes to sue states.5 52  And in 1999, the Court
implied that the President had no extraconstitutional, inherent authority to
terminate tribal rights.553 Finally, as in the immigration area,554 the Supreme
547. Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) (citations omitted); accord
United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (holding that the Court has rejected Lone Wolfs
blanket embrace of the political question doctrine).
548. See Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497 (1937) (holding that the
government may not appropriate tribal lands without just compensation); United States v. Creek
Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935) (holding that U.S. guardianship of tribes "was subject to
limitations inhering in such a guardianship and to pertinent constitutional restrictions" and did not
authorize tribal lands held in fee simple to be taken without just compensation); Lane v. Pueblo of
Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113 (1919) (finding that a tribe possessing lands in fee simple may
maintain injunctive action against confiscation); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 678 (1912)
(holding that land rights bestowed by Congress to individual Indians are protected by the Fifth
Amendment); see also Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 237 (1997) (upholding a Fifth Amendment
takings and just compensation challenge to a federal escheat statute); United States v. Sioux Nation,
448 U.S. 371, 407-23 (1980) (upholding a suit by the Sioux nation for the 1877 taking of tribal
lands).
549. Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977) (rejecting a challenge to federal
Indian employment preferences as racially discriminatory under the Fifth Amendment).
550. Id. at 85; see also Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 (rejecting the contention that an Indian
employment preference constitutes a "racial preference").
551. Frickey, Domesticating, supra note 52, at 49-50.
552. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996); see also Ernest A. Young, State
Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 12 (1999) (discussing
Seminole Tribe).
553. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 188-89 (1999) ("The
President's power, if any, to issue the [Indian removal] order must stem either from an act of
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Court has developed sub-constitutional canons of construction that restrain
the most abusive manifestations of the plenary power doctrine by requiring a
clear statement by Congress before it can restrict Indian rights.555 The
judiciary, however, continues to give Congress broad deference in cases
involving property and tribal sovereignty,556 and "the Court has never
invalidated a statute on the ground that it violated any collective tribal
sovereignty interests.
557
Thus, over time, the Court has reinterpreted the plenary power doctrine
to be a broad federal power deriving from the Constitution's textual
provisions, which is limited to some extent by the Bill of Rights and is
subject to highly deferential judicial review. In short, the authority is treated
much like the modem foreign affairs power. What, if any, impact the
Court's recent Eleventh Amendment558 and Commerce Clause559 decisions
will have on federal power over Indians remains unclear. It is possible that
the decision in Seminole Tribe merely reflects the same willingness to
impose structural limitations on federal plenary authority that the Court
exhibited in the immigration context in INS v. Chadha,560 and that the Court
will not use its newly restrictive approach to the Commerce Clause to
substantively constrain the federal Indian power. The Court certainly has
never imposed the level of scrutiny on congressional Commerce Clause
authority over Indians that it applied in the pre-1937 interstate commerce
context. On the other hand, Seminole Tribe concluded that there is "no
principled distinction" between the Indian and Interstate Commerce Clauses
for purposes of congressional power to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment
Congress or from the Constitution itself." (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 585 (1952))).
554. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1656-79 (1992)
(arguing that courts in the immigration context have employed procedural protections in lieu of
substantive constitutional rights).
555. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 422-24 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing
canons of construction for Indian law).
556. Newton, supra note 52, at 235.
557. Frickey, Domesticating, supra note 52, at 44 n.61.
558. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that
states enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits under the Americans with Disabilities Act);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (finding state immunity from suit under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (announcing that states
are immune from suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996) (holding that states enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits by Indian tribes under
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).
559. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the Violence
Against Women Act under the Interstate Commerce Clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act as exceeding Congress's Commerce Clause
power).
560. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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immunity.561  This holding leaves open the question whether the Court's
newly reaffirmed limitations on the Interstate Commerce Clause may also
impose limits on federal power under the Indian Commerce Clause.162 It is
highly uncertain, for example, that either the Major Crimes Act or the Indian
Civil Rights Act 563 would survive Lopez-Morrison Commerce Clause
scrutiny, although at least one lower court has upheld the Major Crimes Act
against a Lopez challenge.
5 64
IV. Inherent Authority over Immigration
There is also little reason to believe that the Framers contemplated
creating a federal immigration power. One of the grievances directed against
the Crown in the Declaration of Independence was that the King had ob-
structed free immigration to the colonies.165 And at the time of the framing,
the United States generally encouraged free immigration, while various states
maintained laws authorizing the expulsion of aliens deemed undesirable. 66
In 1788, after the Constitutional Convention, the Congress of the
Confederation recommended that the several states "pass proper laws for
preventing the transportation of convicted malefactors from foreign countries
into the United States.,, 567  The action was later viewed by some as
confirming the states' primacy in regulating the entry and exit of aliens. 68
The constitutional text does not expressly address authority to regulate
immigration, and the location and scope of the immigration power were hotly
contested throughout the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century. The
Naturalization Clause authorizes Congress to "establish a uniform rule of
Naturalization,, 569 but this most clearly addresses questions of citizenship,
not admission and expulsion of aliens.5 70 The Migration Clause potentially
561. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 63.
562. United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 778 n.2 (6th Cir. 1997).
563. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 73, 77-78 (1968)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994)) (applying most provisions of the Bill of
Rights to relations between tribes and their members).
564. United States v. Lomayaoma, 86 F.3d 142, 145-46 (9th Cir. 1996).
565. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 12 (U.S. 1776) (stating that the King had
"endeavoured to prevent the population of these States" by "obstructing the Laws for Naturalization
of Foreigners; [and] refusing to pass [other laws] to encourage their migration hither").
566. As Gerald Neuman has documented, early state laws excluded aliens who were convicts,
poor, sick, disabled, free blacks, or ideologically undesirable, and barred the importation of foreign
slaves. NEUMAN, supra note 54, at 21-43.
567. 13 J. OF CONG. 105-06 (Sept. 16, 1788); see also NEUMAN, supra note 54, at 21-22
(discussing the resolution).
568. See New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 149 (1837) (Thompson, J., concurring) (describing
the act as "a strong contemporaneous expression.., that this was a power resting with the states").
569. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
570. Debates in Congress over the first naturalization law suggest that the early Congress may
have viewed the clause as creating a general federal authority over immigration. See, e.g., 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 1147-64 (Joseph Gales ed., 1790) (discussing the 1790 naturalization act); see
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offers the Constitution's most express reference to control of alien
migration. 571 Read literally, the clause suggests that Congress may prohibit
"the migration" of "persons" as well as the importation of slaves. Although
the clause is now commonly understood to refer only to the slave trade, its
applicability to broader immigration issues was a source of debate through
much of the nineteenth century.572 The Taxation Clause, which bars states
from imposing "duties or imposts" on "imports," 573 was also pointed to by
supporters of a federal immigration power, though supporters of state power
also JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 236-39
(1978). But see The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 526-27 (1849) (Woodbury, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the first naturalization laws recognized a state immigration power by allowing states to
participate in citizenship decisions).
571. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the
Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation,
not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.").
572. The meaning of the phrase "Migration or Importation" is unclear, and unfortunately, there
is little drafting history to clarify the issue. Some early commentators maintained that "migration"
and "importation" were synonyms, and that the terms "persons" and "migration" were used simply
to mollify those who wished to avoid mentioning slavery in the Constitution. See The Passenger
Cases, 48 U.S. at 513. An unsuccessful attempt was made at the Convention to strike the word
migration. See id. at 453. For a discussion of the drafting history, see id. at 453-54 (McKinley, J.,
concurring); id. at 512-13 (Daniel, J., dissenting); id. at 542-43 (Woodbury, J., dissenting). Before
the Constitution was adopted, Madison rejected the effort by Antifederalists to "pervert this clause"
by presenting it "as calculated to prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to
America." THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 267 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also
THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 280 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Jefferson contended
in the Fifth Kentucky Resolution of 1789 that the Migration Clause barred Congress from regulating
immigration prior to 1808, see Kentucky Resolution, 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 541 (J.B. Lipincott Co., 2d ed. 1907) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES], while House
Speaker John Dayton of New Jersey responded that the clause did not contemplate persons other
than slaves. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1992-93 (1798). Madison's 1799 report to the Virginia
legislature argued that the clause was limited to the slave trade. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra, at 541
[hereinafter Madison's Report]. In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall viewed the clause as
applying to both free and forced immigration. 22 U.S. 1, 216-17 ("[T]his section proves that the
power to regulate commerce applies equally to the regulations of vessels employed in transporting
men who pass from place to place voluntarily, and to those who pass involuntarily."). In the
Passenger Cases, the Supreme Court divided sharply over the applicability of the Migration Clause
to voluntary immigrants. Compare 48 U.S. at 413-14 (Wayne, J., concurring) (arguing that the
clause includes "the migration of other persons, as well as the importation of slaves"), and id. at 453
(McKinley, J., concurring) (concluding that "there are two separate and distinct classes of persons
intended to be provided for by this clause"), with id. at 476 (Taney, C.J., dissenting) (insisting that
the clause "was intended to embrace those persons only who were brought in as property"), id. at
511-14 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the clause was limited to the slave trade), and id at
542-43 (Woodbury, J., dissenting) (suggesting that "[t]he word 'migration' was probably added to
'importation' to cover slaves when regarded as persons rather than property"). In 1883, the Court
finally rejected the Migration Clause as a basis for the immigration power. New York v.
Compagnie Gdndrale Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59, 62 (1883) ("There has never been any doubt that
this clause had exclusive reference to persons of the African race.").
573. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises .... "); see also id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 ("No State shall, without the
Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its Inspection Laws .... ").
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denied that voluntary immigrants could constitute "imports. 574  As with
authority over Indians, other plausible enumerated sources of the immi-
gration power were the treaty,575 foreign commerce,576 and war powers.577
Otherwise, the Constitution is silent regarding governmental control over
aliens.
A. International Law
International law figured prominently in nineteenth century debates over
the immigration power.578  The Supreme Court's late-nineteenth-century
decisions implicated two strains of international law regarding the power of
states over aliens-the authority to bar, or "exclude," newly arriving aliens
from entering a nation's borders, and the power over resident aliens who
previously had been given permission to enter. In both cases, the Supreme
Court ultimately took the position that international law gave nations
absolute power to exclude aliens seeking admission and to deport aliens no
longer deemed desirable. Contemporary international law scholars, however,
disagreed regarding the scope of these powers, and the applicable
international law doctrines were significantly more modulated than the
Supreme Court recognized.
International law commentators generally viewed authority over foreign
nationals as deriving from international rules regarding commerce or the
state's right to self-preservation. With respect to exclusion, principles of
sovereignty and territoriality provided that states had authority to protect
themselves from undesirable aliens seeking entry, but this power was not
absolute. Writing in the 1600s, Samuel Pufendorf reasoned that admitting
strangers was among the "dut[ies] of humanity," but that no law required
countries to admit strangers who came "unnecessarily and without good
reason." 579 While "[e]very state may reach a decision ... on the admission
574. Compare The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 408 (McLean, J.) ("A tax or duty upon tonnage,
merchandise, or passengers is a regulation of commerce, and cannot be laid by a State, except under
the sanction of Congress ...."), and id. at 421 (Wayne, J., concurring) (stating that "under the
power given to Congress... it may... tax persons as well as things, as the condition of their
admission into the United States"), with id. at 506 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (stating that "alien
passengers ... never can ... be classed with the subjects of sale, barter, or traffic"), and id. at 535
(Woodbury, J., dissenting) ("An import.., does not include persons unless they are brought in as
property.").
575. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
576. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
577. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
578. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), discussed infra notes
862-918 and accompanying text; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892),
discussed infra notes 919-37 and accompanying text; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893), discussed infra notes 938-1025 and accompanying text.




of foreigners who come to it for other reasons that are necessary and
deserving of sympathy," he wrote, "no one can question the barbarity of
showing an indiscriminate hostility to those who come on a peaceful
mission. 58°
Vattel's own writings on the topic a century later were equally
ambiguous. In a passage favored by those advocating an absolute sovereign
power to exclude, Vattel wrote: "The sovereign may forbid the entrance of
his territory either to foreigners in general or in particular cases, or to certain
persons or for certain particular purposes, according as he may think it
advantageous to the state. There is nothing in all this that does not flow from
the rights of domain and sovereignty. ' '58 ' Vattel tied this qualified authority
to self-preservation, maintaining that "every nation has a right to refuse
admitting a foreigner into her territory, when he cannot enter it without
exposing the nation to evident danger, or doing her a manifest injury."
582
Vattel reasoned that exclusion of aliens required "particular and substantial
reasons," 583 including infection with contagious diseases, creation of
religious disturbance, or "just cause to fear that they will corrupt the manners
of the citizens ... or occasion any other disorder, contrary to the public
safety. 584  Accordingly, the sovereign "cannot, without particular and
important reasons, refuse permission, either to pass through or reside in the
country, to foreigners who desire it for lawful purposes." 585 Vattel's position
was further complicated by the fact that he viewed the restrictions on the
sovereign's right to exclude as largely "internal" or imperfect, governed by
the sovereign's conscience, rather than external rights which could be
enforced by other states.586 As a matter of external right, each nation was
authorized to judge for itself the necessity of any restriction.587
580. Id. at 194.
581. VATTEL, supra note 56, bk. II, ch. VIII, § 94, at 169-70. For further discussion, see James
A.R. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 804,
809 (1983) (collecting views of international publicists and concluding that "[b]efore the late 19th
century, there was little, in principle, to support the absolute exclusion of aliens").
582. VATTEL, supra note 56, bk. I, ch. XIX, § 230, at 107 (emphasis added); see also id bk. II,
ch. VIII, § 100, at 171 ("[T]he lord of a territory may, whenever he thinks proper, forbid its being
entered .... [However, under certain circumstances the lord] cannot refuse an entrance into his
territory; and.., his duty towards all mankind obliges him, on other occasions, to allow.., a
residence in his state.").
583. Id. bk. I, ch. XIX, § 230, at 108.
584. Id. at 107.
585. Id. bk. II, ch. X, § 135, at 184-85.
586. Id. Vattel's treatise generally distinguished between "external" and "perfect" obligations,
which created rights among nations whose violation could be redressed by force, and "internal" and
"imperfect" obligations, which were binding on states as a matter of conscience, merely giving
other states the right to object. Id. Preliminaries, § 17-18, at lxii. See also Nafziger, supra note
581, at 811-15; NEUMAN, supra note 54, at 11-12.
587. VATTEL, supra note 56, bk. I, ch. XIX, § 230, at 107 ("[I]t belongs to the nation to judge,
whether her circumstances will or will not justify the admission of that foreigner.").
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Robert Phillimore's 1854 treatise took an absolutist view of exclusion:
"It is a received maxim of international law that the government of a state
may prohibit the entrance of strangers into the country. '588 Even Phillimore,
however, noted that it was "the policy of wise States... to open wide the
door for the reception and naturalisation of foreigners.,, 589  Theodore
Woolsey, who wrote only a few years before the first Chinese exclusion law
was passed, opined that "sovereignty in the strictest sense authorizes a nation
to decide upon what terms it will have intercourse with foreigners and even
to shut out all mankind from its borders, 590 but qualified this statement by
noting, "Entire non-intercourse shuts a nation out from being a partner in
international law."'59 ' Thus, Woolsey concluded, "No state can exclude the
properly documented subjects of another friendly state or send them away
after they have been once admitted without definite reasons, which must be
submitted to the foreign government concerned. 5 92 Edward Creasy noted
"the perfect Right of a State to Independence gives it the power, according to
Positive International Law,... [to] place what restrictions it thinks fit on the
access of foreigners to its coasts or to its interior territories."5 93 He also
observed, however, that "the withdrawal of ancient courtesies and of
indulgences,.., would be a breach of the Comity of Nations, 594 and that
exclusions "have always been and always must be of very rare
occurrence." 595 James Reddie likewise contended that there was "no legal
right, in any state, to compel another state to admit its inhabitants,,' 596 and
that a state's "exclusive rights of dominion ... would authorize the denial of
entry, or passage to all foreigners., 597 He noted, however, that European
powers generally accorded each other "liberty of entry, passage and
residence." 598 In his proposed international law code of 1876, which he
contended reflected existing practice, David Dudley Field observed, "No
nation has the right to interdict, absolutely, the entrance of foreigners into its
territory," and that "[m]embers of any nation... may freely enter, reside and
become domiciled in any other nation,.., subject to the revenue, sanitary,
588. 1 ROBERT PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW, pt. III, ch. X, at
233 (1854).
589. Id. ch. XVIII, at 348.
590. WOOLSEY, supra note 141, ch. III, § 59, at 93.
591. Id. at 94.
592. Id; accord A.G. HEFFTER, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE L'EUROPE § 33 (Jules Bergson
trans., 4th ed. 1883). See also EDWARD S. CREASY, FIRST PLATFORM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
200-01 (1876) (discussing the Woolsey and Heffier rule).
593. CREASY, supra note 592, at 196.
594. Id.
595. Id. at 197.
596. JAMES REDDIE, INQUIRIES INTO INTERNATIONAL LAW 208 (1842).
597. Id. at 204.
598. Id. at 205.
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police and other laws of the country. '599 Field noted that international law
recognized exceptions for paupers, criminals, and enemy aliens. 600  Field
contended that although international law originally took a more absolutist
view toward a state's authority to exclude, the stringent position of
Phillimore and Martens was not in harmony with the general spirit of
international law, as now manifested, 60 1 and that the more generous position
was now settled by many international treaties.
60 2
International law rules regarding obligations toward resident aliens were
also somewhat ambiguous. Commentators recognized that lawfully admitted
aliens were "entitled to the ordinary protection of person and property" even
if not entitled to citizenship.6 3 Vattel maintained that the sovereign who
admitted aliens "engages to protect them as his own subjects, and to afford
them perfect security, as far as depends on him., 60 4 A number of commen-
tators saw some limitation on the power of the state to expel foreign
residents, once duly admitted. Pufendorf interpreted Grotius and St.
Ambrose as prohibiting the expulsion of foreigners, even in cases of
famine. 60 5  Pufendorf himself concluded that "to expel without probable
cause guests and strangers, once admitted, surely savours of inhumanity and
disdain."6°6 Denizens, or long-term lawful alien residents, were recognized
by some international law commentators as possessing greater rights than
aliens seeking entry or temporary residence. 60 7  Two centuries after
Pufendorf, Creasy, for example, took the position that
it is a heinous wrong to withdraw suddenly privileges,.., and to
practice spoliation, imprisonment, or ruinous expulsion upon those
foreigners who have been exercising them, in all cases where long
usage has nurtured a well-founded expectation on the part of the
foreigners that such privileges would continue to be respected. In
599. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, OUTLINES OF AN INTERNATIONAL CODE 163-64 (photo. reprint
2001) (2d ed. 1876) (citing JAMES KENT, COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (J.T. Arby
ed., 2d ed. 1878)).
600. Id. at 164.
601. Id. at 165.
602. Id. at 164.
603. REDDIE, supra note 596, at 208 ("The foreigners thus admitted are, of course, not entitled
to the rights of citizens, nor to any general political or municipal privileges; they are aliens, unless
naturalized in the manner prescribed by the internal law of the particular state. But, even as aliens,
they are entitled to the ordinary protection of person and property.").
604. VATrEL, supra note 56, bk. II, ch. VIII, § 104, at 173.
605. PUFENDORF, supra note 579, bk. II1, ch. III, § 9, at 365-66.
606. Id. at 365.
607. VATTEL, supra note 56, bk. I, ch. XIX, § 213, at 101 (distinguishing between alien
inhabitants, who were "[b]ound to the society by their residence," but enjoyed "only the advantages
which the law or custom gives them," and perpetual inhabitants, who were "a kind of citizens of an
inferior order"); WOOLSEY, supra note 141, § 62, at 98-99 (arguing that foreigners admitted to a
country should be accorded "all private rights," though the law may "place them in an inferior
position to the native-born subject").
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such cases there is an implied promise on the part of the recipient
608nation to continue to respect those privileges.
David Dudley Field provided in his model code that "[n]o nation can expel
the members of another nation without special cause, which must be
explained to the nation the members of which are expelled., 609  Field
contended that this rule comported with that of Woolsey and Heffter, and
was "more reasonable and liberal" than the rule laid down by Phillimore.61 °
On the other hand, Thdodore Ortolan maintained that under
international law the resident alien, who was "not part of the nation," was
received into a foreign state's territory "by simple tolerance, and in no way
by obligation," though he recognized that this international law rule was
subject to the domestic laws of each state. 61' Phillimore took a more abso-
lutist view of expulsion in his public international law treatise. Given the
state's power to prohibit entry, the state equally could "regulate the
conditions under which [foreigners] shall be allowed to remain" or "compel
their departure from it." 612 Phillimore noted that the European custom had
been to order the departure of aliens in times of revolution, though such laws
had generally been of very limited duration.613 In his later volume on private
international law, however, Phillimore took a more qualified approach:
If by long usage and custom [foreigners] have been allowed to enjoy
certain rights; and these, though originally the fruit of free concession,
are violently, suddenly, and without equitable notice, withdrawn from
them; an injury is done to them, for which it is the duty of their own
State to obtain reparation, the denial of which justifies a recourse to
reprisals or war ....614
Accordingly, by the time of the Chinese Exclusion decision in 1889 and its
progeny, international law doctrine itself was qualified regarding the power
to exclude or expel aliens.
B. The Alien Act
Both the scope of constitutional and international law authority over
aliens and the question of inherent powers were central to the debates over
608. CREASY, supra note 592, at 201.
609. FIELD, supra note 599, at 165.
610. Id.
611. THtODORE ORTOLAN, RtGELES INTERNATIONALES ET DIPLOMATE DE LA MER, bk. II, ch.
XIV, at 297 (Author trans., Paris, Pon. 4th ed. 1864) (1845).
612. 1 PHILLIMORE, supra note 588, pt. III, ch. X, at 233. See also I id pt. Ill, ch. XXI, at 407
(noting "the right of the State, into which he has migrated, to send the foreign citizen back to his
own home"). Phillimore acknowledged, however, that aliens who had taken up permanent
residence in another state were "de facto though not de jure citizens of the country of their
[domicile]." I id ch. XVIII, at 347.
613. 1 id. ch. X, at 233.
614. 4 PHILLIMORE, supra note 588, ch. I, at 3.
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the Alien Act of 1798. The Act, which was the partner of the infamous
Sedition Act, authorized the President to summarily expel any alien based on
a suspicion of dangerousness.61 5 The Act was sponsored by the Adams ad-
ministration as part of a package of xenophobic legislation targeting aliens
and the Jeffersonian Republicans during the tensions that led to the
undeclared war with France.616 The Alien Act's indiscriminate application to
all aliens, including lawful, friendly resident aliens, provoked a significant
controversy about the rights of aliens and the scope of federal power. 617 The
dispute culminated in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, the
February 1799 House Report and statements of northern states drafted in
response to the resolutions, and Madison's 1800 Report to the Virginia
Legislature on the Virginia Resolutions. The debate on federal power over
aliens formed part of the broader controversy regarding states' rights and the
political struggle for predominance between Adams and Jefferson.618
The controversy over the Alien Act presaged the legal controversy of
the late 1800s over the Chinese Exclusion laws and forged many of the
615. Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798). The Act established a compulsory registration
requirement for foreign residents and authorized the President "to order all such aliens as he shall
judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to
suspect are concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the government thereof, to
depart out of the territory of the United States." Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 571. Aliens ordered to depart
who were "found at large... after the time limited in such order for his departure... [would], on
conviction thereof, be imprisoned for a term." Id. The Act expired by its own terms on June 25,
1800.
616. In response to the XYZ affair and perceived interference in U.S. domestic and foreign
policies by hostile European powers and French revolutionaries, Congress adopted the Sedition Act,
ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596, and extended the residency requirement for naturalization from five to fourteen
years. Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, § 1, 1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802). In addition to the notorious
Alien Act, Congress adopted a more specific "Alien Enemies Act," which incorporated established
principles of international law regarding alien subjects of a hostile power, and which was
uncontroversially recognized as a proper exercise of the war powers for the expulsion of enemy
aliens. Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577. A similar version of the Alien Enemies Act remains
on the books today. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-23 (1994). For further discussion of the background to
the Act, see JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 3-22 (1956) (arguing that "[d]espite its close association with these
diplomatic events, the legislation was the result of a move directed against domestic dissention and
disaffection rather than foreign danger") and William F. Swindler, Seditious Aliens and Native
"Seditionists ", 1984 Y.B. SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY 12-14 (citing the influence of
the French Revolution and the presence of French agents in America as context for the Act). In the
weeks immediately surrounding the adoption of the Alien Act, Congress also suspended
commercial intercourse with France, Act of June 13, 1798, ch. 55, 1 Stat. 565, authorized the
defense of U.S. merchant vessels, Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 60, 1 Stat. 572, terminated U.S. treaties
with France, Act of July 7, 1798, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578, and authorized the capture of French war
vessels, Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578.
617. The ensuing discussion owes a particular debt to the eloquent discussion of the theories of
constitutional law prevailing in the debates over the Alien and Sedition Acts set forth in Gerald L.
Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 927-38 (1991); see also NEUMAN, supra note
54, at 52-60.
618. Most aliens at the time supported the Jeffersonian Republicans. SMITH, supra note 616, at
22-25.
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positions that reemerged at that time, including arguments regarding
sovereignty, international law, and the constitutional rights of aliens.
However, arguments in 1798 and 1799 that the source of the power to expel
aliens derived from inherent powers played a minimal role in the debates.
Both supporters and opponents of the Act contended that while international
law established that a sovereign nation might possibly exercise such power
over aliens, the constitutional distribution of powers determined whether and
by whom the power could be exercised in the United States. In other words,
while many opponents conceded that international law would allow a
sovereign to exercise this power, few if any supporters claimed that this
international law principle alone could authorize the United States to exercise
this power.
The opening volley in the House debate on the constitutionality of the
Act framed the question in a manner that was, for the most part, accepted
throughout the debate. Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania, a Jeffersonian and
opponent of the Act, stated that
it must be agreed by all that every nation had a right to permit or
exclude alien friends from entering within the bounds of their society.
This is a right inherent in every independent nation; but that power is
vested, according to the Constitutions of different countries, in one or
other branch of the Government. In this country, he contended, that
the power to admit, or to exclude alien friends, does solely belong to
each individual State, and that the General Government has no power
over them, and therefore, that all the provisions in this bill [are]
perfectly unconstitutional.619
Gallatin continued by arguing that the bill was not within the enumerated
powers of the national government. 620 By contrast, some supporters con-
cluded that the international law rule was incorporated into the Constitution's
enumerated clauses, and that Congress could authorize the expulsion of
friendly aliens under the war powers and other constitutional clauses.
Accordingly, the House Report defending the Act invoked international law
in support of the power to expel, but ultimately lodged the power in the
Constitution:
It is contended that Congress have no power to pass a law for
removing aliens.
• . . To this it is answered, that the asylum given by a nation to
foreigners, is mere matter of favor, resumable at the public will. On
this point, abundant authorities might be adduced, but the common
practice of nations attests the principle.
619. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1955 (1798).
620. Id. ("If there is any clause in the Constitution which prohibits individual States from
exercising this power, or which gives it to the General Government, he should be glad to have it
pointed out .... ).
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... The right of removing aliens, as an incident to the power of war
and peace, according to the theory of the Constitution, belongs to the
Government of the United States.
621
The Report further invoked the duty to protect states from invasion and the
Necessary and Proper Clause as authority for the Act.622
In the debates, a number of individual supporters offered arguments that
relied heavily on sovereignty and referred loosely to a possible enumerated
source of the power. Thus, William Gordon of New Hampshire argued that
the power involved "[t]he sovereign power of every nation•.. to protect
itself,,623 but Gordon ultimately concluded that this power was implied in
"the power of making war, and providing for the general welfare." 624 Samuel
Sewall of Massachusetts asserted a somewhat convoluted argument that sov-
ereignty lay in the national government, as established by the Constitution,
625
but he ultimately located the authority in the Commerce and Migration
Clauses.626 Harrison Gray Otis of Massachusetts, a key Federalist leader on
the bill, argued broadly that "it was the design of the Federal Constitution to
embrace all our exterior relations" and suggested obliquely that the power lay
in the common defense.627 Otis later viewed the legal question as a tension
between the sovereign authority of a nation to forbid the entrance of
foreigners, which was incidental to the commerce and war powers, and the
Migration Clause, which constrained the power to some extent until 1808.628
The purest inherent powers argument came from Samuel W. Dana of
Connecticut, who argued from self-preservation:
621. Report of the select committee of the House of Representatives, made to the House of
Representatives on Feb. 21, 1799, 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2986 (1799) [hereinafter House Report].
For Gallatin's response, see 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2994 (1799) ("To admit the first position [that
every nation has a power at will to admit and to remove aliens] in its full extent does not destroy the
force of the objection; for that objection rests not on a supposition that the power of removing aliens
does not exist in the nation; but on the principle that it is not one of those granted by the nation to
the General Government ... .
622. Id.
623. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1983-84 (1798).
624. Id. at 1984.
625. Id. at 1957 ("The Constitution, therefore, he said, in the outset, establishes the sovereignty
of the United States, and that sovereignty must reside in the Government of the United States.").
626. Id. at 1957-58.
627. Id. at 1986 ("If Congress has the right to defend the Union, it has certainly a right to
prepare for defense.").
628. Id. at 2018. See also Debate on the Virginia Resolutions, reprinted in THE VIRGINIA
REPORT OF 1799-1800, at 31, 100-01 (1850) [hereinafter Debate on the Virginia Resolutions]
(statement of William Cowan). "The rights of citizens and aliens," he thought, "had been
confounded." He believed their rights were to be measured by, "as to citizens, the Constitution," as
to aliens, the law of nations. "Every sovereign nation ... was possessed of certain rights. Amongst
them the right to govern aliens was a perfect right. It vested a power to restrain them." Cowan
ultimately located this power in the power to repel invasions and the Necessary and Proper Clause.
See also id. at 72 (statement of Archibald Magill) (invoking Vattel's view of power over aliens and
arguing that "the safety of a nation could not be secured, without such a power.., being deposited
somewhere").
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There is one power, Mr. D. said, inherent and common in every form
of Government, which is founded upon any rational principles of
policy, which is the power of preserving itself.... The question then
arises, whether it is not consistent with that power to pass a law for the
purposes of removing [aliens] from the country ....629
In the Virginia Legislature, George Keith Taylor cited Vattel and
Blackstone's Commentaries to demonstrate that under the law of nations,
states could admit or expel aliens as a matter of grace. 630 Although Taylor
appeared to suggest that in the absence of constitutional authority for the
power, the international law norm still controlled,631 he ultimately concluded
that the power could be derived from the powers of Congress "to define and
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and against the law
of nations," and to protect states against invasion, and the Republican Form
of Government Clause.6 32
Finally, arguments from necessity in light of the French hostilities
played a prominent role in the defense of the Act.633  In its Answer to the
Resolutions, the Massachusetts legislature observed that at the time of the
Act's passage, the United States had been "threatened with actual invasion;
had been driven, by the unjust and ambitious conduct of the French
government, into warlike preparations, expensive and burdensome; and had
then, within the bosom of the country, thousands of aliens, who, we doubt
not, were ready to cooperate in any external attack., 634  Under such
circumstances, the legislature argued, "It cannot be seriously believed that
the United States should have waited till the poniard had in fact been
629. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1969-70 (1798). Representative John Wilkes Kittera, of
Pennsylvania, similarly argued:
The power proposed to be exercised by this bill is exercised by every Government
upon earth, whether despotic or democratic .... It is a right which every man
exercises in his own house, by turning out of it, without ceremony, any person whom
he thinks dangerous to the peace and welfare of his family. Indeed it was absurd, in
the extreme, to be told that the States might exercise this power, but that the United
States could not exercise it.
Id. at 2016.
630. Debate on the Virginia Resolutions, supra note 628, at 31-32 (statement of George Keith
Taylor).
631. Id. at 31 ("If there were nothing then, he said, in the Constitution of the United States,
respecting the migration of persons, the doctrine of the law of nations which he had read, was
sound, and the general government might by that lawfully restrain or regulate the entry of aliens,
and order them away if necessary.").
632. Id. at 32-33.
633. The House Report noted that "though the United States, at the time of passing this act,
were not in a state of declared war, they were in a state of partial hostility, and had power, by law,
to provide.., for removing dangerous aliens." House Report, supra note 621, at 2987.
634. Answer of the States-Massachusetts, adopted Feb. 13, 1799, 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 572, at 535, cited in Brief for Appellant at 48-49, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S.
581 (1889) (No. 1446).
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plunged. ' '635 In contrast to invocations of necessity later in the century, how-
ever, necessity generally was used to support broad interpretations of the
enumerated clauses. The House Report accordingly argued that the power
must not be prohibited by the Migration Clause, since the measure was a
necessary expedient, and any necessary powers not held by the State
governments under the Constitution must be possessed by the national
government. Since the Constitution gave no power to the states to remove
aliens, the national government must have the power. Otherwise, "there
would be no authority in the country empowered to send away dangerous
aliens, which cannot be admitted.,
636
Thus, despite some loose rhetoric regarding the powers of the national
government, supporters of the Alien Act primarily concentrated their
arguments on the presence or absence of an enumerated federal power to
expel aliens, and the majority of the debate concerned the meaning and
import of various clauses of the Constitution.637 The debates demonstrated
both the supporters' determination to find enumerated support for the power
and the difficulty the express clauses posed for this search.
If the Alien Act debates provided little basis for the contention that the
government possessed an inherent, extraconstitutional source of authority
over aliens, however, supporters did clearly articulate the view that aliens
lacked recourse to the Constitution's affirmative protections.638 One central
635. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 572, at 535; House Report, supra note 621, at 2987.
636. House Report, supra note 621, at 2987. See also 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1985 (1798)
(statement of Rep. William Gordon of New Hampshire) ("If no law of this kind was passed, it
would be in the power of an individual State to introduce such a number of aliens into the country,
as might not only be dangerous, but as might be sufficient to overturn the Government, and
introduce the greatest confusion in the country .... To suppose [that the General Government is so
deficient in power] would be to suppose that the very existence of the Union is in the power of a
single State."); Debate on the Virginia Resolutions, supra note 628, at 32 (statement of George
Keith Taylor) ("If the general government ... possessed not the power of removal, one great
mischief of a general nature, which it was intended to remedy, would remain as before.").
637. Supporters of the Act relied primarily on the war power and the Common Defence and
General Welfare clauses, as discussed above. Supporters also relied on the Republican
Government, Commerce, and Migration Clauses. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1965-66 (1798)
(statement of Rep. James Asheton Bayard of Delaware); id. at 1991 (statement of Rep. Robert
Goodloe Harper of South Carolina); id at 1994 (statement of Rep. Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey);
Answer of the States-Massachusetts, 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 572, at 534-35.
638. Opponents argued that the Act could not be justified under any enumerated power. See,
e.g., Madison's Report, supra note 572, at 546; Virginia Resolution of 1798, 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 572, at 528; Kentucky Resolution of 1798, 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 572, at 541.
They also argued that even if such a power could be found, the Act violated express provisions of
the Constitution. Opponents argued primarily that the Act expressly violated the Migration
Clause's prohibition of federal regulation of migration prior to 1808, e.g., Kentucky Resolution of
1798, supra, and the Habeas Corpus, Due Process, and Jury Trial Clauses. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF
CONG. 1955-57 (1798) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania); Kentucky Resolution,
supra, at 541-42 (arguing that the Act violated due process and the Sixth Amendment). Finally,
opponents argued that the enormous discretionary power the Act granted to the Executive violated
the Constitution's careful separation of powers and the Article III command that the judicial power
should be vested in the courts. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1954-57 (1798) (statement of Albert
[Vol. 81:1
2002] Powers Inherent in Sovereignty
contention of Jeffersonian opponents of the Act was that it violated various
individual rights protections. In response, having established that the power
to expel derived from some constitutional source, Hamiltonian Federalists
argued from social contract theory that the Constitution imposed no limits on
the exercise of the power, since aliens were not parties to that document. As
the House Report on the Alien Act stated,
the Constitution was made for citizens, not for aliens, who of
consequence have no rights under it, but remain in the country and
enjoy the benefits of the laws, not as a matter of right, but merely as a
matter of favor and permission, which... may be withdrawn
whenever the Government charged with the general welfare shall
judge their further continuance dangerous.639
"The citizen," the House Report observed, "being a member of the society,"
could not be disenfranchised other than following conviction by a jury trial.
Aliens, however, could be removed "merely... from motives" of policy or
security. 640 Their removal was not a punishment, but the withdrawal "of an
indulgence ... which we are in no manner bound to grant or continue.' 64'
Otis of Massachusetts likewise contended that "upon reading the
Constitution, [one] found that 'we the people of the United States,' were the
only parties concerned in making that instrument. He found nothing in it
Gallatin); 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2993-3002 (1799) (statement of Albert Gallatin); Madison's Report,
supra, at 559-60.
639. House Report, supra note 621, at 2987. See also Answer of the States-Massachusetts, 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 572, at 534-35 (arguing that the Alien Act applied to "a description
of persons whose rights were not particularly contemplated in the Constitution of the United States,
who are entitled only to a temporary protection while they yield a temporary allegiance-a
protection which ought to be withdrawn whenever they become 'dangerous' ... or...
'treasonable"'); Answer to the Resolutions of the State of Kentucky, Oct. 29, 1799, in 4 RECORDS
OF THE GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF VERMONT 525, 528 (1876) (stating that "we
never conjectured that aliens were any party to the federal compact; we never knew that aliens had
any rights among us, except what they derived from the law of nations, and rights of hospitality");
Debate on the Virginia Resolutions, supra note 628, at 34 (statement of George Keith Taylor)
(arguing that the right to jury trial was not violated because "aliens were not a party to the compact"
and only enjoyed rights under natural law); id. at 73 (statement of Archibald Magill); id. at 102
(statement of William Cowan) ("Aliens were entitled to their privileges from a principle of the law
of nations, and not under the Constitution." An interpretation that aliens were "persons" for
purposes of the Constitution might establish that "an Indian or a Negro" was equally entitled, "[b]ut
none of these were parties to the Constitution."); ADDRESS OF THE MINORITY IN THE VIRGINIA
LEGISLATURE TO THE PEOPLE OF THAT STATE; CONTAINING A VINDICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS 9-10, microformed on AMERICAN
ANTIQUARIAN SOCIETY, EARLY AMERICAN IMPRINTS 1639-1800 (Evans No. 36635) (arguing that
"the right of remaining in our country is vested in no alien; he enters and remains by the courtesy of
the sovereign power, and that courtesy may at pleasure be withdrawn").
640. House Report, supra note 621, at 2987.
641. Id. See also Debate on the Virginia Resolutions, supra note 628, at 100-01 (statement of
William Cowan) ("The rights of citizens and aliens, he thought, had been confounded."). Cowan
believed their rights were to be measured "as to citizens, [by] the Constitution, as to aliens, [by] the
law of nations." Id.
Texas Law Review
which bound us to fraternize with the whole world., 642 Accordingly, if an
enumerated source of authority could be found, the Constitution's express
individual rights clauses would not stymie the exercise of that power.
In an approach that directly foreshadowed the analysis in Curtiss-
Wright, Pennsylvania state court judge Alexander Addison combined social
contract and territoriality principles to argue that the restrictions of the
Constitution applied only to domestic affairs. "The restrictions of the
constitution," he argued, were "not restrictions of external and national right,
but of internal and municipal right." Because aliens were not "parties and
subjects to the constitution," but foreign subjects, authority over them was
"to be measured ... [only] by external.., law."
643
Jefferson and Madison, who ghost-authored the Kentucky and Virginia
Resolutions, and their followers disagreed with the supporters' interpretation
of international law regarding aliens, the enumerated powers doctrine, and
the protection aliens enjoyed under the Constitution. In his 1800 Report to
the Virginia Legislature, which summarized and elaborated on the arguments
in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions from the year before, Madison
challenged the assumption that the power to expel friendly aliens was con-
sistent with international law. The law of nations, he contended, authorized
only the expulsion of alien enemies, not alien friends. 644 "Alien enemies are
under the law of nations, and liable to be punished for offen[s]es against it.
Alien friends... are under the municipal law, and must be tried and pun-
ished according to that law only. 645 Even if the admission of friendly aliens
was a matter of discretion under international law, he argued, once admitted
to the country, the grant could not be rescinded. Like a grant of land, a
642. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2018 (1798) (remarks of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis of Massachusetts);
see also id. at 1984-85 (remarks of Rep. William Gordon of New Hampshire) (arguing that the
Constitution was not formed for the use and benefit of aliens); Debate on the Virginia Resolutions,
supra note 628, at 34 (statement of George Keith Taylor) (arguing that "aliens not being a party to
the compact, were not bound by it to the performance of any particular duty, nor did it confer upon
them any rights"); id. at 105 (statement of Henry Lee) ("It was wonderfully kind, he said, in our
fathers to devote their time and money to the care of the Turk, Gaul, and Indian, when the proper
object was that of their children.").
643. ALEXANDER ADDISON, ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE VIRGINIA
ASSEMBLY (1800), reprinted in 2 CHARLES S. HYNEMAN & DONALD S. LUTZ, AMERICAN
POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805, at 1070 (1983). For further
discussion of Addison's defense of the Alien Act, see NEUMAN, supra note 54, at 55-56.
644. Madison argued:
[T]he general practice of nations distinguishes between alien friends and alien enemies.
The latter it has proceeded against, according to the law of nations, by expelling them
as enemies. The former it has considered as under a local and temporary allegiance,
and entitled to a correspondent protection. If contrary instances are to be found in
barbarous countries, under undefined prerogatives, or amid revolutionary dangers, they
will not be deemed fit precedents for the government of the United States, even if not
beyond its constitutional authority.
Madison's Report, supra note 572, at 557. The Report was adopted by the Virginia Legislature in
1800. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 572, at 546.
645. Madison's Report, supra note 572, at 556.
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pardon, or a naturalization decision, the original bestowal may have been
discretionary, but could not be revoked without good reason.646
If supporters of the Act attempted to fit the expulsion of friendly aliens
into the constitutional framework, its opponents characterized the Act as
relying on extraconstitutional powers. Even if international law did authorize
the expulsion of friendly aliens, opponents contended, that fact did not
overcome the limitations of the enumerated powers doctrine.647 Madison
emphasized that the Constitution did not give the national government and
the states all the powers enjoyed by other sovereign nations. International
law might inform the meaning of constitutional provisions, such as the war
power.64 8 But powers authorized by international law were both distributed
and limited by the Constitution. "There are powers exercised by most other
governments," Madison noted, "which, in the United States, are withheld by
the people both from the general government and from the state
governments." 649  John Taylor of Virginia objected strenuously to the
suggestion that either sovereignty or international law should expand the
powers of the national government:
This doctrine of the rights of sovereignty was as dangerous as false.
Dangerous, because its extent could be never forseen; false, as
violating the idea of limiting a government by constitutional rules.
From this unlimited source, the British Parliament derives its claim of
unlimited power. King, lords and commons, because sovereign, may
do everything. If it was admitted here, .... it not only would absorb
the... [powers] arising from the laws of nations, but also the royal
prerogatives, and whatever else it bestows upon the British
Parliament. Such a sovereignty would speedily swallow up the state
governments, consolidate the Union, and terminate in monarchy.
650
As Taylor put it, the federal government possessed solely enumerated
powers; it could not "at pleasure dip [its] hands into the inexhaustible
treasuries of the ... law of nations., 651  Gallatin equally objected to the
suggestion that necessity could justify the power.652
646. Id. ("[l]t cannot be a true inference, that, because the admission of an alien is a favor, the
favor may be revoked at pleasure.").
647. See, e.g., Debate on the Virginia Resolutions, supra note 628, at 68-69 (statement of
James Barbour) (noting that Vattel recognized that the rights of aliens were governed by both
international and domestic law).
648. Cf 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1980 (1798) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania)
("By virtue of that [war] power, and in order to carry it into effect, Congress could dispose of the
persons and property of alien enemies as it sees fit, provided it be according to the laws of nations
and to treaties.") (emphasis added).
649. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 572, at 559.
650. Debate on the Virginia Resolutions, supra note 628, at 118 (statement of John Taylor).
651. Id. at 115-16 (statement of John Taylor); JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED
AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 279-89 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1820).
652. According to Gallatin:
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Accordingly, while the national government had power under the
Constitution's war powers to expel enemy aliens during hostilities, no similar
power existed to expel friendly aliens who had been admitted to reside in the
United States.653 The Act thus was "void, and of no force. 654
Madison also accused the Federalists of inverting the enumerated
powers doctrine. The assumption, he wrote, "that the powers supposed to be
necessary, which are not so given to the state governments, must reside in
this government of the United States,', 655 was inapplicable to the United
States, whose powers were cautiously "delegated and defined., 656  Indeed,
the Federalists' assertion of this view was so "new" and "extraordinary" as to
strike "radically at the political system of America.,
657
Finally, the Act's opponents rejected the suggestion that the
Constitution did not protect aliens. The mere fact that aliens were not parties
to the Constitution, Madison argued, did not establish that Congress had
absolute power over them, since "[t]he parties to the Constitution may have
granted, or retained, or modified, the [international law] power over aliens,
without regard to that particular consideration.', 658 The determining factor
was the Constitution's text, which spoke of the rights of "persons" and
constraints on governmental action, and did not limit its protections to
citizens. 659 The Act thus violated the constitutional rights of aliens to habeas
[The supposition] that there must exist certain general powers in Congress which are
equal to meet any possible case... is contrary to the Constitution, for that has put
limits to the powers of the Government, and has said certain things shall not be done
by it. For instance, it might be thought necessary, though neither an invasion nor a
rebellion had taken place, to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act .... But the Constitution
would be directly against such a motion.... So that this Government cannot do
everything which the gentleman may suppose necessary to be done.
8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1977 (1798) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania); see also id
at 1969 (statement of Albert Gallatin) ("There are other mischiefs which might be done, against
which the Federal Constitution makes no provision. Persons might burn our towns and slay our
inhabitants. But our Constitution goes upon an idea that there are State Governments who divide
the powers of Government with the Federal Government.").
653. Madison's Report, supra note 572, at 554.
654. Kentucky Resolution of 1798 and 1799, 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 572, at 541. See
also Virginia Resolution of 1798, 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 572, at 528 (maintaining that
the Alien Act "exercises a power ... [nowhere] delegated" to the federal government).
655. Madison's Report, supra note 572, at 559.
656. Id.
657. Id. at 558.
658. Id. at 556.
659. Albert Gallatin, who led Jeffersonian Republicans in the House, for example, noted that
the Habeas and Due Process Clauses, and the right to jury trial, all applied to persons, not
"citizens." 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1956 (1798) (discussing habeas and due process); id. at 1981
(discussing the right to jury trial). See also Debate on the Virginia Resolutions, supra note 628, at
24-25 (statement of John Taylor) (arguing that the "Constitution literally reached aliens, by using in
all places the term 'persons,' not 'natives"'). In the Virginia Debates, John Allen contended that,
under the law of nations, aliens could not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without a trial by
jury. Id. at 53.
[Vol. 8 1:1
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty
corpus, due process, and a jury trial.66 ° In the House debate, Edward
Livingston of Virginia offered an eloquent reply to the Federalists' social
contract argument:
[W]e are told that the Constitutional compact was made between
citizens only, and that, therefore, its provisions were not intended to
extend to aliens, and that this acting only on them, is, therefore, not
forbidden by the Constitution. But, unfortunately .... the Constitution
expressly excludes any idea of this distinction; it speaks of all 'judicial
power,' 'all trials for crimes,' all 'criminal prosecutions,' all 'persons
accused.' No distinction between citizen and alien, between high or
low, friends or opposers to the Executive power, republican and
royalist. All are entitled to the same equal distribution of justice, to
the same humane provision to protect their innocence; all are liable to
the same punishment that awaits their guilt.
661
Opponents of the Act also disputed the logical consequences of the
Federalists' social contract approach. As Madison put it:
[A] more direct reply is, that it does not follow, because aliens are not
parties to the Constitution, as citizens are parties to it, that, whilst they
actually conform to it, they have no right to its protection .... [A]s
they owe, on one hand, a temporary obedience, they are entitled, in
return, to their protection and advantage.
662
Thus, the national government did not enjoy any greater powers over friendly
aliens than it did over citizens.
In sum, supporters of the Act contended that international law
authorized the expulsion of friendly aliens, and argued from necessity that
the national government must have the power to expel aliens, as one held by
all sovereign states. They generally sought to locate this sovereign authority
in some enumerated power, though some Federalist supporters relied directly
on an inherent powers argument. Supporters also contended that aliens, as
outsiders to the social contract, could not invoke the Constitution's
protections. Conversely, opponents of the Act denied that international law
authorized the expulsion of aliens and argued that the Constitution did not
bestow full international law authority over aliens on the national
government. National power over aliens must be determined from the
Constitution's provisions, according to ordinary enumerated powers analysis.
Finally, opponents maintained that the Constitution's text clearly included
660. See supra note 638.
661. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2012 (1798) (statement of Rep. Edward Livingston of New York).
662. Madison's Report, supra note 572, at 556. See also 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2012 (1798)
(statement of Edward Livingston) ("It is an acknowledged principle.., that alien friends,....
residing among us, are entitled to the protection of our laws, and that during their residence, they
owe a temporary allegiance to our Government. If they are accused of violating this allegiance, the
same laws which interpose in the case of a citizen must determine the truth of the accusation, and if
found guilty they are liable to the same punishment.").
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aliens in its protections. The Alien Act expired in 1800 of its own terms,
without judicial resolution of these issues. Although John Adams signed
expulsion orders for several aliens under the Act, the targeted individuals
either evaded arrest or left the country of their own accord. 663  The Act
became notorious, and by 1832, Vice President John C. Calhoun asserted that
the unconstitutionality of the Alien and Sedition laws was "settled.,
664
Justice Story gave no opinion regarding the Act's legality in his
Commentaries, predicting that the Act was "not likely to be renewed" and
had "left no permanent traces in the constitutional jurisprudence of the
country. 6 65
C. Immigration and Slavery
The 1798 and 1799 debates over federal control of aliens occurred
against a backdrop of political concerns about the power of Federalists to
expel Jeffersonian aliens, as well as concerns about the power of states to
control the entry of undesirable aliens-including slaves and free blacks-
into their territories. Southern states feared that free blacks from the North
and the West Indies would provoke dissension and revolt among the slaves in
their territories-a fear that was exacerbated by the successful Haitian slave
revolt in 1802. Southern states eventually adopted legislation excluding free
blacks. In coastal states, these laws included restrictions on the movement of
black seamen in port, generally providing for their imprisonment during the
period the ship was in port.666 Because free blacks were citizens in some
northern states, slaveholding states felt that they could maintain the right to
exclude free blacks only by asserting the power to exclude all persons
deemed dangerous or injurious to their interests.667 Pro-slavery and states'
rights advocates thus viewed regulation of immigration as intimately related
to state police powers.
Federal activity in the immigration area was minimal during the pre-
Civil War period. The federal government's express policy was to encourage
settlement in the new nation, and naturalization was extended to free white
663. NEUMAN, supra note 54, at 60.
664. Letter of Aug. 28, 1832 from Vice President Calhoun to Governor Hamilton, quoted in 2
STORY, supra note 288, bk. III, ch. XXVII, § 1294, at 174 n.i. In his edition of Story's
Commentaries, Judge Cooley disagreed with Calhoun's view that the Act's unconstitutionality had
been established. Id. at 175 n.1 ("The Alien and Sedition acts were, beyond all question,
condemned by public sentiment, but that the condemnation, ... is placed on the ground of want of
constitutional power is by no means clear.").
665. STORY, supra note 288, bk. III, ch. XXVII, §§ 648-49, at 464-65.
666. Philip M. Hamer, British Consuls and the Negro Seamen Acts, 1850-1860, 1 J.S. HIST.
138, 138 (1935); Philip M. Hamer, Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro Seamen Acts,
1822-1848, 1 J.S. HIST. 33-34 (1935).
667. For further discussion of the relationship of slavery and immigration, see NEUMAN, supra
note 54, at 35-40.
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residents.668 Federal legislation was adopted to ensure the health and safety
of passengers and to grant duty-free admission to their personal and
professional possessions.669  No meaningful federal restrictions on
immigration were imposed.
The slavery question cast a long shadow over arguments regarding the
nature and location of the immigration power in the pre-Civil War period.
Within this debate, inherent powers arguments were asserted by the states,
who contended that the power to exclude aliens was possessed by the states
as the original sovereigns. Proponents of a national immigration power, on
the other hand, sought to locate the power in the enumerated federal clauses,
particularly the Commerce Clause.
D. The Antebellum Era: Commerce v. Police
Although little noted in the debates over the 1798 Alien Act, the foreign
commerce power early emerged as a leading contender for the constitutional
source of an enumerated federal power over immigration. Immigration
quickly became equated with the commerce power, due in part to the fact
that many early immigrants to the United States came as indentured workers
and slaves.670 As Stephen Legomsky pointed out in his important work trac-
ing the evolution of the plenary power doctrine, in Gibbons v. Ogden671 the
668. Naturalization Act, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 103-04 (1790) (repealed 1795). The 1790 act
allowed any free, white alien who had resided in the United States for two years to naturalize. The
residence requirement was increased to five years in 1795, to fourteen years in 1798, and modified
again in 1802. The "whites only" naturalization rule remained in place until 1870, when
naturalization was extended to aliens of African decent, but not to the Chinese. Naturalization Act
of 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256. OwEN M. FIss, 8 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 300 nn.8-9
(1993).
669. In 1799, Congress enacted legislation requiring ship captains arriving from foreign ports to
provide manifests identifying passengers and their cargo and admitting the personal baggage and
trade tools of persons arriving in the United States duty-free. Federal Revenue Act of 1799, ch. 22,
§§ 23, 30, 46, 1 Stat. 627, 644-45, 649, 661. An Act of April 27, 1816, continued exempting
personal baggage from duty, regulated passenger capacity and conditions for ships arriving from
foreign ports, and required that passenger manifests be provided to Congress. Act of Apr. 27, 1816,
ch. 107, § 2, 3 Stat. 310, 313. Two statutes from the 1840s provided duty-free entry for the personal
and professional effects of arriving passengers. Act of Aug. 30, 1842, ch. 270, § 9, 5 Stat. 548, 560
(continuing duty-free entry of clothing, personal effects, professional books, and trade tools of
arriving passengers); Act of July 30, 1846, ch. 74, 9 Stat. 42, 49 (extending duty-free entry to
household effects of "persons or families from foreign countries"). See The Passenger Cases, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 283, 441-42 (1849) (Catron, J., concurring); Astor v. Merrit, 111 U.S. 202, 210-11
(1884) (discussing statutes).
670. See Mary S. Bilder, The Struggle over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and
Articles of Commerce, 61 Mo. L. REv. 743, 761 (1996) ("[T]he transportation of indentured
servants was generally perceived as a commerce of 'imported' persons."). A number of
international law commentators also had viewed authority over immigration as part of commerce.
See supra Part IV(A).
671. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See LEGOMSKY, supra note 51, at 181
(noting the origins of the concept of immigration as a plenary power in Gibbons).
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Supreme Court generally recognized that the commerce power included the
transportation of persons. 672 "Vessels," said the Chief Justice, "have always
been employed ... in the transportation of passengers .... Yet it has never
been suspected that the general laws of navigation did not apply to them.,
673
Marshall portrayed commerce as a plenary congressional power:
This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself,
may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution .... [T]he
sovereignty of Congress... is plenary as to those objects ....
Marshall's reference to plenary power, of course, meant a power exclusively
held by the national government and not shared with the states, but one
which was nevertheless limited by the Constitution.
1. New York v. Miln.-The portrayals of commerce as encompassing
immigration and as an exclusive federal power were both hotly contested in
the 1827 immigration case of New York v. Miln.675 Miln addressed the
constitutionality of a New York statute requiring ship captains to identify all
foreign passengers brought into the Port of New York.676 The case con-
sidered whether the reporting requirement could be sustained as an exercise
of the state police power or whether it was barred by an exclusive national
power.
At the time of the Supreme Court argument in the case, New York was
receiving 60,500 immigrants annually,677 and New York argued that it should
not be required to bear the cost of the Western states' demand for "emigrati"
by supporting those who entered and became a burden on the city.678 New
York defended the statute on the grounds either that the statute was an
exercise of the police power protected by the Tenth Amendment, or that the
legislation was not barred by the commerce power because Congress had not
legislated in the area.679 Counsel for New York stressed repeatedly that
invalidating the law would require the invalidation of a wide range of state
672. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 215 (finding "no clear distinction.., between the power to regulate
vessels employed in transporting men for hire, and property for hire").
673. Id. at 217.
674. Id. at 196-97. Counsel had argued to the Court that the commerce power was a sovereign
plenary power shared between Congress and the states: "The power, considered in itself, is
supreme, unlimited, and plenary. No part of any sovereign power can be annihilated. Whatever
portion, then, of this power, was not granted to Congress, remains in the States." Id. at 46.
675. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
676. On February 11, 1824, the New York legislature passed "[a]n act concerning passengers in
vessels arriving in the port of New York." Section one of the statute imposed a $75 fine for every
passenger not properly reported. The defendant ship captain had failed to provide the passenger
report, and New York sued to recover the penalties owed under the act. Id. at 104-05.
677. Id. at 106 (argument for plaintiff).
678. Id. at 114 (argument for plaintiff).
679. Id at 107-08 (argument for plaintiff).
[Vol. 81:1
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty
laws affecting commerce, including the negro seamen laws of southern
states.680
The Federalists in the debates over the Alien Act had invoked inherent
sovereign powers to support federal authority over immigration, but New
York now asserted sovereign powers in support of a state immigration
power. Thus, New York argued, the "power of determining how and when
strangers are to be admitted, is inherent in all communities. 68' This power
was a "high sovereign power" which "belonged to the states, before the
adoption of the federal Constitution., 682 It was given only secondarily to the
national government as an incident to the war, treaty, and commerce
powers. 683 By contrast, the defendant ship captain argued that the New York
legislation regulated foreign commerce and that, under Gibbons, Congress
had exclusive power in this area.684 Counsel for the defendant argued that
the New York statute could entirely bar immigration into the country, and
that if the evils of immigration cited by New York actually existed, Congress
could pass a law remedying them.685
Miln was highly contentious, due both to the Court's uncertainty
regarding the scope of the commerce power and to the possible implications
of the case for state regulation of slavery.686  The resulting six-to-one
decision upheld the New York reporting requirement under the police power
in a variety of opinions, with Justice Story dissenting. Both Justice
Barbour's "opinion of the Court' 687 and Justice Baldwin's concurrence
embraced New York's theory of state inherent powers. Barbour noted that
"[t]he power.., of New York to pass this law... undeniably existed at the
formation of the Constitution, 688 and cited Vattel for the proposition that
"[t]he sovereign may forbid the entrance of his territory, either to foreigners
in general, or in particular cases,.., according as he may think it
advantageous to the state.', 689 In the most controversial part of his opinion
680. Id. at 109-12, 115 (argument for plaintiff).
681. Id. at 110 (argument for plaintiff).
682. Id. (argument for plaintiff).
683. Id. at 111 (argument for plaintiff).
684. Id. at 116-17 (argument for defendant).
685. Id. at 116 (argument for defendant).
686. The case was argued before Chief Justice Marshall, and then set over for re-argument after
Marshall left the Court, due to disagreement on the issues among the Justices. Id at 106.
687. Barbour described the opinion as that of the Court, id. at 130, though as Justice Wayne
later noted, the reasoning did not clearly enjoy a majority. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 283, 429-36 (1849) (Wayne, J., concurring) (discussing the Court's disagreement regarding
the Miln decision).




for future immigration cases, Barbour held that the commerce power did not
include the regulation of persons.
690
Justice Baldwin's lengthy concurring opinion articulated the extreme
states' rights position on the Court. Baldwin viewed the power as one which
was inherent in the states and had not been withheld from them by the
Constitution. Thus to Baldwin, "the sovereignty of the states over [this
subject], not having been abridged, impaired or altered by the constitution, is
as perfect as if it had not been adopted., 691 Baldwin emphasized that the
power at issue was one of police power, and that such laws were passed "in
virtue of an original inherent right in the people of each state," which
"remains in them in full and unimpaired sovereignty, as absolutely as their
soil., 692 The power to exclude undesirable individuals was an exercise of
the highest and most sovereign jurisdiction, indispensable to the
separate existence of a state; it [is] a power vested by original inherent
right, existing before the constitution, remaining in its plenitude,
incapable of any abridgment by any of its provisions.
693
Baldwin denied that the national government had any power to regulate
paupers, or that such regulation could in any way be considered commerce.
694
The national government could only exercise enumerated powers, while
under the Tenth Amendment states retained original powers not granted to
the United States or withheld from the states.
695
Justice Story dissented on the grounds that the statute regulated
interstate and foreign commerce and that these powers had been dedicated
exclusively to Congress. Story felt that Gibbons had expressly held that the
transport of passengers constituted commerce 696 and observed that, if the
same act had been passed by Congress, it would have been upheld.697
In short, the Miln Court recognized a narrow state police power over
entry of aliens, as required by the southern states, while avoiding any
pronouncement on the scope or exclusivity of the federal commerce power.
Justice Barbour's putative opinion for the Court, and Baldwin's concurrence,
690. Id. at 136-37 ("But how can this apply to persons? They are not the subject of commerce;
and not being imported goods, cannot fall within a train of reasoning founded upon the construction
of a power given to congress to regulate commerce."). This finding so distressed Justice Wayne
that he later argued, in a highly unusual concurrence in the Passenger Cases, that Barbour's
assertion that "persons are not subjects of commerce" did not enjoy the support of the Miln
majority. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 430-32 (Wayne, J., concurring); but see
id. at 487-89 (Taney, C.J.) (disputing Justice Wayne's position).
691. Miln, 36 U.S. at 153 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
692. Id. (Baldwin, J., concurring).
693. Id. (Baldwin, J., concurring).
694. Id (Baldwin, J., concurring).
695. Id. (Baldwin, J., concurring).
696. Id. at 155 (Story, J., dissenting).
697. Id. at 157 (Story, J., dissenting).
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portrayed control over undesirable aliens as an inherent sovereign power of
the states.
2. The Passenger Cases.-The next major immigration challenge to
come to the Supreme Court arose in the 1849 Passenger Cases, which
involved Massachusetts and New York laws taxing arriving foreign
698passengers. Ship masters challenged the constitutionality of the head taxes
in both cases. By a narrow five-to-four vote, with no majority opinion and
voluminous concurrences, the Supreme Court invalidated the state
legislation. The cases again revealed bitter disagreements among the Justices
over whether the state laws could be considered an exercise of the police
power, whether the importation of passengers constituted commerce, and
whether the commerce power was exclusive in the national government. By
1849, slavery had become an extremely divisive issue in national politics.
699
The dissenters openly decried the decision's implications for the slave-
holding states,7 °° while the members of the majority avoided the issue, either
by denying that slavery involved commerce or by recognizing a state police
power to regulate entry by slaves and free blacks.0
The members of the majority found that the state laws infringed on
powers that were dedicated to the national government, either through the
Commerce, Taxation, Naturalization, or Migration Clauses. 7 2 The majority
agreed that whether or not the commerce power was exclusive, Congress had
occupied the field with legislation encouraging free immigration.7 °3 Several
698. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
699. The decisions in Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841) (considering the right
of a state to prohibit bringing slaves into its territory for sale), and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (upholding the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act), had exacerbated the
tension between recognizing a state power over slavery and a federal immigration power. The
arguments and opinions in Groves addressed the Miln decision at length. See, e.g., Groves, 40 U.S.
at 467 (argument of appellants); id. at 488-89 (argument of appellee); id at 506-07 (McLean, J.)
(arguing that slaves, as persons, do not fall under the commerce power); id. at 509-10 (Taney, C.J.)
(suggesting that whether the federal commerce power is exclusive is an open question); id. at 513-
15 (Baldwin, J.) (stating that slaves are property, not commerce). Groves and Prigg, in turn, were
considered extensively in the Passenger Cases.
700. See, e.g., The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 474, 477 (Taney, C.J., dissenting); id at 508
(Daniel, J., dissenting); id at 542, 567 (Woodbury, J., dissenting) (all warning that giving Congress
power over immigrants as objects of commerce would strip the states of their power to regulate
slaves and the slave trade).
701. See, e.g., id. at 406 (McLean, J., concurring); id. at 426, 428 (Wayne, J., concurring); id. at
457 (Grier, J., concurring) (all asserting that the federal government's power over immigration does
not affect the states' power to exclude blacks).
702. See, e.g., id. at 408 (McLean, J., concurring) (arguing that passengers are the subjects of
commerce and that Congress has exclusive power to regulate them); id. at 426 (Wayne, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the state immigration laws are inconsistent with the Naturalization
Clause).
703. See, e.g., id. at 461 (Grier, J., concurring) ("It is the cherished policy of the general
government to encourage and invite Christian foreigners of our own race to seek an asylum within
our borders, and to convert these waste lands into productive farms, and thus add to the wealth,
2002]
Texas Law Review
Justices stressed that immigration was necessarily a matter of national rather
than local concern and that allowing the few state ports of entry to constrain
migration to other parts of the country would make the interior states
"tributary to" Boston and New York.7 °4
Justice Wayne was the only member of the majority who discussed the
immigration power in terms of inherent sovereignty, and he viewed the
Commerce Clause as incorporating this power. Citing Martens's
international law treatise, Justice Wayne observed that every nation had a
natural right, through commerce, "to exercise freely its sovereign power over
the foreigners living in its territories" and to make any distinctions between
nations that it wishes.7 °5 In Justice Wayne's view, police powers were in-
distinguishable from powers of sovereignty and included the right of nations
to restrain entry of foreigners. 70 6 Justice Wayne agreed that States retained
the sovereign powers necessary to their internal governance. 707  States did
not, however, retain the power at issue in the Passenger Cases, since that had
been dedicated to the national government.70 8
While the majority emphasized the beneficial effects of immigration,
Chief Justice Taney's lengthy dissent was riddled with invective about aliens
akin to his portrayal of Indians in Rogers
70 9 and of blacks in Dred Scott.710
Taney warned of "pauperism," "pestilence,"'' 1 and "vice,'7 12 and portrayed
population, and power of the nation."); id. at 440-42 (Catron, J., concurring) (concluding that
"Congress has covered and has intended to cover, the whole field of legislation over this branch of
commerce"). See also supra note 669 (discussing federal legislation).
704. Id. at 461 (Grier, J., concurring).
705. Id. at 416 (Wayne, J., concurring) (quoting G.F. MARTENS, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS, FOUNDED ON THE TREATIES AND CUSTOMS OF THE MODERN NATIONS OF EUROPE
(William Cobbett trans.) (1795)); see also id. at 421 (stating that "among the restraints which
nations may impose upon the liberty or freedom of commerce [are] those which may be put upon
foreigners coming into or residing within their territories"); id. at 423 ("Nations have a right to keep
at a distance all suspected persons; to forbid the entry of foreigners or foreign merchandise of a
certain description, as circumstances may require.").
706. Id. at 423-24 (Wayne, J., concurring).
707. Id. at 424 (Wayne, J., concurring); see also id. at 425 (noting that states had a right to be
informed of the names of arriving foreigners, as in Miln, and "to turn off from their territories
paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice").
708. Id. at 427 (Wayne, J., concurring) (maintaining that "the constitutional obligations.., in
respect to commerce and navigation and naturalization, have qualified the original discretion of the
States as to who shall come and live in the United States"); see also id. at 425-26 (Wayne, J.,
concurring) ("Having surrendered to the United States the sovereign police power over
commerce. ... it is necessarily a part of the power of the United States to determine who shall come
to and reside in the United States for the purposes of trade, independently of every other condition
of admittance which the States may attempt to impose upon such persons.").
709. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 571 (1846); see supra notes 262-81 and
accompanying text.
710. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857); see infra notes 1305-28 and
accompanying text.
711. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 490 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
712. Id. at 472 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
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European immigrants as "strangers" who were dangerous, "indigent and
infirm, '71 3 "tainted with crimes or infectious diseases ,,714 "the needy and the
wretched" and an "immense mass of poverty and helplessness, '71 5 who
"constantly subject[ed the citizenry] to the danger of infectious diseases. 716
The laws were designed to protect the states from "the burdens and evils of




The dissenters 718 argued generally that immigration was a matter of
local rather than national concern, which had been reserved to the states, and
denied that any constitutional provision authorized Congress to force
unwanted foreigners upon the states.719 The dissenting Justices offered a
number of arguments that later would be embraced by the Court in support of
an inherent national immigration power. All the dissenters stressed the pow-
er as essential to self-defense.72° Chief Justice Taney, for example, argued
that the laws were authorized by the states' "power of self-preservation,"
72'
which "must be paramount and absolute in the sovereignty that possesses
it.",7 22  Both Justices Daniel and Woodbury invoked the debates over the
Alien Act to support their argument that Congress lacked power to regulate
the admission of friendly aliens. 23 Justice Woodbury cited Vattel and other
scholars to conclude that the power to exclude immigrants existed in all
sovereign states.724 Woodbury also emphasized state control over member-
ship and identity, arguing that the laws rested on the "sovereign right [of a
state] to regulate who shall be her inhabitants. 72 5 He asserted that even if
the law could not be justified as a police measure, it "results from the power
713. Id. at 485 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
714. Id. at 476-77 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
715. Id. at 490 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
716. Id. at 485 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
717. Id. at 483 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
718. Chief Justice Taney and Justices Nelson, Daniel, and Woodbury.
719. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 479 (Taney, C.J., dissenting); id. at 500-02 (Nelson, J.,
dissenting); id at 518 (Daniel, J., dissenting); id at 524-25 (Woodbury, J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Taney's dissent was consistent with his opinion in Dred Scott in its strict construction of
national enumerated power. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 401-04 (1856). Taney
argued that "commerce" could not be construed to include regulation of passengers, The Passenger
Cases, 48 U.S. at 493, that the Naturalization Clause was limited to rights of citizenship, id. at 483,
and that the Migration Clause applied exclusively to slaves. Id. at 474.
720. Id. at 467-68 (Taney, C.J., dissenting); id. at 494 (Daniel, J., dissenting); id at 520
(Woodbury, J., dissenting).
721. Id. at 470 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
722. Id. at 467 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
723. Id. at 513-14 (Daniel, J., dissenting); id. at 527 (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
724. Id. at 525 (Woodbury, J., dissenting) (citing VATrEL, supra note 56, bk. 1, ch. XIX, §§
219, 231, and bk. II, ch. VII, §§ 93, 94).
725. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 545 (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
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of every sovereign State to impose such terms as she pleases on the
admission or continuance of foreigners within her borders."
726
The Passenger Cases closed the major immigration confrontations of
the first half of the century with little resolution of the power to restrict the
entry and exit of aliens. The Alien Act had raised a substantial question of
whether the power to expel friendly, lawful resident aliens resided in any part
of the state or national government. Miln and the Passenger Cases posed the
more modest question of whether states could monitor and regulate the
arrival of foreign nationals, and the Court expressed mixed views regarding
whether this power lay in the national government or was part of the states'
inherent police powers. The Court upheld the power of the states to require
passenger manifests, but rejected specific state efforts to tax immigrants,
while generally acknowledging a state power to exclude slaves, free blacks,
and immigrant convicts and paupers. The Court was fiercely divided on the
question, however, and the decisions in the Passenger Cases simply
entrenched that disagreement. During this period, the claim that the
immigration power was inherent in sovereignty was advanced primarily on
behalf of the states. Members of the Court who favored national authority
over immigration located the power in the enumerated clauses. No member
of the Court suggested that the national government enjoyed an inherent,
unenumerated power over immigration. On the other hand, no member
raised the possibility posed by Madison that the power might be denied both
levels of government. All assumed that the power was held by either the
national government or the states.
E. The Post-Civil War Era and the Ascendance of the Commerce
Clause
The Civil War removed the question of slavery from immigration
debates, and the Fourteenth Amendment established the national character of
American citizenship. With questions regarding the power of states to
regulate the entry of slaves resolved, the federal courts became increasingly
willing to acknowledge immigration as an exclusive federal power and to
locate that power in the Foreign Commerce Clause.
Congress did not pass a major immigration act until 1875,727 and
immigration doctrine in the first two decades after the Civil War continued to
726. Id. at 524-25 (Woodbury, J., dissenting). Since the Constitution did not expressly grant a
national power to exclude aliens, Woodbury concluded that the states must have the authority, since
"the power must exist somewhere in every independent country." Id. at 543-44 (Woodbury, J.,
dissenting).
727. The "Page Law" of 1875 prohibited the entry of convicts, prostitutes, and involuntary
"Oriental" laborers. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477. In 1882, Congress imposed the first
federal head tax on immigration and adopted the first Chinese Exclusion law. See infra notes 806-
08 and accompanying text.
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develop through scrutiny of state barriers to aliens. Cities and states on the
West Coast now adopted a number of anti-immigrant provisions designed to
restrain the growing Asian immigrant population, laws that were motivated
both by nativist sentiment and by competition for jobs with local whites.
Coastal states attempted to craft immigration restrictions that would satisfy
the elusive constitutional strictures of Miln and the Passenger Cases, and the
lower federal courts became increasingly hostile to their efforts.
7 28
These cases percolated to the Supreme Court, and in 1875 the Court
struck down statutes from New York, Louisiana, and California as violations
of the Commerce Clause. Henderson v. New York 729 involved consolidated
challenges to New York and Louisiana statutes which required ship masters
to post a bond or pay a specified sum per passenger to alleviate the state's
burden of caring for immigrants.7 30 The states argued that the option of
posting the bond avoided the infirmities confronted in the Passenger Cases.
The ship masters in turn contended that the head taxes violated the Foreign
Commerce Clause as unconstitutional state taxes on imports.3
The Court now had no difficulty concluding that the laws burdened
foreign commerce. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Miller observed
that, since the decision in Gibbons v. Ogden,
the transportation of passengers from European ports to those of the
United States has attained a magnitude and importance far beyond its
proportion at that time to other branches of commerce. It has become
a part of our commerce with foreign nations, of vast interest to this
country, as well as to the immigrants who come among us to find a
welcome and a home within our borders.732
Given immigrants' contribution to the national economy, Miller noted, it
could not be doubted that laws regulating their transport involved a branch of
commerce. 733 Moreover, the immigration power implicated relations with
728. People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169 (1857) (striking down a $50 tax on Chinese immigrant
passengers); Ling Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534 (1862) (striking down a monthly tax of $2.50 on
Chinese immigrants, the purpose of which was to discourage immigration); In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas.
213, 216 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 102) (Field, J., Circuit Justice) (striking down a California
inspection statute on the grounds that immigration power is "exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the General Government, and is not subject to State control or interference"). Cf Ho Ah Kow v.
Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 256 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,546) (Field, J., Circuit Justice) (holding that a
San Francisco "Queue ordinance" violated aliens' right to equal protection, which applies to
persons, not citizens).
729. 92 U.S. 259 (1875).
730. By the time of Henderson, the New York statute required masters to provide a report of
passengers to the mayor and either to post a bond of $300 for every passenger to indemnify the City
for any costs of support or to pay a head tax of $1.50 per passenger. Id. at 267.
731. New York was receiving 100,000 immigrants a year, the plaintiffs argued, and the bonds
on this flow would amount to a $30 million tax on shippers annually. Brief for Appellants at 18,
Henderson (No. 880).
732. Henderson, 92 U.S. at 270.
733. Id. at 270-71 ("[Immigrants] till our soil, build our railroads, and develop the latent
resources of the country in its minerals, its manufactures, and its agriculture .... Can it be doubted
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foreign states.34  The Court concluded that the power was national and
exclusive 735 and called upon Congress to provide a uniform system of laws in
the area.736
The contrast between Henderson and the earlier decisions was striking.
Previously, the Court had struggled to acknowledge some state control over
immigration, and four members of the Court had urged that the state power
was exclusive. But the Court now unequivocally held that Congress had the
exclusive power pursuant to the Foreign Commerce Clause. Inherent powers
did not figure into the argument.
The Court found the similar California statute in Chy Lung v.
Freeman737 so coercive as to warrant open ridicule. The California statute
required ship masters to post a bond for passengers deemed to be paupers,
criminals, lewd or debauched women, or likely to become public charges.738
The plaintiff, a Chinese national, had been singled out as "lewd and
debauched" at the port of San Francisco. While the others were released on
habeas corpus by Justice Field, who served as Circuit Justice to the Ninth
Circuit, 739 Chy Lung challenged the statute in the U.S. Supreme Court. The
plaintiff primarily advanced an equal protection argument, asserting that an
equivalent law would not be imposed on subjects from England or France
and that Chinese were entitled to the same rights. 740 "Under [the Fourteenth
Amendment]," the plaintiff wrote, "every person, whether native or foreign,
is entitled to equalprotection of our laws." 741 The Attorney General appeared
on behalf of the United States,742 but California declined to appear or to
submit a brief.
743
that a law which prescribes the terms on which vessels shall engage in [transportation of
immigrants] is a law regulating this branch of commerce?").
734. Id. at 273.
735. Id. at 272-74 (finding that "this whole subject has been confided to Congress by the
Constitution").
736. Id.
737. 92 U.S. 276 (1875).
738. Public charges included the "lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind, crippled, or infirm." Id. at
277. The commissioner was authorized to charge 75 cents for inspecting each passenger and $3 for
each bond. The bond for each designated passenger required two separate sureties who were
residents of the state and who had not served as sureties for any other bond. The commissioner
could charge $1 for each oath administered to a surety. The ship master could avoid posting the
individual bonds by paying a sum set solely by the Commissioner, who was authorized to keep
20%. Id at 277-78.
739. Chy Lung was arrested with 20 other women, who were released on habeas by Justice
Field, sitting as Circuit Justice. See In re Ah Fong, I F. Cas. 213 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 102).
740. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 5-6, Chy Lung, 92 U.S. 276 (1875) (No. 478).
741. Id. at 11.
742. Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 277.
743. Id.
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The Court, again through Justice Miller, unanimously invalidated the
statute under the foreign commerce power. 744  In language highly sympa-
thetic to the immigrant plaintiff, the Court deemed the statute "systematic
extortion of the grossest kind" and contended that it was "hardly possible to
conceive a statute more skillfully framed to place in the hands of a single
man" an arbitrary power.745 Justice Miller appeared sympathetic to Chy
Lung's equal protection argument, asking, "[I]f this plaintiff and her twenty
companions had been subjects of the Queen of Great Britain, can any one
doubt that this matter would have been the subject of international inquiry, if
not of a direct claim for redress? ' 746 The Court found the statute grossly
overbroad to promote any potentially legitimate state interest in excluding
criminals and paupers. Miller also noted that the statute impacted foreign
relations, since under the statute, "a silly, an obstinate, or a wicked
commissioner may bring disgrace upon the whole country" 747 and "embroil
us in disastrous quarrels with other nations. 748 Thus, the decision appeared
motivated by a desire both to protect aliens seeking entry from unequal and
arbitrary state treatment and to preserve national control over foreign
relations.
The 1883 case of New York v. Compagnie Gnrrale Transatlantique
749
presented a challenge to a New York quarantine statute requiring ship
masters to pay one dollar for the inspection of every alien passenger arriving
from a foreign port.750  Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Miller ob-
744. Id. at 280.
745. Id. at 278. Regarding the commissioner's power, the Court noted:
The commissioner has but to go aboard a vessel filled with passengers ignorant of our
language and our laws, and without trial or hearing or evidence, but from the external
appearances of persons with whose former habits he is unfamiliar, to point with his
finger to twenty... or a hundred if he chooses, and say to the master, "These are
idiots, these are paupers, these are convicted criminals, these are lewd women, and
these others are debauched women ......
Id. With respect to the statute's effect on immigrants, the Court stated:
The patriot seeking our shores after an unsuccessful struggle against despotism in
Europe or Asia, may be kept out because there his resistance has been adjudged a
crime. The woman whose error has been repaired by a happy marriage and numerous
children, and whose loving husband brings her with his wealth to a new home, may be
told she must pay a round sum before she can land .... Whether a young woman's
manners are such as to justify the commissioner in calling her lewd may be made to
depend on the sum she will pay for the privilege of landing in San Francisco.
Id. at 281.
746. Id. at 279.
747. Id.
748. Id. at 280.
749. New York v. Compagnie G~n6rale Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59 (1883).
750. Act of May 31, 1881, 1881 N.Y. Laws 590 (raising money to execute the New York
inspection laws). The inspection statute required immigration commissioners to identify "habitual
criminals, or pauper lunatics, idiots, or imbeciles, or deaf, dumb, blind, infirm, or orphan persons,
without means or capacity to support themselves and subject to become a public charge," and
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served, "It has been so repeatedly decided by this court that such a tax as this
is a regulation of commerce with foreign nations, confided by the
Constitution to the exclusive control of Congress," that the issue was no
longer open for debate.75 In Transatlantique, the Court for the first time
foreclosed all state immigration efforts. This may have been because
Congress had finally adopted a general immigration statute in 1882.752 "This
legislation covers the same ground as the New York statute," the Court
observed, "and they cannot coexist.
753
In the 1884 Head Money Cases,5 the Supreme Court for the first time
considered the constitutionality of a federal immigration statute. The
consolidated cases of Edye and Cunard Steamship Co. v. Robertson ad-
dressed the constitutionality of the 1882 Act to Regulate Immigration, which
imposed a fifty-cent head tax and created an immigration support fund
overseen by the Secretary of Treasury.755 The Act closely paralleled the state
laws that the Court previously had invalidated. Various shipping companies
challenged its constitutionality on the now-futile argument that the law was a
police measure,756 that the Constitution did not give Congress the power to
tax immigrants,757 and that to recognize the power was tantamount to holding
"that Congress possesses an unlimited sovereignty inherent to an autocratic
form of Government.,
758
The Head Money Cases were the federal government's first appearance
as a party to an immigration case, and the decisions of the prior decade
offered the United States a clear argument under the Foreign Commerce
Clause. Remarkably, however, the Solicitor General's four page brief relied
entirely on a theory of inherent sovereign powers.759  Indeed, the
government's brief failed to even mention the Commerce Clause. Two years
before the Court articulated the theory of inherent powers in the 1886 Indian
persons who brought "infectious or contagious disease." Transatlantique, 107 U.S. at 60-61. The
New York quarantine statutes had been adopted after the previous New York laws were voided in
Henderson and the Passenger Cases.
751. Transatlantique, 107 U.S. at 60.
752. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214.
753. Transatlantique, 107 U.S. at 63.
754. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
755. In addition to collecting the 50-cent head tax, state immigration officers were directed to
board and inspect passenger vessels to identify any foreign "convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person
unable to take care of himself or herself, without becoming a public charge," and to bar such
persons from landing. The Secretary was also directed to prepare rules for the protection of
immigrants and for the return of those forbidden to land. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214,
214.
756. Brief for Plaintiffs in Error at 13-15, Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) (No. 772).
757. Brief for Plaintiffs in Error at 20-22, Cunard S.S. Co. v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884)
(No. 754).
758. Brief for Plaintiffs in Error at 17, Edye (No. 772).
759. Brief for the United States at 2-3, Edye (No. 772).
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case of United States v. Kagama,760 the government in the immigration
context rested squarely on a theory of sovereign powers antedating the
Constitution and directly foreshadowed Justice Sutherland's theory of
inherent external powers. The Solicitor General maintained that Congress's
power to regulate immigration was "implied in [the] very existence of
independent government anterior to the adoption of a constitution," and that
constitutional provisions relevant to the power were "merely in recognition,
and not in creation thereof. 761 Relying on Cooley, the Solicitor General
asserted that the Constitution neither created nor restrained federal power
over aliens and foreign relations:
It cannot be a valid objection [to the statute] that ... it does not come
within any phrase in the... Constitution. That nomenclature is
intended to define the relation of a government of enumerated powers
toward those persons (the people and the States) with respect to which
it is a government .... As to foreign Governments and non-resident
foreigners the United States is not of merely enumerated powers.
Such parties can by themselves question no exertion of its force in the
view of its being 'unconstitutional.' As to them, it has all the powers
which according to international law any sovereign society
possesses .... The Constitution is merely a domestic thing, whilst the
nation itself has foreign relations, powers and duties, as well as
domestic.
762
Territoriality and social contract theories helped shape the Solicitor
General's vision. Immigrants leaving one country and entering another were
in a "proverbially ticklish" position, the government argued, a sort of limbo,
relatively unprotected by either constitutions or treaties. 763  "These
'immigrants,' therefore, not being citizens of the United States, [were],
previously to any allowed and perfected arrival by them, beyond the verge of
constitutional restrictions. " 764  In short, foreign nationals who had not
lawfully entered the United States could not object to the Constitution's
infraction.
The Supreme Court declined the government's invitation to embrace an
inherent powers argument. Justice Miller, who would reject the
government's Commerce Clause theory in favor of an inherent powers
argument in Kagama, again wrote for a unanimous Court and again upheld
760. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
761. Brief for the United States at 2, Edye (No. 772). See also id. at 2-3 (stating that the
Constitution's express provisions in this area were "rather recognitions of an antecedent 'primitive
formation' of social power than grants thereof').
762. Id. at 3 (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 197
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 5th ed. 1883)).
763. Idat4.
764. Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added).
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the statute under the commerce power. 765 Indeed, he seemed surprised at the
effort to challenge the statute.76 6 The Court in the Head Money Cases relied
exclusively on an enumerated powers-Commerce Clause analysis, without
reference to any other provision of the Constitution. The only suggestion of
the Court's future inherent powers approach was the Court's holding-in
response to the plaintiffs' allegations that the Act discriminated against
immigrants who were not paupers and criminals and violated the
Appropriations Clause-that "Congress, and not the courts, are the sole
judges" of such matters. 767  "Congress having the power to pass a law
regulating immigration as a part of commerce of this country with foreign
nations," the Court reasoned, "we see nothing in the statute [that is]
forbidden by any other part of the Constitution.
'" 768
F. Chinese Immigration and the Exclusion Laws
In 1882 Congress passed both the head tax upheld in the Head Money
Cases and the first of the Chinese Exclusion Acts. The 1882 Act restricting
Chinese immigration resulted from a long history of West Coast antagonism
to Chinese and other Asian immigration. Asian laborers had been brought to
the United States in the mid-1800s to construct the transcontinental
railroad,769 and the gold rush of 1849 concentrated Chinese laborers on the
West Coast, many under contract to their employers. A federal statute
established a federal policy of encouraging immigration, 770 and Chinese
immigration also was encouraged by the 1868 Burlingame Treaty with
China,771 which recognized "the inherent and inalienable right of man to
change his home and allegiance," and "the mutual advantage of the free
migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects., 772  More
765. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 600 (1884) ("Congress [has] the power to pass a
law regulating immigration as a part of commerce of this country with foreign nations .... ").
766. Id. at 591 ("That these statutes are regulations of commerce ... is conceded in the
argument in this case; and that they constitute a regulation of that class which belongs exclusively to
Congress is held in all the cases in this court.").
767. Id. at 599.
768. Id. at 600.
769. Chinese laborers constituted 90% of the Central Pacific Railroad's workforce. LucY E.
SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN
IMMIGRATION LAW 8 (1995).
770. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223 (providing that "the right of expatriation is a
natural and inherent right of all people .... and.., in... recognition of this principle this
government has freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested them with the rights of
citizenship"), quoted in Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century
of Chinese Exclusion, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 855 n.10 (1987). The 1864 Act to Encourage
Immigration also authorized the federal government to enforce contracts for imported contract
laborers. See ANDREW GYORY, CLOSING THE GATE: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE CHINESE
EXCLUSION ACT 20, 270 n.6 (1998).
771. Treaty with China, July 28, 1868, U.S.-China, 16 Stat. 739 [hereinafter Burlingame
Treaty].
772. Id. art. V.
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specifically, Article VI of the treaty provided that Chinese nationals in the
United States "shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities and exemptions in
respect to travel or residence" as U.S. citizens, although the treaty also
expressly denied the Chinese U.S. citizenship.773 By 1870, 63,199 Chinese
were in the United States. 774 Forty-six percent of workers in the four major
San Francisco industries, and twenty-five percent of all California workers,
were Chinese. 775  By 1880, Chinese in the United States numbered
105,465.776 The Chinese also organized in defense of their interests. The
Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, a powerful board of
representatives of the Chinese community in San Francisco (informally
known as the Chinese Six Companies) aggressively and often effectively
represented the civil rights of arriving and resident Chinese nationals against
discriminatory state and federal legislation.777
Such efforts became increasingly necessary as anti-Chinese sentiment
grew, particularly on the West Coast. Theories of Chinese racial inferiority
spread quickly with the appearance of the Chinese in California. As early as
1854, the Supreme Court of California interpreted a California statute
prohibiting "blacks and Indians" from testifying in criminal proceedings
against whites as barring testimony by Chinese. The court reasoned that the
Chinese were a "distinct ... race of people whom nature has marked as
inferior, and who are incapable of progress or intellectual development
beyond a certain point. 778 The decision reflected sentiment in a portion of
the white community that Chinese were "barbarians" like Indians, and only
slightly more advanced than blacks. 779 Emerging racial antagonisms were
exacerbated by economic depression and drought during the 1870s, which
brought low wages and widespread unemployment.78 ° Chinese immigration
was increasingly opposed by white labor groups, who equated Chinese
workers with indentured "coolie labor" which unfairly undermined white
773. Id. art. VI. The privileges and immunities provision of the treaty resulted in part from the
political lobbying efforts of the Chinese Six Companies. SMITH, supra note 95, at 312.
774. SALYER, supra note 769, at 8.
775. Id.
776. Id. (citing U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Historical Abstracts, series A91-104, 14).
For further discussion of early Asian immigration on the West Coast, see RONALD TAKAKI,
STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS 79-131 (rev. ed. 1998).
777. For further discussion of the Chinese Six Companies, see Ellen D. Katz, The Six
Companies and the Geary Act: A Case Study in Nineteenth-Century Civil Disobedience and Civil
Rights Litigation, 8 W. LEGAL HIST. 227, 231-39 (1995).
778. People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 404-05 (1854). The Court also remarkably reasoned that the
term "Indians" in the statute included the Chinese, since Columbus had thought that he discovered
Asia. Id at 400-05.
779. See SMITH, supra note 95, at 312 (discussing West Coast hostility towards Chinese
immigrant laborers).
780. SALYER, supra note 769, at 9, 12.
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working conditions and wages. 781 Dennis Kearney's Workingmen's Party
used anti-Chinese sentiment to win one-third of the seats to California's 1878
constitutional convention. 782 The resulting state constitution of 1879 denied
Chinese the right to vote, prohibited their employment by private
corporations, and purported to prohibit "Asiatic coolieism" as a form of
human slavery.783 Anti-Chinese sentiment also was prevalent at the national
level. In 1862, Congress prohibited involuntary Asian immigration,784 and
the 1875 Page Act again barred involuntary "Oriental" laborers, as well as
convicts and prostitutes.785
As with Indians, the adoption of the Reconstruction civil rights acts and
the Fourteenth Amendment raised the question of the relationship of Chinese
nationals to the U.S. constitutional structure.786 In explaining his veto of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, President Johnson criticized its incorporation of
Chinese, Indians, blacks, and gypsies into the American citizenry:
By the first section of the bill, all persons born in the United States,
and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are
declared to be citizens of the United States. This provision
comprehends the Chinese of the Pacific States, Indians subject to
taxation, the people called Gypsies, as well as the entire race
designated as blacks, persons of color, negroes, mulattoes, and persons
of African blood. Every individual of those races, born in the United
States, is, by the bill, made a citizen of the United States.
787
White European immigrants had been entitled to citizenship since 1790;
blacks ultimately were included in the 1870 naturalization statute, and many
Indians were granted citizenship under treaties and statutes such as the
Dawes Act in the late 1880s. Chinese were not covered by the naturalization
statutes, however, and the Burlingame Treaty expressly preserved their non-
citizen status. 788 Even the Chinese community's right to birthright citizen-
ship under the Fourteenth Amendment remained ambiguous until the 1898
781. Id. at 10. For further discussion of the relationship between Chinese immigration and
American labor, see generally GYORY, supra note 770.
782. SALYER, supra note 769, at 12.
783. Id. at 12-13; PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE GOLD
RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE 203 (1997). Most of these anti-Chinese provisions were later
invalidated by the courts as violating the Burlingame Treaty and constitutional equal protection.
784. Act of Feb. 19, 1862, ch. 27, §§ 2158-2164, 12 Stat. 340 (1862) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§
331-339) (targeting the "Coolie" trade by prohibiting the preparation or use of any vessel for the
purpose of procuring from China an inhabitant of China, excepting those emigrating voluntarily),
repealed by Act of Oct. 20, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-461, 88 Stat. 1387.
785. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477. See supra note 727.
786. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 697-98 (1898) (discussing debates
over the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
787. Id. at 682 (citation omitted); see also id. at 697-98 (discussing congressional debates over
whether children born to Asian immigrants would be citizens under the proposed Civil Rights Act
and proposed Fourteenth Amendment).
788. Burlingame Treaty, supra note 771, art. VI.
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decision upholding Chinese citizenship in Wong Kim Ark.789 Thus, through
the latter half of the century, Asians remained the United States' only
immigrant group who were absolutely denied the right to become citizens.790
As the federal courts consistently invalidated local efforts to discourage
Chinese immigration, pressure increased on Congress to address the
situation. In 1876, Congress appointed a joint committee to investigate the
impact of Chinese immigration on the United States. Written by California
Senator Aaron Augustus Sargent, the resulting report warned of dangers and
recommended modifying the Burlingame Treaty.9 In February 1879, the
California constitutional convention petitioned Congress for immigration
restrictions, contending that immigration of Chinese laborers constituted "an
Oriental invasion" and "a menace to our civilization" and that discontent
with the problem was "universal.,
792
Among those calling for national legislation to restrict Chinese
immigration was Justice Field. Although as a Circuit Justice Field consis-
tently struck down state and local attempts to burden Chinese immigrants, he
simultaneously called for congressional restrictions on Asian immigration.
793
As a presidential hopeful in the 1880 and 1884 elections, Justice Field
figured prominently in the efforts to persuade Congress to restrict Asian
immigration. In an 1879 interview, Field asserted an overtly ascriptivist
view of immigration. "[T]he practical issue," he argued, "is, whether the
civilization of this coast, its society, morals, and industry, shall be of
American or Asiatic type." 794 Field's campaign literature urged the necessity
of protecting American institutions from "the oriental gangrene. 795 Field is
believed to have authored the Democratic National Convention platform
plank calling for restrictive national legislation.796 Field also worked aggres-
789. 169 U.S. 649 (1898). See infra notes 1059-82 and accompanying text.
790. SALYER, supra note 769, at 13.
791. H.R. REP. No. 46-872.
792. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889).
793. In the 1879 case of Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6546)
(Field, Circuit Justice) (invalidating a San Francisco ordinance requiring male Chinese prisoners to
shave their queues), Field acknowledged the "positive ... hostility prevailing in California against
the Chinese," and confessed that "thoughtful persons, looking at the millions which crowd the
opposite shores of the Pacific, and the possibility at no distant day of their pouring over in vast
hordes among us.... hope that some way may be devised to prevent their further immigration." Id.
at 256. He concluded, however, that such appeals "must be made to the general government." Id.
See also In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213, 217 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 102) (Field, Circuit Justice) ("If
their further immigration is to be stopped, recourse must be had to the federal government, where
the whole power over this subject lies."); CHAUNCEY F. BLACK & SAMUEL B. SMITH, SOME
ACCOUNT OF THE JUDICIAL WORK OF STEPHEN J. FIELD AS A LEGISLATOR, STATE JUDGE, AND
JUDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 390, 404-05 (reprint 1986) (1881).
794. CARL B. SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 221 (1969) (citation
omitted).
795. KENS, supra note 783, at 205; see also id. at 205-09.
796. MILTON R. KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 10 n.29 (1946).
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sively to ensure modification of the Burlingame Treaty to allow restrictions
on Chinese immigrant labor.797
Many national political figures believed that immigration restrictions
could not be adopted without abrogating the Burlingame Treaty's free
migration provisions.798 In 1879, Congress passed legislation restricting
Chinese immigration to fifteen passengers per steamship, but President
Hayes vetoed it as violating the Treaty.799 In response to what Field later
described as "urgent and constant" prayers for relief against "existing and
anticipated evils," 800 Hayes later appointed, and Congress funded, a
commission to negotiate a treaty modification with China.80'
The resulting 1880 treaty with China allowed the United States to
"regulate, limit, or suspend" future immigration of Chinese laborers, but not
to prohibit it absolutely. 80 2  The treaty preserved the rights of Chinese
laborers who were already in the United States, who would "be allowed to go
and come of their own free will and accord," and who would "be accorded all
the rights, privileges, immunities, and exemptions" of U.S. citizens.80 3
Following the ratification of the 1880 treaty, Congress passed legislation
suspending Chinese immigration for twenty years, which President Chester
804Arthur vetoed as an unreasonable restriction in violation of the treaty.
Debates in Congress regarding legislation singling out the Chinese for
immigration restrictions pitted the emerging concept of constitutional equal
protection against racial, cultural, and economic justifications for differential
treatment of the Chinese. While legislators such as Senator George F. Hoar
of Massachusetts contended that equal protection prohibited differential
treatment of a racial group, Senator La Fayette Grover of Oregon retorted
with classic nativist social contract arguments. "When [the signers of the
Declaration of Independence] declared that all men were created equal," he
maintained, "they undoubtedly meant all men like themselves, and in like
manner joined in the bonds of civil society. 80 5
797. SWISHER, supra note 794, at 222-24.
798. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 596 (1889).
799. GYORY, supra note 770, at 166-67.
800. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 596.
801. Act of May 14, 1880, ch. 88, 21 Stat. 133, 133-34; see generally GYORY, supra note 770,
at 212-13; Shirley Hune, Politics of Chinese Exclusion, 9 AMERASIA J. 5, 15-17 (1982).
802. Treaty between the United States and China Concerning Immigration, May 19-July 19,
1880, U.S.-China, 22 Stat. 826.
803. Id. art. II.
804. GYORY, supra note 770, at 244-45. The Senate failed to override the veto by five votes.
Id. at 244.
805. 13 CONG. REC. S1546 (1882) (statement of Sen. La Fayette Grover); see also id. at 1483,
1484, 1485, 1518-19, 1586, 1635-37, 1644-45 (citing similar remarks by other members of
Congress).
[Vol. 81:1
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty
In 1882, Congress finally adopted legislation suspending entry of
Chinese laborers80 6 into the United States for ten years. Consistent with the
treaty modification, the 1882 Act prohibited the arrival of new Chinese
laborers while allowing existing residents to come and go from the United
States upon the presentation of a customs certificate.8 °7 The Act also barred
courts from recognizing U.S. citizenship for the Chinese.8 °8
The Act apparently was extremely successful in reducing Chinese
immigration. Custom House statistics showed that in the two years follow-
ing the 1882 Act, 12,000 more Chinese departed than arrived.80 9 Wages of
Chinese laborers also rose from $1 to $1.75 per day. 810 Nevertheless, due to
a widespread perception among political elites that new Chinese were
entering on fraudulent claims of prior residence, and the alleged "notorious
capabilities of the lower classes of Chinese for perjury," as a House
committee reported,81' Congress modified the 1882 Act in 1884 to provide
that the Customs certificate would be the only evidence accepted for
812reentry. This exclusion provision was quickly challenged by Chew Heong,
a returning U.S. resident who had departed the country prior to passage of the
1882 and 1884 Acts, and thus could not have obtained the required reentry
certificate.813
Chew Heong v. United States came to the Court in 1884 and was
decided the same day as the Head Money Cases.814 Chew Heong argued that
the statute must be construed consistent with his treaty right to reenter the
806. Section 15 of the Act defined "Chinese laborers" to mean "both skilled and unskilled
laborers and Chinese employed in mining." Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 15, 22 Stat. 58, 61.
807. Id. See also 13 CONG. REC. H1973 (1882) (summarizing the majority opinion of the
House regarding the 1882 Act). Section 3 of the Act exempted existing resident laborers from the
exclusion provisions, and section 4 entitled them to obtain a certificate as "proper evidence of their
right to go from and come to the United States of their free will and accord." Section 4 further
provided that presentation of the certificate to a customs officer "shall entitle the Chinese
laborer ... to return to and re-enter the United States." The Act authorized the deportation of "any
Chinese person found unlawfully within the United States" after the individual was "brought before
some justice, judge, or commissioner of a court of the United States and found to be one not
lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United States."
808. Act of May 6, 1882, § 14 (declaring that "hereafter no State court or court of the United
States shall admit Chinese to citizenship").
809. In re Cheen Hong, 21 F. 791, 807-08 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884) (No. 3,472); see also Plaintiff's
Statement of Case at 43, Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884) (No. 1088) (stating that
between August 4, 1882 and January 15, 1884, 3,415 Chinese entered at the port of San Francisco,
while 17,088 were deported).
810. Plaintiff's Statement of Case at 43, Chew Heong (No. 1088).
811. House Committee of Foreign Affairs Report on the Act of 1884, quoted in Brief for the
United States at 11, Chew Heong (No. 1088).
812. Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, § 4, 23 Stat. 115, 115-16.
813. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 536-37 (1884).
814. See supra notes 754-68 and accompanying text.
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United States815 and challenged the rule designating the certificate as the only
conclusive evidence of residency as violating Fifth Amendment due
816process. No question of Congress's constitutional authority to regulate
immigration was presented.81 7
The United States defended the certificate policy as necessary to make
the suspension of immigration effective.818 The government primarily
defended the statute as either consistent with, or as superseding, the treaty.
819
The government objected to the plaintiffs due process argument, however,
with a plenary power argument. Congress, the government contended, had
the absolute right to determine "who shall enter the country, and on what
terms." 820  Regardless of the resulting hardship, "the Constitution is not
broken, for the alien has no constitutional right to set foot on our shore
except on the terms Congress has prescribed.,
821
In a seven-to-two decision,822 the Supreme Court construed the statute
to uphold Chew Heong's right to reenter. Writing for the majority, Justice
Harlan held that the statute must be construed consistent with the treaty to
preserve the right of exit and entry of Chinese laborers who had been in the
United States when the treaty was signed.823 Justice Field, who had ruled
against Chew Heong below,824 filed a lengthy and outraged dissent.
Thus, through 1884, on the threshold of the inherent powers era, the
Court had consistently recognized the Commerce Clause as the source of
federal immigration authority, but the application of the Constitution's indi-
vidual rights protections to aliens remained unclear. Prior decisions largely
had been limited to the source of Congress's power over aliens. Chew
815. See Plaintiffs' Statement of Case by Attorney Riordan at 11-13, Chew Heong (No. 1088)
(arguing that Congress did not intend to interfere with rights obtained under the Burlingame
Treaty).
816. See id. at 40-41 (arguing that "prescribing a conclusive rule of evidence, is a deprivation
of both liberty and property without ... due process of law"); Plaintiffs' Statement of the Case by
Attorney Brown at 41-42, Chew Heong (No. 1088) ("If it is held that the act prohibits the Courts
from hearing any evidence which can be introduced in any other case, where the liberty or property
of a person is involved, then we maintain that the statute... is a manifest violation of the 5th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.").
817. This omission may have occurred because the Act expressly implemented the 1880 treaty,
and thus could be considered a necessary and proper exercise of the treaty power.
818. See Brief for the United States at 11, Chew Heong (No. 1088) ("[S]o much do these people
resemble one another, and so profligate are the lower orders of them in the disregard of oaths, that
without such legislation the tide of immigration would continue to flow in the name of the exempted
class.").
819. Id. at 2-3.
820. Id. at 14.
821. Id. at 15.
822. Justices Field and Bradley dissented.
823. Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 549-50.
824. In re Cheen Heong, 21 F. 791 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884) (Field, Circuit Justice), reprinted in
Proceedings Below at 7, Chew Heong (No. 1088).
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Heong had raised a due process claim against the national government, but
the Court did not address the claim. Chy Lung had tacitly recognized equal
protection rights against states, but Chew Heong did not raise an equal
protection challenge to the federal statute's restriction to the Chinese, likely
because equal protection did not then apply to the national government.
825
Modern equal protection doctrine was soon significantly advanced, however,
by the 1886 decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.
826
1. Yick Wo v. Hopkins.-Together with Wong Wing v. United States
827
and Wong Kim Ark v. United States,828 Yick Wo stands as one of the late-
nineteenth-century Court's most powerful affirmations of the liberal,
egalitarian vision of the Constitution. The case, of course, involved an equal
protection challenge by two Chinese nationals 829 to a San Francisco or-
dinance prohibiting the operation of wood laundries without a permit. The
ordinance established no criteria on which the decision to grant or deny a
permit would be based. The California laundry industry was predominately
Chinese, 830 and in an earlier 1885 case, the Chinese community had
challenged a related ordinance as motivated by invidious anti-Chinese
sentiment.83' The Supreme Court had rejected the facial challenge, finding,
per Justice Field, that the ordinance was warranted by the need to avoid fires
in a windy city, was facially neutral, and could not be invalidated "unless in
its enforcement it is made to operate only against the class
825. The Supreme Court did not formally interpret the Fifth Amendment as incorporating equal
protection principles until Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), although the concept of equal
treatment at the federal level was respected and enforced by the Fuller Court in other contexts. See,
e.g., Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 420 (1894) (holding that a rate regulation
violated equality before the law). See infra notes 1706-08 and accompanying text.
826. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
827. 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (concluding that aliens are entitled to Fifth and Sixth Amendment
protections in criminal proceedings). See infra notes 1037-58 and accompanying text.
828. 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (holding that Chinese persons are entitled to natural born citizenship).
See infra notes 1059-82 and accompanying text.
829. Yick Wo and his co-plaintiff, Wo Lee, were lawful Chinese residents who had been
engaged in the laundry business for 22 and 25 years, respectively. Authorities and Arguments for
Defendant and Respondent at 1, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (No. 1280, 1281). Yick
Wo sought habeas in the Supreme Court of California, while Wo Lee filed in the California federal
court. The California Supreme Court upheld the San Francisco ordinance, based on a decision of
the appeals commission, as a valid exercise of the police power. Circuit Judge Sawyer concluded
the statute vested arbitrary and discriminatory power in the city officials, but nevertheless denied
Wo Lee's petition in deference to the state Supreme Court decision. Arguments of Hall
McCallister, C.H. Van Shaick, and D.L. Smoot, for Appellants and Plaintiffs in Error at 1-2, Yick
Wo (No. 1280, 1281).
830. In the period between 1870 and 1890, Chinese persons constituted approximately 70% of
all workers in the California laundry industry. TAKAKI, supra note 776, at 92. Laundry was one of
the few industries open to Chinese workers by the latter 1800s, and by 1900, 25% of all Chinese
males in the U.S. were laundry workers. Id. at 93.
831. Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885).
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mentioned .... ,,832  The following year in Yick Wo, the Chinese plaintiffs
alleged precisely that.
The extant Supreme Court briefs from the case are extremely poor. The
brief for the plaintiffs is a mere thirteen pages, alleging disparate
enforcement of the statute 833 and summarily asserting violations of equal
protection, due process, and the treaty with China.834 San Francisco's
lengthy submission, on the other hand, argued that the city had consistently
denied permits to laundries with wood scaffolding on the roofs, and that, as a
precaution against fire, the ordinance was a valid exercise of the police
power.835 Much of the city's brief was dedicated to invective about the
Chinese and their well-financed legal attack, which the city contended was
thwarting its efforts to enforce valid laws.836
Despite the poor briefing, the Supreme Court had no difficulty striking
down the ordinance. Writing for the Court, Justice Matthews articulated the
classical limited government approach to alienage. "The rights of the
petitioners," he held, "are not less because they are aliens and subjects of the
Emperor of China." 837 Matthews observed that the Fourteenth Amendment
refers to "Persons" and "is not confined to the protection of citizens. 838
Moreover, "the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness" were "universal in their application to all [p]ersons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or
of nationality." 839 Thus, aliens enjoyed the same treatment as citizens under
the questions presented.
8 40
Matthews found with equal ease that the San Francisco ordinance, as
applied, violated equal protection. The ordinance conferred on city officials
"a naked and arbitrary power,, 841 which, if "applied ... with an evil eye and
an unequal hand," constituted "a practical denial" of equal protection.
842
Matthews specifically denied that governmental sovereignty could warrant
such arbitrariness:
832. Id. at711.
833. Plaintiffs contended that all 200 Chinese who had requested permits had been denied,
while all 80 Caucasian applicants, with one exception, had been granted permits. Brief for Plaintiffs
at 2, Yick Wo (No. 1280, 1281). San Francisco disputed these facts, arguing that only two white
laundries had been granted permits and that these laundries employed large numbers of Chinese.
Brief for Defendant at 20, 26-27, Yick Wo (No. 1280, 1281).
834. Brief for Plaintiffs at 5-6, Yick Wo (No. 1280, 1281).
835. Brief for Defendant at 13, 15, Yick Wo (No. 1280, 1281).
836. Id at 17-20.
837. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 368-69.
838. Id. at 369.
839. Id.
840. Id.
841. Id at 366.
842. Id. at 373-74.
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When we consider the nature and theory of our institutions of
government... we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean
to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary
power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the
author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers
are delegated to the agencies of the government, sovereignty itself
remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government
exists and acts.
843
Matthews's decision in Yick Wo could be read as imposing a territorial
restriction on the constitutional protection of aliens, since he observed that
"these provisions [of due process and equal protection] are universal in their
application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction."844 The case did
not present any questions of territoriality, however. Moreover, Matthews
also cited the decision in Chy Lung in support of his equal protection
analysis, which had involved an alien who had not yet legally entered the
United States.845
In short, the Court's decisions between 1875 and 1886 rejected the
possibility of an exclusive or concurrent state power over immigration and
upheld an exclusive federal authority to impose head taxes and inspect
immigrants. Throughout the period, the Court evaluated the statutes before it
according to ordinary enumerated powers analysis. The Court located the
federal immigration power in the Commerce Clause, and applied equal
protection and due process principles in Chy Lung and Yick Wo to reject state
laws that arbitrarily impacted aliens. Antebellum rhetoric about inherent
power disappeared from the Court's jurisprudence. The Court did not rely on
international law as a source of authority, and it declined the theory of
inherent and plenary powers urged by the Government in the Head Money
Cases and Chew Heong. With the possible exception of a vague passage in
the Head Money Cases, none of these decisions suggested that congressional
power over aliens was in any way insulated from ordinary rules of
constitutional jurisprudence.
The inherent powers era was fast approaching, however. The same year
that the Supreme Court decided Chew Heong, the Court held in the Legal
Tender Cases that Congress enjoyed "powers belonging to sovereignty in
other civilized nations, and not expressly withheld from Congress by the
Constitution." 846 Writing for the Court, Justice Gray looked to international
843. Id. at 369-70.
844. Id. at 369 (emphasis added).
845. Id. at 374.
846. Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 450 (1884). The case involved a highly contentious
challenge to Congress's power to designate paper money as legal tender of the United States.
Congress originally created paper money during the Civil War in legislation that later was upheld
by the Court as an emergency war measure. See The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 529 (1871).
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concepts of sovereignty to inform the Constitution's provisions. 847  Gray
reasoned that the power to lay and collect taxes "either embodies a grant of
power to pay the debts of the United States or presupposes and assumes that
power as inherent in the United States as a sovereign government.'" 848 The
power to designate legal tender had been "a power universally understood to
belong to sovereignty, in Europe and America, at the time of the framing,"
which continued to be exercised in Europe. 849 Since the power was "one of
the powers belonging to sovereignty in other civilized nations, and not
expressly withheld from Congress by the Constitution," he concluded that the
power was within the constitutional authority of Congress. 850 The question
whether the exigencies at any particular time justified resort to the measure
was "a political question, to be determined by Congress. 851
The Court in the Legal Tender Cases ultimately did not rely solely on
inherent powers as the exclusive source of governmental power. Instead, the
Court assumed that the Constitution's provisions broadly encompassed the
powers held by other sovereign states. Nevertheless, the approach was
novel, and Justice Field dissented bitterly over inherent powers:
Congress can exercise no power by virtue of any supposed inherent
sovereignty in the general government .... [T]here is no such thing
as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the United
States .... In this country sovereignty resides in the people .... 852
Like Madison's Report to the Virginia Legislature, Field specifically rejected
the assumption that powers withheld from the states necessarily were
possessed by the national government:
It seems.., to be supposed that, as the power was taken from the
States, it could not have been intended that it should disappear
Justice Bradley's concurrence in the 1871 cases, however, relied more directly on inherent
sovereign powers:
The United States is not only a government, but it is a National government, and the only
government in this country that has the character of nationality .... [I]t is invested with all
those inherent and implied powers which, at the time of adopting the Constitution, were
generally considered to belong to every government as such, and as such being essential to the
exercise of its functions.
79 U.S. at 555-56 (Bradley, J., concurring). Chief Justice Chase dissented. Id. at 582 ("[W]e reject
wholly the doctrine, advanced for the first time, we believe, in this court .... that the legislature has
any 'powers under the Constitution which grow out of the aggregate of powers conferred upon the
government, or out of the sovereignty instituted by it.' If this proposition be admitted... the
government becomes practically absolute and unlimited."). Congress later reenacted the legal
tender laws after the Civil War, and the 1884 cases involved the controversial question whether
Congress possessed this power in peacetime. See Juilliard, 110 U.S. at 437-38.
847. Juilliard, 110 U.S. at 447.
848. Id. at 440 (emphasis added).
849. Id. at 447.
850. Id. at 450.
851. Id.
852. Id. at 467 (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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entirely, and therefore it must in some way adhere to the general
government, notwithstanding the Tenth Amendment and the nature of
the Constitution .... [T]he true doctrine is the very opposite of this.
If the power is not in terms granted [by the Constitution], and is not
necessary and proper for the exercise of a power which is thus
granted, it does not exist.
853
Field argued that the method of interpretation applied by the Court "would
change the whole nature of our Constitution and break down the barriers
which separate a government of limited from one of unlimited powers."
854
Two years later, on the same day that Yick Wo was decided, the Court in
Kagama unanimously rejected the Commerce Clause as a basis for
congressional legislation over Indian tribes and embraced the doctrine of
inherent, plenary congressional power.855
G. The Inherent Powers Era
Chew Heong proved to be the Crow Dog856 of the immigration
decisions. The Court's broad, pro-immigrant statutory interpretation, and the
continued willingness of the lower courts to accept claims of prior residence
by Chinese arrivals lacking certificates, provoked a backlash on the West
Coast and in Congress. Anti-immigrant forces viewed the decisions as
flouting the express will of Congress. Private exclusion campaigns,
characterized by violent riots, murder, and intimidation of Chinese persons,
peaked on the West Coast in 1885 and 1886, while anti-Chinese sentiment
among jurors made it impossible to bring the perpetrators to justice.857
Congress quickly sought to negotiate a new supplemental treaty with China
to allow further immigration restrictions and hastily adopted new legislation
after the treaty negotiations fell through.858  The 1888 act amended the
existing exclusion laws by barring all Chinese laborers who had left the
United States from returning, regardless of whether they held certificates, in
direct breach of the 1868 and 1880 treaties. 859 During the debates over the
legislation, concerns were raised regarding Chinese residents who had
already left the United States with certificates in reliance upon their right to
return, and a failed motion was made in the Senate to create an exception for
853. Id. at 467-68 (Field, J., dissenting).
854. Id. at 466 (Field, J., dissenting).
855. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886).
856. See supra note 370.
857. SALYER, supra note 769, at 21.
858. Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (supplementing an act to execute certain treaty
stipulations relating to Chinese).
859. See id. § 2 (declaring existing customs certificates to be "void and of no effect" and that




these aliens.86° In signing the bill, the President called upon Congress im-
mediately to pass further legislation creating an exception for this class of
persons, but Congress did not act upon the suggestion.
861
1. Chae Chan Ping v. United States.-The original Chinese Exclusion
Case, Chae Chan Ping v. United States,862 addressed whether Congress had
constitutional authority to retroactively terminate the right of an alien
resident to reenter the United States. 863 Chae Chan Ping had resided in the
United States for twelve years prior to 1887, when he departed for China
with a customs certificate indicating that he was a resident entitled to return
to the United States.864 He returned to San Francisco harbor six days after
the passage of the 1888 Act and was denied entry. 865  Excluded alien
residents like Chae Chan Ping were not allowed to recover any personal
belongings or dispose of any personal property which they owned in the
United States-property which the Chinese Consulate General contended
amounted to "several millions of dollars., 866 The right to reenter of an es-
timated 20,000 Chinese nationals who had previously departed the United
States with certificates was implicated by the case.
867
Chae Chan Ping presented his case to the Supreme Court as a claim
regarding the right of Congress to expel a lawful, long-term U.S. resident
alien, rather than a question of entry.868 Plaintiffs' counsel focused on Chae
Chan Ping's lengthy prior residence in the United States and maintained that
his absence from the country-on which the United States justified his
exclusion-had been induced by the government's promise of his right to
return.869 The plaintiffs case thus, for the first time since the Alien Act,
raised the question of the national government's power to summarily expel
friendly resident aliens in time of peace.
The plaintiff asserted straight enumerated-powers and individual rights
arguments. With respect to the source of Congressional authority, he
contended that the Constitution did not delegate any power to Congress to
860. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 36 F. 431, 433 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1888).
861. Id.
862. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
863. Id. at 589.
864. The customs certificate established the bearer's right "to return to and to re-enter the
United States upon producing and delivering this certificate to the Collector of Customs." Briefs for
Appellant by Attorneys Houndly and Carter at 3-4, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581
(1889) (No. 1446) [hereinafter Plaintiff s Brief I].
865. Id. at 2.
866. Id. at 36.
867. MARY ROBERTS COOLIDGE, CHINESE IMMIGRATION 280 (1968).
868. Brief for Appellant by Attorney James C. Carter at 3-4, Chae Chan Ping (No. 1446)
[hereinafter Plaintiffs Brief II] ("Whatever power Congress may have to prohibit the immigration
of other foreign citizens .... it had none to prohibit the return to this country of the appellant.").
869. Plaintiffs Brief 1, supra note 864, at 33.
[Vol. 81:1
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty
expel lawful resident aliens. Chae Chan Ping denied that the expulsion of
lawful residents implicated foreign commerce. 870 The Act could not be up-
held under the treaty power, since it expressly abrogated the China treaties.
Nor could the Act be upheld under the war powers, since China was at peace
with the United States, and Chae Chan Ping was not a belligerent.871
Arguments based on sovereignty also failed on two grounds. First, Chae
Chan Ping relied on international publicists to argue that international law
did not allow civilized states to exclude or expel foreigners. 872 And second,
even if international law did allow such actions, the United States enjoyed no
such enumerated power.
Chae Chan Ping's individual rights arguments are not mentioned in the
Supreme Court decision, and immigration law commentators traditionally
have assumed that no individual constitutional rights claims were raised in
the case.873 However, the briefs reveal that Chae Chan Ping also squarely
rooted his claim in a Yick Wo argument that the Constitution applied to res-
ident aliens and prohibited their arbitrary expulsion without due process. 74
Plaintiff suggested that both principles of territoriality and membership
supported his claim. Resident aliens were "'persons' within the jurisdiction
of the United States, [to whom] all the protection afforded by the
Constitution to 'persons' not citizens, can apply. 875
870. Id. at 67. See also Plaintiffs Brief II, supra note 868, at 4 (stating that "while the power to
regulate commerce with 'foreign nations' may authorize congressional legislation to prevent the
entry of foreign subjects, no one.., will assert that any power is conferred on Congress to
command them to surrender any residence.., and depart from the country").
871. Plaintiff's Brief I at 20-21.
872. Id. at 14 ("[It] is doubtless a principle of the law of nations, as understood among civilized
nations and in modern times, that no nation has the right to close its doors to foreigners."). Plaintiff
cited Woolsey's treatise on international law, see supra note 141, for the proposition that "[n]o State
in peace can exclude the properly documented subjects of another friendly State or send them away
after they have been once admitted without definite reasons, which must be submitted to the foreign
government concerned." Id. See also id. at 14-15 ("No nation has the right to interdict absolutely
the entrance of foreigners into its territory or to close the country to foreign commerce." (citing
FIELD, supra note 599, § 318)); id. at 15 ("[S]overeignty is therefore not absolute, but limited by the
law of nations.").
873. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 51, at 858 ("Apparently, the alien claimed no constitutional
rights, and the Court did not independently probe possible constitutional objections to his
exclusion."); LEGOMSKY, supra note 51, at 193 ("[T]he Court was not considering what the judicial
role should be when an individual constitutional right has allegedly been violated.").
874. Plaintiff's Brief I, supra note 864, at 30, 62 ("It may be objected that Chae Chan Ping is
not a citizen of the United States... but he is, nevertheless, a 'person', a member of the human
race, within the definition and protection of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal
Constitution."); Argument on Behalf of Appellant by Attorneys Harvey S. Brown and Thomas D.
Riordan at 7, Chae Chan Ping (No. 1446) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Brief I1] ("The Act... is in
contravention of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution... in... that it deprives the Appellant of
both Liberty and Property without due Process of Law."). Plaintiff also challenged the law as a bill
of attainder or ex post facto law. Id. at 14.
875. Plaintiff's Brief I, supra note 864, at 34.
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Chae Chan Ping relied heavily upon Madison's arguments regarding the
Alien Act.876 Like Madison, plaintiffs counsel equated a friendly resident
alien to a person on whom the government had bestowed a vested property
interest. Although the decision to admit was discretionary, it could not be
revoked without good cause. The treaties, statutes, and certificate that grant-
ed Chae Chan Ping the privileges and immunities of citizenship and freedom
of travel thus gave Chae Chan Ping "a vested right to return, which could not
be taken from him by any exercise of mere legislative power."
877
As in the Head Money Cases, the United States made no effort to
defend the federal action under the Commerce Clause. Solicitor General
Jenks instead asserted a territorial argument that because Chae Chan Ping
was outside the country, the government had an absolute right to bar his
reentry. Jenks argued that the power to exclude arose from the government's
collective powers over foreign relations, which embraced the full sovereign
powers enjoyed by independent states. The government suggested that these
powers were supported by the Migration Clause:
The whole tenor of the Constitution is that the United States is a
nation, and, as to foreign nations and their subjects, is endowed with
full sovereign powers.
The implication from [the Migration Clause], is clear, that after the
year 1808 Congress might prohibit the migration or importation of
foreigners. As a nation the Government may exercise international
powers.
878
The government further cited Vattel for the proposition that "[i]nternational
law fully establishes the right of a nation to exclude foreigners from its
domain,, 879 and invoked Justice Marshall's decision in The Schooner
Exchange v. McFadden that "the jurisdiction of the nation within its own
territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute .... Any restriction upon
it... from an external source, would imply a diminution of its
sovereignty ....8 80
876. Id. at 37, 44. See also Plaintiffs Brief 11, supra note 874, at 10-12 (discussing the Alien
Act).
877. Plaintiffs Brief II, supra note 868, at 4.
878. Brief for the United States at 5, Chae Chan Ping (No. 1446).
879. Id. at 6-7 (stating that "the lord of a territory may, whenever he thinks proper, forbid its
being entered ... [and] [t]here are states, such as China and Japan, into which all foreigners are
forbid to penetrate without an express permission") (quoting VATTEL, supra note 56, bk. 2, ch. VIII,
§ 100, at 171-72). See also id. at 7 ("The entry of foreigners and their effects is not an absolute
right, but only one of imperfect obligation, and it is subject to the discretion of the government
which tolerates it.") (quoting 1 KENT'S COMMENTARIES *35). Cf supra text accompanying note
581-587.
880. Brief for the United States at 6, Chae Chan Ping (No. 1446) (quoting The Schooner
Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 136 (1812)). See supra notes 107-09 and
accompanying text.
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This argument was flawed in a number of respects. The Court
previously had expressly rejected the Migration Clause as a source of the
immigration power, 881 and The Schooner Exchange said nothing about
whether the United States' own domestic laws (e.g., the Constitution) limited
the government's power in this area. The government's citations to in-
ternational law for the power to exclude also failed to take note of the
qualifications on the right to exclude recognized by Vattel and others, and
also was not on point to the extent that Chae Chan Ping's residence made the
case one of expulsion, rather than exclusion.
The government did not expressly acknowledge Chae Chan Ping's due
process argument other than to deny that he had a vested right to return.
Because he resided here "by permission only," the United States argued,
"[t]he withdrawal of that permission violated no personal right., 882 "On his
departure the Government relinquished to him none of its sovereign power,
to repeal its laws, nor did it give him any pledge that it would adhere in the
future to any policy then existing. That he expected to return did not entitle
him to do so. ' 88 3  Thus, the government denied that Chae Chan Ping's
residence altered his status in any respect.
884
In sum, although the government relied on concepts of international law
and sovereignty, its argument fell short of the broad assertion of inherent
power offered by the United States in the Head Money Cases. The gist of the
government's argument was that the power to exclude was recognized by
international law and resided somewhere in the Constitution (presumably the
Migration Clause).
California offered the most aggressive argument in favor of federal
power. Appearing as an amicus, California urged that the power to exclude
aliens was critical to a nation's sovereign autonomy:
The power to determine what individuals of the human race, not
citizens of the United States, may or may not peacefully come into the
country from abroad.., how they shall be treated while here, how
long they may remain, and when and under what circumstances they
shall be required to depart, are essential attributes and prerogatives of
881. New York v. Compagnie Gn6rale Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59, 62 (1883) ("There has
never been any doubt that this clause had exclusive reference to persons of the African race.").
882. Brief for the United States at 11, Chae Chan Ping (No. 1446).
883. Id.
884. Id. at 11-12 ("[W]hether he resided in the United States before.., gave him no right,
under the act of 1888, to admission .... When the privilege to return or remain was absolutely
withdrawn.., it was of no avail to prove that he had been here before or when he left."); id. at 14
("If Chae Chan Ping claims he has exceptional privileges, which other Chinese laborers have not,
who had not been residents of the United States before the passage of the act, the reply is that he
held his exceptional privileges only by virtue of the laws which then existed. The law gave him the
privilege, the repeal of the law has taken it away; and he has no rights greater than any other non-
resident of the same class.").
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sovereignty, and a State can only lose them by being subjugated by
another, in fact, by ceasing to be a State.
885
California asserted that the power to deal with aliens in time of war
gave Congress full authority to deal with aliens in war or peace. 886 In fact,
"necessities urgent as those of war demanded it." 887 Indeed, Congress had
plenary power to expel aliens from within the country, if it wished.888
California also waved the bloody shirt of the Civil War in support of national
supremacy:
[The Plaintiffs position] is a revival of the old contention of State
Rights, with the Virginia resolution of 1798 urged as conclusive of the
question ....
Will counsel claim, in the present condition of the American Nation,
and in the light of the events of the last quarter of a century, that
aliens, objectionable to the United States at large, and believed to be
dangerous to the interests of the entire country, can be protected and
domiciled in any particular State by virtue of State laws, in defiance of
the will of the Nation expressed through Congress?
If so, we have made but little progress in consolidating the American
people into a Nation .... 889
California argued forcefully from social contract and consent principles
that Chae Chan Ping's residence in the United States was "a privilege
permitted to be enjoyed only so long as the U.S. continued [to be] so
minded."8 90
The Constitution and laws of the United States were adopted for the
benefit of the people of the United States. Resident aliens have only
such absolute rights as the public law of Nations secures to them,
which rights are of imperfect obligation. Non-resident aliens have no
rights at all, save what we choose to accord to them.
891
The argument flatly ignored the Court's holding in Yick Wo that aliens within
U.S. jurisdiction were entitled to the Constitution's protections.
885. Argument of John F. Swift and Stephen M. White, of Counsel for Respondent Concurred
in by G.A. Johnson, Attorney Gen., Cal., at 3, Chae Chan Ping (No. 1446).
886. Id. at 6.
887. Id. at 16.
888. The state contended:
[I]t is futile to deny, that the same Congress could have passed at the same session an
act requiring him, in common with any or all other aliens, to depart with or without
notice or in a time given, or peremptorily, and to have him, as an alien, finally thrust
across the frontier and expelled, if necessary. The greater power must surely include
the lesser. If he could be sent away after coming, he can be kept out.
Id. at 4-5.
889. Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added). I am grateful to Gerry Neuman for bringing this argument to
my attention.
890. Id. at 11-12.
891. Id. at 8.
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The state finally disputed the plaintiff's claim of a vested right to return.
The Certificate was "nothing more than a photograph," issued, not with the
intent to establish a right to return, but "because the bad character of Ping's
countrymen made it necessary to provide a moderately certain means of
identification."
892
Although the Court had rejected the United States' suggestion of
inherent powers five years before in the Head Money Cases, Justice Field
now embraced the broadest version of California's inherent powers
argument. Writing for a unanimous Court, Field opened his opinion with an
overtly nativist and ascriptivist explanation of the government's efforts to
regulate Chinese immigration. The Chinese, Field wrote, while originally
welcomed, had refused to assimilate.893 Despite treaty provisions giving
them the privileges of citizens,
they remained strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, and
adhering to the customs and usages of their own country. It seemed
impossible for them to assimilate with our people, or to make any
change in their habits or modes of living. As they grew in numbers
each year the people of the coast saw, or believed they saw, in the
facility of immigration, and in the crowded millions of China ... great
danger that at no distant day that portion of our country would be
overrun by them, unless prompt action was taken to restrict their
immigration.
894
Chinese immigration constituted "an Oriental invasion," and "a menace to
our civilization." 895 "[T]hey retained the habits and customs of their own
country, and in fact constituted a Chinese settlement within the state.,
896
Congress accordingly had acted in response to "urgent and constant prayers
for relief, against existing and anticipated evils. 897
Field invoked international principles of territoriality to assert the
nation's absolute authority to prevent people from entering its borders. Like
the Solicitor General, Field invoked The Schooner Exchange for the
proposition of absolute sovereignty over U.S. territory:
That the government of the United States, through the action of the
legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a
proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction
over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent
nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens it
would be to that extent subject to the control of another power....
892. Id. at 13-14.
893. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 589-90.
894. Id. at 595.
895. Id.
896. Id. at 595-96.
897. Id. at 596.
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All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation
within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the
nation itself They can flow from no other legitimate source.898
Having concluded that international law principles allowed the
exclusion of aliens, however, Field did not address whether the constitutional
structure imposed limitations on that power. International law did not re-
solve whether an exception to the power had been "imposed by... the nation
itself." Without explaining how this particular power had been incorporated
into the enumerated powers of the national government, Field assumed that
the Constitution bestowed on the United States all the foreign relations
powers of independent nations:
[T]he United States, in their relation to foreign countries and their
subjects or citizens are one nation, invested with powers which belong
to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the
maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its
entire territory. The powers to declare war, make treaties, suppress
insurrection, repel invasion, [and] regulate foreign commerce.., are
all sovereign powers, restricted in their exercise only by the
constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice
which control, more or less, the conduct of civilized nations.
8 99
This catalogue did not identify any particular enumerated power over
immigration, but simply asserted that the national government possessed
certain sovereign powers. Field, however, did not further consider the
question, but assumed that the authority was held by the United States as a
fundamental power of national security and self-preservation. The power to
expel dangerous aliens was "too clearly within the essential attributes of
sovereignty to be seriously contested." 900 Field embraced the United States'
and California's argument that "vast hordes" of friendly aliens encroaching
upon U.S. shores triggered the core national security powers of the state.
Like Vattel, Field portrayed the right to exclude as essential to self-
preservation:
To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign
aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and
to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be
subordinated. It matters not in what form such aggression and
encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its
national character or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon
us. The government, possessing the powers which are to be exercised
for protection and security, is clothed with authority to determine the
898. Id. at 603-04, (quoting The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116,
136 (1812)) (emphasis added).
899. Id. at 604, 606.
900. Id. at 607 (quoting communication from Mr. Fish, Secretary of State under President
Grant, to Mr. Washbume, Minister to France (Sept., 1869)).
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occasion on which the powers shall be called forth .... If, therefore,
the government of the United States, through its legislative
department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in
this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its
peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the
time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which the
foreigners are subjects. The existence of war would render the
necessity of the proceeding only more obvious and pressing. The
same necessity, in a less pressing degree, may arise when war does not
exist, and the same authority which adjudges the necessity in one case
must also determine it in the other.
90 1
While Field had sharply criticized the majority's suggestion of inherent
national power in the 1884 Legal Tender Cases, he now invoked Justice
Bradley's theory of sovereignty in an opinion that was both heavily
nationalist and nativist.
90 2
The Court did not expressly acknowledge the plaintiffs constitutional
due process claim, despite the holding in Yick Wo and the suggestion in Chy
Lung that the Constitution protected even newly arrived aliens from arbitrary
treatment. Instead, Field simply denied that either the certificate or the
statutes and treaties gave the plaintiff a right to reenter. Unlike property
rights, which could vest by treaty, the immigration power was a political
power and a core characteristic of sovereignty held by all nations which
could not be granted away:
903
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those
sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its
exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the
interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained
on behalf of any one .... They cannot be abandoned or
surrendered .... Whatever license, therefore, Chinese laborers may
have obtained, previous to the Act of October 1, 1888, to return to the
United States after their departure, is held at the will of the
government, revocable at any time, at its pleasure.
904
Having established the first element of the inherent powers doctrine-a
source of authority inherent in international law and sovereignty-Field also
adopted the third element of limited judicial review, concluding that
901. Id. at 606.
902. Id. at 605 ("[T]he United States ... is a national government, and the only government in
this country that has the character of nationality." (quoting Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457,
555 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring))).




Congress's exercise of the power to exclude was a political question which
was "conclusive upon the judiciary."
905
The government... is clothed with authority to determine the
occasion on which the powers shall be called forth; and its
determinations, so far as the subjects affected are concerned, are
necessarily conclusive upon all its departments and officers .... If
the [alien's] government ... is dissatisfied with this action it can make
complaint to the executive head of our government, or resort to any
other measure which, in its judgment, its interests or dignity may
demand; and there lies its only remedy.
90 6
In sum, the power derived from international law, and international relations
between states provided the only remedy for its wrongful exercise.
Although Chae Chan Ping had argued that the case involved the
expulsion of a lawful resident alien from within the nation's jurisdiction,
Field characterized the case as one regarding exclusion of aliens outside of
the nation's jurisdiction. The fiction that the case involved exclusion, not
deportation, was important to his decision. Field specifically designated his
opinion "The Chinese Exclusion Case, 90 7 and upheld "[t]he power of
exclusion of foreigners [as] an incident of sovereignty belonging to the
government of the United States. 90 8 Field carefully distinguished the 1798
Alien Act from the "exclusion" law at issue. 90 9  Field thus avoided
California's contention that the powers to exclude and to expel were
indistinguishable. Field's apparent discomfort with the Alien Act, and his in-
sistence that the case involved the exercise of an entirely different power,
confirm that he found the distinction between exclusion and expulsion
significant.
Field's opinion also adopted the most absolute view of international
authority over aliens, ignoring public law qualifications on the power,
particularly regarding aliens who had established lawful residence. He
declined to consider the petitioner's contention that whatever power existed
under international law and the Constitution to exclude aliens did not extend
to the expulsion of aliens, like the petitioner, who had established permanent
residency in the territory. The decision, however, soon made its own con-
tribution to international law. In 1891, the United Kingdom relied on Field's
905. Id. at 606. But see LEGOMSKY, supra note 5 1, at 193 (arguing that the statement
"undoubtedly meant only that the Court could not interfere because Congress had done nothing
unconstitutional").
906. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
907. FISS, supra note 668, at 306-07 (noting that Field was careful to use the word "exclusion"
without drawing a sharp distinction between exclusion and expulsion).
908. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609 (emphasis added).
909. Id. at 610-11 (noting that the 1798 Act had given the President power to order aliens "to
depart out of the territory" and was "entirely different from the act before us").
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portrayal of the international rule to uphold an absolute power to exclude
returning alien residents. 910
In sum, Chae Chan Ping radically transformed the Court's approach to
the immigration power. Field made no effort to locate the immigration
power in the Commerce Clause, and instead characterized the immigration
power as an exclusive federal power incident to sovereignty, derived from
the absolute sovereign right of all nations to deny aliens entry. The power
was presumed to be incorporated into the general powers of the national
government over foreign affairs and was not subject to judicial review.
Although Field suggested nebulously that the Constitution restricted its
exercise,9" he did not acknowledge Chae Chan Ping's due process argument.
The conclusion that all sovereign nations had authority to exclude aliens
ended his examination of Chae Chan Ping's claims. It thus appeared that the
exercise of the power was insulated-at least in the "exclusion" context-
from due process objections.
Why was Field so willing to abandon the Commerce Clause analysis?
Field's personal frustration with the Court's prior responses to Chinese
immigration was both extreme and palpable. His experience as a presidential
candidate from California and his longstanding service as a California circuit
justice may have made him sympathetic to California's argument. Field's
anger, however, does not explain the unanimity of the Court's decision.
Some commentators have suggested that by 1889, post-Civil War notions of
humanity made the Court uncomfortable with portraying voluntary
immigration as "commerce." 912 However, the greatest controversy on the
Court over designating immigration as "commerce" occurred in the ante-
bellum period, as discussed above. The post-Civil War Court had expressed
no discomfort with the issue and had uniformly embraced immigration as
foreign commerce.
913
More likely, as with the decision in Kagama three years earlier, the
Court may have concluded that the power being upheld was too broad to
justify under the Commerce Clause. At the same time that the national
government was seeking more expansive powers over Indians and aliens in
the name of Indian and foreign commerce, the Court was narrowing the
910. Musgrove v. Chun Teeong Toy, 1891 A.C. 272, quoted in Nafziger, supra note 581, at
828-29 ("No authority exists for the proposition that an alien has [a legal right to enter British
territory] ... [or to] maintain [such] an action in a British Court .. "). Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand likewise adopted exclusion legislation targeting the Chinese in the late nineteenth
century. Id. at 816.
911. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604.
912. Henkin, supra note 51, at 856; see also Bilder, supra note 670, at 819, 822. But see
LEGOMSKY, supra note 51, at 186 n.42 (suggesting that the Court's retreat from the Commerce
Clause may have been motivated by its narrowing construction of that clause).
913. The Court's desire to distance immigration from the slavery question, however, may well




scope of the domestic Commerce Clause. In particular, the 1888 decision of
Kidd v. Pearson914 stressed the limited reach of the federal commerce
authority. The commerce power did not include the regulation of manu-
facture, the Court reasoned, and to extend the power beyond regulation of
goods that had been loaded for interstate conveyance would invest Congress
with the power to regulate "every branch of human industry" at the expense
of the states. 91 5 The same year the Court acknowledged that the powers of
interstate and foreign commerce were "undoubtedly of the same class and
character and equally extensive." 916 The Court's constraints on the Interstate
Commerce Clause would soon peak with the 1895 decision in United States
v. E.C. Knight.917
In Chae Chan Ping, the de facto and retroactive exclusion of a lawful
resident was less obviously related to commerce than a head tax on newly
arriving aliens. Moreover, the immigration power was being used here not
merely to preclude state action, but to nullify prior federal activity. In order
to rule for the United States, therefore, the Court had to uphold Congress's
abrogation of the treaty with China, the power to forbid new arrivals, and the
revocation of a legal resident's certificate. At the same time that the Court
was narrowing federal power under the Commerce Clause, it was aggres-
sively protecting property and contract rights in other contexts. The Court
had acknowledged as recently as the Head Money Cases that treaties could
establish legally vested rights for private individuals,91 8 and if Chae Chan
Ping was correct that his right to return under the treaty and prior statutes
was analogous to contract or property rights, he was likely to prevail. If the
power to exclude had been merely a power of commerce, it might have been
hard to deny that Chae Chan Ping's interests had vested. Alternatively, to
hold that they did not vest might have given strength to the Commerce
Clause that would prove unpalatable in the interstate commerce context. By
portraying immigration as a core sovereign power that could not be alienated,
therefore, Field was able to reject Chae Chan Ping's contention that the
certificate constituted an irrevocable promise without distorting the
commerce power. Thus, as in Kagama, when the Court was confronted with
an exercise of national power deemed beyond the scope of the Commerce
Clause, it turned, on arguments of necessity, to a theory of inherent power.
2. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States.-Chae Chan Ping's sub silentio
rejection of the plaintiffs due process claim was soon made express in the
914. 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (upholding a state statute prohibiting alcohol manufacture for export).
915. Id. at 21, 25.
916. Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 480, 482 (1888).
917. 156 U.S. 1 (1895); see infra notes 1701-14, 1783-83, and accompanying text.
918. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) ("A treaty may also contain provisions
which confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of [the other nation].").
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1892 case of Nishimura Ekiu v. United States.91 9 Nishimura Ekiu was not a
Chinese exclusion case, but arose under the general immigration statutes
which authorized immigration commissioners to bar any individuals deemed
likely to become a public charge. 920 An 1891 Act, which became effective
during her detention, provided that all decisions by immigration inspection
officers regarding the rights of aliens to land would be final, subject only to
very limited administrative appeal. 92' Nishimura Ekiu was a Japanese
national who came to the U.S. seeking her husband and had been excluded
under the statute without being given the opportunity to present evidence of
her entitlement to land.922 Nishimura Ekiu thus actually presented the case
that Justice Field had claimed he was deciding in Chae Chan Ping-the
exclusion of a newly arriving alien, who had not entered U.S. territory and
had no claim of membership. Nishimura did not challenge Congress's
abstract power to exclude, but questioned only whether Congress's
dedication of the power to the executive's unreviewable discretion was
consistent with habeas and due process. 923 As in Yick Wo, Nishimura argued
that due process protects all "persons" within U.S. jurisdiction.924 Chy Lung
similarly had involved the exclusion of a newly arriving alien through
arbitrary processes, and the Court's decision in that case, as well as Yick Wo,
suggested that the Court should be skeptical of arbitrary discretion.
The brief for the United States relied on citations from Vattel,
Phillimore, and Chae Chan Ping to argue that the government had the power
to exclude aliens.925 No constitutional source of the authority was offered.
With respect to the Constitution's constraints, the United States argued that
the exclusion procedure was consistent with due process and then contended,
from strict territoriality and membership theory, that Nishimura was not
919. 142 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1892).
920. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214 see supra notes 791-93 and accompanying
text. While Nishimura's habeas petition was pending, the immigration inspector upheld her
exclusion based on a later statute. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084 (amending
various acts concerning immigration and importation of immigrant laborers).
921. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 8, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085-86, quoted in Brief for the
Appellees at 6-7, Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (No. 1393).
922. Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 656; see also Brief for the Appellants at 12, Nishimura Ekiu
(No. 1393) (arguing that Nishimura was 25 years old, in good health, and with sufficient money to
support herself until she found employment).
923. Brief for the Appellants at 6-7, Nishimura Ekiu (No. 1393).
924. Appellant's argument relied in part on the plain text of the Constitution:
The Constitution does not say that no citizen or resident shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, but that no person shall be deprived
of... due process .... Person is broad enough to include every human being within
the jurisdiction .... The petitioner on board of a ship tied up to the wharf in the port
of San Francisco, is within the jurisdiction of the United States, and is one of those
persons mentioned in the 5th and 14th Amendments ....
Id. at 17.
925. Brief for the Appellees at 14-17, Nishimura Ekiu (No. 1393).
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entitled to due process protections because she was an alien outside the
United States. "The Constitution has no application to the appellant any
more than it has to any other foreigner,"926 the government urged. Citing the
strict territoriality case of In re Ross,927 the government contended, "The
Constitution is limited by its nature and purposes and by the terms of its
preamble to the people and the territory of the United States. 92'  Nishimura
was "not to be considered as a person lawfully within the United States.. . or
even as landed upon its shores." 929 Although she had been moved to a
detention site in San Francisco, she was "constructively and in legal view on
board the S.S. Belie, in the port of San Francisco, claiming that she has the
right to land., 930 Ignoring the fact that the Due Process Clause is not limited
to citizens, the government argued that the doctrine that aliens at the border
could demand "the privileges and immunities given to citizens" by the
Constitution was "preposterous.,
931
In an eight-to-one opinion by Justice Gray, the Supreme Court upheld
Nishimura's exclusion. 932 Justice Gray opened with an expansive statement
of sovereign power over immigration:
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign
nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-
preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions,
or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it
may see fit to prescribe .... In the United States this power is vested
in the national government, to which the Constitution has committed
the entire control of international relations .... 933
As in Chae Chan Ping, the power to exclude was treated as an undisputed
principle of international law, "inherent in sovereignty" and "essential to
self-preservation," which "belong[ed] to the political department of the
government."
934
The Court conceded that aliens prevented from landing were deprived
of liberty and entitled to review under a writ of habeas corpus. 93 5 However,
Gray held that for aliens who had not yet entered the United States, a court
was entitled to inquire into the facts on habeas only if the statute so
926. Id. at 13.
927. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891); see infra notes 1380-93 and accompanying text.
928. In re Nishimura Ekiu on Habeas Corpus, Appellee's Brief at 13, Nishimura Ekiu (No.
1393).
929. Id. at 2.
930. Id Congress had provided that the removal and detention of aliens for inspection purposes
"shall not be considered a landing." Id. at 9 (quoting section 8 of the March 3, 1891 Act).
931. Id. at 12.
932. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
933. Id. (citing VATTEL, supra note 56, bk. II, §§ 94, 100; 1 PHILLIMORE, supra note 588, ch.
10, § 220).
934. Id.
935. Id. at 660.
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authorized. In Nishimura's case, due process had not been violated, and
habeas review of the facts found by the commissioner was not allowed. The
Court thus embraced the government's membership and territoriality argu-
ments to justify the exercise of an absolute political right to exclude aliens at
the border:
It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners
who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicil or
residence within the United States, nor even been admitted into the
country pursuant to law, shall be permitted to enter, in opposition to
the constitutional and lawful measures of the legislative and executive
branches of the national government. As to such persons, the
decisions of the executive [and Congress], are due process of law.
9 36
Justice Brewer, who had been appointed to the Court in 1890, dissented
without opinion.
Nishimura Ekiu thus confirmed the scope of the inherent powers
doctrine by dedicating near absolute discretion over entry decisions to
Congress and the executive. All three elements of the inherent powers
doctrine had now been articulated. The source of authority was inherent and
derived from international law. Individual rights protections such as due
process would not be applied to constrain that power, and judicial review
would be authorized only to review questions of law and fact to the extent
provided for by those bodies.937 The question that remained unanswered was
the scope of federal power over persons who satisfied threshold membership
and territoriality concerns-i.e., long-term legal residents who were present
in the United States.
3. Fong Yue Ting v. United States.-In May 1892, Congress passed the
Geary Act,938 which extended the 1882 suspension of Chinese immigration
for another ten years. 939 The Act further required all lawful resident Chinese
laborers to carry a certificate of residence at all times, based on the testimony
of a white witness, and imposed a one-year deadline for Chinese laborers to
register. 940  Chinese found without a certificate would be subject to
deportation unless they could establish to a reviewing court, through the
936. Id.
937. See Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens,
98 COLUM. L. REv. 961, 1008-10 (1998) (discussing Nishimura Ekiu).
938. Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25, 60.
939. Id. § i.
940. Id. § 6. The Act did not specifically define what proof of residence was required to obtain
a certificate, id, but regulations promulgated under the Act provided that residence must be proved
by "at least one credible witness of good character" or by other proof in case of necessity. Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 726 (1893). The requirement was interpreted as requiring
proof through at least one white witness. See SALYER, supra note 769 at 47 (noting that as the
deadline for registering approached, the Secretary of the Treasury reduced the white witness
requirement from two to one).
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testimony of a "credible white witness," that they had been a resident of the
United States upon the Act's passage and that "by reason of accident,
sickness or other unavoidable cause" they had been unable to procure a
certificate. 941 The Geary Act thus was the first expulsion measure adopted
since the 1798 Alien Act. The Act underscored the inferior status of the
Chinese, even to other immigrants, by singling them out for a pass-law
requirement.942
The Geary Act's specific targeting of resident Chinese provoked a
massive campaign of civil disobedience within the Chinese community.
943
Confident after their victory in Yick Wo and on the advice of a team of elite
legal counsel,944 the Chinese Six Companies condemned the law as inhumane
and unconstitutional and called upon Chinese not to register. The campaign
was wildly successful: by the registration deadline, 13,242 Chinese in the
United States had registered, leaving approximately 85,000 who were legally
subject to deportation under the Act.945  Meanwhile, the Chinese Six
Companies brought a test case challenging the constitutionality of the Geary
Act. Due no doubt in part to the prohibitive cost of enforcement, the
Secretary of the Treasury suspended enforcement of the law while the court
case was pending.946
The Chinese community's challenge to the Geary Act, Fong Yue Ting v.
United States,94 7 involved three plaintiffs, each of whom had been a lawful
resident of the United States for more than ten years. The first two
petitioners, Fong Yue Ting and Wong Quan, had declined to apply for
certificates and were arrested in New York and ordered deported. The third
petitioner, Lee Joe, who had been a U.S. resident for nearly twenty years, had
applied for a certificate of residence, but had been able to present only
Chinese witnesses to attest to his residency. Lee Joe satisfied the court that
he had been a resident of the United States at the time of the 1882 Act's
passage, but he was ordered deported for failure to produce a white witness.
941. Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 6, 27 stat. 25, 60.
942. In the Senate debates, Senator Sherman of Ohio criticized the Act, stating: "They are here
ticket-of-leave men; precisely as, under the Australian law, a convict is allowed to go at large upon
a ticket-of-leave, these people are to be allowed to go at large and earn their livelihood, but they
must have their tickets-of-leave in their possession." "This inaugurates in our system of
government a new departure; one, I believe, never before practiced, although it was suggested in
conference that some such rules had been adopted in slavery times to secure the peace of society."
See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 743 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
943. See Katz, supra note 777, at 253-63 (discussing Chinese opposition to the Geary Act).
944. The Six Companies hired some of Washington, D.C.'s preeminent appellate attorneys-J.
Hubley Ashton (counsel for the Southern Pacific Company), Joseph Choate, Maxwell Evarts, and
James Carter-to evaluate the legality of the Geary Act and, ultimately, to bring a legal challenge.
SALYER, supra note 769, at 47. See FISS, supra note 668, at 304 & n.34.
945. 25 CONG. REC. 2421 (1893).
946. See H.R. REP. No. 53-70, at 2 (1893) (noting that the arrest and deportation of the 85,000
noncompliant Chinese would cost an estimated $6 million).
947. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
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All three aliens unsuccessfully sought habeas relief from the Circuit Court in
the Southern District of New York.
Justice Field's decision in Chae Chan Ping had avoided the question of
Congress's constitutional power to deport lawful residents by treating the
plaintiff as a new entrant. But Fong Yue Ting now squarely presented the
Alien Act controversy regarding the scope of congressional authority over
friendly resident aliens and their entitlement to constitutional protection in
expulsion proceedings. The plaintiffs' arguments closely tracked the
Jeffersonian, limited-government and individual rights position from the
Alien Act debates. 948 Plaintiffs first attacked Congress's source of authority,
contending that the Framers had not delegated to Congress any power to
remove friendly resident aliens (except as punishment for a crime).949 In
particular, the plaintiffs denied that the power was implied in the Commerce
Clause, arguing that the appellants had been in the United States as
permanent residents for many years, and their expulsion had nothing to do
with foreign commerce. 950 To the contrary, the plaintiffs contended that the
Constitution incorporated an affirmative policy to encourage immigration
and that the Tenth Amendment reserved the power to expel friendly aliens to
the people.951
Plaintiffs further rejected the contention that the United States
enjoyed any "inherent power of sovereignty" under the Constitution.
[T]he appellants therefore claim that there is no such thing as an
inherent power of sovereignty resting in Congress, that is not
conferred upon it by the Constitution. Before Congress has the power
to pass a law, that power must be found in the Constitution, either
expressly stated or given by implication, and no law passed by it can
be sustained on the sole ground that it is passed under an inherent
power of sovereignty, that it is necessary to the preservation of the
nation, or an incident of sovereignty. All such powers are still in the
people .... 952
Plaintiffs rejected any analogy to the powers of England, arguing that the
United States was a limited government "made up of responsible and
delegated power.,
95 3
948. Brief for Petitioners at 45-47, Fong Yue Ting (No. 1345).
949. Id. at 17-19.
950. Id at 52. See also id. at 54 (arguing that "when immigrants have ceased to be immigrants,
and have been transformed into an integral part of our own population, with the same constitutional
rights to personal liberty as native-born citizens, they have escaped beyond the reach of the
Commerce Clause").
951. Id. at 26. See also id. at 18-19 (noting that ultimate sovereignty in the United States rests
with the people).
952. Id. at 19.
953. Id. at 22.
2002]
Texas Law Review
The plaintiffs also urged that international law supported their
interpretation. A country that invited and admitted an alien as a permanent
resident "preclude[d] itself, according to the practices of civilized nations,
from dismissing him from its borders, except on the ground that it is at war
with his nation of origin or as a punishment for a crime., 954 St. Ambrose and
Grotius had believed that a country had no right to exclude a lawfully ad-
mitted foreigner, even to save the domestic population from starvation.955
Moreover, the plaintiffs argued, the expulsion of such a large class of
resident aliens in time of peace was contrary to the practices of civilized
nations and had never been attempted by a civilized government in modern
history.956
Having rejected the Constitution as a source of authority, the plaintiffs
contended that even if Congress had a power to expel, the Constitution's
individual rights protections limited its exercise. They argued from Yick Wo
that as aliens lawfully present in the United States, they were entitled to the
same constitutional privileges and immunities as citizens. 957 For the first
time since Yick Wo, the plaintiffs criticized the law as racially discriminatory
and argued that the Due Process Clause protected the right of resident aliens
to live and labor where they chose within the limits of U.S. territory. 958 The
plaintiffs quoted at length from Chy Lung's condemnation of arbitrary,
unreviewable authority 959 and urged that likewise here, "the power given...
depends entirely upon the whim, the caprice and the honesty of each
particular Collector of Internal Revenue. ' 96°  Reviewing courts had no
authority to determine whether the alien actually satisfied the law's
requirements, and "the judicial determination of the most sacred of all rights
is left to a wholly unqualified ministerial officer., 961  This due process
objection was essentially the same as that advanced in Nishimura Ekiu,
except that here the aliens in question were lawful U.S. residents. Regardless
of whether Congress justified its action under powers inherent in sovereignty
or a power under the Constitution, the plaintiffs urged, "the procedure by
which the expulsion is accomplished must be according to 'due process of
law."'
9 62
954. Id. at 41.
955. Id. (citing PUFENDORF, supra note 579, bk. III, ch. III, § 9).
956. Id. at 15.
957. Id. at 12-13. See also id. at 75 ("Each one of the first eight amendments... was ordained
by the people for the benefit of every person within the limits of the United States.").
958. Id. at 54.
959. Id. at 66-67.
960. Id. at 68.
961. Id. at 61.
962. Id. at 63.
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Plaintiffs additionally maintained that the proceedings, including the
white witness requirement, violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against warrantless arrest, the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury, and the
Sixth Amendment rights to criminal process and trial by jury.9 63 Plaintiffs
further argued that aliens subject to deportation were denied any opportunity
to gather up their property and settle their affairs, thus depriving them of
property without due process.
964
As it had in Chae Chan Ping, the United States, in turn, invoked the
Federalist Alien Act theories of the territorial sovereignty of states under
international law, and aliens' non-membership in the constitutional compact,
to assert that even resident aliens enjoyed no constitutional protection against
the national government. The Solicitor General offered lengthy international
law citations for the proposition that every nation had a right both to set the
terms upon which aliens would be admitted to its territory, and to suspend
such residence and require that they depart.965  Any limitation other than
international law on the power to expel, the government argued, would deny
the U.S. control over its membership, and mean "that other sovereign nations
may... plant colonies upon our shores foreign in allegiance as well as
citizenship.'' 966 Notably, the United States invoked power over Indians in
support of its argument. The forced removal of the Indians from the eastern
United States confirmed this national authority, since Indians were "regarded
as aliens" for this purpose.967
Non-membership was a prominent theme for the government. The
Solicitor General's brief was riddled with nativist sentiment and hostility
toward the Chinese litigants. 968  Like past "hordes of barbarians, ' '969 the
"Mongolians [were] practically incapable of assimilation with our people.
They [came] as a foreign element, and they remain[ed] as such., 970 Their
strangeness created a pressing national security concern. Indeed, "the most
insidious and dangerous enemies to the State," the government argued, "are
not the armed foes who invade our territory, but those alien races who are
963. Id. at 71.
964. Id. at 83.
965. Brief for Respondents at 22, Fong Yue Ting v. United States 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (No.
1345). In addition to citing Phillimore and Vattel, the United States invoked Creasy, Lorimer,
Woolsey, and Reddie. Id. at 23-27.
966. Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
967. Id. at 30.
968. Id. at 12 (describing the Chinese as "a large class of people owing allegiance to a foreign
sovereign, by a people not suited to our institutions, remaining a separate and distinct race,
incapable of assimilation, having habits often of the most pernicious character, working at wages
that debase our own laboring classes, not bound by any considerations of the sanctity of an oath,
given to evasions of other laws of Congress, and by that body.., declared to be a people of such a
character and so inimical to our interests as to require that their coming shall be prohibited").
969. Id. at 55.
970. Id. at 18.
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incapable of assimilation, and come among us to debase our labor and poison
the health and morals of the communities in which they locate."97 '
The government sought to distinguish Yick Wo as involving the right of
aliens to invoke the Constitution against the States. By contrast, aliens could
not "appeal to the Federal Constitution for protection against the Federal
Government itself., 972 At any rate, the exercise of the power was "beyond
the province of the judiciary. 973 Turning the tables on Field's treatment of
Chae Chan Ping as an exclusion case, the government argued that because
Chae Chan Ping had been a long-term lawful resident, the legal issues had
already been decided in that case. 9 74 Finally, the government urged that the
power was "political in its character, and for its exercise the nation can not be
called to account in judicial tribunals."
975
For the first time since the Civil War, the Supreme Court significantly
divided over Congress's authority over aliens. The Court upheld the statute
in a five to three opinion by Justice Gray, with Justices Brewer, Field, and
Chief Justice Fuller dissenting.976 Justice Gray opened the opinion by re-
peating at length the Court's assertions of sovereign power over immigration
from Chae Chan Ping and Nishimura Ekiu, and he concluded that the power
to expel "rests upon the same grounds. 977 They were "but parts of one and
the same power., 978 Gray offered the government's lengthy citations to
international law treatises in support of the power-citations which, as
Justice Field pointed out in dissent, stood at most for the power to exclude,
not the power to expel resident aliens.979 Nevertheless, Gray concluded,
"The right to exclude or expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or
upon certain conditions, in war or in peace [is] an inherent and inalienable
right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its
independence and its welfare. 98°
While Field had relied on the fiction that Chae Chan Ping was an
exclusion case, Gray now bootstrapped Chae Chan Ping to uphold the
deportation of alien residents. Gray noted that Chae Chan Ping unanimously
had upheld the power of Congress to exclude a long-term resident of the
United States "without judicial trial or hearing." 981 That decision foreclosed
971. Id. at 55.
972. Id. at 40; see also id at 44 (arguing that a Chinese alien is not entitled to invoke the
Constitution against the police power of the United States).
973. Id. at 32.
974. Id. at 42.
975. Id. at 54.
976. Justice Harlan did not participate in the consideration of the case.
977. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707.
978. Id. at 713.
979. Id. at 745-46 (Field, J., dissenting).
980. Id. at 711.
981. Id. at 723.
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the possibility of holding "that a Chinese laborer acquired.., any right. .. to
be and remain in this country, except by the license, permission and suf-
ferance of Congress, to be withdrawn, whenever, in its opinion, the public
welfare might require it.' 982  Thus, because Field had treated Chae Chan
Ping as an exclusion case, and Gray treated that case as having already
decided the issue of expulsion, the Court simply avoided ever considering the
international law rules regarding expulsion of long-term lawful residents.
Unlike the decisions in Chae Chan Ping and Nishimura Ekiu, which had
at least mentioned the Constitution, Gray's argument that Congress had the
power to exclude relied solely on principles of international law and English
practice and made no attempt to locate the immigration power in any specific
clause of the Constitution, or even in the Constitution generally. He simply
asserted summarily that "[t]he constitution of the United States speaks with
no uncertain sound on this subject.,
983
Gray next rejected the plaintiffs' individual rights claims. The Court
did not embrace the government's extreme position that the constitutional
protections recognized in Yick Wo did not apply against the federal
government. Instead, the Court distinguished Yick Wo by holding that consti-
tutional protections attached to aliens, "so long as they are permitted by the
government of the United States to remain in the country."98 4  These
safeguards included "their rights of person and of property, and... their civil
and criminal responsibility." 985 They did not, however, limit the power of
Congress to withdraw its permission at any time.986 This reasoning was in
tension with Chy Lung, which had applied equal protection principles to a
state exclusion law. Gray explained away Chy Lung, however, by asserting
that it had simply found that a state immigration statute contravened
Congress's immigration power. 987  In any event, the Court suggested that
because deportation was not punishment, 988 and because the white witness
rule was consistent with other procedural practices,989 the Due Process
Clause was not violated.990
982. Id. at 723-24.
983. Id. at 711.
984. Id. at 724 (emphasis added). See also id. at 725 (reasoning that Yick Wo had involved
"the power of a state over aliens continuing to reside within its jurisdiction, not.., the power of the
United States to put an end to their residence in the country").
985. Id. at 724.
986. Id. ("[Tjhey continue to be aliens.., and therefore remain subject to the power of
congress to expel them, or to order them to be removed and deported from the country, whenever, in
its judgment their removal is necessary or expedient for the public interest.").
987. Id.
988. Id. at 730.
989. Id. at 729-30 (finding that the white witness requirement was both within the power of
Congress and consistent with the naturalization laws' requirement of testimony by a U.S. citizen).
990. Id. at 730 ("[The alien] has not, therefore, been deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; and the provisions of the constitution, securing the right of trial by jury,
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The Court finally asserted that immigration was a political question not
subject to review. Like Justice Field in Chae Chan Ping, Gray viewed "[t]he
question whether, and upon what conditions, these aliens shall be permitted
to remain within the United States [as] one to be determined by the political
departments."
991
The extension of the Chae Chan Ping doctrine to permanent lawful
residents apparently was too much for Field, who, together with Brewer and
Chief Justice Fuller, now vociferously dissented from the Court's opinion.
The three dissenters all strenuously objected to the majority's inherent
powers argument and contended that, whatever the national government's
authority over entering aliens, ordinary constitutional principles must apply
to alien residents. 992  The dissenters asserted enumerated powers-limited
government visions of national authority strongly reminiscent of the
Jeffersonian position in the Alien Act debates.
Field rejected the application of his own analysis in Chae Chan Ping to
the deportation of lawfully admitted aliens, and he sharply distinguished
between entering and resident aliens.993 The dissenters generally agreed with
this distinction. For Brewer, the distinction turned in part on principles of
strict territoriality:
The constitution has no extraterritorial effect, and those who have not
come lawfully within our territory cannot claim any protection from
its provisions .... But the constitution has potency everywhere
within the limits of our territory, and the powers which the national
government may exercise within such limits are those, and only those,
given to it by that instrument.
994
Fuller also distinguished between the United States' internal and external
powers.995
The logical implication of this territoriality distinction was that aliens
within U.S. territory were fully entitled to the Constitution's protection.
and prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and cruel and unusual punishments, have no
application.").
991. Id. at 731. Given Gray's apparent conclusion that due process was not violated, this
statement may simply constitute an observation that a court would not interfere with powers
exercised consistent with the Constitution.
992. Id. at 733-34 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 755-56 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 762
(Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
993. Id. at 746 (Field, J., dissenting) ("[B]etween legislation for the exclusion of Chinese
persons-that is, to prevent them from entering the country-and legislation for the deportation of
those who have acquired a residence in the country under a treaty with China, there is a wide and
essential difference.").
994. Id. at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
995. Id. at 762 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that while the United States was "invested, in
respect of foreign countries and their subjects or citizens, with the powers necessary to the
maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory," these broad
powers did not justify arbitrary treatment of persons "lawfully within the peace of its dominions").
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Thus, even if the national government enjoyed power to deport resident
aliens, that power could "be exercised only in subordination to the limitations
and restrictions imposed by the Constitution." 996  Here Brewer asserted a
classic limited government theory, arguing that the Bill of Rights was
adopted to prevent abuse of national authority, and that the language of the
amendments was not limited to citizens but broadly embraced "people" and
"persons. 997  Yick Wo had confirmed that the Fourteenth Amendment
preserved "to any person within [U.S.] jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws," 998 and U.S. governmental institutions did not leave room for "purely
personal and arbitrary power."999 Brewer noted that congressional exercise
of the commerce power was limited by the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause, "[a]nd, if that be true of the powers expressly granted, it must as
certainly be true of those that are only granted by implication."10 In Yick
Wo, Brewer ironically observed, "this court saw no difficulty in finding a
constitutional barrier .... But this greater wrong, by which a hundred
thousand people are subject to arrest and forcible deportation from the
country, is beyond the reach of the protecting power of the constitution."
1°0
The Chinese being deported had lived in the country, he noted, "almost as
long a time as some of those who were members of the congress that passed
this act of punishment and expulsion.,'
10 0 2
Field had authored the 1891 territorial decision in In re Ross, which
emphasized a strict territoriality view of the Constitution's application,
100 3
and he also emphasized that the Constitution "extends protection to all
persons within its jurisdiction." 100 4  But in contrast to Brewer, Field here
relied more on theories of membership to find that an alien, once lawfully
admitted with the community's consent, was entitled to the Constitution's
protection:
Aliens from countries at peace with us, domiciled within our country
by its consent, are entitled to all the guaranties for the protection of
their persons and property which are secured to native-born citizens.
The moment any human being from a country at peace with us comes
996. Id. at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
997. Id. at 739 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
998. Id. (Brewer, J., dissenting) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)). See
also id. at 761 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that due process in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments are "universal in their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction"
(quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369)).
999. Id. at 742 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369).
1000. Id. at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
1001. Id. at 744 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
1002. Id. at 734.
1003. 140 U.S. 453 (1891). See infra notes 1391-92 and accompanying text.
1004. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 755 (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting an unpublished passage




within the jurisdiction of the United States, with their consent-and
such consent.., in the case of the Chinese laborers before us, was, in
terms, given by the treaty... -he becomes subject to all their laws, is
amenable to their punishment, and entitled to their protection .... To
hold that they are subject to any different law ... is in my judgment to
ignore the teachings of our history, the practice of our government,
and the language of our Constitution.
100 5
The implications of Field's membership argument were potentially narrower
than Brewer's limited government theory. Brewer's approach, which rested
on territoriality, would apply the Constitution equally to all persons present
in the jurisdiction, while Field's membership analysis limited constitutional
protections to lawful aliens to whose presence the nation had consented.
100 6
Field now clarified his ambiguous reference to the Alien Act at the end
of Chae Chan Ping by discussing at length the debates surrounding the Alien
Act and the effects of deportation that Field had ignored in the earlier case.
Even the Alien Act, Field contended, "was defended by its advocates as a
war measure" and did not support any power to expel aliens in time of
peace.1007 Moreover, the Alien Act had been widely denounced "as uncon-
stitutional and barbarous."'' 00 8 "In no other instance, until the law before us
was passed," Field contended, "has any public man had the boldness to
advocate the deportation of friendly aliens in time of peace."
' 1009
The dissenters also denied that the United States possessed any power
under the Constitution or international law to expel resident aliens. Both
Field and Brewer embraced the plaintiffs' assertion that they were denizens
and that the law of nations had long recognized that aliens domiciled in a
country were entitled to greater protections. 10 10 Field noted that both the
Court's prior decisions and the international law treatises cited by the
majority "all have reference to the exclusion of foreigners from entering the
country. They do not touch upon the question of deporting them from the
country after they have been domiciled within it by the consent of its
government .... 1011
Nevertheless, both Brewer and Field ultimately urged from classic
enumerated powers principles that it was an alien's status under the
1005. Id. at 754 (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
1006. Id. at 760 (Field, J., dissenting) ("I cannot but regard the decision as a blow against
constitutional liberty, when it declares that Congress has the right to disregard the guaranties of the
Constitution intended for the protection of all men, domiciled in the country with the consent of the
government.").
1007. Id. at 747, 748-50 (Field, J., dissenting).
1008. Id at 747 (Field, J., dissenting).
1009. Id. See also id. at 746 (Field, J., dissenting) (asserting that prior to the Alien Act, the
government had no power to deport persons lawfully domiciled in the country with the country's
consent).
1010. Id. at 736-37 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
1011. Id. (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Constitution, not international law principles, that was controlling. Whatever
the practices of despotic nations recognized under international law, these
powers had not been incorporated into the limited, delegated powers of the
national government. "[E]ven if that power were exercised by every gov-
ernment of Europe, it would have no bearing on these cases," Field wrote.
"It may be admitted that the power has been exercised by the various
governments of Europe .... [But] no power to perpetrate such barbarity is
to be implied from the nature of our government, and certainly is not found
in any delegated powers under the Constitution."
' 1012
All three dissenters invoked enumerated powers principles to attack the
inherent powers doctrine. Fuller bemoaned the majority's "assertion of an
unlimited and arbitrary power,.., in conflict with the written Constitution by
which that government was created."' 10 1 3 Brewer likewise voiced concern at
the implications of the doctrine:
It is said that the power here asserted is inherent in sovereignty. This
doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one both indefinite and
dangerous. Where are the limits to such powers to be found, and by
whom are they to be pronounced? ... The governments of other
nations have elastic powers-ours is fixed and bounded by a written
constitution. The expulsion of a race may be within the inherent
powers of a despotism. History, before the adoption of this
Constitution, was not destitute of examples of the exercise of such a
power; and its framers ... wisely ... gave to this government no
general power to banish.
0 14
And Field now returned to the enumerated powers position from his Legal
Tender Cases dissent:
The government of the United States is one of limited and delegated
powers. It takes nothing from the usages or the former action of
European governments, nor does it take any power by any supposed
inherent sovereignty .... Sovereignty or supreme power is in this
country vested in the people, and only in the people. By them certain
sovereign powers have been delegated to the government of the
United States and other sovereign powers reserved to the states or to
themselves. This is... the express declaration of the Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution, passed to avoid any misinterpretation
of the powers of the general government .... When, therefore, power
is exercised by Congress, authority for it must be found in express
1012. Id. at 757 (Field, J., dissenting); accord id. at 737 (Brewer, J., dissenting) Justice Brewer
argued that "whatever rights a resident alien might have in any other nation, here he is within the
express protection of the Constitution, especially in respect to those guarantees which are declared
in the original amendments. It has been repeated so often as to become axiomatic, that this
government is one of enumerated and delegated powers," with the powers not delegated reserved to
the states and the people.
1013. Id. at 764 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
1014. Id. at 737-38 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
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terms in the Constitution, or in the means necessary or proper for the
execution of the power expressed. If it cannot be thus found, it does
not exist.
10 15
The consequences of the Court's contrary approach shocked the conscience:
The existence of the power thus stated is only consistent with the
admission that the government is one of unlimited and despotic power
so far as aliens domiciled in the country are concerned. According to
this theory, Congress might have ordered executive officers to take the
Chinese laborers to the ocean and put them into a boat, and set them
adrift; or to take them to the borders of Mexico, and turn them loose
there; and in both cases without any means of support; indeed, it might
have sanctioned towards these laborers the most shocking brutality
conceivable. 1016
The dissenters appeared motivated in part by the implications of the
power for European immigrants.101 7 Brewer noted that the power was not
limited to "the obnoxious Chinese"-a phrase he appears to have adopted
sarcastically from the government's brief.1018 "[I]f the power exists," Brewer
asked, "who shall say it will not be exercised tomorrow against other classes
and other people? 1 °0 9
Justice Field's radical departure from his Chae Chan Ping decision, and
particularly his emphasis on the Fong Yue Ting plaintiffs' status as lawful
residents, is difficult to reconcile with the fact that Chae Chan Ping also had
been a long-term lawful resident. It may have been Chae Chan Ping's
departure that made the "marked difference" to Field between the two cases,
either because Chae Chan Ping was at the border, which triggered strict
territoriality concerns, or because Field felt that Chae Chan Ping had
abandoned his membership (as Field felt the appellant in Chew Heong had
abandoned his). Field did not emphasize these points in Chae Chan Ping,
however. Perhaps Field's change of heart was due to his realization of the
severe implications of the inherent powers analysis for lawful residents. Or,
perhaps, it reflected his oncoming senility. Whatever the basis for the
distinction, Field was sufficiently outraged by the decision to suggest that
1015. Id. at 757-58 (Field, J., dissenting).
1016. Id. at 755-56 (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
1017. "Is it possible," Field asked, "that Congress can, at its pleasure, in disregard of the
guarantees of the Constitution, expel at any time the Irish, German, French, and English who may
have taken up their residence here on the invitation of the government, while we are at peace with
the countries from which they came, simply on the ground that they have not been naturalized?" Id
at 750 (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
1018. Id. at 743 (Brewer, J., dissenting). See also Brief for the United States at 49, Fong Yue
Ting (No. 1345) (arguing that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to "exclude and deport
obnoxious subjects of China, as well as obnoxious products of that country").
1019. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 743 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
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Congress should ask the Court to reconsider the issue, and he later urged that
the Court be packed to ensure the "proper" result. 
1 020
In sum, the decision in Fong Yue Ting extended the inherent powers
rationale to the expulsion of lawfully resident aliens. While Field in Chae
Chan Ping had suggested that the power derived from, and was limited by,
the aggregate provisions of the Constitution, in Fong Yue Ting the Court
confirmed that the power to exclude and expel derived from powers enjoyed
by all sovereign states under international law. Its exercise apparently was
neither limited by the Constitution nor subject to judicial review. The briefs
before the Court demonstrate that the Court was fully presented with the
competing arguments under international law but chose to reject them.' 
021
The Fong Yue Ting decision devastated the Chinese community. It also
posed a serious problem for immigration authorities, who were now
obligated to deport the vast majority of the nation's Chinese residents. The
executive branch estimated that deportation of all the Chinese who had failed
to register would cost $7,310,000, though the Treasury Department had only
a $25,000 budget for the task. 10 22 California farmers warned that the loss of
Chinese laborers would destroy the region's agriculture. 10 23  The United
States assured the Chinese government that Congress would modify the
legislation, and the McCreary Amendment of November 1893 extended the
deadline for registering. 10 24  In an effort to mollify the concerns of the
Chinese government, in 1894 the United States entered into a Convention
with China which again promised that "Chinese... either permanently or
temporarily residing in the United States, shall have for the protection of
their persons and property all rights that are given by the laws of the United
States to citizens ... excepting the right to become naturalized citizens.' 0 25
4. Lem Moon Sing v. United States.-In 1894, Congress acted upon its
newfound plenary power over immigration to strip the federal courts of
jurisdiction to review most Chinese exclusion decisions. 0 26 In the 1895 case
of Lem Moon Sing v. United States,10 27 the Court upheld the jurisdictional bar
while further elaborating on the inherent powers doctrine. Lem Moon Sing
1020. KENS, supra note 783, at 213; Fiss, supra note 668, at 29 n.29, 312 n.67.
1021. Nafziger, supra note 581, at 824-28.
1022. 25 CONG. REc. H2422 (1893).
1023. Charles H. Shinn, The Geary Act in California, 56 NATION 365 (1893).
1024. SALYER, supra note 769, at 55-56 (explaining that the amendment allowed Chinese
laborers an additional six months to register).
1025. Convention on Emigration between the United States of America and the Empire of
China, Mar. 17, 1894, U.S.-China, 28 Stat. 1210, 1211.
1026. The statute provided in relevant part that "the decision of the appropriate immigration or
custom officers, if adverse to the admission of such alien, shall be final, unless reversed on appeal to
the Secretary of the Treasury." Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat. 390.
1027. 158 U.S. 538 (1895).
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involved a habeas challenge by a Chinese permanent resident merchant who
claimed exemption from the laws excluding Chinese laborers. Upon
returning from a two-year trip to China, Lem Moon Sing was denied entry in
San Francisco despite the testimony of two credible non-Chinese witnesses
that he was a Chinese merchant lawfully residing in the United States. Lem
Moon Sing contended that his exclusion violated due process and equal
protection. 10 28 He argued that although Congress had a right to give im-
migration officers power to exclude aliens not entitled to enter the United
States, executive exclusion of those whose entry no law prohibited presented
a question for judicial review.
10 29
Justice Harlan, who in the territory cases was one of the Court's most
assertive proponents of the enumerated powers doctrine and individual
rights, upheld the exclusion for an eight-to-one Court. 10 30 After reviewing
the Court's prior holdings that "according to the accepted maxims of
international law, every sovereign nation has the power, inherent in
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of
foreigners within its dominions," Harlan concluded that the exercise of this
power "belongs to the political department."10 31 Harlan viewed the power of
Congress to exclude aliens without judicial intervention as settled by the
prior decisions.10 32 Although while domiciled in the United States, the alien
was protected by all the guarantees of life, liberty, and property secured by
the Constitution, "he cannot reenter the United States in violation of the will
of the government.' '0 33 The Court declined to consider whether the pe-
titioner actually was legally entitled to enter the United States, finding that
"that question has been constitutionally committed by congress to... the
executive department.', 0 34 If the methods used to screen aliens de facto
eliminated the legal right of an alien to reenter the country, "the authority of
congress to do even that cannot be questioned.,
10 35
H. The Competing Vision
Despite the decisions embracing the inherent powers doctrine between
1889 and 1894, the competing enumerated powers vision of the rights of
aliens was not destroyed. As Lucy Salyer has carefully documented, lower
federal courts during the 1890s continued to provide basic due process
1028. Id. at 541.
1029. Id. at 546.
1030. Justice Brewer dissented without opinion.
1031. Lem Moon Sing, 158 U.S. at 543.
1032. Id. at 547.
1033. Id. at 547-48.
1034. Id. at 550. It is unclear whether the decision upheld the finality only of executive factual
determinations or barred consideration of the legal scope of the exclusion laws as well. See
Neuman, supra note 937, at 1012.
1035. Lem Moon Sing, 158 U.S. at 549.
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protections to Chinese nationals in habeas corpus proceedings and
consistently reversed collector determinations. 103 6 Yick Wo also continued to
be applied to protect the personal and property rights of aliens who were
lawfully present in the country. But after Fong Yue Ting, it was unclear to
what extent the courts would uphold the Yick Wo approach to constrain
federal (as opposed to state) authority over aliens. As with Indians, the
question of Chinese entitlement to natural-born citizenship under the
Fourteenth Amendment also was percolating in the latter 1890s. Both of
these questions were soon resolved in favor of constitutional protections for
the Chinese, as the Court reaffirmed the enumerated powers-limited
government approach. The decisions in Wong Wing v. United States and
United States v. Wong Kim Ark crystallized the Court's distinction between
recognizing constitutional protections for the persons and property of
resident aliens and deferring to the government's decision to admit or expel
immigrants.
1. Wong Wing v. United States.-The 1896 case of Wong Wing v.
United States1037 involved a constitutional challenge to section four of the
Geary Act, which allowed aliens found unlawfully present in the United
States to be sentenced without a jury trial to up to one year at hard labor prior
to deportation. Wong Wing and other resident Chinese were arrested in
Michigan, determined by the local United States Circuit Court Commissioner
to be unlawfully within the United States, and ordered imprisoned for sixty
days at hard labor prior to their deportation.
103 8
The petitioners argued on habeas that imprisonment at hard labor was
punishment which had been imposed in violation of the Fifth Amendment
rights to grand jury and due process, the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial,
and the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude.
10 39
Petitioners invoked Yick Wo to argue that these provisions applied to "any
person," whether aliens or U.S. citizens. 
1040
The United States continued to maintain, as it had in Fong Yue Ting,
that the Constitution applied only to aliens who were lawfully present in the
country. Thus, aliens who had entered the country unlawfully, or whose
permission to remain had been withdrawn, became subject to national power
free of constitutional constraint.' 0 4' To hold otherwise, the government
argued, would be to hold that an alien could enter "against the express will of
1036. See SALYER, supra note 769, at 80-81 (presenting statistics on how frequently collector
determinations were reversed from 1891 to 1905).
1037. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
1038. Id. at 239 (Field, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1039. Brief for Appellants at 6-9, Wong Wing (No. 204).
1040. Id. at 11.
1041. Brief for the United States at 9, Wong Wing (No. 204).
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the sovereign and in defiance of its laws," and nevertheless "acquire a status
which will give him a right to rely on constitutional guaranties intended to be
acquired only in a lawful way."'10 42 This would violate the "paramount and
inalienable right of the sovereign to withdraw its consent," 10 43 and in essence
determine "that the United States have bartered away or alienated a portion
of its sovereign power."' 01 44 Again arguing from social contract principles,
the government now contended that the Constitution imposed no limits on
U.S. foreign relations. The Constitution, the government argued,
was not made nor intended for all humanity,... but was ordained and
established by the people of the United States for their own benefit
and for the benefit of those lawfully within their territory .... In
dealing with other nations and their subjects the people of the United
States are not trammeled by restrictions established for their own
safety within, but have as full and supreme a power as any other
nation, and exercise it under the jus gentium with no accountability
other than that which every independent Government must give, under
a judgment quickened by an enlightened civilization, rendered in the
forum of nations .... 1045
The government further argued that the sentence to hard labor was part
and parcel of the deportation proceeding, and that the Court must defer to
Congress's determination that such imprisonment was necessary to deter
Chinese immigration and to aid enforcement of the government's lawful
policy. 10 46 Deportation alone was an insufficient deterrent-indeed, depor-
tation otherwise was "game" and "a pleasant episode in [the aliens'] lives" in
which they would be fed, lodged, and returned to China "as a guest of the
United States."'0 47  The government baldly acknowledged that such an
unlimited congressional power would allow the summary execution of
unwanted aliens: "It may be said" the government wrote, that Congress
"may, by virtue of the same principle,.., sentence to imprisonment for life
or event inflict capital punishment." Although this ordinarily might have
been a valid criticism, "[t]he right of Congress, in this case, [was] unlimited,
and there [was] no paramount power for it to infringe upon."'
0 48
The government also contended that requiring a jury trial before
imprisonment could be imposed would be enormously expensive 1049 and
1042. Id. at 12.
1043. Id at 5.
1044. Id.
1045. Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added); see also id. at 10-11.
1046. Id. at 23.
1047. Id.
1048. Id. at20-21.
1049. Id. at 22 ("[T]he country would not only be impoverished by the expense of deporting the
vast hordes who would come into the country vested with such sanctity.... but the courts ... would
be surrendered to foreigners.").
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would cripple the power of the United States relative to other nations. "If the
United States... can not punish without all of the delay and expense
incident to the trial by jury and due process of law which an enlightened
civilization has evolved for the protection of its own citizens and invited
aliens, the Government is onerated with a burden which no other country
would for a moment tolerate."' 050
Given the sweeping and unreviewable power which the Court had
upheld for Congress over permanent residents at the border, it would have
been easy for the Court to defer to Congress's determination and hold that
the sentence to hard labor was part and parcel of the deportation process. In
a seven-to-one decision,10 51 however, the Supreme Court invalidated the law.
Writing for the Court, Justice Shiras rejected the argument that aliens
unlawfully present lacked constitutional protection, and affirmed the broad,
limited government and territorial vision of Yick Wo. Yick Wo, Justice Shiras
held, recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment was universal in its
application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. The same reasoning applied to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, with
the result that "even aliens shall not be held to answer for a capital or other
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."'
1 52
Shiras acknowledged that "[n]o limits can be put by the courts upon the
power of congress to protect, by summary methods, the country from the
advent of aliens whose race or habits render them undesirable as citizens, or
to expel [them].' 0 53 The case, however, did not present a question of the
"inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation" to
exclude or expel aliens. Instead, the case addressed whether Congress could
further the policy of deportation by adding imprisonment at hard labor
without a trial by jury.'0 54 The Court thus declined to allow the classically
punitive sanction of imprisonment at hard labor to be incorporated into the
concept of "nonpunitive" deportation.
0 55
Perhaps motivated by the government's assertion that deportable aliens
could be subjected to capital punishment without constitutional protection,
Justice Field filed an unusual opinion in which he attacked the "harsh and
illegal assertions, made by counsel of the Government... as to the right of
the court to deny to the accused the full protection of the law and
Constitution against every form of oppression and cruelty to them."'
0 56
1050. Id. at 23.
1051. Justice Brewer took no part in the decision.
1052. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238.
1053. Id. at 237.
1054. Id. at 233-34.
1055. Id. at 237-38.
1056. Id. at 239 (Field, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The term "person," used in the Fifth Amendment, is broad enough
to include any and every human being within the jurisdiction of the
republic. A resident, alien born, is entitled to the same protection
under the laws that a citizen is entitled to. He owes obedience to the
laws of the country in which he is domiciled, and, as a consequence,
he is entitled to the equal protection of those laws.
The contention that persons within the territorial jurisdiction of this
republic might be beyond the protection of the law was heard with
pain on the argument at the bar-in face of the great Constitutional
amendment which declares that no state shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 1057
The fact that the government could expel or exclude such an alien did not
mean that it could confine them at hard labor before deportation or subject
them to any other cruel punishment. 1
058
Wong Wing reaffirmed the limited government vision for unlawful
aliens and thus strengthened the Court's distinction between recognizing
constitutional protections for aliens within U.S. territorial jurisdiction and
rejecting the Constitution's application to the government's decision regard-
ing an alien's eligibility to enter or remain. In other words, the Court broadly
deferred to Congress's decisions regarding aliens' membership in the
American polity, while holding that the Constitution otherwise applied to
aliens in the United States.
2. United States v. Wong Kim Ark.-The Court's deference to
congressional decisions regarding membership, however, was not absolute.
The one significant exception to the Court's deference to congressional
membership decisions in this period was the 1898 case of United States v.
Wong Kim Ark.10 59 The question whether Chinese persons could acquire
birthright citizenship had become increasingly important as Congress
tightened the restrictions on alien Chinese, since citizenship, if established,
removed the individual from the reach of the deportation and exclusion laws.
Wong Kim Ark thus presented the question whether Chinese persons could be
natural born citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment, and paralleled the
Indian decision in Elk v. Wilkins.' 060 The plaintiff was summarily excluded
by the collector of customs in San Francisco following a temporary trip to
China.10 6' He contended that he was a citizen and thus entitled to enter as a
result of his birth in the United States.
1057. Id. at 242-43 (Field, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1058. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 237-38.
1059. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
1060. Id. at 653. Cf Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99 (1884).
1061. WongKimArk, 169 U.S. at 649.
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The United States opposed Wong Kim Ark's admission on the grounds
that birth in the United States did not make the Chinese American citizens.
The United States maintained that with the exception of Great Britain and her
colonies, the majority international law rule was that ofjus sanguinis-that
persons born in the country to parents who were citizens, become
citizens. 1062 The government urged that aliens, like Indians, were not born
"completely subject to [the] political jurisdiction" of the United States,
because they owed allegiance to a foreign power. 10 63 Citing Dred Scott and
the Constitution's preamble, the United States argued from social contract
principles that the country was established for its citizens "and their
posterity," and that no person therefore could be a citizen unless born to a
citizen or naturalized. 10 64 The government urged the Court to interpret the
Fourteenth Amendment so as to respect Congress's exclusive authority to
confer citizenship through the naturalization power.'
1 065
Although the government contended that Congress retained control of
citizenship for all aliens through the naturalization laws, it noted that natural-
born citizenship for the Chinese was particularly offensive. Chinese aliens,
unlike other immigrants, were not allowed to naturalize and Congress had
singled them out among all immigrant groups for exclusion from the United
States. 10 66 Congress accordingly had legislated to make the Chinese a po-
litically subordinated racial caste-an "internal colony"--within the United
States. 10 67  Because the plaintiffs claim was supported by Justice Field's
controlling decision in the District of California, 10 68 the lower court found he
was a citizen and ordered him released.
1062. Brief for the United States, at 7-8, United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)
(No. 904) (arguing that citizenship based on nationality is the prevailing international law rule).
1063. Id. at 38-39 (citing Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)). See also id. at 22 ("Who are
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States? Manifestly not those who are subject to the
jurisdiction of any other nation, or who owe allegiance to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or
sovereignty.").
1064. Id. at 16.
1065. Id. at 37-38.
1066. The government contended:
For the most persuasive reasons we have refused citizenship to Chinese subjects; and
yet, as to their offspring, who are just as obnoxious, and to whom the same reasons for
exclusion apply with equal force, we are told that we must accept them as fellow-
citizens .... because of the mere accident of birth.. There certainly should be some
honor and dignity in American citizenship that would be sacred from the foul and
corrupting taint of a debasing alienage.
Id. at 34. If Chinese could be natural-born citizens and thus eligible for the Presidency, "then verily
there has been a most degenerate departure from the patriotic ideals of our forefathers; and ...
American citizenship is not worth having." Id. See also Reply Brief for the United States at 16,
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (No. 904) (noting that U.S. law prohibited
Chinese laborers from returning to the United States).
1067. TAKAKI, supra note 776, at 99.
1068. In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884).
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The Supreme Court's six-to-two decision 169 in Wong Kim Ark,
upholding Chinese birthright citizenship, produced lengthy and passionate
opinions on both sides of the Court. Writing for the majority, Justice Gray
held that while every nation had "the inherent right" to determine "what
classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship," 0 70 the Fourteenth
Amendment had resolved that question by incorporating the English
common-law custom that birth "within the allegiance ... of the king" gave
rise to citizenship.' 0 7 1  The limiting words "subject to the jurisdiction
thereof," excluded Indians born to tribes, as Elk had held, but did not exclude
Chinese persons born in the United States, who unquestionably were subject
to its "full and absolute territorial jurisdiction."''0 72 "It can hardly be denied
that an alien is completely subject to the political jurisdiction of the country
in which he resides," Gray wrote. 0 73  Yick Wo had confirmed that the
Fourteenth Amendment applied to aliens, 10 74 and the mere fact that Chinese
persons were exempted from the right to naturalize, and that Congress had
legislated to exclude them, could not alter this constitutional principle.' 
075
Chief Justice Fuller vociferously dissented, together with Justice Harlan,
who had argued in favor of Indian birthright citizenship in Elk.0 76 Fuller's
opinion embraced the government's argument that citizenship was governed
by the international, not common-law, rules of descent. The dissenters also
disputed that Chinese were subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
within the meaning of the amendment. Chinese nationals were not allowed
to naturalize and remained bound to the emperor of China by duty and
religion. 10 77 Fuller and Harlan thus accepted the government's contention
that Congress possessed power, notwithstanding the Fourteenth Amendment,
to prohibit "all persons of a particular race, or their children," from becoming
1069. Justice McKenna took no part in the decision because he was not a member of the Court
when the case was argued. Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Harlan dissented.
1070. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 668.
1071. Id. at655.
1072. Id. at 684.
1073. Id. at 693.
1074. Id. at 696.
1075. Id. at 699-701.
1076. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Fuller's dissent has perplexed scholars, given his vote in
favor of citizenship in Elk and his sympathy elsewhere for the Chinese. It is possible that Harlan's
distinction between entitlement to birthright citizenship for Indians and that for aliens turned on his
belief, suggested in Elk, that while aliens were voluntarily present and capable of returning to the
protection of their government, Indians owed no allegiance to any foreign power and, absent
birthright citizenship, would be left "a despised and rejected class of persons, with no nationality
whatever." Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 122 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting). But see Gabriel J.
Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REv. 151, 156 (1996)
(arguing that Justice Harlan "was a faithful opponent of the constitutional rights of Chinese for
much of his career on the Court").
1077. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 725-26 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
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citizens. 1078 The dissenters noted with irony that the majority ruling would
exempt children born on U.S. soil from the plenary power to expel or deport
their alien parents that had been recognized so often by the court.
107 9
The upshot of Wong Kim Ark was that the bonds of the Chinese to their
home country-unlike the tribal bonds of Native Americans born to tribes in
Elk v. Wilkins-were insufficient to bar the Chinese from citizenship under
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court applied a rule of absolute
sovereignty over persons within U.S. jurisdiction to hold that the Chinese,
despite half a century of federal and local discrimination, were equally
entitled to birthright citizenship. The decision contrasted sharply with the
Court's persistent willingness to defer to congressional decisions regarding
U.S. membership in both the Indian and territorial contexts.' 80 The Court's
decision ultimately may have been motivated by its inability to distinguish
meaningfully between the children of the Chinese and those of English,
Scottish, Irish, German, or other European immigrants, "who have always
been considered and treated as citizens of the United States."'10 8 1  The
decision also was likely to have little immediate impact, since few Chinese
children were likely to be born in the United States. Women made up only a
tiny fraction of the Chinese population in the United States,'0 82 and the
isolation of the Chinese community made interracial marriage unlikely.
The classical immigration cases of the last decade of the nineteenth
century established that the immigration power, although not enumerated in
the Constitution, was inherent in the sovereignty and nationhood of the
United States. After resolving half a century of debate by locating the im-
migration power in the Commerce Clause, the Court between 1889 and 1900
abandoned the effort to locate the power in any particular constitutional
provision. Instead, the Court adopted an absolutist view of power over aliens
under international law to hold that the authority to determine who could
enter or remain was both dedicated to the political branches and unlimited by
other constitutional constraints. The foreign affairs and national security
implications of immigration were a primary justification for the Court's
abdication of ordinary constitutional analysis in this area.'0 83  The Court
1078. Id. at 732 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
1079. Id. at 705-06, 726 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
1080. See, e.g., Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 103-07 (1884); The Insular Cases, supra note 45.
1081. WongKimArk, 169 U.S. at 694.
1082. Of 63,199 Chinese in the United States in 1868, only 4,566 were female. TAKAKI, supra
note 776, at 121. The 1870 California census indicated that there were 3,536 Chinese women in the
state, id., and by 1880, the number had dropped to 3,171. Id. at 123. The imposition of the Chinese
exclusion laws after 1882 ensured that these numbers would remain low.
1083. E.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705-06 (1893).
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repeatedly portrayed Congress's control over admission and expulsion of
aliens as so exclusive as to completely prohibit review by the courts.
10
84
Despite the rhetoric, however, the doctrine of powers inherent in
sovereignty did not necessarily imply that courts were completely barred
from considering the issue. The Court in Fong Yue Ting reviewed the statu-
tory provisions, albeit deferentially, for constitutionality. 10 85 The Court also
rejected the more extreme social contract positions urged by the government
that the Constitution did not apply to any interactions between aliens and the
national government,0 86 or that it did not apply to aliens who no longer were
lawfully present in the United States.'0 87 The Court's recognition of plenary
power was limited to issues of entry and expulsion, and the Court recognized
in Yick Wo, Wong Wing, and Wong Kim Ark that various constitutional
protections applied to Chinese present in the United States. The Court in this
sense reached a compromise between the extreme Federalist social contract
theory and the Jeffersonian limited government vision.
I. The Constitutionalization of the Immigration Power
The doctrine of inherent plenary power had sweeping implications for
immigration jurisprudence. In 1903, the doctrine was applied to uphold the
deportation of a non-English-speaking alien in proceedings where the alien
was afforded neither counsel nor translation.' 88 Two years later, the Court
held that Congress could bar judicial review even of exclusion decisions
involving alleged U.S. citizens. 0 89 By 1909, the doctrine was sufficiently
entrenched for the Court to pronounce infamously that "over no conceivable
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete" than
immigration.10 90 In the 1913 case of Tiaco v. Forbes,10 91 Justice Holmes
stated, "It is admitted that sovereign states have inherent power to deport
1084. See Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476, 480 (1893) (holding that Congress's absolute
"power to exclude [is] ... not open to challenge in the courts"); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 706
(stating that Congress's decisions are "conclusive upon the judiciary"); Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (stating that the power over entry "belongs to the political
department"); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (asserting that the
legislative power is "conclusive upon the judiciary").
1085. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 729-30. See supra notes 988-90 and accompanying text.
1086. See Brief for the United States at 40, Fong Yue Ting (No. 1345) (arguing that aliens "are
not entitled to appeal to the Federal Constitution for protection against the Federal Government
itself').
1087. See supra notes 1041-48 and accompanying text.
1088. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
1089. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905).
1090. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909); see also United
States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to
Congress's power to exclude anarchists).
1091. 228 U.S. 549, 557 (1913) (upholding the deportation of a Chinese national by the
Philippine government against a due process objection).
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aliens, and seemingly that Congress is not deprived of this power by the
Constitution of the United States., 10 92 By 1915, the doctrine was extended to
female U.S. citizens who married aliens. Thus, in Mackenzie v. Hare,0 93 the
Court upheld a federal statute providing that a female U.S. national who
married a foreigner lost her U.S. citizenship, even if she continued to reside
in the United States. 10 94 The Court relied both on the subordinate legal status
of women'0 95 and an inherent national security rationale. The marriage of an
American woman with a foreigner, here a British national, "involve[d]
national complications.., tantamount to expatriation," which could "bring
the Government into embarrassments, and... into controversies."' 96 The
power to expatriate citizens in this manner accordingly derived from
sovereignty:
As a government, the United States is invested with all the attributes
of sovereignty. As it has the character of nationality it has the powers
of nationality, especially those which concern its relations and
intercourse with other countries. We should hesitate long before
limiting or embarrassing such powers. 097
In 1932, the inherent powers doctrine was again applied to uphold
Congress's power to subpoena a U.S. citizen from abroad.10 98  In the
McCarthy era case of United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, the Court
inverted Mackenzie to uphold the exclusion, without a hearing, of the alien
bride of a U.S. citizen.
10 99
The doctrine of plenary power over immigration was reinvigorated by
the cold war immigration cases of the early 1950s, in which the Court
combined the doctrine with Curtiss-Wright to uphold an inherent executive
1092. Id. at 556.
1093. 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
1094. Id. at311-12.
1095. The statute's targeting of women only apparently rested in the "ancient principle" of the
merger of identity of husband and wife. Id. at 311. The decision thus was consistent with the
legally subordinate status of female citizens of the era. See L.V. BAR, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW § 71(5) (G. R. Gillespie trans., The Edinburgh Press 1892) ("The
naturalisation of a foreign woman who marries a citizen is a privileged species of naturalisation,
which by almost all legal systems takes full effect ipsojure . .
1096. Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at 312.
1097. Id. at311.
1098. In Blackmer v. United States, the Court held:
What in England was the prerogative of the sovereign in this respect, pertains under
our constitutional system to the national authority which may be exercised by the
Congress by virtue of the legislative power to prescribe the duties of the citizens of the
United States. It is also beyond controversy that one of the duties which the citizen
owes to his government is to support the administration of justice by attending its
courts and giving his testimony whenever he is properly summoned .... And the
Congress may provide for the performance of this duty and prescribe penalties for
disobedience.
284 U.S. 421,437-38 (1932).
1099. United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
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power over immigration. 100 Thus, Justice Minton wrote in Knauff v.
Shaughnessy:
The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right
to do so stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the
executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation. When
Congress prescribes a procedure concerning the admissibility of
aliens, it is not dealing alone with a legislative power. It is
implementing an inherent executive power. 1101
The McCarthy-era cases upheld the power of the United States to indefinitely
detain a returning permanent resident, without a hearing, on undisclosed
national security grounds,'10 2 and authorized the expulsion of long-term
residents for prior, lawful membership in the Communist Party. 10 3 In 1954,
Justice Frankfurter acknowledged the anomalous nature of the plenary power
doctrine in light of developments in substantive due process jurisprudence
but declined to reconsider it.
1104
The Court has held that the First Amendment does not bar the exclusion
of aliens on ideological grounds,"1 05 and in 1982, the Court confirmed that an
alien seeking entry "has no constitutional rights regarding his
application."' 106 The plenary power doctrine also has been applied to uphold
overt discrimination on the basis of race and national origin in immigration
policies.1107
Nevertheless, the immigration power has been normalized somewhat.
The Court continues to rely on "ancient principles of the international law of
nation states" to withhold constitutional protection from aliens at the
border."0 8  But as in the Indian context, the Court has reformulated the
power as arising to some degree from the Constitution's enumerated
1100. See id.
1101. Id. at 542 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
1102. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 214-15 (1953).
1103. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (upholding the deportation of a
legally resident alien because of his membership in the Communist Party); Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522 (1954) (upholding the deportation of a legally resident alien on the same grounds).
1104. Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530-31 ("[M]uch could be said for the view, were we writing on a
clean slate, that the Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of political discretion heretofore
recognized as belonging to Congress in regulating the entry and deportation of aliens .... But the
slate is not clean.").
1105. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972).
1106. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
1107. See, e.g., Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 97 (1903) (stating that Congress may exclude
aliens of a particular race from the United States). Until 1952, U.S. "national origins" policy tied
the number of immigrants admitted annually to the percentage of existing U.S. inhabitants of that
nationality. The Act excluded Indians and descendants of slave immigrants from the enumeration
of American inhabitants. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 1 (b) & (d), 43 Stat. 153, 159.
For further discussion of the relationship between the plenary power doctrine and race
discrimination, see Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. I (1998).
1108. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 765.
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provisions. In 1904, the Court questioned whether the immigration power
was inherent or derived from the Foreign Commerce Clause." 0 9 In Toll v.
Moreno, the Court held that the power arose from "various sources,"
including the enumerated naturalization and foreign commerce powers, as
well as general "foreign affairs" powers,"' 0 while in INS v. Chadha, the
authority was derived solely from the Naturalization Clause."
Some substantive constitutional restrictions on the doctrine have also
been recognized. As early as 1903, the Supreme Court had held that at least
limited due process applied to an alien in deportation proceedings, even
though the alien allegedly was illegally present in the United States. 1 2 The
Court has held that returning resident aliens, such as Chae Chan Ping, are
entitled to due process in exclusion hearings." 1 3  The Court also made
limited habeas corpus available to aliens in exclusion and deportation
proceedings who claimed to be U.S. citizens.' 
l4
Decisions in the 1970s and 1980s suggested that the Court had qualified
the plenary power doctrine. In Fiallo v. Bell,' 5 for example, the Court held
that while the power was "largely immune" from judicial review, some
review was available. In INS v. Chadha, the Court rejected the government's
contention that Congress's plenary power under the Naturalization Clause
granted it "unreviewable authority over the regulation of aliens '1116 and
invalidated the single-house veto over deportation decisions. And as in the
Indian context, the federal courts have developed subconstitutional review
mechanisms to ensure some procedural protections for aliens." 7 The Yick
Wo tradition of affording constitutional protections to aliens within the
1109. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290 (1904) ("Whether rested on
the accepted principle of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in
sovereignty and essential to self-preservation, to [exclude or expel foreigners] ... ; or on the power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations .... the act before us is not open to constitutional
objection.").
1110. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982). See also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
1111. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1982).
1112. Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 101 (holding that due process protections of notice and a hearing
are available to "an alien, who has entered the country, and has become subject in all respects to its
jurisdiction"); see also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 48-51 (1950).
1113. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-34 (1982).
1114. Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908) (finding that habeas is available to review
the arbitrary denial of an opportunity to establish citizenship in exclusion proceeding); Ng Fung Ho
v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 283-85 (1922) (recognizing a due process right to judicial review of
nonfrivolous citizenship claims in deportation proceedings).
1115. 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
1116. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940-41 ("The plenary authority of Congress... is not open to
question, but what is challenged here is whether Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible
means of implementing that power."). See also Legomsky, supra note 5 1, at 255, 257 & n. 12, 299-
304.
1117. See generally Motomura, supra note 554, at 1656 (stating that in several areas of




United States has continued as the Court has recognized First and Fourth
Amendment protections for aliens' 118 and held that state laws discriminating
on the basis of alienage are subject to strict scrutiny."' 9 In Zadvydas v.
Davis, the Supreme Court rejected the government's contention that the
plenary power doctrine eliminated any due process concerns regarding the
indefinite detention of deportable aliens, noting that "that power is subject to
important constitutional limitations. ' 120 The Court recently suggested a
preference for applying ordinary equal protection analysis to the immigration
context, where possible. 121 On the other hand, as in the Indian and territory
contexts, the Court has invoked the plenary power doctrine to give the
federal government broad authority to discriminate on the basis of alienage
in distributing government benefits. In Mathews v. Diaz, for example, the
Court emphasized the implications of immigration for "our relations with
foreign powers" to hold that equal protection challenges to alienage
discrimination in federal welfare legislation are subject only to rational basis
scrutiny. 1122
Thus, the power over exclusion and deportation is far from normalized.
As Professor Aleinikoff has noted, the anomalous treatment of aliens in
deportation and exclusion proceedings yields the bizarre result that an alien
can be lawfully deported or excluded for conduct for which, under the First
Amendment, she could not be imprisoned."1 23 Despite limited due process
protections, visa denials by U.S. consular officials are unreviewable, aliens
are not entitled to government-appointed counsel or protected by the
exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings, 1124 and homosexuality has been
upheld as a lawful bar to naturalization." 25  Moreover, the United States
regularly maintains, and the courts frequently agree, that federal immigration
laws should be subject to little or no judicial review, based on the
1118. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (First Amendment); Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (Fourth Amendment search and seizure).
1119. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371, 372 (1971). See also Examining Bd. of
Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973).
1120. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001).
1121. In Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, the Court found that a statute that conferred automatic
citizenship on children born abroad to U.S. citizen mothers, but not to U.S. citizen fathers, satisfied
"conventional equal protection scrutiny," and thus did not require consideration of the "wide
deference" afforded to Congress in the immigration area. 553 U.S. 53, 72-73 (2001).
1122. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976). For further discussion of the relationship
between the plenary power doctrine and the Court's equal protection analysis, see Michael J.
Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and
Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 493 (2001).
1123. Aleinikoff, supra note 51, at 868.
1124. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
1125. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439 (5th Cir. 1983).
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immigration power's roots in "national sovereignty, foreign relations, and the
fundamentally political character of nationality decisions."'
' 126
V. Authority over the Territories
The third line of nineteenth century decisions critical to the
development of the inherent powers doctrine concerns the authority of
Congress to acquire and govern territories beyond the borders of the original
states. The absence of any authority to govern territories and admit new
states had created a crisis under the Articles of Confederation, which had not
mentioned territories other than to authorize the admission of Canada and
other colonies with the consent of nine of the existing states.' 12  Following
the Revolutionary War, various states had ceded large tracts of western lands
to the United States, and two months before the Constitutional Convention,
the Continental Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,1128 which
provided for the governance of these territories and their eventual admission
to the Union as states. Madison and others considered this to be an entirely
unconstitutional (albeit necessary) exercise of authority.'1 129 In addition to the
need to create a continuing authority to administer this territory, the drafters
of the Constitution anticipated that Georgia and North Carolina also would
soon cede their western lands to the United States, 1 3° and some may have
anticipated the acquisition of Canada or other territories.1131 Thus, the
Framers viewed the power to admit new states and to make rules and
regulations for territories as "a power of very great importance" due to "the
1126. Brief for the United States at 8, 12-14, 22, Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (No.
96-1060). For further discussion, see Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical
Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright,
1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
1127. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION Art. X1, reprinted in MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES app. A, at 222 (1913) ("CANADA acceding to this
confederation, and joining in the measures of the united states, shall be admitted into, and entitled to
all the advantages of this union: but no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such
admission be agreed to by nine states.").
1128. Congress re-enacted the Northwest Ordinance in its first session in 1789. See Act of
Aug. 7, 1789, 1 Stat. 50 (providing for the government of the territory northwest of the Ohio River).
See also THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, 1787: A BICENTENNIAL HANDBOOK (Robert M. Taylor, Jr.
ed., 1987).
1129. See THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 239-40 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(noting that Congress had administered the U.S. territories "without the least color of constitutional
authority" due to "the necessity of the case").
1130. Id. at 239 ("We may calculate, therefore, that a rich and fertile country of an area equal to
the inhabited extent of the United States will soon become national stock."); see also Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 435-36 (1857).
1131. See, e.g., 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 631-32 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1856)
("1... think it highly probable that the [constitutional] Convention meant to authorize Congress in
[the] future to admit Canada and Nova Scotia into the Union, in case we should have a war, and be
obliged to conquer them by kindness or force."). Gouvemeur Morris anticipated the acquisition of
Canada and Louisiana. See infra note 1148.
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inconvenience of this omission" under the Articles and the unfortunate
"assumption of power into which Congress have been led by it.' ' 132
The result of this concern was the Territory Clause of Article IV, which
provides that "Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States."'1 33 Article IV also provides for the admission of new
states. 134 While the Territory Clause might appear adequate to cover powers
of territorial acquisition and governance, some nineteenth century commen-
tators ranging from Thomas Jefferson to Chief Justice Taney viewed the
clause as limited to "the territory" which the United States possessed when
the Constitution was adopted."1 35 Alternative plausible sources of authority
for property acquisition include the treaty and war powers, but the
Constitution is otherwise silent regarding the United States' authority to
acquire and govern new territory.
Among the criticisms directed at the proposed Constitution in 1787 was
the alleged ungovernability of "the great extent of country which the Union
embrace[d]." 1 36  Nevertheless, the United States grew rapidly over the
course of the 1800s as a result of western and colonial expansion. In the fifty
years between 1803 and 1853, the land area of the United States increased by
over three hundred percent.' 37  In 1803, the United States acquired the
Louisiana Territory, which added 822,000 square acres to the new nation,
nearly doubling its size. 1138 The Red River Basin was acquired in 1818, and
in 1819 Florida was purchased from Spain. Texas was annexed by joint
resolution in 1845, and the Oregon Territory was acquired in an 1846
settlement with Britain. 1139  The Mexican Cession of 1848 (following the
Mexican-American War) and the 1853 Gadsden Purchase from Mexico
largely completed the acquisition of the forty-eight contiguous states." 1
40
American expansion extended abroad in the second half of the century.
The United States acquired approximately seventy Caribbean islands under
1132. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 274 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
1133. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
1134. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 ("New states may be admitted by the congress into this
Union. But no new state shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state, nor
any state be formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states, without the consent of
the legislature of the states concerned, as well as of the congress.").
1135. See infra notes 1154-62 and accompanying text (discussing Jefferson's position). In
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 432 (1857), Chief Justice Taney concluded that the
Territory Clause was limited to the original territories in a sophisticated effort to deny the
precedential effect of the Northwest Ordinance for congressional power over slavery. See infra
notes 1317-18 and accompanying text.
1136. THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 15 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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the Guano Islands Act of 1856. In 1867, Alaska was purchased from
Russia,"141 and Midway Island was acquired from Hawaii. Hawaii was
formally acquired by joint resolution of Congress in 1898, and Guam, Puerto
Rico, and the Philippines were ceded to the United States following the 1898
war with Spain.
Each of these acquisitions posed fundamental questions for the young
regime: Did the United States have constitutional authority to acquire new
territory? If so, from where did Congress's authority to govern new ter-
ritories derive, and what were the limitations upon it? Did the Constitution
and federal law apply immediately, or proprio vigore, or did these laws have
to be affirmatively bestowed upon the territory, either through congressional
legislation or by treaty? Did Congress's power include authority to create
non-Article III courts and to prohibit slavery? Did ordinary constitutional
constraints apply to the exercise of this power? To what extent were
territorial inhabitants entitled to constitutional protections and the benefits of
citizenship? Congress's efforts to govern the conduct of U.S. nationals
abroad raised analogous problems regarding the extraterritorial reach of the
Constitution and of federal authority. In the effort to resolve these issues, a
tension emerged between the view that constitutional principles of enu-
merated powers and individual rights applied to all territory possessed by the
United States and the concept of inherent, plenary congressional power.
A. International Law and the Territories
As in the Indian and alien cases, the constitutional questions posed by
territorial acquisition were powerfully informed by international law
principles of the day. As discussed previously in the context of Indian law,
international law had long recognized the right of states to acquire
uninhabited territories through discovery and occupation, while territories
subject to the authority of another sovereign typically had to be acquired
through conquest or purchase, both of which were generally concluded
through treaties of cession. International practice also recognized the right of
the acquiring power to govern a territory as it saw fit. The sovereign had
discretion to govern territorial inhabitants either as subordinate colonies and
subjects or to give them full citizenship status, and to maintain the laws of
the previous sovereign until altered by the new power.'142 Oppenheim took
the extreme view of the authority resulting from conquest:
1141. Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America, June 20,
1867, U.S.-Russia, 15 Stat. 539.
1142. Andrew Lowndes, The Law of Annexed Territory, 11 POL. SCI. Q. 672, 679-81 (1896),
available at http://www.jstor.org; see also Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 398 (1608) ("[F]or if a
King come to a Christian kingdom by conquest... he may at his pleasure alter and change the laws
of that kingdom: but until he doth make an alteration of those laws the ancient laws of that kingdom
remain .... "); WILLIAM HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 593 (4th ed. 1895) (noting
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Being now their sovereign, [the subjugating State] may indeed impose
any burdens it pleases on its new subjects-it may even confiscate
their private property, since a sovereign State can do what it likes with
its subjects .... [D]octrine and practice agree that such enemy
subjects as are domiciled on the annexed territory and remain there
after annexation become ipso facto by the subjugation subjects of the
subjugator. 143
Enlightenment influences led some international law commentators to
hold that at least Christian inhabitants of acquired lands were entitled to have
their religious rights protected, 1144 but the practice of states in this respect
was not uniform. For uninhabited territories settled by English subjects, "all
the English laws then in being, which were the birthright of every subject,
[were] immediately there in force."'1 145  English law also recognized that
neither the Crown nor Parliament could make laws contrary to the
fundamental principles of English law.1 146 On the other hand, Blackstone
viewed the "infidel" inhabited American colonies as subject to authoritarian
rule:
And therefore the common law of England as such has no allowance
or authority there; they being no part of the mother country, but
distinct (though dependent) dominions. They are subject.., to the
control of the Parliament, though... not bound by any acts of
Parliament unless particularly named.' 147
Whatever the rule under international law, however, the United States'
recent experience as colonial subjects made international law principles of
colonial governance particularly abhorrent to American political ideology.
There was no suggestion at the Constitution's drafting that the powers
recognized by international law to acquire and govern subjugated colonies
that such inhabitants "become subjects of the State and are naturalized for external purposes,
without necessarily acquiring the full status of subjects or citizens for internal purposes").
1143. FRANCIS & OPPENHEIM, supra note 136, § 240.
1144. See SHARON KORMAN, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND PRACTICE 34 (1996). Following the conquest of French Canada in the Seven Years' War,
for example, Parliament adopted the Quebec Act of 1774, "which recognized the wishes of the
French Canadians to retain their religion, rights, and customs." Id. at 35. It is unclear whether this
legislation was considered to reflect an international law obligation, however, since Great Britain
simultaneously was enforcing Protestantism on Irish Catholics. Id.
1145. FORTUNATUS DWARRIS, A GENERAL TREATISE ON STATUTES: THEIR RULES OF
CONSTRUCTION, AND THE PROPER BOUNDARIES OF LEGISLATION AND OF JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION 905 (2d ed. 1848) see also Rex v. Sawyer, 175 Eng. Rep. 41, 48 (1815); The
Zollverein, 166 Eng. Rep. 1038, 1040 (Adm. 1856) (both holding that English statutes bind English
subjects everywhere).
1146. See, e.g., Campbell v. Hall, 20 State Trials 239, 319 (K.B. 1774).
1147. BLACKSTONE, supra note 135, at *108-09; accord Dawes v. Painter, 89 Eng. Rep. 126,
175 (1674) (maintaining that "for all islands and other places extra maria, though they are part of
the King's dominions, yet they are not governed by the laws of England, unless it were so appointed
by Act of Parliament").
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numbered among the enumerated powers of the national government. 1 48
While the 1787 Northwest Ordinance recognized that territories had no
immediate right to representative government, 149 the Ordinance established a
precedent that territorial inhabitants would be given the privileges and
immunities of citizenship, other constitutional protections, and eventual
statehood." 50 On the other hand, U.S. relations with Indians from the begin-
ning incorporated international principles of colonial conquest. In dicta in
Johnson v. M'Intosh, Chief Justice Marshall would embrace international law
principles regarding relations between the conqueror and conquered.' 't ' In
little over a decade after the Constitution's adoption, fundamental challenges
to the meaning of the Territory Clause and to the powers of the national
government to acquire and govern territory began to emerge.
B. The Louisiana Purchase
Conflicts with Spain over navigational rights to the Mississippi and the
twin desires to provide lands for western settlement and relocate Indians
from the East prompted Jefferson to negotiate the purchase of the Louisiana
Territory from Napoleon in 1803 for the sum of fifteen million dollars."1
52
1148. Gouverneur Morris did later express such an opinion, but noted that his view was not
necessarily shared by the other drafters. See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W.
Livingston (Dec. 4, 1803), in 3 JARED SPARKS, THE LIFE OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS 192 (Boston,
Gray & Bowen 1832). Morris responded to the question whether Congress could admit, as a new
state, territory that did not belong to the United States when the Constitution was made, as follows:
"In my opinion they cannot. I always thought that, when we should acquire Canada and Louisiana
it would be proper to govern them as provinces, and allow them no voice in our councils. In
wording the third section of the fourth article, I went as far as circumstances would permit to
establish the exclusion. Candor obliges me to add my belief, that, had it been more pointedly
expressed, a strong opposition would have been made." Id.
1149. The Northwest Ordinance established a three-stage process for territorial governance: (1)
a brief period of governance by a federally-appointed governor and/or council; (2) establishment of
a representative legislature (subject to congressional override), local courts (with appeal to the
federal court system), and nonvoting representation in Congress; and (3) statehood. See generally
ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES
TERRITORIAL RELATIONS 6-8 (1989). The Northwest Ordinance and its successors provided that
territorial laws must be consistent with the Constitution. THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, 1787: A
BICENTENNIAL HANDBOOK, supra note 1128, at 48-49.
1150. LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1149, at 6 ("The Northwest Ordinance... stated the underlying
principle of territorial evolution in U.S. law and tradition: that the goal of all territorial acquisition
eventually was to be Statehood.").
1151. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588-90 (1823). The conqueror, according
to Marshall, prescribed the conditions under which new subjects would be governed, and
"conquered inhabitants can be blended with the conquerors, or... governed as a distinct people."
Id. at 589-90. "Humanity, however, acting on public opinion," had established "that the conquered
shall not be wantonly oppressed .... Id. at 589.
1152. For a detailed discussion of the constitutional debates surrounding the Louisiana
Purchase, see EVERETT BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE
1803-1812 (Clifton ed. 1972) (1920); ALEXANDER DECONDE, THIS AFFAIR OF LOUISIANA (1976);
and David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Jefferson and the West, 1801-1809, 39
WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1441, 1456-76 (1998). An interesting contemporaneous description of
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As with the 1798 Alien Act, the debates in Congress regarding the
ratification of the treaty and the establishment of a territorial government set
forth many of the essential positions regarding the status of newly acquired
territories that would continue to be debated until the Insular Cases a century
later. 153
1. The Power to Acquire Territory.-The first question raised by the
Louisiana Purchase was whether or not the United States had constitutional
authority to acquire new territories. This issue was less contentious than the
question of the power to govern, but nevertheless was an object of debate.
Jefferson himself doubted the authority of the government either to acquire
the territory or to incorporate it into the Union (as provided by the treaty
terms), since he believed the Constitution limited the United States to its
existing boundaries." 54  "The Constitution," he wrote to Senator John
Breckenridge of Kentucky, "has made no provision for our holding foreign
territory, still less for incorporating foreign nations into our Union.""
55
Jefferson felt a constitutional amendment was necessary both to acquire the
territory and to govern it. 1156 Jefferson's Attorney General, Levi Lincoln,
apparently agreed that the authority of the national government under the
Territory and Treaty Clauses was limited to the territory then belonging to
the United States."1 57 Most of Jefferson's confidants, however, believed that
the treaty power included a power to acquire new territory. Jefferson's
Treasury Secretary, Albert Gallatin, argued in a letter to the President that the
Territory Clause did not expressly limit Congress's authority to the existing
U.S. territory,1158 and that "the existence of the United States as a nation
the debates is contained in WILLIAM PLUMER'S MEMORANDUM OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED
STATES SENATE, 1803-1807 (Everett Somerville Brown ed., 1923).
1153. See infra subpart (G).
1154. Jefferson wrote:
[W]hen I consider that the limits of the [United States] are precisely fixed by the treaty
of 1783, that the Constitution expressly declares itself to be made for the [United
States], I cannot help believing the intention was to permit Congress to admit into the
Union new States which should be formed out of the territory for which, & under
whose authority alone, they were then acting. I do not believe it was meant that they
might receive England, Ireland, Holland, &c. into it ....
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 247-48 (Paul L. Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1892).
1155. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Breckenridge (Aug. 12, 1803), in 8 id. at 244.
1156. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson (Aug. 9, 1803), in 8 id. at 263
("[T]he general government has no powers but such as the constitution has given it; & it has not
given it a power of holding foreign territory, and still less of incorporating it into the Union. An
amendment of the Constitution seems necessary for this.").
1157. Letter from Levi Lincoln to Jefferson (Jan. 10, 1803), quoted in BROWN, supra note
1152, at 19. Lincoln, however, felt that any constitutional difficulty could be avoided by annexing
the territory to one of the existing states. Id. at 18-19.
1158. Letter from Gallatin to Jefferson (Jan. 13, 1803), in SELECTED WRITINGS OF ALBERT
GALLATIN 211,213 (E. James Ferguson ed., 1967).
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presuppose[d] the power enjoyed by every nation of extending their territory
by treaties."'1 159  The Treaty Clause should be presumed to include this
"inherent right to acquire territory. ' '1160 Gallatin thus foreshadowed
Marshall's approach to inherent powers in McCulloch by reading the Treaty
Clause as incorporating the powers of states to acquire territory under
international law.
Jefferson apparently remained unconvinced, however, and during the
summer and fall of 1803 he persisted in his belief that a constitutional
amendment authorizing the acquisition was required. Jefferson viewed the
constitutional interpretation that would allow the territory's acquisition and
governance as a direct affront to his strict constructionist principles:
When an instrument admits two constructions, the one safe, the other
dangerous, the one precise, the other indefinite, I prefer that which is
safe & precise. I had rather ask an enlargement of power from the
nation, where it is found necessary, than to assume it by a construction
which would make our powers boundless. Our peculiar security is in
possession of a written Constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper
by construction.
1161
Jefferson accordingly drafted two constitutional amendments which would
have made Louisiana part of the United States and granted citizenship to its
white inhabitants.' 1
62
Expedience, however, soon prevailed over constitutional principle.
Jefferson's cabinet opposed his idea of requesting a constitutional
amendment. 1163  The short time period allowed for ratification of the
treaty, 1164 and Jefferson's concern that events in Europe would cause
Napoleon to change his mind, led Jefferson to ask his friends not to publicize
his concerns about the constitutional difficulties involved in annexing
1159. Id.
1160. Id at 214. Gallatin noted, however, that he was not "perfectly satisfied" with his answer
and that the issue required further examination. Id. at 215. Likewise, Senator Wilson Cary
Nicholas of Virginia wrote to Jefferson on September 3, 1803, that he found the power under the
Territory Clause "as broad as it could well be made," and that he did not "see anything in the
constitution that limits the treaty-making power, except the general limitation of the power given to
the government." Letter from Wilson Cary Nicholas to Jefferson (Sept. 3, 1803), quoted in BROWN,
supra note 1152, at 26-27.
1161. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nichols, in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 1154, at 247.
1162. One amendment provided that "the province of Louisiana is incorporated with the U.S.
and made part thereof" The second provided that "Louisiana... is made a part of the United
States. Its white inhabitants shall be citizens, and stand, as to their rights and obligations, on the
same footing as other citizens in analogous situations." 8 id. at 241, 244-45.
1163. See DECONDE, supra note 1152, at 181 (noting the Cabinet's cool response and attempts
to dissuade Jefferson).
1164. The treaty was required to be ratified within six months of the original signing or by
October 30, 1803. See BROWN, supra note 1152, at 22-23. Jefferson had to call Congress into
session three weeks early in order to meet the deadline. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 11 (1803); PLUMER,
supra note 1152, at 1.
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Louisiana.1165 When Congress convened to consider the treaty on October
17, 1803, Jefferson did not mention the constitutional issue and simply asked
Congress to take such measures as "necessary for the immediate occupation
and temporary government of the country; for its incorporation into the
Union."' 166 After only two days of debate, the Senate voted twenty-four to
seven in favor of ratification. Congress ultimately authorized the President
to take possession of the territory and continue the existing government'
67
and appropriated funds for the purchase." 68 In the debates in Congress, very
few members took the position that the United States lacked constitutional
authority to acquire territory. Ultimately, both opponents and supporters
overwhelmingly lodged the power to acquire territory in the treaty power
(and commonly recognized that the war power contained a corresponding
authority). 169  Although a small number of New England Federalists
opposed the acquisition, their position was difficult to maintain in light of the
fact that the Federalists had previously called for the acquisition of New
Orleans by force." 1
70
1165. See BROWN, supra note 1152, at 25 & n.28. Jefferson admonished: "It will be well to say
as little as possible on the constitutional difficulty, and that Congress should act on it without
talking." DECONDE, supra note 1152, at 184. See also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John C.
Breckenridge, supra note 1155, at 245 ("nothing must be said on that subject which may give a
pretext for retracting but that we should do sub-silentio what shall be found necessary"); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 1154,
at 269 ("[T]he less we say about constitutional difficulties respecting Louisiana the better, and that
what is necessary for surmounting them must be done sub-silentio .....
1166. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 12 (1803).
1167. Act of Oct. 31, 1803, 2 Stat. 245, ch. 1.
1168. Act of Nov. 10, 1803, 2 Stat. 245, ch. 2.
1169. Representative James Elliot of Vermont cited Vattel and others to argue that the treaty
power incorporated international power of territorial acquisition. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 448 (1803)
("The American people, in forming their Constitution, had an eye to that law of nations .... With a
view to this law the treaty-making power was constituted, and by virtue of this law, the
Government... in common with other nations, possess[es] the power and right of making
acquisitions of territory by conquest, cession or purchase."). See also id. at 468 (statement of Rep.
Joseph Nicholson of Maryland) (maintaining that the right to acquire territory was "essential to
independent sovereignty" and had been given to the national government through the war and treaty
powers); id. at 473 (statement of Rep. Caesar A. Rodney of Delaware) ("It does appear to me that
the right of acquiring territory must be included in the treaty-making power .... I should deem this
important authority as nugatory, if it did not give the President and Senate the right to accept a
cession of territory ...."); id. at 50 (statement of Sen. John Taylor of Virginia) (arguing that "this
right [acquiring territory is]... indispensably annexed to the treaty-making power, and the power of
making war"); id. at 45 (statement of Sen. Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts (Federalist opponent
of the treaty)) (maintaining that he "had never doubted the right of the United States to acquire new
territory, either by purchase or by conquest, and to govern the territory so acquired as a dependent
province"); id at 58 (statement of Sen. Uriah Tracy of Connecticut (Federalist opponent of the
treaty)) ("I have no doubt but we can obtain territory either by conquest or compact, and hold it...
without violating the Constitution ....").
1170. See DECONDE, supra note 1152, at 178-79. See also 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 72 (1803)
(statement of Sen. William Cocke of Tennessee); id. at 468-69 (statement of Rep. Joseph Nicholson
of Maryland).
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Whatever Jefferson's motivation in failing to seek an amendment, it is
clear that he did not seek to justify the purchase's legality by relying on
inherent powers. Instead, he viewed the action as extraconstitutional and
therefore unlawful. "The Executive," he wrote, "in seizing the fugitive oc-
currence which so much advances the good of their country, have done an act
beyond the Constitution."' "' John Quincy Adams also condemned the
purchase as a vast assumption of implied (not inherent) power by a proponent
of limited government. 
172
2. Territorial Governance and Citizenship.-The primary debate
surrounding the Louisiana Purchase turned on the proper relationship
between the new territory and the existing Union and the legal rights to
which its inhabitants were entitled. This debate was largely inspired by
Article III of the treaty, which provided, in relevant part, as follows:
The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the
Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible,
according to the principles of the Federal constitution, to the
enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of
the United States; and in the mean time they shall be maintained and
protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the
religion which they profess.
1173
The treaty thus appeared to mandate that the territorial inhabitants ultimately
would be granted citizenship and placed on the road to statehood and that "in
the mean time" certain fundamental protections would be afforded them.
These treaty requirements provoked an extensive debate in Congress
regarding whether a treaty itself could work such changes without further
action by Congress. New England Federalists, who feared that the addition
of new western states would undermine their political power, argued that a
treaty could not incorporate a new state into the Union, and that the treaty
therefore was unconstitutional."174 Defenders of the treaty, on the other hand,
urged that the treaty was constitutional because it did not itself require
statehood for the new territory.' 175
The arguments regarding statehood raised, in a backhanded way, the
prospect that Louisiana and future territories could be governed as dependent
1171. Letter of Thomas Jefferson to John Breckenridge, supra note 1155, at 244.
1172. BROWN, supra note 1152, at 46-47.
1173. Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Republic, Apr. 30, 1803,
U.S.-Fr., art. 3, 8 Stat. 201, 202.
1174. Representative Gaylord Griswold of Connecticut argued that the treaty's attempt to
confer statehood was unconstitutional and an usurpation of power. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 432-33
(1803). See also id. at 454-56 (statement of Rep. Samuel Thatcher of Massachusetts).
1175. E.g., id. at 50-52 (statement of Sen. John Taylor of Virginia). Other supporters
maintained that any possible need for an amendment did not invalidate the treaty. See id. at 70-71
(statement of Sen. Wilson Carey Nicholas of Virginia).
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colonies, outside of the constitutional protections enjoyed by states and their
inhabitants. In other words, the question of statehood asked whether the
territory would be placed on the same footing as the existing territories, with
citizenship and ultimate statehood for the region's French and Spanish
inhabitants, or whether it would be governed as a permanent colony, attached
"to the empire as afief," as England ruled Jamaica.' 176 Thus, Representative
Roger Griswold of Connecticut contended, "A new territory and new sub-
jects may undoubtedly be obtained by conquest and by purchase; but neither
the conquest nor the purchase can incorporate them into the Union. They
must remain in the condition of colonies, and be governed accordingly."'
177
The source of Congress's authority to govern the territory was relatively
undisputed. Aside from Jefferson's concerns and the objections of John
Quincy Adams, 1178 most members of Congress attributed the power of
governance to Congress's Article IV powers to make rules for the territories
and to admit new states. 1179 Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey was relatively
isolated in his view that the Constitution did not apply to the territory either
as a source of authority or a constraint. For Dayton, the source of authority
was inherent. "I ask the gentleman.., where, & in what part of the
Constitution does he find any authority to legislate for [Louisiana]-The
1176. ALLAN B. MAGRUDER, POLITICAL, COMMERCIAL AND MORAL REFLECTIONS, ON THE
LATE CESSION OF LOUISIANA, TO THE UNITED STATES 95 (Lexington, D. Bradford 1803).
1177. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 463 (1803). See also id. at 45 (statement of Sen. Timothy
Pickering of Massachusetts) (maintaining that he "had never doubted the right of the United States
to acquire ... and to govern the territory acquired as a dependent province"); id at 58 (statement of
Sen. Uriah Tracy of Connecticut) ("I have no doubt but we can obtain territory either by conquest or
compact, and hold it, even all Louisiana, and a thousand times more, if you please, without violating
the Constitution. We can hold territory; but to admit the inhabitants into the Union, to make
citizens of them, and States, by treaty, we cannot constitutionally do; and no subsequent act of
legislation, or even ordinary amendment to our Constitution, can legalize such measures."); id. at
457-58 (statement of Rep. John Smilie of Pennsylvania) ("[Ihf the prevailing opinion shall be that
the inhabitants of the ceded territory cannot be admitted under the Constitution as it now stands, the
people of the United States can, if they see fit, apply a remedy, by amending the Constitution ....
And if they do not choose to do this, the inhabitants may remain in a colonial state.").
Representative Samuel L. Mitchill of New York noted that the United States routinely acquired
territory by treaty from Indian tribes, whose lands were "as much foreign dominion as the soil of
France or Spain." Id. at 478.
1178. Newly appointed Federalist Senator John Quincy Adams proposed a constitutional
amendment providing that Congress could incorporate new territories into the Union, bestow on the
inhabitants the "rights, privileges, and immunities" of citizens, and govern the territory "as may best
conciliate the protection of the liberties, property and religion of the said inhabitants with the rights
of the United States, of their citizens, and of the respective States, under the Constitution." 3
WRITINGS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 20-21 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1917). Adams's
resolution to form a committee to determine what measures were necessary to carry the treaty into
effect was rejected. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 105-06, 213 (1803).
1179. See id. at 474 (statement of Rep. Caesar A. Rodney of Delaware) (urging that the
Territory Clause provides a basis for governance "not merely of territory then held, but of territory
which might in future be acquired by treaty or purchase"); see also id at 480 (statement of Rep.
Samuel L. Mitchill of New York) (arguing that the Territory Clause provides authority for
governance).
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constitution gives us no authority on the subject-We derive our power &
right from the nature of government-That Country is a purchased territory
and we may govern it as a conquered one."
' 180
The question whether the Constitution required that the inhabitants be
granted citizenship was obscured somewhat by the treaty's requirements. No
one contended that the inhabitants became citizens immediately by operation
of the treaty,1" 88 and few argued aggressively that the inhabitants must be
placed on a road to citizenship, although given the treaty's apparent
stipulation on that point, this was largely assumed."8 2 One of Jefferson's
proposed amendments, for example, would have bestowed immediate
citizenship on the region's white inhabitants." 83  Representative Samuel
Mitchill of New York maintained that the inhabitants of the territory were
not yet prepared to assume the responsibilities of democratic governance and
must serve a "probationary" period, "according to the principles of the...
Constitution," after which Congress would grant them citizenship."
84
Congress did not prove ready at that time to bestow citizenship on the
Louisianans, however, and an attempt to extend the naturalization act to
Louisiana in early 1804 failed with little recorded argument." 
85
The debates over the government to be established for the new territory
shed some light on the prevailing views regarding the application of the
Constitution and other federal laws to the territory. Some type of
1180. PLUMER, supra note 1152, at 136 (statement of Sen. Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey).
Senator Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts also argued that, as a purchased province, Louisiana
was not entitled to representation, and the Constitution did not apply there. Id. at 233.
1181. E.g., id. at 481 (statement of Rep. Samuel L. Mitchill of New York) ("1 do not venture to
affirm that, by the mere act of cession, the inhabitants of a ceded country become, of course,
citizens of the country to which they are annexed. It seems not to be the case, unless specially
provided for.").
1182. Playing the expedient Republican role in arguing in support of the treaty, Senator John
Taylor of Virginia emphasized that because the treaty simply required the incorporation of
Louisiana as a territory of the Union, not as a state, the inhabitants would not have become citizens
absent the treaty's requirement. Id. at 52. See also id. at 1186 (statement of Rep. Joseph Clay of
Pennsylvania) (arguing in support of naturalizing the inhabitants that "this privilege had been
promised [in the treaty] and ought to be granted").
1183. See supra note 1162. In his October 17th Message to Congress, Jefferson referred to the
inhabitants as "adopted brethren," 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 12 (1803), which Representative James
Elliot of Vermont interpreted as indicating that "we shall gain an acquisition, not of subjects, but of
citizens." Id. at 395.
1184. Mitchill allowed Congress some discretion:
They are to serve an apprenticeship to liberty; they are thus to be taught the lessons of
freedom; and by degrees they are to be raised to the enjoyment and practice of
independence. All this is to be done as soon as possible; that is, as soon as the nature
of the case will permit; and according to the principles of the Federal Constitution ....
They shall, as soon as the principles of the Constitution permit, and conformably
thereto, be declared citizens of the United States. Congress will judge the time,
manner, and expediency of this.
Id. at 480.
1185. Id. at 1185-86.
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government was urgently required, and immediately following the
ratification, Congress authorized the President to take possession and govern
the territory until such time as Congress adopted organizing legislation."
1 86
In February 1804, Congress adopted a "temporary" government which was in
effect for a year and then replaced after much complaint." 187 The temporary
territorial government was comprised of a governor, a legislative council of
thirteen members, and judicial officers serving four-year terms-all to be
appointed by the President."i8 8 The legislative authority extended to all right-
ful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States." 189 The right of jury trial was granted in capital cases and
in all superior court cases if either party requested it,1190 and the governor had
absolute authority to convene and disband the legislative council." 9 1 Both
laws raised difficult questions regarding what kind of government Congress
could lawfully establish in the territories, what constraints the Constitution
imposed on congressional power, and to what rights the inhabitants were
lawfully entitled.
Most participants in the governmental debates appear to have assumed
that some affirmative action was required to make U.S. laws operative in the
territory, independent of the question of what the inhabitants were entitled to
under the treaty or the Constitution. Members of Congress generally ac-
cepted the international law principle that the laws of a conquered or ceded
territory remained in place until altered by the new sovereign,1 1 92 and
Jefferson apparently shared this view.1193 Thus, in adopting the temporary
government, Congress provided that certain U.S. laws would be extended to
1186. The statute provided, in relevant part, that:
until Congress shall have made provision for the temporary government of the said
Territories, all the military, civil, and judicial powers, exercised by the officers of the
existing government of the same, shall be vested in such person and persons, and shall
be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct [for the
maintaining and protecting inhabitants of Louisiana in the full enjoyment of their
liberty, property, and religion].
Id. at 498. The bracketed language was added to the final version. Id.
1187, See infra notes 1224-27 and accompanying text.
1188. Act of Mar. 26, 1804, 2 Stat. 283, 283-84; see also 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 1293-95
(1804).
1189. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 1294 (1804).
1190. Id.
1191. Id.
1192. E.g., id. at 518 (1804) (statement of Rep. Caesar A. Rodney of Delaware) ("It is a
received principle of the law of nations, that, when territory is ceded, the people who inhabit it have
a right to the laws they formerly lived under, embracing the whole civil and criminal code, until
they are altered or amended by the country to whom the cession is made.").
1193. Letter to the Secretary of State (May 19, 1808), in 7 THE WRITNGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 1154, at 58-59 ("Louis XIV having established the Costumes de Paris as the
law of Louisiana, this was not changed by the mere act of transfer; on the contrary, the laws of
France continued and continues to be the law of the land, except where specially altered by some
subsequent edict of Spain or act of Congress.").
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the territory. The fact that international law recognized that ordinary rules
regarding property use, contracts, and crime were not immediately
applicable, however, did not clearly address what constitutional protections
applied to the territory, and in particular what constraints the Constitution
imposed on congressional power.
Both the presidential and temporary government bills provoked strong
opinions regarding whether Congress could constitutionally establish such a
government. Opponents of each bill contended that the Constitution limited
Congress's power in the territory. Thus, opponents condemned the initial
decision to vest discretion to govern the territory in the President as
"despotic"11 94 and argued that the bill violated the constitutional separation of
powers, the prohibition on suspension of habeas corpus, and principles of
republican government."195 Representative Andrew Gregg of Pennsylvania
sought to underscore the constitutional constraints on the proposed presi-
dential government with an amendment specifying that the government's
actions be "not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States.
''
196
The amendment was opposed on the grounds that Congress obviously could
not "pass laws that were unconstitutional" and thus the amendment was
"superfluous.""197
Opponents likewise condemned the subsequent temporary government
as "tyrannical"' 198 and "a military despotism,"''199 and viewed the lack of
representative government as an affront to the Constitution and democratic
institutions. 200  Senator Joseph Anderson of Tennessee, for example,
1194. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 511 (1804) (statement of Rep. John G. Jackson of Virginia).
1195. Representative Roger Griswold of Connecticut objected that the powers of the existing
government inherited from France might be "inconsistent with the Constitution of the United
States," in particular habeas corpus and other constraints on government power. Id. at 499. He
likewise objected that the complete powers vested in the President violated the constitutional
separation of powers. Id. at 500 ("I do not.., understand that, according to the Constitution, we
have a right to make [the President] legislator, judge, and executive, in any territory belonging to
the United States."); see also id. at 5 10 (same). Representative James Elliot of Vermont concurred
in the view that "[sluch a delegation of power [to the President] was unconstitutional." Id. at 499;
see also id. at 508 (same); id. at 510 (statement of Rep. John G. Jackson of Virginia) (noting that he
"considered the second section of the bill [giving complete power to the President] as repugnant to
the Constitution").
1196. Id. at 504.
1197. Id. (statement of Rep. Samuel W. Dana of Connecticut).
1198. PLUMER, supra note 1152, at 111 (statement of Sen. William Cocke of Tennessee).
1199. Id. at 134 (statement of Sen. Thomas Worthington of Ohio).
1200. Id. at 135 (statement of Sen. John Smith of Ohio) ("The establishment of a Military
government is at war.., with the letter & spirit of your constitution-which knows no other
government than that of Republicanism."); see also id. at 111 (statement of Sen. Samuel Maclay of
Pennsylvania) ("Those people.., ought to elect a legislature and have jurors."); id. (statement of
Sen. William Cocke of Tennessee) ("The people of that country are free-let them have liberty & a
free government."). Senator Anderson objected to taxation of the Louisiana inhabitants without
representation. Id. at 108. Senator Breckenridge stated that he did "not feel any constitutional
difficulty as to the form of government" but nevertheless opposed the unrepublican government as
arbitrary. Id. at 138.
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contended that "the only power we have to legislate for that country is
derived from the Constitution-& we must give them a republican
government-we can give them no other." 120 1 Responding to xenophobic
arguments in opposition, he noted that more than two-thirds of the
inhabitants of upper Louisiana were already American citizens.1 20 2 John
Quincy Adams contended the U.S. government had no power to tax and
govern peoples without representation and argued from the Declaration of
Independence and fundamental American constitutional principles that the
consent of the Louisiana inhabitants was required for their governance. 2 3
Adams condemned the bill as "destructive of the essential principles of
genuine liberty" and containing "principles repugnant to our
Constitution."' 120 4 He objected, inter alia, to the government's lack of pop-
ular consent from the Louisiana inhabitants, to the lack of any provision for
future representation, as provided by other territorial governments, and to the
fact that judges would serve a term of years rather than the constitutional
tenure of good behavior.12
05
In the debates over the temporary government, provisions for more
representative government were narrowly defeated. The House passed an
amendment for representative government 120 6 and insisted on it in conference
committee, but narrowly receded from the demand on a pragmatic argument
that the variety of languages of the inhabitants would not allow them to
communicate in a representative body. 120 7  Likewise, the House passed a
1201. Id. at 136; 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 238-39 (1804).
1202. Id. at 238-39.
1203. BROWN, supra note 1152, at 46-47. Adams offered a resolution on this point: "Resolved,
That by concurring in any act of legislation for imposing taxes upon the inhabitants of Louisiana
without their consent, this Senate would assume a power, unwarranted by the constitution and
dangerous to the liberties of the people of the United States." 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 227 (1804).
Adams argued in support of the resolution that since "the just powers of a government can be
derived only from the consent of the governed, the French Republic could not give us the right to
make laws for the people of Louisiana, without their acquiescence in the transfer." THE WRITINGS
OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 1178, at 28. Adams also looked beyond the Constitution for
support from the Declaration of Independence. Id. at 29.
1204. PLUMER, supra note 1152, at 144 (statement of Sen. John Quincy Adams).
1205. Id. at 144.
1206. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 1191-93 (1804). An amendment for representative government
failed in the Senate by an evenly divided 13-to-13 vote. Id. at 251-52.
1207. When the Senate objected to the representative government provisions, the House
initially refused to recede by a vote of 63 to 37. Id. at 1206. The House then voted 53 to 36 to
insist. Id. at 1207. The House finally receded on representative government on practical grounds.
E.g., id. at 1229 (statement of Rep. Joseph Nicholson of Maryland) ("Some of those [Louisiana]
parishes were entirely composed of Spaniards, some of French, some of Germans, and some of
Creoles. If each of them were to send a member, the Legislative body would be composed of
persons of different languages. The representatives of no two parishes would perhaps speak the
same languages. This, Mr. N [Representative Nicholson] said, was the principal reason which
induced the managers to recommend that the House should recede.").
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broad trial-by-jury measure but narrowly receded from it, 120 8 although the
law ultimately adopted did give the inhabitants a right to request a jury trial.
The House also attempted to put a time limit on the government, 120 9 "on
account principally of the great powers conferred on the Executive.
1 210
Supporters primarily defended the presidential government as necessary
and temporary, 121 but proponents for both governments also attempted to
justify their constitutionality. Many argued, to a greater or lesser extent, that
constitutional constraints did not apply. Some supporters rooted the power
to establish such governments in the Territory Clause 212 and argued that the
Constitution's limits on power that applied to "States" were not operative in
the territories. Thus, Senator Robert Wright of Maryland noted that the
Republican Guarantee Clause applied only to states and that the "[t]erritorial
governments in this Country are not, or is it necessary they should be,
republican."1 213  Others appeared to contend more generally that the
Constitution, in toto, did not apply to the territory.' 214  The relationship
between the territories and slavery was also coloring constitutional
arguments. 215  Senator James Hillhouse of Connecticut, a New England
Federalist who wished to limit slavery, contended during the debates on
1208. The House adopted an amendment to expand the jury trial to more criminal cases, id. at
1197, but finally receded from it. See id. at 1207.
1209. Id. at 1198-99.
1210. Id. at 1198 (statement of Rep. Willis Alston of North Carolina).
1211. E.g., id. at 503 (statement of Rep. Samuel Mitchill of New York) (stating that "if ever the
plea of adopting measures de necessitate could be made, it was on such occasion as this"); id. at 512
(statement of Rep. Caesar A. Rodney of Delaware) (arguing that the powers were necessary and of
short duration).
1212. Id. at 502 (statement of Rep. Samuel Mitchill of New York) ("Congress is clothed with
the power to dispose of such territory and property, and to make all needful rules and regulations
respecting it. This is as fair an exercise of Constitutional authority as that by which we assemble
and hold our seats in this House.").
1213. PLUMER, supra note 1152, at 137. See also id. at 108 (statement of Sen. Jonathan Dayton
of New Jersey) ("The constitution has provided only for the representation of States, & no man will
pretend that Louisiana is a State."). In the debate over the constitutionality of the treaty's grant of
preferential port access to France and Spain, Representative Joseph Nicholson of Maryland likewise
argued that the preference could not violate the prohibition on preferences "given to the ports of one
State over another," because the Louisiana Territory was not a "state," but was "in the nature of a
colony whose commerce may be regulated without any reference to the Constitution." 13 ANNALS
OF CONG. 471 (1803).
1214. PLUMER, supra note 1152, at 137 (statement of Sen. Timothy Pickering of
Massachusetts) (maintaining that the Constitution did not extend to the territory and that "[w]e must
consider & govern them as a colony," though the United States was bound by treaty to secure their
rights and privileges). Caesar Rodney contended that the Territory Clause "does not limit or
restrain the authority of Congress with respect to Territories, but vests them with full and complete
power to exercise a sound discretion generally on the subject .... The limitations of power, found
in the Constitution, are applicable to the States and not to Territories." 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 513-
14 (1803) (statement of Rep. Caesar A. Rodney of Delaware).
1215. For the debates on extension of slavery to Louisiana, see, e.g., PLUMER, supra note 1152,
at 111-22, 126-30, 131-34.
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extending slavery to the territory that the Constitution did not apply since the
territory was "not part or parcel of the United States."'
2 1 6
The Constitution's inapplicability was often justified by nativist views
regarding the Catholic inhabitants' incapacity for self-governance. Members
of Congress portrayed the French and Spanish inhabitants as "next to a state
of nature"'' 21 7 and not yet capable of choosing their government or selecting
jurors. 121 William C. C. Claiborne, who was appointed Governor of the
territory, also observed that jury trials initially would "only embarrass the
administration of justice.' 219  Supporters generally did not, however, take
the position that constitutional protections should never apply or that the
people should be kept in second-class status indefinitely; the question
seemed to be largely a matter of time and training. Jefferson considered the
populace as "incapable of self government as children,"'120 and suggested
that the territorial legislature should introduce democratic governance
gradually, in accordance with the populace's ability to adapt, 221 though he
1216. Id. at 114 (statement of Sen. James Hillhouse of Connecticut) ("The Constitution...
admits of a Republican government and no other. We must apply the Constitution to that people in
all cases or in none-We must consider that country as being within the Union or without it-there
is no alternative. I think myself they are not part or parcel of the United States.").
1217. BROWN, supra note 1152, at 106.
1218. PLUMER, supra note 1152, at 110 (statement of Sen. James Jackson of Georgia) ("The
inhabitants of Louisiana are not citizens of the United States-they are now in a state of
probation-They are too ignorant to elect a legislature-they would consider jurors as a curse to
them."); id. at 111 (statement of Sen. Samuel Smith of Maryland) ("Those people are absolutely
incapable of governing themselves, of electing their rulers or appointing jurors. As soon as they are
capable & fit to enjoy liberty & a free government I shall be for giving it to them."); id. (statement
of Sen. Wilson Carey Nicholas of Virginia) ("We ought not yet to give that people self-
government."); id. (statement of Sen. Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts) ("They are too ignorant
to elect suitable men."); id. at 134 (statement of Sen. James Hillhouse of Connecticut) ("I would not
give them a trial by jury, because they are not used to it-but I would give them the liberty of
having trial by jury whenever they are able to express their desire of it by their own legis-ture [sic]
& to make laws regulating that mode of trial.").
1219. Letter from William C. C. Claiborne to James Madison (Jan. 2, 1804), in 2 ROBERTSON,
LOUISIANA UNDER THE RULE OF SPAIN, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES 1785-1807, at 232-34
(1911).
1220. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dewitt Clinton (Dec. 2, 1803), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 1154, at 283.
1221. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin (Nov.
9, 1803), in 7 id. 275 n. I. Jefferson argued that
the new legislature will of course introduce the trial by jury in criminal cases, first; the
habeas corpus, the freedom of the press, freedom of religion, etc., as soon as can be,
and in general draw their laws and organization to the mould [sic] of ours by degrees as
they find practicable without exciting too much discontent. In proportion as we find
the people there riper for receiving these first principles of freedom, congress may
from session to session confirm their enjoyment of them.
Id. (emphasis added). After Congress's establishment of the temporary territorial government,
Jefferson observed in an 1804 letter to Secretary of State Madison that Congress had provided that
the inhabitants of the territory
shall continue under the protection of the treaty until the principles of our Constitution
can be extended to them, when the protection of the treaty is to cease, and that of our
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also appears to have assumed that they were ultimately entitled to such
protections. Many maintained simply that the Constitution did not apply
until the inhabitants received citizenship or statehood. Representative John
Smilie of Pennsylvania argued, for example, that "the Constitution of the
United States did not extend to this territory any farther than they were bound
by the [treaty]. On this principle they had right, viewing it in the light of a
colony, to give it such government as the Government of the United States
might think proper, without thereby violating the Constitution .... 1222 He
contended, however, that he "would be among the first to incorporate the
territory in the Union, and to admit the people to all the rights of citizens."1223
The temporary government quickly provoked opposition both in the
press and from the inhabitants of the Louisiana Territory, largely for its
nonrepresentative character.1224  The Mayor of New Orleans resigned in
protest over the new government and residents of Louisiana petitioned
Congress demanding a right of self-government and statehood. 225 On March
2, 1805, Congress approved a new territorial government extending the
principles of the 1787 Northwest Ordinance to the Orleans territory,
including the privileges and immunities of citizenship and a bill of rights.
1226
This included provisions for a general assembly of twenty-five elected
members, and, upon the achievement of a certain population, preparation for
statehood. 2 2 7  The imperial colonial model had been rejected, at least
momentarily. The question of the constitutionality of statehood for
Louisiana, which was so hotly contested when the treaty was first considered,
was never expressly revisited, and Congress admitted Louisiana as a state in
1812.
The Louisiana Purchase was later criticized primarily as an assertion of
implied powers that contradicted the strict constructionism of President
Jefferson. 1228  But the controversies surrounding the purchase and the
own principles to take its place. But as this could not be done at once, it has been
provided to be as soon as our rules will admit. Accordingly Congress has begun by
extending about 20 particular laws by their titles, to Louisiana.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 14, 1804), in 8 id 313.
1222. Id. at 511-12.
1223. Id. at 512.
1224. See generally BROWN, supra note 1152, at 147-69. Part of the impetus behind the
demand for self-government was the desire to determine the slavery issue, which Congress had
banned. Id. at 159.
1225. See 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 1597-608 app. (1803-1804); id at 1608-20.
1226. Act of Mar. 2, 1805, ch. 23, 2 Stat. 322, in 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 1674-76 app. (1804);
see also BROWN, supra note 1152, at 160-61.
1227. 2 Stat. 322.
1228. In his Commentaries, Justice Story viewed the Louisiana Purchase as one of "the most
remarkable" exercises of implied powers by the national government. 3 STORY, supra note 288, ch.
27, § 1282, at 166. Story found it "incredible" that the power to acquire and govern Louisiana
could have been in the contemplation of the Framers. "If it exists at all," he argued, "it is
unforeseen, and the result of a sovereignty, intended to be limited, and yet not sufficiently guarded."
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establishment of the territorial government raised other profound questions
that remained unresolved and cast lengthy shadows over the ensuing century.
As in the Alien Act debates, few members of Congress contended that the
United States' power to govern the territory derived from inherent,
extraconstitutional sources, though many argued that Congress could
exercise its delegated powers in the territory, at least temporarily, without
constitutional constraint.
Consideration of the questions of federal power to govern the territory
and the rights enjoyed by the inhabitants was complicated by the fact that the
Constitution's text did not conclusively resolve its application to the
territories. The Constitution did not define citizenship until the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment. It expressly guaranteed the right to a republican
form of government and congressional representation only to the organized
states, and it apparently granted Congress the power to admit new states as a
matter of discretion. Moreover, as the debates over the Alien Act indicate,
the question of the constitutional entitlements of aliens within the states of
the Union was unresolved at the time of the Louisiana Purchase, and the
extension of this question to the new territory simply compounded the
confusion. Thus, although the Constitution provided no clear source of
authority for proponents of colonial governance, advocates of immediate
citizenship, self-government, and eventual statehood had to derive their
arguments from the spirit of American political institutions and the ideas of
equality and representative government that animated the nation's creation,
rather than from the Constitution's text.
The Article III treaty stipulation also colored the debates over
representative government and citizenship in many ways, making it difficult
to isolate what politicians of the day believed the Constitution itself required.
Finally, although the Louisiana Purchase ultimately was resolved with the
establishment of a quasi-representative government and the expectation of
statehood, wholly undemocratic forms of government had been established in
the interim, and even the final territorial government apparently departed
from the Constitution (for example, through the appointment of judges for
four-year terms).
Id. § 1285 at 167. John Quincy Adams was equally distressed by the implications for strict
constitutional construction. "After this," he wrote, "to nibble at a bank, a road, a canal, the mere
mint and cummin of the law, was but glorious inconsistency." 5 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY
ADAMS 401 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1875). Judge Cooley was less generous in his portrayal of the
acquisition and excoriated the Louisiana Purchase as the original sin of the United States' territorial
acquisitions. Thomas M. Cooley, The Acquisition of Louisiana, in 2 IND. HIST. SOC'Y,
PUBLICATIONS 88-89 (1887) ("The poison was in the doctrine which took from the Constitution all
sacredness.... After this time the proposal to exercise unwarranted powers on a plea of necessity
might be safely advanced without exciting the detestation it deserved; and the sentiment of loyalty
to the Constitution was so far weakened that it easily gave way under the pressure of political
expediency.").
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The Louisiana Purchase thus in many ways simply highlighted the
ambiguities in the Constitution regarding the United States' ability to engage
in colonial rule without resolving them. In the end, the specific question
whether inhabitants of newly acquired territories must become citizens
destined for statehood was indefinitely deferred by the fact that all the
territories acquired between the Louisiana Purchase and 1898 were granted
the privileges and immunities of citizenship and constitutional protections by
treaty and statute. 1229 As with the Alien Act, no court ever adjudicated the
legality of the ultimate compromise reached regarding Louisiana, and the
questions of constitutional authority over territories and their inhabitants
would await resolution at a later date.
C. The Constitution and Western Expansion
The years between the Louisiana Purchase and the Civil War laid
important groundwork for the development of the doctrine of inherent
plenary congressional power over the territories. A series of early cases
presented the Supreme Court with questions that the Louisiana Purchase had
left unresolved. Like the Louisiana Purchase, the early cases revealed a
tension between a vision of the Constitution as the source of all national
government authority, and thus extending to all territories subject to U.S.
1229. Florida was acquired in 1819 under treaty terms analogous to the Louisiana treaty, 8 Stat.
252, and the principles of the Northwest Ordinance, including a bill of rights and the privileges and
immunities of citizenship, were extended to it by statute in 1822. 3 Stat. 654. The Treaty of Peace
with Mexico which ceded California to the United States included a stipulation for rights of
citizenship, and California was quickly admitted as a state. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra
note 516. The treaty with Russia ceding Alaska followed this model but expressly excluded native
tribes from citizenship. See 15 Stat. 542, art. 3 ("The inhabitants of the ceded territory ... shall be
admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United
States .... "); see also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 333-36 (1901) (White, J., concurring).
Furthermore, the organizing statutes for the western territories all provided that no territorial
laws could be adopted that were inconsistent with the Constitution. For example, the organic statute
establishing the territorial government of Utah provided, "That the Constitution and laws of the
United States are hereby extended over and declared to be in force in said Territory of Utah, so far
as the same, or any provision thereof, may be applicable." Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 51, § 17, 9 Stat.
453, 458. Section 6 of the Act further provided that the power of the territorial legislature "shall
extend to all the rightful subjects of legislation, consistent with the Constitution of the United States
and the provisions of this act ..... Id. at 454. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States provided, "The Constitution and all the laws of the United States, not locally inapplicable,
shall ... have the same force and effect within the organized territories, and in every territory
hereafter organized, as elsewhere in the United States." See Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. (II How.)
437, 460 (1850) (holding that the Constitution applied to the Iowa territory through the Ordinance
of 1787 and the organic law establishing the territorial government); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S.
130 (1878) (holding that the Utah Territory was vested with legislative power over "all rightful
subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States" (quoting
Rev. Stat. § 1851 (1856))); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 28 (1889) (holding that the Constitution
applied to Montana through the Act of May 26, 1864, ch. 95, § 13, 13 Stat. 91 and Rev. Stat. §
1891); Black v. Jackson, 177 U.S. 349, 363 (1900) (holding that the Oklahoma territory was
obligated to pass laws not inconsistent with the Constitution (citing Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, §
6, 26 Stat. 81, 84)).
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sovereignty, and a vision of a Constitution of limited applicability in the
territories, which left congressional authority correspondingly unchecked.
The cases also reveal the Court's gradual movement toward a broad, pro-
expansionist understanding of national power.
In the 1810 case of Sere v. Pitot,1230 for example, Chief Justice Marshall
held that Congress could bestow broader jurisdiction on territorial courts than
that authorized by Article II1. The "absolute and undisputed power" to
govern the Orleans territory, he wrote, either was inherent in "the inevitable
consequence of the right to acquire and to hold territory," or arose from the
Territory Clause. 1
231
The proposition that the Constitution applied equally to all parts of the
"American empire" was asserted in the 1820 case of Loughborough v.
Blake,1232 which involved a challenge to Congress's constitutional authority
to tax the District of Columbia. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall
found that the taxation power was a general power, not textually limited to
any specific territory, which "extends to all places over which the
government extends.', 233 Marshall further found that the requirement that
"all duties ... be uniform throughout the United States" applied equally to
the District of Columbia.'2 34  The "United States," Marshall made clear,
included the territories as well as the states:
Does this term designate the whole, or any particular portion of the
American empire? Certainly this question can admit of but one
answer. It is the name given to our great republic, which is composed
of States and territories. The district of Columbia, or the territory
west of the Missouri, is not less within the United States, than
Maryland or Pennsylvania .... 1235
Loughborough thus reflected a classic enumerated powers approach that
viewed the Constitution, at least as a source of governmental authority, as
extending to all territory subject to U.S. sovereignty. 236 In light of Sere,
however, Loughborough did not preclude the possibility that some specific
constitutional provisions might be inapplicable.
1230. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332 (1810).
1231. Id. at 336-37.
1232. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317 (1820).
1233. Id. at318-19.
1234. Id. at 319.
1235. Id. (emphasis added).
1236. Later cases involving the District of Columbia similarly confirmed that the District,
except for purposes of voting representation in Congress, was a part of the United States and fully
protected by the Constitution. See, e.g., Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899) (holding
that the right to trial by jury applies to the District of Columbia); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540
(1888) (Harlan, J.) (holding that the constitutional due process, including right to trial by jury in
criminal cases, applies to the District of Columbia).
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1. American Insurance Co. v. Canter.-Following the acquisition of
Florida from Spain in 1819, Congress established a territorial government for
Florida which, like other territorial governments, included territorial courts
with judges appointed for four-year terms. The ability of the inferior
territorial courts to exercise federal admiralty jurisdiction became an object
of contention in American Insurance Co. v. Canter.1237  The plaintiffs
contended, "The Constitution was made for the whole people of the United
States, without reference to their being within the original thirteen states,"
12 38
and that Article III's bestowal of exclusive admiralty jurisdiction to the
federal courts accordingly was controlling in the territories.
Defendant's counsel, Daniel Webster and John Whipple, in turn argued
from international practice that Florida existed outside the Constitution and
was subject to plenary congressional authority until Congress deemed
otherwise. As Whipple put it,
How the Constitution became of force in Florida has not been shown.
Was it by the Act of cession? Is there any principle in the law of
nations, which upon the Act of cession or conquest, gives to the ceded
or conquered country, a right to participate in the privileges of the
Constitution of the parent country? The usages of nations from the
period of Grecian colonization to the present moment, are precisely
the reverse. 1239
Daniel Webster similarly argued that the Constitution only applied to Florida
through positive legislation. 1240  Analogizing from English law, Webster
maintained that until Congress applied the Constitution to new territories,
Congress could govern Florida "as she thought proper."' 241 Webster saw no
limitations on Congress's power in the territories and argued that Congress
"might have done anything-she might have refused the trial by jury, and
refused a legislature."
' 1242
Sitting as Circuit Judge, Justice Johnson embraced the defendant's
arguments, ruling that the Constitution did not apply to Florida and that only
the law of nations limited Congress's power to govern it.1 243 Like some
international law scholars, Johnson distinguished between territories that had
been acquired from the Indians, which as "vacant" lands immediately
became subject to U.S. laws, and territories that had been acquired from
1237. Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828). In 1826, Congress disapproved
the provision authorizing inferior territorial courts to exercise admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 533.
1238. Id. at 523.
1239. Id. at 533 (emphasis omitted).
1240. Id. at 538 ("What is Florida? It is no part of the United States. How can it be? -how is




1243. Id. at 515 (unnumbered footnote).
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another sovereign government, such as Florida. In the latter case, the law of
nations established that the "laws, rights and institutions of the territory so
acquired remain in full force, until rightfully altered by the new
government."' 1244 Thus, "the government and laws of the United States do
not extend... by the mere Act of cession.',1245 Johnson reasoned that the
Constitution was adopted only to govern the then-existing states and
territories. 1246  Because new territories existed entirely outside of the
constitutional structure, the Constitution's dedication of admiralty
jurisdiction to the federal courts "[could] have no application" in Florida.
247
The Supreme Court upheld the territorial court's jurisdiction without
embracing Johnson's extraconstitutional reasoning. Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Marshall contended that the United States' authority to acquire
territory derived from the war power and the treaty power. 1248 With regard to
the Constitution's application to the new territory, Marshall noted that under
the law of nations, laws regarding political allegiance transferred im-
mediately upon the transfer of sovereignty, while other laws continued in
force until altered by the new sovereign. 1249 Marshall found it unnecessary to
reach the question whether this rule of international law governed the
Constitution's application to Florida, since both the treaty with Spain and the
federal statute creating the territorial government stipulated that the
Constitution applied. 1
250
Having established that the Constitution applied to Florida, Marshall
asserted that the power to govern the territories arose from the Territory
1244. Id. at 517-18 (unnumbered footnote).
1245. Id. at 517 (unnumbered footnote).
1246. Id.
1247. Id. at 518 (unnumbered footnote).
1248. Id. at 542.
1249. Marshall complained:
The usage of the world is ... to consider the holding of conquered territory as a mere
military occupation, until its fate shall be determined at the treaty of peace. If it be
ceded by the treaty, the acquisition is confirmed, and the ceded territory becomes a part
of the nation to which it is annexed; either on the terms stipulated in the treaty of
cession, or on such as its new master shall impose .... The same Act which transfers
their country transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law, which may
be denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the
intercourse, and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the
newly created power of the state.
Id
1250. Id. Article 6 of the February 2, 1819 treaty provided, "The inhabitants of the
territories... shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, as soon as may be consistent
with the principles of the Federal Constitution, and admitted to the enjoyment of all the privileges,
rights, and immunities, of the citizens of the United States." Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and
Limits Between the United States of America and His Catholic Majesty, Feb. 22, 1819, U.S.-Spain,
8 Stat. 252, 256. The Act of Congress of March 3, 1823, provided that "no law shall be valid,
which is inconsistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States." Act of Mar. 3, 1823, ch.
28, 3 Stat. 750 (establishing a territorial government in Florida).
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Clause 1251 but immediately qualified this ruling with the suggestion of
inherent power:
Perhaps the power of governing a territory belonging to the United
States, which has not, by becoming a state, acquired the means of self-
government, may result necessarily from the facts, that it is not within
the jurisdiction of any particular state, and is within the power and
jurisdiction of the United States. The right to govern, may be the
inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory. Whichever
may be the source whence the power is derived, the possession of it is
unquestioned. 1252
Marshall concluded that the territorial courts, in which judges did not hold
life tenure, were not established under Article III of the Constitution.
1253
Instead they were legislative courts, created by Congress either "in virtue of
the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government," or as a
result of the Territory Clause. 1254 Marshall thus found that the requirement
that only Article III courts could hear admiralty cases did not apply to the
territories, where "Congress exercises the combined powers of the general,
and of a state government. '' 1255 Thus, the Court upheld the non-Article III
courts as a proper exercise of "those general powers which [Congress]
possesses over the territories."
' 1256
Sere and Canter contributed significantly to the development of
congressional power over territories in at least two respects. First, both
decisions suggested that congressional authority might derive from the
government's "general right of sovereignty" rather than from any specific
constitutional provision. 1257 Second, and in contrast to Loughborough, the
decisions evidenced a willingness on the part of the Court to find that even
certain general constitutional provisions (which contained no textual
territorial limitation) did not constrain Congress's power in the territories,
where Congress exercised the equivalent of both state and federal legislative
power.
The decision in Canter left open the question whether the Constitution
applied automatically to territorial governments, or whether its operation was
dependent upon the positive mandates in the treaty of cession and from
1251. Canter, 26 U.S. at 542 ("Florida continues to be a territory of the United States; governed
by virtue of that clause in the Constitution, which empowers Congress 'to make all needful rules
and regulations, respecting the territory, or other property belonging to the United States.").
1252. Id. at 542-43 (emphasis added).
1253. Id. at 546.
1254. Id. (emphasis added).
1255. Id.
1256. Id.
1257. Cf United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537-38 (1840) (holding, with respect
to the original U.S. territories, that the power to "make all needful rules and regulations" for the
territory was "vested in Congress without limitation").
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Congress. Both Marshall and Johnson had recognized that under
international law, a nation's laws did not automatically apply to a conquered
territory. This analysis, however, begged the question whether U.S. domestic
law required that U.S. constitutional principles be extended to territories
subject to U.S. authority. In his discussion of Canter in his international law
treatise, Halleck later recognized this weakness in Marshall's analysis:
This [rule regarding the transfer of sovereignty] is now a well settled
rule of the law of nations, and is universally admitted. Its provisions
are clear and simple, and easily understood; but ... [where] the
government ... is a constitutional government, of limited and divided
powers, questions necessarily arise respecting the authority, which, in
the absence of legislative action, can be exercised in the conquered
territory after the cessation of war, and the conclusion of a treaty of
peace. The determination of these questions depends upon the
institutions and laws of the new sovereign, which ... affect the
construction and application of that [international law] rule to
particular cases.' 
258
Thus, according to Halleck, although international law allowed the
conquering sovereign broad discretion to govern the newly acquired territory,
this power was also limited by the scope of the sovereign's authority under
its constitution and domestic laws.
1259
Language in the 1850 case of Benner v. Porter, 1260 which again
addressed the Florida territorial courts, further suggested ambiguously that
the territories were extraconstitutional entities. The territorial governments,
the Court reasoned, "are not organized under the Constitution, nor subject to
its complex distribution of the powers of government, as the organic law,"
since "they were invested with powers and jurisdiction which [Congress]
were incapable of conferring upon a court within the limits of a State.' 26'
They were instead "the creations, exclusively, of the legislative department,
and subject to its supervision and control."'' 262 This plenary power over the
territories, however, terminated upon Florida's admission to the Union.
263
The Court declined to address the applicability of other constitutional
constraints to the territories, ruling that "[w]hether, or not, there are
provisions in that instrument which extend to and act upon these Territorial
governments, it is not now material to examine."'
1264
1258. HALLECK, supra note 56, ch. 33, § 14 (emphasis added).
1259. Accord Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 225 (1845) (holding that a conquering
power holds new territory "subject to the constitution and laws of its own government, and not
according to those of the government ceding it").
1260. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235 (1850).
1261. Id. at 242, 244.
1262. Id. at242.
1263. Id. at 243.
1264. Id.
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2. Fleming v. Page.-The 1850 case of Fleming v. Page 126 again raised
the question of whether U.S. laws applied immediately to newly acquired
territory or whether some affirmative congressional action was required. The
case involved whether a foreign territory under U.S. military control was part
of the United States, so that goods imported from the territory to the U.S.
were not "imports" subject to U.S. tariff duties. 1266 Congress had declared
war with Mexico in 1846, and it was undisputed that the port of Tampico,
Mexico, from which the goods were shipped, was "in the exclusive and firm
possession of the United States."' 1267  Arguing for the plaintiffs, Daniel
Webster urged that the determinative issue was whether the territory was
subject to U.S. sovereignty. "If it did not belong to us," he asked, "whose
was it? ' 1268 Citing Grotius, Vattel, Pufendorf, and other international law
scholars, Webster contended that under the law of nations, military
occupation transferred full sovereignty to the conquering power.
1269
Although perfect title did not transfer until the treaty of peace, "[t]he
jurisdiction of the conqueror is complete. He may change the form of
government and the laws at his pleasure, and may exercise every attribute of
sovereignty."'' 270 The Constitution did not pose an obstacle to this principle,
since the territories were different from other parts of the United States.
1 271
Thus, since sovereignty transferred with occupation, the goods were not
"foreign" and could be imported duty-free.
In defense of the import duties, counsel for the United States argued
from membership and consent principles that although U.S. sovereignty had
attached, the Constitution provided that United States law could not apply
until Congress affirmatively acted. 1272  If the plaintiffs' argument were
correct, the United States maintained, "every port in Mexico became a
domestic port of the United States" during the U.S. occupation, and all the
inhabitants "must have become converted into American citizens, without the
affirmative consent of the American people."
' 1273
Writing for the Court over one dissent, 1274 Chief Justice Taney accepted
the government's distinction between U.S. sovereignty and the application of
U.S. laws. Taney concluded that though "subject to the sovereignty and
1265. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850).
1266. Id. at 606.
1267. Id. at 614. U.S. customs duties were being imposed on goods brought into Tampico, and
the military commander had received orders to establish temporary civil governments. Id. at 609-
10.
1268. Id. at 614 (reply argument for plaintiffs).
1269. Id. at 608 (argument for plaintiffs).
1270. Id. at 607 (argument for plaintiffs).
1271. Id. at 612 (argument for plaintiffs).
1272. Id. at 611 (argument for the United States).
1273. Id. at 610, 612 (argument for the United States).
1274. Justice McLean dissented without opinion.
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dominion of the United States, 1275 Tampico was occupied enemy territory
and "was not a part of this Union" because it had not yet been formally ceded
by treaty or statute.1276 Like Halleck, Taney argued that the relation between
Tampico and the United States "did not depend upon the law of nations, but
upon our own Constitution and acts of Congress."'277 "[I]n this country the
sovereignty of the United States resides in the people of the several States,
and they act through their representatives, according to the delegation and
distribution of powers contained in the Constitution."' 278 In particular, Taney
rejected the relevance of English law precedents, noting that "[o]ur own
Constitution and form of government must be our only guide.' ' 279 Taney
concluded that under the Constitution, only Congress had authority to extend
the borders of the United States to a new territory or to subject such a
territory to U.S. laws. Mere military occupation could not accomplish this
because the president could not constitutionally enlarge the boundaries of the
United States.
Taney could have closed at this point, leaving open the question
whether U.S. laws applied immediately upon a territory's formal cession to
the United States. However, he proceeded to suggest, in dicta, that even after
formal cession, only the affirmative imposition of tariff laws by Congress
could make a territory part of the "United States" for this purpose.' 280 Thus,
territory could belong fully to the United States without being subject to its
laws until Congress formally extended those laws to it. The dicta would
prove extremely important to the Insular decisions.
As the preceding cases indicate, by the mid-1800s, Supreme Court
jurisprudence regarding the Constitution's application in the territories
remained in a state of flux. Several fundamental issues remained
unanswered. First, the Court remained equivocal about the source of
Congress's authority to govern later acquired territories. Chief Justice
Marshall had suggested in Canter that congressional authority derived either
from the Territory Clause or from the government's "general right of
sovereignty,' ' 1281 while Benner v. Porter had suggested that the territories
were strictly legislative creations organized outside the Constitution.1
21
2
Second, the Court had failed to resolve whether the Constitution became
immediately applicable to a territory upon its acquisition, or whether an
1275. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. at 614.
1276. Id. at615.
1277. Id.
1278. Id. at 618.
1279. Id.
1280. Id. at 617.
1281. Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).
1282. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235 (1850).
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affirmative action by Congress or the existing states of the Union was
necessary in order for a territory subject to U.S. sovereignty to be "admitted"
to the constitutional community. Canter suggested that, under international
law, the acquiring nation's laws did not become applicable until positively
imposed by the new government, but the Court did not address the
constitutional question. Fleming held that the dictates of the Constitution,
not international law, were controlling, but suggested in dicta that the
Constitution required the positive application of U.S. law to a new territory.
On the other hand, Loughborough had asserted that the Constitution's
general clauses applied to all American territory, while Sere and Canter held
that Article III of the Constitution (a general clause) did not constrain
congressional authority there.
Finally, the question whether the Constitution required that territorial
inhabitants be granted citizenship and placed on the road to statehood
continued to be avoided by the fact that these rights were consistently
bestowed by treaty and statute. 
1283
Both the propositions that Congress exercised extraconstitutional
authority over territories and that the Constitution and citizenship did not
immediately apply to new territories left the door open for the application of
inherent, extraconstitutional power. Yet the doctrinal support for the prop-
ositions was weak. Canter had construed congressional power as arising
from the Constitution, even if not from any specific clause. The critical
language in Benning was ambiguous, and that in Fleming was pure dicta.
Even in its more forceful pronouncements of congressional authority, the
Court appeared simply to assert that Congress, in acting over the territories,
exercised both state and federal governmental powers, and thus, as a full
sovereign, could legislate for the territories in ways not allowed by the
Constitution when Congress acted solely for the national government.
D. Slavery and the Territories
The debate over slavery lent urgency to the question whether the
Constitution applied to the territories. Some pro-slavery forces argued that
the Constitution-including the protection of property rights in slaves-
extended to all U.S. territories, and that Congress lacked power under the
Constitution to abolish slavery. 1284  Slavery advocates such as John C.
Calhoun1285 and Senator Pierce Butler 286 vowed "to carry slavery into [the
1283. See supra note 1229.
1284. See ROBERT B. SHAW, A LEGAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 160-61
(1991) (noting that "it was universally held that, aside from the slave trade, the federal government
had no authority to regulate the practice of slavery in any respect").
1285. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 275-76 (1901) (citing THOMAS HART BENTON, A
HISTORY AND LEGAL EXAMINATION OF THAT PART OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE DRED ScoTr CASE (1857)). See also NEUMAN, supra note 54 at 76-77 & n.254.
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territories] under the wing of the Constitution.' ' 1287 Calhoun argued that the
Constitution provided the exclusive source of congressional authority to
legislate for the territories, and thus as a matter of necessity applied there.1
288
Senator Berrien of Georgia took a middle position, arguing that while the
constitutive rules of representative government did not apply to the
territories, the Constitution's protections of individual rights "of necessity
operate in the Territories."'
1289
Abolitionist and free-labor forces, on the other hand, argued that the
Constitution applied only to duly admitted states, and that Congress was free
to adopt anti-slavery legislation for the territories. 1290  (The Northwest
Ordinance's prohibition on slavery supported this proposition but did not
resolve it, since the law had been adopted immediately before the
Constitution.) During the 1848-49 debates over the extension of slavery to
California, New Mexico, and Oregon, 1291 Daniel Webster and Senator
Dayton of New Jersey argued that the Constitution did not apply
automatically to the territories and that only so much of the Constitution
extended to the territories as Congress chose to apply. 1292 As Webster put it,
"These principles do not, proprio vigore, apply to any one of the territories of
1286. "This is a principle which can not be disputed, that our fundamental law must necessarily
apply to all our possessions .... Will it be pretended that in those territories arbitrary punishment
can be inflicted without law? ... I think it exists proprio vigore, and I think we can extend it by
legislation in the same manner that we can extend the laws of Congress." Brief for the United
States at 157-58, Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901) (No. 340). See also id. at 156 ("If
by that Constitution slavery is extended, I am willing to stand by that Constitution. I am unwilling
to withhold from our Southern brethren any of the rights given to them by that sacred instrument.")
(statement of Rep. Benjamin Walker of New York).
1287. Downes, 182 U.S. at 276.
1288. Brief for the United States at 161, Goetze (No. 340) ("If the Constitution does not extend
there, you have no right to legislate or to do any act in reference to the Territories.").
1289. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 279-81 (1849).
1290. Of course, other arguments on both sides were also available. Abolitionists contended
that if the Constitution applied to the territories, either Congress had no constitutional authority to
establish slavery in the territories, or, in the exercise of its combined federal and local legislative
authority, Congress had power to prohibit it. See, e.g., Downes, 182 U.S. at 297 n.10 (White, J.,
concurring) (quoting the 1842 platform of the Free Soil Party). Other proponents of slavery simply
wanted to ensure that, whatever the applicability of the Constitution to the territories, the peculiar
institution would be protected there.
1291. In 1849, Senator Walker proposed an amendment to give the Constitution "full force and
efficacy" in California and New Mexico. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 561, 585, 595
(1849); see also id. app. at 255. The amendment was opposed by Senator Dayton of New Jersey
and other opponents to the extension of slavery to the territories. Brief for the United States at 152-
56, Goetze (No. 340).
1292. "Let me say that in this general sense there is no such thing as extending the Constitution.
The Constitution is extended over the United States and over nothing else. It can not be extended
over anything except over the old States and the new States that shall come in hereafter ....
Undoubtedly these rights must be conferred by law before they can be enjoyed in a Territory."
Brief for the United States at 158-59, Goetze (No. 340) (statement of Sen. Daniel Webster); see
also id. at 154 (statement of Sen. Jonathan Dayton) (asserting that "the Constitution proprio vigore
does not extend to or reach the Territories at all").
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the United States, because that territory, while a territory ... is no part of
the United States. '1293  Henry Clay similarly suggested either that the
Constitution did not apply to the territories or that it did not carry slavery
with it:
[T]he idea that eo instanti upon the consummation of the treaty the
Constitution of the United States spread itself over the acquired
country and carried along with it the institution of slavery is so
irreconcilable with any comprehension or any reason which I possess,
that I hardly know how to meet it.
1294
The debate over slavery distorted and complicated the question of the
Constitution's geographic scope. The primary question of course, as Chief
Justice Marshall had recognized in Loughborough, was not whether the
Constitution applied in toto to U.S. territories, since some clauses (such as
the Republican Guarantee Clause) were expressly limited to the States. The
real question, which was obscured by slavery obsessions on both sides, was
which provisions applied. It also seemed apparent that, regardless of the
Constitution's application, Congress had legal power to prohibit slavery in
the territories, because the early cases had recognized that in the territories
Congress exercised the powers of both the state and national governments.
The convergence of the slavery debate with territorial governance was
particularly problematic given that between 1845 and 1848 the United States
acquired 1,204,000 acres of new territory through the annexation of
Texas, 1295 the Oregon settlement, and the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
with Mexico. Two Supreme Court decisions handed down in the 1850s-
Cross v. Harrison and Scott v. Sandford-supported the proposition that the
Constitution applied, fully and immediately, to the later acquired territories.
1. Cross v. Harrison.-The cession of California to the United States
following the treaty of peace with Mexico provoked a bitter dispute in
Congress over the status of slavery in California. 1296 During the 1848-49
1293. Id. at 159. See also CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 274 (1879). On March
23, 1848, however, Webster had argued in the Senate that "[a]rbitrary governments may have
territories and distant possessions, because arbitrary governments may rule them by different laws
and different systems .... We can do no such thing. They must be of us, part of us, or else
strangers." 5 WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 300 (1851).
1294. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 117 (1850).
1295. See generally FREDERICK MERK, SLAVERY AND THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 121-51
(1972). Merk notes that originally, Texas was to be annexed pursuant to a treaty between the
United States and the Republic of Texas. When it became apparent that the requisite two-thirds
majority of the Senate was unwilling to ratify due to opposition over the admission of a new slave
territory, Congress annexed the territory by simple majority through a joint resolution on March 1,
1845. Texas was formally admitted as a state on December 29 of that year. 9 Stat. 108.
1296. Early during the war with Mexico, Congressman David Wilmot of Pennsylvania had
offered the Wilmot proviso, which would have imposed the requirement that "neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any part of [Mexican] territory" acquired by the United
States. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 1217 (1846). Wilmot and other supporters of the
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session, pro-slavery forces in Congress attempted to amend a bill establishing
territorial governments for New Mexico, California, and Utah to provide that
"the Constitution of the United States... be and the same hereby are
extended and given full force and efficacy in said territories.' 297 As a result
of the ensuing gridlock, between May 1848 and March 1849,1298 California
was governed de facto by the temporary civil government that had been
established during the war, without instructions from the national
government.
In Cross v. Harrison,129 9 importers sued to recover duties that had been
collected in San Francisco Harbor during the period after the treaty of peace
and before Congress created a customs district in California. Following
Chief Justice Taney's dicta in Fleming v. Page, the plaintiffs contended that
U.S. laws did not apply to the California territory until they were formally
imposed by Congress and that the collection of U.S. import duties therefore
was ultra vires. 
1 300
The Supreme Court acknowledged that legal authority for the military
government expired upon the signing of the treaty of peace. The Court
nevertheless concluded that the anomalous situation in California justified
continuing that government. 130 1 The Court reasoned that the sovereign pow-
ers of the United States had attached to California with the U.S. military
occupation 1302 and that U.S. customs laws had applied to California
immediately upon its cession. "By the ratifications of the treaty, California
became a part of the United States .... [It] became instantly bound and
privileged by the laws which Congress had passed to raise a revenue from
duties on imports and tonnage.' ' 30 3 The Court rooted the U.S. authority over
California in the Territory and Treaty Clauses and the right to acquire
territory. 130 4  Thus, contrary to the reasoning in Fleming, the decision in
Cross asserted that the Constitution and laws of the United States applied to
new territories immediately upon their acquisition and that the collection of
tariffs in California was proper even in the absence of congressional
proviso in Congress justified it on the grounds that "the negro race already occupy enough of this
fair continent; let us keep what remains for ourselves." HYAM & WIECEK, supra note 1137, at 129-
30.
1297. THOMAS HART BENTON, A HISTORY AND LEGAL EXAMINATION OF THAT PART OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE DRED SCOTT CASE 14 (photo. reprint 1969)
(1857), quoted in Downes, 182 U.S. at 275.
1298. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed on February 3, 1848, and ratifications were
exchanged on May 30, 1848. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 516. Congress adopted
customs legislation for California on March 3, 1849. Act of March 3, 1849, ch. 112, 9 Stat. 400.
1299. Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164 (1853).
1300. Id. at 187.
1301. Id. at 192-93.
1302. Id.
1303. Id. at 196.
1304. Id. at 194.
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legislation. The members of the Court, including Chief Justice Taney, dealt
with the apparent tension with Fleming by ignoring it.
2. Scott v. Sandford.-The tension between slavery and Congress's
authority to legislate for the territories came to a head in Dred Scott.'30 5 The
case challenged the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise,' 30 6 which
had outlawed slavery in the northern Louisiana Territory. It also raised the
threshold jurisdictional question of whether Scott, a free black, was a U.S.
citizen who was entitled to sue in U.S. courts. The plaintiff contended that
Congress had power to outlaw slavery in the territories under the Territory
Clause, and that the Constitution applied fully to all territories destined for
statehood. 130 7  Interestingly, in an effort to reconcile the ambiguities in
American Insurance v. Canter, the plaintiff argued that the United States
could acquire territory pursuant to the war and treaty powers and to govern
the territory despotically, entirely outside of the constitutional structure,
according to the law of nations. The Territory Clause only became the
source of congressional authority-and other constitutional protections only
applied-once the territory was incorporated into the political union and
intended for statehood. 130 8  The plaintiff thus largely foreshadowed the
argument that would be embraced in the Insular Cases.
Chief Justice Taney first denied jurisdiction over Scott's claim. Taney's
basic constitutional approach combined strict social contract theory and
enumerated powers analysis. Taney viewed the Constitution as a compact
between the government and its citizens.' 30 9  The Constitution and its
protections were "formed by them, and for them and their posterity, but for
no one else."' 1310  Taney believed that while Indians and aliens could be
naturalized and thus made beneficiaries of the political community, blacks
had not been citizens of the several states at the time the Constitution was
adopted, and could not later be made such, whether by congressional
naturalization or by the individual states.1 311 Thus, Scott was not a citizen
and could not sue in federal court.
1305. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
1306. Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545.
1307. Argument of Mr. Curtis on Behalf of Plaintiff, reprinted in 3 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 241, 246-
47, 259-60 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1978).
1308. Id.
1309. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404-05 ("They both describe the political body who, according to
our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the
government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the 'sovereign people'
and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty.").
1310. Id. at406.
1311. Id. at 407 ("They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, .... and so far inferior, that they
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect ... ").
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Turning to the question of Congress's power to abolish slavery, Chief
Justice Taney agreed that the Constitution applied to the territories but held
that it barred Congress from outlawing slavery there. Taney rejected the
existence of inherent national powers.1 312 In contrast to the government un-
der the Articles, which had enjoyed such powers, the new government "was
to be carefully limited in its powers, and to exercise no authority beyond
those expressly granted by the Constitution, or necessarily to be implied from
[it]." 1313 "It took nothing by succession from the Confederation." 1314 Taney
likewise denied that international law had any relevance to the questions
13 5
and adamantly rejected the concept that the national government enjoyed the
full panoply of powers held by sovereign nations. Instead, he emphasized
the "peculiar" limited sovereignty of the United States:
[A]lthough it is sovereign and supreme in its appropriate sphere of
action, yet it does not possess all the powers which usually belong to
the sovereignty of a nation. Certain specified powers, enumerated in
the Constitution, have been conferred upon it; and neither the
legislative, executive, nor judicial departments of the Government can
lawfully exercise any authority beyond the limits marked out by the
Constitution.
13 16
Like Jefferson, and contrary to Marshall's suggestion in American
Insurance v. Canter, Taney denied that the Territory Clause extended beyond
the territories that were held by the United States when the Constitution was
adopted. It was "a special provision for a known and particular territory,....
and nothing more.'1317 By so holding, Taney denied the possibility that the
Northwest Ordinance's prohibition on slavery had any precedential effect for
the territories acquired through western expansion. Nevertheless, Taney
1312. Cf Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487); see supra note
275 and accompanying text.
1313. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 435. See also id. at 501-02 (Campbell, J., concurring)
(acknowledging that although Britain had enjoyed absolute legislative sovereignty over its
possessions, this principle was rejected by the American revolution and the American system)
(citing Johnson v, M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823)).
1314. Id. at441.
1315. Taney argued that
there is no law of nations standing between the people of the United States and their
Government .... The powers of the Government, and the rights of the citizen under it,
are positive and practical regulations plainly written down .... It has no power over
the person or property of a citizen but what the citizens of the United States have
granted. And no laws or usages of other nations, or reasoning of statesmen or jurists
upon the relations of master and slave, can enlarge the powers of the Government ....
Id. at 45 1. Justice Daniel similarly rejected the existence of "some implied and paramount authority
of a supposed international law.., from which independent and sovereign States can be exempted
only by a protest." "Sovereignty, independence, and a perfect right of self-government, can signify
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agreed that the Constitution plainly granted the power to acquire new
territory as part of the power to admit new states and that the power of
Congress to govern territories "unquestionabl[y]" arose as "the inevitable
consequence of the right to acquire territory."' 318  This implied power to
govern the territories, however, must be exercised consistent with the
Constitution and did not include the power to prohibit slavery:
[W]hen the Territory becomes a part of the United States, the Federal
Government... enters upon it with its powers over the citizen strictly
defined, and limited by the Constitution, from which it derives its own
existence, and by virtue of which alone it continues to exist and act as
a Government and sovereignty. It has no power of any kind beyond it;
and it cannot, when it enters a Territory of the United States, put off
its character, and assume discretionary or despotic powers which the
Constitution has denied to it.'
319
Like Marshall in Loughborough, Taney concluded that the various
protections of the Bill of Rights were general prohibitions which "extend[ed]
to the whole territory over which the Constitution gives [Congress] power to
legislate ... and place[d] the citizens of a Territory, so far as these rights are
111320concerned, on the same footing with citizens of the States ....
Accordingly, in language that would become important in the Insular
Cases, Taney rejected the possibility that the U.S. could exercise colonial
authority:
There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal
Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United
States or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure;
nor to enlarge its territorial limits in any way, except by the admission
of new States .... [N]o power is given to acquire a Territory to be
held and governed permanently in that character.'
321
1318. Id. at 443.
1319. Id. at449-50.
1320. Id. at 450-51. These rights specifically included the prohibition against the
establishment of religion, abridgement of freedom of speech, of the press, or the right to peaceably
assemble and to petition the government, denial of the rights to bear arms or trial by jury,
compelling anyone to be a witness against himself, quartering soldiers, taking private property for
public use, or depriving a citizen of his liberty or property.
1321. Id. at 446. See also id. at 448 ("A power, therefore, in the General Government to obtain
and hold colonies and dependent territories, over which they might legislate without restriction,
would be inconsistent with its own existence in its present form."). Justice Campbell concurred in
this view:
I look in vain among the discussions of the time [of the Constitution's adoption], for
the assertion of a supreme sovereignty for Congress over the territory then belonging to
the United States, or that they might thereafter acquire. I seek in vain for an
annunciation that a consolidated power had been inaugurated, whose subject
comprehended an empire, and which had no restriction but the discretion of
Congress.... Ifind nothing to authorize these enormous pretensions ....
ld. at 505 (Campbell, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
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Taney thus denied that the Constitution gave the United States any
enumerated power to govern territories other than in preparation for
statehood. But consistent with his social contract views, his focus with
respect to the affirmative constraints imposed by the Bill of Rights was
primarily on citizenship. "[C]itizens of the United States who migrate to a
Territory belonging to the people of the United States," he wrote, "cannot be
ruled as mere colonists. 1322  Because Sanford was a citizen and the
Constitution applied to the territories of the United States, Taney concluded
that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibited Congress from
terminating property rights in slaves.
The concurring and dissenting Justices apparently agreed with Taney's
view that the Constitution applied to the territories. 1 323 Taney failed to garner
a majority, however, for the view that the Territory Clause was restricted to
the original U.S. territories.1 324 In dissent, Justices McLean and Curtis both
considered Congress's power over territories to be extremely broad-
certainly broad enough to prohibit slavery. Curtis argued that Congress's
discretion was unlimited "save those positive prohibitions to legislate, which
are found in the Constitution. '"1 325  Congress's rules under the Territory
Clause must be "needful," but whether or not this requirement was satisfied
was a political, not a judicial, question: "Whatever Congress deems needful
is so, under the grant of power." 1326 Nevertheless, Taney's opinion cast a
sufficient pall over the Territory Clause as a source of authority to govern
later acquired territories to deter courts from relying on it. Most decisions
for the remainder of the century were highly ambiguous about the source of
authority for territorial governance, and many turned to implied or inherent
powers.
In his history of the Dred Scott case, Benton characterized the Court's
assumption that the Constitution extended to the territories as "the great
fundamental error of the Court,... a naked assumption without reason to
1322. Id. at 447. Taney also acknowledged that the United States could acquire territory with
inhabitants unfit for immediate statehood and govern it as a territory "until it was settled and
inhabited by a civilized community capable of self-government." Id. at 448.
1323. See, e.g., id. at 542 (McLean, J., dissenting) ("In organizing the government of a
Territory, Congress is limited to means appropriate to the attainment of the constitutional object.
No powers can be exercised which are prohibited by the Constitution, or which are contrary to its
spirit."); id. at 614 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress's power to legislate for the
territories, like all other legislative powers of Congress, "finds limits in the express prohibitions on
Congress not to do certain things" such as pass ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, "and so in
respect to each of the other prohibitions contained in the Constitution").
1324. Three members of the majority and both dissenters rejected Taney's position. See id at
489 (Daniel, J., concurring); id. at 501 (Campbell, J., concurring); id. at 519-21 (Catron, J.,
concurring); id. at 540-42, 544 (McLean, J., dissenting) (Congress's power to legislate arose from
the Territory Clause and the power to conquer territory); id. at 613 (Curtis, J., dissenting)
(ridiculing the majority for rejecting the Territory Clause but nevertheless implying the authority to
govern from "suppositious powers" found nowhere in the Constitution).
1325. Id. at 623.
1326. Id. at 614-16 (Curtis, J., dissenting); see also id. at 540-42 (McLean, J., dissenting).
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support it, or a leg to stand upon--condemned by the Constitution itself, and
the whole history of its formation, and administration., 1327 The proposition
that the Constitution applied to the territories of the continental United States
should have been fairly unproblematic, however, since after the Louisiana
Purchase, the enabling statutes under which the western territories were
organized all provided that no territorial laws could be adopted that were
inconsistent with the Constitution.1 328 It is not clear whether the drafters of
these provisions believed the Constitution would apply in their absence,
though the consistency of these provisions appears to reflect the belief that
the government had no constitutional authority to acquire and govern ter-
ritory other than on terms of citizenship and preparation for statehood. And
while some could have contended that the application of the Constitution to
these regions was simply a matter of legislative grace, the decision in Dred
Scott foreclosed this argument. If the Due Process Clause had applied to the
Indiana Territory only as a matter of legislative grace, Congress presumably
could have overriden that provision in adopting the Missouri Compromise.
No party pressed such an argument, however, and the Supreme Court
decision extinguished it.
E. Post-Civil War Consensus
The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to reverse Taney's holding
that blacks could not be citizens, and it appeared to confirm the view that the
Constitution applied uniformly to the territories by extending birthright
citizenship to all persons "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States. In
the Slaughter-House Cases,1 329 the Court (per Justice Miller) recognized that
the Amendment bestowed citizenship on inhabitants of the territories who re-
sided outside of any state. The Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against
slavery and involuntary servitude "within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction," however, was more ambiguous regarding
territorial scope.133 This distinction between the "United States" and places
"subject to [U.S.] jurisdiction" could be read as confirming that the
Amendment applied both to the sovereign domain of the United States and to
any forts, consuls, or vessels abroad. It could have been intended to clearly
include the seceded southern states when the amendment was adopted in
January 1865. Or it could be interpreted, as it would be in the Insular Cases,
to mean that the "United States" to which the Constitution applied was some
1327. THOMAS HART BENTON, A HISTORY AND LEGAL EXAMINATION OF THAT PART OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE DRED SCOTT CASE 26 (photo. reprint 1969)
(1857); BROWN, supra note 1152, at 276.
1328. See supra note 1229.
1329. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
1330. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §1.
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geographic subset of the territories subject to U.S. jurisdiction and
sovereignty.
1331
The consensus that arose from Dred Scott regarding the Constitution's
application to the territories continued unshaken for most of the nineteenth
century. In the 1878 case of Reynolds v. U.S.,133 2 the Court acknowledged
that the constitutional rights to an impartial jury, to confront witnesses, and
to free speech applied to the territories while nevertheless upholding the
statute criminalizing polygamy in the Utah territory against a First
Amendment challenge. The same year, Wilkerson v. Utah1333 acknowledged
that the Eighth Amendment applied to the Utah territory. In Callan v.
Wilson,1334 the Court held that the constitutional right to jury trial "was
demanded and secured for the benefit of all the people of the United States"
over the government's objection that the right was limited to the several
states. 1335
The 1889 case of Kennon v. Gilmer1336  held that the Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial was "in full force in Montana, as in all other
organized territories of the United States." American Publishing Company v.
Fisher'337 did not address the source of the Constitution's application, but the
Court held that "either the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, or these
acts of Congress, or all together, secured to every litigant in a common law
action in the courts of the Territory of Utah the right to a trial by
jury . .. ,,1338 Two weeks later, however, the Court held that the Seventh
Amendment itself required the territorial legislature to provide for unanimous
jury verdicts in civil trials, finding that "the act of Congress could not impart
the power to change the constitutional rule, and could not be treated as
attempting to do so."
' 33 9
1331. E.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 251 (1901) (Brown, J.) (asserting that the
Thirteenth Amendment demonstrates "that there may be places within the jurisdiction of the United
States that are no part of the Union"); id. at 336 (White, J., concurring) (same). But see id. at 358
(Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that the Amendment's language was included "out of abundant
caution" to include the rebellious southern states and would have applied to the territories even
without the phrase "or any place subject to their jurisdiction").
1332. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
1333. 99 U.S. 130, 137 (1878) (rejecting the claim that a sentence that a convicted capital
defendant "be publicly shot until [he was] dead" violated the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause).
1334. 127 U.S. 540 (1887).
1335. Id. at 548, 550.
1336. 131 U.S. 22, 28 (1889) (citing Act of May 26, 1864, ch. 95, §13, 13 Stat. 91).
1337. 166 U.S. 464 (1897).
1338. Id. at 467-68.
1339. Springville v. Thomas, 166 U.S. 707, 708-09 (1897) (emphasis added).
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Particularly illuminating was the decision in Thompson v. Utah,1340 in
which the Court held that the right to criminal jury trial required territorial
juries comprised of twelve persons. Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan
observed that it was "beyond question" that the provisions of the Constitution
relating to trial by jury in common-law and criminal cases applied "to the
Territories of the United States."'1 341 Even though Utah, once admitted as a
state, had sovereign power to provide for eight-member juries, in governing
the territory, the United States was bound by the Constitution to require the
twelve-member, unanimous juries required in federal courts. 13 42 The 1900
decision in Black v. Jackson134 3 confirmed that the Seventh Amendment right
to jury trial applied to the Oklahoma territory.
This consensus around the application of individual rights constraints
began to erode, however, in the last decades of the 1800s, as the rhetoric of
broad congressional power began to creep back into the Court's opinions. In
the 1879 case of National Bank v. County of Yankton,1 34 4 for example, the
Supreme Court held that Congress had authority to rescind an act of the
Dakota territorial legislature, despite the lack of any provision for such
power in the territory's organizing statute.1345 "It is certainly now too late,"
the Court held, "to doubt the power of Congress to govern the
Territories."'' 346 In expansive language, the Court did not tie the power to
any particular constitutional provision, but found its source in sovereignty:
Such a power is an incident of sovereignty, and continues until
granted away. Congress may not only abrogate laws of the territorial
legislatures, but it may itself legislate directly for the local
government. It may make a void act of the territorial legislature valid,
and a valid act void. In other words, it has full and complete
legislative authority over the people of the Territories and all the
departments of the territorial governments .... 1347
The Court nevertheless acknowledged that constitutional limitations applied:
"Congress is supreme [over the territories] and.., has all the powers of the
people of the United States, except such as have been expressly or by
implication reserved in the prohibitions of the Constitution.,1348 The Court
1340. 170 U.S. 343 (1898). The defendant Thompson had stolen a calf while Utah was a
territory, and later was convicted by an eight-member jury as provided by the Utah Constitution
after Utah became a state. Justices Brewer and Peckham dissented without opinion.
1341. Id. at 346-47.
1342. Id. at 355.
1343. 177 U.S. 349, 363 (1900).
1344. 101 U.S. 129 (1879).
1345. Id. at 133-34.
1346. Id. at 132.
1347. Id. at 133.
1348. Id. (emphasis added).
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thus continued to recognize that the Constitution limited Congress's power
over territories, despite Congress's sovereign supremacy in the area.
As in the Indian and alien contexts, the desire to exercise increasing
authority both over the western territories and abroad led Congress to test the
limits of its power, and by the 1890s, the Court turned to inherent powers
rationales to uphold it.
F. The Early Inherent Powers Era
1. The Mormon Cases.-The struggle with the Mormons for the control
of Utah formed an important early battleground for the inherent powers
doctrine. As noted earlier, the Court had already upheld Congress's ban on
polygamy in the Utah Territory, 1349 and the 1885 case of Murphy v.
Ramsey1350 addressed the constitutionality of an act of Congress which
prohibited bigamists and polygamists from voting.1351 Writing for the Court,
Justice Matthews rejected the claim that the law unconstitutionally abrogated
the right to vote that previously had been bestowed by Congress, and, as in
Yankton, espoused a theory of broad national authority:
The people of the United States, as sovereign owners of the national
territories, have supreme power over them and their inhabitants. In
the exercise of this sovereign dominion ... all the discretion which
belongs to legislative power is vested in congress ... subject only to
such restrictions as are expressed in the Constitution, or are
necessarily implied in its terms. 
1352
The Court invoked social contract-membership themes and the preservation
of American civilization to establish territorial inhabitants as second-class
citizens. Congress enjoyed discretion to bestow or abridge suffrage upon
inhabitants of the territories as it deemed expedient, the Court maintained,
because residents of the territories were only modified participants in the
American compact. "The right of local self-government ... belongs, under
the Constitution, to the States and to the people thereof, by whom that
Constitution was ordained and to whom by its terms, all power not conferred
by it upon the government of the United States, was expressly reserved.'
' 353
While territorial inhabitants enjoyed the same personal and civil rights as
other citizens, "their political rights are franchises which they hold as
privileges in the legislative discretion of the Congress of the United
1349. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
1350. 114U.S. 15 (1885).
1351. Id. at 17; Act of Mar. 22, 1882, ch. 46, § 8, 22 Stat. 3, repealed by Act of Dec. 8, 1983,
Pub. L. 98-213, §16, 97 Stat. 1462, 1463.
1352. Ramsey, 114 U.S. at44.
1353. Id.
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States."' 1354  In this case, the abrogation of the right to vote served the
important goal of establishing a commonwealth founded on the holy state of
matrimony, "the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our
civilization."'1 355 Other than its rooting in Christianity, the holding itself was
not particularly remarkable. The Court continued to recognize, at least in the
abstract, that constitutional constraints limited congressional action in the
territories, but simply recognized that the Republican Guarantee Clause did
not prohibit the legislation.
In the 1890 case of The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 13 56 the Court upheld the power of
Congress to rescind the charter of the Mormon Church 1357 and to forfeit the
Church's property in enforcing the anti-polygamy statutes.' 358 The Church
contested the law as an arbitrary taking of property without due process in
violation of the Fifth Amendment, which it contended constrained Congress
in the territories. 1359 Like the parties in Chae Chan Ping and Lone Wolf, the
Church also contended that Congress lacked authority to rescind its vested
property rights.
360
The United States, in turn, asserted a modest sovereign authority over
the territories that was both derived from and constrained by the
Constitution. 36' The government contended that the power to legislate arose
from the Territory Clause and the power to acquire, that Congress had
reserved the power to nullify territorial legislation in Utah's organic act, that
the Mormon Charter violated the Establishment Clause, and that the
promotion of polygamy constituted abuse of corporate powers warranting
dissolution under Congress's police powers.
362
Writing for the Court, however, Justice Bradley asserted a sweeping
vision of absolute congressional power:
The power of Congress over the Territories of the United States is
general and plenary .... The incidents of these powers are those of
national sovereignty, and belong to all independent governments. The
1354. Id. at 44-45 (citing Nat'l Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129 (1879); Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828)).
1355. Id. at 45.
1356. 136 U.S. 1, 42, 64-65 (1890).
1357. The Charter had been granted by the preexisting Mormon State ofDeseret. Id. at 3.
1358. The statute authorized the Attorney General to forfeit the property of the Mormon Church
without any criminal proceeding establishing a violation of the anti-polygamy statutes. The
proceeds from the forfeited property were to be used for the common schools of the territory. Id. at
7.
1359. See generally Brief for the United States, Latter-Day Saints (Nos. 1031, 1054).
1360. Brief for Appellants at 32-41, Latter-Day Saints (Nos. 1031, 1054).
1361. See Brief for the United States at 4-5, Latter-Day Saints (Nos. 1031, 1054).
1362. Id. at 4-5, 7-8, 15-17.
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power to make acquisitions of territory by conquest, by treaty and by
cession is an incident of national sovereignty. 
1363
Citing the decisions in American Insurance, Benner v. Porter, National Bank
v. Yankton, and Murphy v. Ramsey, and like Justice Miller's decision in
Kagama, Bradley invoked the absence of any competing (e.g., state)
sovereignty in the territories to conclude that Congress's power must be
"complete." 1364 "No State of the Union had any such right of sovereignty
over them; no other country or government had any such right."
'1 365
In response to the observation in Murphy that this sovereign power was
restricted by the Constitution, Bradley now added his own ambiguous
innovation:
Doubtless Congress, in legislating for the Territories would be subject
to those fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights which are
formulated in the Constitution and its amendments; but these
limitations would exist rather by inference and the general spirit of the
Constitution from which Congress derives all its powers, than by any
express and direct application of its provisions. 
1366
Bradley otherwise did not acknowledge the Church's constitutional claims
and did not expressly recognize that the Constitution either provided the
source of congressional authority or imposed any constraint upon it.1361 In
light of Congress's supreme and complete authority over the territories, he
concluded that Congress could revoke or repeal any enactments of the local
"State of Deseret," including the organizational charter of the Mormon
Church. 1368
The decision provoked objection from the enumerated powers-limited
government adherents on the Court. Chief Justice Fuller dissented with
Justices Field and Lamar, arguing that Congress enjoyed only enumerated,
not inherent, authority, and that the Constitution did not authorize Congress
to confiscate property in this manner:
In my opinion Congress is restrained, not merely by the limitations
expressed in the Constitution, but also by the absence of any grant of
power, express or implied, in that instrument .... [The property's]
diversion under this act of Congress is in contravention of specific
limitations in the Constitution; unauthorized, expressly or by
implication, by any of its provisions; and in disregard of the
1363. Latter-Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 42.
1364. Id. at 45.
1365. Id. at 42-43.
1366. Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
1367. Id.
1368. Id. at 46.
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fundamental principle that the legislative power of the United
States ... is delegated and not inherent.
1369
Latter-Day Saints thus injected tremendous ambiguity into both the
constitutional source of authority over the territories and the applicability of
constitutional limits. Bradley did not elaborate on his conclusion that con-
stitutional limits applied as a matter of "inference" and "general spirit" rather
than "direct application," but the reasoning was quite contrary to the
conclusions in both Loughborough and Dred Scott that general constitutional
limits expressly applied.
2. Overseas Expansion and Extraterritoriality.-Church of Latter-Day
Saints, together with the Indian and alien cases discussed earlier, set the stage
for America's experiment with imperial expansion in the last decade of the
1 800s. Like the alien exclusion cases, the cases discussed in this section-
involving the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction over guano islands in the
Caribbean and U.S. consular courts abroad-raised the question of the
Constitution's application beyond the borders of the United States.
a. Jones v. United States.-The same year as the Latter-Day Saints
decision, the Court in Jones v. United States invoked a variation of the
discovery doctrine to hold that the United States, as a result of nationhood,
could exercise criminal jurisdiction over its overseas possessions. 1370 Under
the 1856 "Guano Island" Act, Congress had authorized the President to assert
U.S. sovereignty over unoccupied guano islands in the Caribbean and
extended U.S. criminal jurisdiction to the islands.' 371  The territories so
discovered were viewed as "appertaining to" the United States, and juris-
diction could be relinquished when the guano recovery was completed.
1372
Henry Jones was a U.S. national who had been tried and convicted by a
federal jury in Maryland for capital murder committed during a labor dispute
on the Caribbean island of Navassa. 1373 Jones did not raise any individual
rights challenges to his conviction, but instead contested the ability of
Congress to legislate for territories that were neither part of the territorial
1369. Id. at 67-68.
1370. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212-13 (1890).
1371. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 164, § 1, 11 Stat. 119, provided that when any citizen of the
United States shall discover "a deposit of guano on any island, rock, or key not within the lawful
jurisdiction of any other government, and not occupied by the citizens of any other government,....
said island, rock, or key may, at the discretion of the president of the United States, be considered as
appertaining to the United States." The Act further provided that "nothing in this act contained
shall be construed obligatory on the United States to retain possession of the islands, rocks, or
keys.... after the guano shall have been removed." Id. at § 4.
1372. Id.
1373. Jones, who was a black laborer, was charged with murdering a company officer during a
revolt by the island's 137 black laborers against the 11-member white management. Transcript of
Record at 26-30, Jones (No. 1143).
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domain of the United States nor the "high seas."'1 374 The United States in
turn contended that Congress had the power to legislate, either under the
Territory Clause 1375 or under the "inherent" authority to govern U.S. citizens
recognized by international law which the government contended was be-
stowed by the Constitution. 1376 This power was the basis for consular courts
abroad, the government contended, "and it is too late now to question the
validity of [its] exercise."
' 1377
Without any discussion of a constitutional source of authority, the Court
fully embraced the government's international law argument:
By the law of nations, recognized by all civilized States, dominion of
new territory may be acquired by discovery and occupation, as well as
by cession or conquest; and ... the nation... may exercise such
jurisdiction and for such period as it sees fit over territory so acquired.
This principle affords ample warrant for the legislation of Congress
concerning guano islands. 1
378
The Court concluded that Congress had authorized the punishment of death
for any murder committed in any land "under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States" or on the high seas, and that this authorization was
sufficient.' 379 Despite the government's willingness to seek a constitutional
source of congressional authority, therefore, the Court further unhinged
Congress's power from any constitutional roots.
b. In re Ross.-The following term, the Court held in In re Ross
that the constitutional criminal protections of a jury trial and grand jury
indictment did not apply to U.S. consular courts in Japan. 138  Ross was a
British seaman on an American merchant vessel who was charged with
murdering a fellow crew member aboard the ship in Yokohama harbor.
Eleven days after the incident, Ross was convicted and sentenced to death by
hanging by a consular court comprised of the consul general and four U.S.
citizens.' 381 The court had been created by a treaty between the United States
1374. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 4-5, 7, Jones (No. 1143). The Defendant also denied that
the discovery was valid since Haiti had a prior claim to the territory and the island had no guano.
Id. at 13. Haiti's 1856 claim to the island had not been acknowledged by the United States, since
the United States refused to recognize the black-ruled island of Haiti until after the Civil War.
1375. Brief for Defendant in Error at 7-8, Jones (No. 1143).
1376. Id. at 8-9 ("The power ... to enact laws for the government, trial, and punishment of
American citizens for crimes wherever committed is inherent in Congress under the Constitution, as
a like inherent power is vested in every other nation to supervise, try, and punish its own citizens or
subjects."). The government contended that this power was recognized by the constitutional
provision allowing Congress to designate the location of trials for crimes committed outside of any
state. Id. at 10 (referring to U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2, cl. 3).
1377. Id. at 9.
1378. Jones, 137 U.S. at 212.
1379. Id. at211-12.
1380. 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).
1381. Id. at454.
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and Japan, which provided that "Americans committing offenses in Japan
shall be tried by the American consul general.., and shall be punished
according to American laws., 1382 The consular procedure was anomalous:
had the crime been committed on the high seas, Ross, like Jones the year
before, would have been entitled under federal law to a trial before a
domestic U.S. court, with full constitutional protections.1 383  Within three
months of the conviction, President Rutherford B. Hayes commuted Ross's
sentence and sentenced him to life imprisonment at hard labor in the Albany,
New York penitentiary. 1384 Ten years later, Ross brought a habeas challenge,
arguing that his conviction violated the constitutional rights to grand jury
indictment and to jury trial.
1385
In the 1890 case of Geofroy v. Riggs, 138 Justice Field had held for the
Court that the treaty power was limited by the Constitution. Writing for a
unanimous Court in Ross, however, Justice Field had no difficulty finding
authority for the consular procedures in the treaty power. It had been "the
uniform practice of civilized governments for centuries to provide consular
tribunals [for their nationals],' 387 Field reasoned, and the tribunals had been
created out of necessity to protect the country's citizens in non-Christian and
particularly in Muslim countries. 1388  Field argued that the United States
enjoyed a treaty power equal to that of foreign governments, which included
the power to establish consular courts:
The treaty-making power vested in our government extends to all
proper subjects of negotiation with foreign governments. It can,
equally with any of the former or present governments of Europe,
make treaties providing for the exercise of judicial authority in other
countries by its officers appointed to reside therein.
389
Pursuant to this authority, Congress had created consular courts and
authorized them to enforce U.S. civil and criminal laws "in conformity with
1382. Treaty of June 17, 1857, art. IV, 11 Stat. 723; Treaty of July 29, 1858, art. VI, 12 Stat.
1056. Similar treaties had been entered with China, Siam, Egypt, and Madagascar.
1383. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112 ("[T]he trial of crimes committed on the high
seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, shall be in the district where the
offender is apprehended, or into which he may first be brought.").
1384. Ross, 140 U.S. at 454.
1385. Id.
1386. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) ("The treaty power, as expressed in the
Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those restraints which are found in that instrument ....
It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids ... .
1387. Ross, 140 U.S. at 462.
1388. Id. at 463 ("[B]y reason of the barbarous and cruel punishments inflicted in those
[Islamic] countries, and the frequent use of torture to enforce confession from parties accused, it
was a matter of deep interest to Christian governments to withdraw the trial of their subjects...




the laws of the United States."1390 Thus, the Constitution's Treaty Clause
created the source of U.S. authority to establish consular courts abroad.
The power of the Congress to create consular courts, however, was not
at issue in the case. The question was whether Congress had power to
establish consular tribunals which enforced U.S. laws against U.S. citizens
without affording the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Field's
answer with respect to the Constitution's individual rights provisions was
one of strict territoriality:
By the Constitution a government is ordained and established 'for the
United States of America,' and not for countries outside of their limits.
The guaranties it affords against accusation of capital or infamous
crimes, except by indictment or presentment by a grand jury, and for
an impartial trial by a jury when thus accused, apply only to citizens
and others within the United States, or who are brought there for
trial... , and not to residents or temporary sojourners abroad. The
Constitution can have no operation in another country. 1
391
Ross thus applied strict territoriality principles only to the Constitution's
constraints, and not to the Constitution as a source of authority. In Field's
view, although the Constitution was the source of Congress's authority
abroad, the Constitution did not limit the exercise of that authority, which
was governed by the treaty power and international law.
Field rejected Ross's contention that the American vessel constituted
U.S. territory to which the Constitution applied. Field acknowledged that
U.S. vessels were considered the territory of the United States for many
purposes, but held that persons on board could not invoke the protection of
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments "until brought within the actual territorial
boundaries of the United States."'' 392 Outside these boundaries, U.S. author-
ity was governed only by the treaty conditions agreed to with the foreign
government. Field avoided jurisdictional problems arising from the fact that
Ross was British by concluding that the treaty provision creating jurisdiction
over "Americans" referred to all "those who may be brought within the
jurisdiction of the consular court for offenses committed in Japan.'
1393
Although Ross is often viewed as establishing strict territorial limits on
the Constitution, the geographic limitations it imposed applied only to the
Constitution's individual rights provisions. Field's reasoning rendered Ross
both subject to complete U.S. authority under the treaty power and wholly
unprotected by the U.S. Constitution. Through the treaty power, the United
States stepped into an extraconstitutional realm governed only by the law of
nations.
1390. Id. at 469.
1391. Id. at 464 (citation omitted and emphasis added).
1392. Id.
1393. Id. at 475.
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After the decisions in Jones and Ross, Supreme Court decisions
regarding the Constitution's application to territories provided some support
for each of the following propositions:
1) Congress had authority to govern territories under the Territory
Clause (Canter, 1828);
2) Congress had inherent authority to govern territories pursuant to the
sovereign power to acquire (Canter, 1828; Dred Scott, 1857; Jones,
1890);
3) The Constitution and U.S. laws applied automatically to newly
acquired territory (Loughborough, 1820; Cross v. Harrison, 1853;
Dred Scott, 1857);
4) Not all portions of the Constitution and U.S. laws applied to the
territories (Canter, 1828; Murphy v. Ramsey, 1885);
5) The Constitution and U.S. laws did not apply to new territories until
extended there by Congress (Fleming v. Page, 1850, dicta);
6) Constitutional protections might not apply to non-members of the
constitutional compact in the territories (Dred Scott, 1857, dicta);
7) The letter of constitutional limitations did not restrict Congress in the
territories (Latter-Day Saints, 1890, dicta);
8) Congress could act extraterritorially pursuant to the treaty power
without constitutional limitation (In re Ross, 1891).
The argument that the Constitution's general restraints might not apply to
U.S. territories, however, relied largely on dicta from Fleming v. Page and
Latter-Day Saints. The established doctrine was that the Constitution applied
to the domestic territories of the United States and that Congress enjoyed the
combined authority of state and federal governments over U.S. territories
subject to the constraints of the Constitution. Whether congressional
authority derived from the Territory Clause, the power to acquire, or some
other inherent authority remained unclear, and decisions after Dred Scott
largely avoided the question. The only territory case in which the Court had
held that the Constitution did not constrain congressional authority was In re
Ross, which involved action in Japanese territory not subject to U.S.
sovereignty. Thus, through the 1890s, the Court never held that constitu-
tional constraints did not operate in territories subject to U.S. sovereignty.
G. The Spanish-American War and the Insular Possessions
U.S. territorial aspirations took a radical turn in the 1890s. With the
exception of the Alaska Purchase in 1867 and the uninhabited Guano Island
possessions, U.S. territorial acquisitions until the last decade of the century
were limited to regions that were geographically contiguous with the United
States. U.S. Presidents had attempted to annex other overseas territories in
the post-Civil War period, but Congress had repeatedly rejected the
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efforts. 3 94  Furthermore, prior U.S. acquisitions had often been sparsely
populated, subject to rapid settlement by white citizens, and (again, with the
exception of Alaska) had been quickly placed on the road to statehood.
The closing of the U.S. frontier in 1890, the search of America's rising
industrialists for overseas raw materials and markets, competition with
European imperialist rivals, and impulses of manifest destiny, however, led
U.S. expansionists of the 1890s such as Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred T.
Mahan to turn their sights outward toward far-flung territories abroad. These
territories were inhabited by peoples deemed culturally and racially inferior
to the American Anglo-Saxon Christian majority, whom the elites of the
1890s hoped to civilize, humanize, Christianize, and otherwise bestow the
benefits of advanced democratic society. In 1893, U.S. sugar planters staged
a revolution in Hawaii in an effort to protect their holdings and trigger the
islands' annexation to the Union. While that effort initially was thwarted by
Grover Cleveland, Hawaii was formally annexed in 1898. In 1899, the
United States acquired the Insular territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the
Philippines, and established a protectorate over Cuba as a result of the
Spanish American War-the "splendid little war," which, as Charles and
Mary Beard observed, "made Manifest Destiny a little more manifest."'
1395
The eastern Samoan islands were acquired by treaty with Great Britain and
Germany in 1900; the Panama Canal treaty was negotiated following U.S.
intervention in Colombia in 1903; and by 1904-05, President Roosevelt
warned Latin American states that "chronic wrongdoing... may force the
United States, however reluctantly ... to the exercise of an international
police power."'
1396
The acquisition of the Insular territories in the Spanish-American War,
in particular, occurred at the height of America's robust imperial ambitions
and became a focal point for a variety of political and economic pressures.
The acquisition provoked extensive academic 97 and political debate over
1394. Congress had rejected efforts to annex the Danish West Indies (now the U.S. Virgin
Islands), Santo Domingo, and Hawaii. Congress also had rejected two treaties for control of part of
Samoa in the 1870s, but finally accepted a similar treaty in 1878. Jim Zwick, An Empire is Not A
Frontier: Mark Twain's Opposition to United States Imperialism, 15 OVER HERE: REVIEWS IN
AMER. STUD., Summer-Winter 1995, at 1.
1395. CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION: THE
INDUSTRIAL ERA 362 (1930).
1396. RICHARD D. HEFFNER, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 212 (1965).
1397. See, e.g., James Bradley Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARV. L. REV. 464, 467
(1899) (arguing that the U.S. has the same authority to govern colonies as European powers);
Carman S. Randolph, Constitutional Aspects of Annexation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 291, 304 (1898)
(stating that territories must be placed upon the ordinary path to statehood); Simeon E. Baldwin,
The Constitutional Questions Incident to the Acquisition and Government by the United States of
Island Territory, 12 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1899) (assuming that the Constitution applies wherever the
flag of the Union flies); C.C. Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 HARV. L. REV. 365,
371 (1899) (arguing that the Constitution applies only to the states); A. Lawrence Lowell, The
Status of Our New Possessions: A Third View, 13 HARV. L. REV. 155, 170-76 (1899)
(distinguishing between incorporated and unincorporated territories). See also A. Lawrence Lowell,
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the legal status of the territories, the scope of congressional authority over
them, and the extent of constitutional protections, 1398 much as the Louisiana
Purchase had done almost a century before. Xenophobes strenuously
opposed the idea that the "alien and uncivilized peoples" of these new
territories should attain American citizenship, and some considered the very
authority of the United States to acquire the Philippines to turn on whether
the government was limited by the powers enumerated in the Constitution or
enjoyed additional powers recognized by international law. 3 99  The
Louisiana Purchase provided precedent for both sides of the debate, because
it had initially been governed through authoritarian means, then quickly
placed on the road to self-government and statehood. In the debates in
Congress regarding the status of the island inhabitants, advocates of
imperialism drew analogies to the subordinate status of native Americans to
justify colonial rule over the new territories. 1400 Industrialists argued that the
Constitution did not apply to justify protectionist tariffs against cheap Puerto
Rican and Filipino goods.' 40 1 Imperial expansionists, jealous of the colonial
possessions of Europe, viewed the acquisition as precedent for the United
States' future possession of "Egypt and the Soudan, or a section of Central
Africa, or a spot in the Antarctic Circle, or a section of the Chinese
Empire., 140 2  On the other hand, anti-imperialists also invoked the racial
inferiority of the Insular inhabitants to oppose the territories' continued
possession. The political dilemma regarding what to do with the new
territories was resolved in favor of imperialism with the reelection of
President William McKinley in 1900, who had actively campaigned against
William Jennings Bryan on a pro-colonial ticket.
The political ambivalence surrounding the acquisitions was reflected in
the treaty of cession and the organizing legislation adopted for the Insular
territories. Prior to the 1899 Treaty of Peace with Spain, every territorial
treaty entered by the United States had provided that the new territory was to
be "incorporated" into the United States for future admission as a state and
that the inhabitants were to be afforded the rights and privileges of
Colonial Expansion of the United States, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1899, at 145 (viewing
territories as colonies to be administered by the United States). See also Akhil Amar,
Intertextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747, 782-88 (1998) (arguing that a necessity may justify an
action under our constitutional structure but does not require one).
1398. See Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 958-59 (1991).
1399. See E. STAWOOD, A HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENCY: 1897-1916, at 26 (1916) (recording
the presidential argument that Filipinos were incapable of self-governance and the Democratic
Senators' response that no constitutional power existed to acquire distant territory).
1400. See, e.g., 33 CONG. REC. 707 (1900); 33 CONG. REc. 2618, 2620 (1900) (statement of
Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge); 33 CONG. REc. 1062 (1900) (statement of Sen. Ross); 33 CONG. REC.
2097 (1900) (statement of Rep. Moody). Both President McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt
portrayed the Philippines as inhabited by at least 84 warring "tribes." Zwick, supra note 1394, at
n.14.




citizenship. Since the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, moreover, Congress
had provided that the Constitution and U.S. laws "shall have the same force
and effect within all the organized territories, and in every territory hereafter
organized, as elsewhere within the United States."'' 40 3 Accordingly, in 1899,
the Secretary of War reported that the Insular inhabitants "have acquired a
moral right to be treated by the United States in accordance with the
underlying principles of justice and freedom which we have declared in our
Constitution .... not because these provisions were enacted for them, but
because they are essential limitations inherent to the existence of the
American government."'
140 4
Difficulties with assimilation of new populations had been confronted
before. The Louisiana Purchase and the acquisitions of Texas, New Mexico,
and California from Mexico had involved the incorporation of French,
Hispanic, and mulatto populations with different religions, cultures, lan-
guages, and legal traditions. 1405 Although the non-Christian, Asian Filipino
population unquestionably was viewed as racially and culturally inferior to
U.S. Anglo-Saxon elites, the inhabitants of Puerto Rico did not differ
significantly from previously assimilated groups. In a radical break from
past practice, however, the new treaty with Spain simply provided that "the
civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress."
140 6
This language raised the question whether Congress enjoyed plenary
authority to legislate for these territories. When the Foraker Act, 140 7 which
established a government for Puerto Rico, was reported from committee, it
contained a provision conferring citizenship upon the residents of Puerto
Rico. 40 8 This provision was eliminated by the Senate, however, and the final
1403. Rev. Stat. § 1891 (1876).
1404. Brief for Plaintiff at 13, Downes (No. 507) (quoting the 1899 Annual Report of the
Secretary of War, at 26).
1405. These concerns figured particularly prominently in the admission of New Mexico and
Arizona as states. The predominance of Spanish-speaking Mexican Americans in New Mexico led
to Arizona's rejection of a proposal that the two territories be admitted as a single state and delayed
New Mexico's admission until 1912. See Language Rights and New Mexico Statehood, in
LANGUAGE LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH CONTROVERSY 59 (James
Crawford ed., 1992).
1406. Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, Dec.
10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, art. IX, para. 2, 30 Stat. 1754, 1759 [hereinafter Treaty of Paris].
1407. (Foraker) Act of Apr. 12, 1900, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (codified as amended at 48
U.S.C. § 731 (2002)).
1408. Senator Foraker, in introducing the Act, also had argued that Congress was bound by
constitutional constraints, since "[t]hese limitations [were] placed upon the exercise of legislative
power without regard to the place or the people for whom the legislation in a given case may be
intended." Brief for Plaintiff at 13, Downes (No. 507) (quoting S. REP. NO. 56-249 (1900), on the
bill for temporary civil government for Puerto Rico).
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act instead provided that the inhabitants of Puerto Rico would "constitute a
body politic under the name of The People of Porto Rico."
' 140 9
The legal status of the Philippines and its inhabitants was particularly
problematic due to the geographic remoteness of the territory; the racial,
cultural, and religious differences of the population; and their revolt against
U.S. rule. 410  Moreover, annexation of the Philippines necessarily meant
subjugated colonial rule, since no one advocated Filipino statehood.
41'
Following the treaty with Spain, the U.S. Senate passed a single house
resolution stating that the treaty "is not intended to incorporate the
inhabitants of the Philippine islands into citizenship of the United States, nor
is it intended to permanently annex said islands as an integral part of the
territory of the United States., 141 2 In establishing a temporary government
for the Philippines in 1902, Congress expressly provided that Section 1891 of
the Revised Statutes of 1878, which applied the Constitution to the organized
territories, would not apply, 1413 and withheld the rights to bear arms and to
jury trial.
1414
The exceptional treatment of the new territories was justified in
Congress on the now-familiar principles of social contract theory, U.S.
sovereignty, and territoriality. In the 1898 debates regarding the Insular
territories, Republican Senator Platt of Connecticut inverted the enumerated
powers doctrine and portrayed the Constitution as setting forth the powers
dedicated to the states and the people, with all remaining sovereign powers
reserved to the national government. The United States, according to Platt,
possesses every sovereign power not reserved in its constitution to the
State or to the people: that the right to acquire territory was not
reserved and is, therefore, an inherent sovereign right: that it is a right
upon which there is no limitation and with regard to which there is no
qualification, that in certain instances the right may be inferred from
specific clauses in the Constitution but that it exists independent of the
clauses: that in the right to acquire territory is found the right to
1409. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 348 (1901) (quoting the Foraker Act).
1410. Although the United States purported to purchase the Philippines from Spain, the
Philippines had established a republic following Spain's withdrawal, and U.S. authority was only
asserted through the forcible subjugation of the republic in a war that officially lasted from February
1899 until 1902. See Saito, supra note 50, at 444. The U.S. governed the islands militarily from the
1898 occupation until the president created the Philippine Commission in 1900. Instructions of the
President dated Apr. 7, 1900, Public Laws and Resolutions of the Philippine Commission, 6-9
discussed in Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 122-24 (1904).
1411. LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1149, at 20.
1412. 32 CONG. REC. 1846 (1900).
1413. Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, 692 ("The provisions of section eighteen
hundred and ninety-one of the Revised Statutes of eighteen hundred and seventy-eight shall not
apply to the Philippine Islands.").
1414. Id. § 5, 32 Stat. at 692. Congress otherwise provided the Philippines with a Bill of Rights
including most basic constitutional protections.
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govern it: that as the right to acquire is a sovereign and inherent right,
the right to rule is a sovereign right not limited in the Constitution. 1415
Platt's position echoed that of the most extreme proponents of inherent
powers in the Indian and alien cases-that the United States enjoyed the
sovereign powers of other nation states in a manner unlimited by the
Constitution.
The question whether the United States exercised inherent,
extraconstitutional power over the territories soon came before the Court in
the Insular Cases, a term which refers to a series of decisions between 1901
and 1905 regarding the application of U.S. tariff laws1416 and constitutional
criminal provisions 141 7 to the new territories. Ultimately, the Supreme Court
did not entirely embrace Platt's version of the inherent powers doctrine. But
the Court's vision of a national government enjoying largely unlimited
authority over unincorporated territories was strongly influenced by inherent
powers principles and exempted the new territories from most ordinary
constitutional protections. In the course of resolving national authority over
the new territories, the Court revisited U.S. territorial doctrine from the
Louisiana Purchase forward, drawing repeatedly from Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Johnson v. M'Intosh that sovereign states could govern
conquered territories as they saw fit. The decisions that resulted were largely
motivated by the juxtaposition of an expansionist desire to acquire territory
in the far reaches of the earth, with all the benefits of commerce and
international status that this entailed, and a xenophobic desire not to allow
the inhabitants of such regions to partake of the American birthright.
The U.S. occupation of Cuba provided the prelude to the Insular
decisions. The Spanish-American War had been fought ostensibly to liberate
the Cuban people from the abhorrent conditions under which they were held
by Spain, which shocked the moral sense of the American people and
constituted a "disgrace to civilization." 415 During the war, the United States
occupied Cuba, an occupation which was authorized to continue by the treaty
1415. 31 CONG. REC. 6584 (1898) (emphasis added).
1416. See, e.g., De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221
(1901) (following De Lima); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901) (Dooley 1); Armstrong v.
United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901) (following Dooley]); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901);
Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901) (Dooley I/); The Diamond Rings, 183 U.S. 176
(1901).
1417. See, e.g., Territory of Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (finding that the
conviction of a Hawaiian citizen is valid without a grand jury indictment or jury trial); Kepner v.
United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904) (finding double jeopardy protections applicable based on
statute); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (finding no right to jury trial absent a
congressional statute).
1418. Joint Resolution of Apr. 20, 1898, 30 Stat. 738 (authorizing the use of force to liberate
Cuba). The resolution provided that "the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification
thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and
control of the island to its people." Id. at 739.
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of peace, although the United States disclaimed any permanent sovereignty
over the territory. The President appointed a military governor for the island,
under the Secretary of War, who created various departments of government
and established a supreme court for Cuba. The military governor declared a
number of new laws and otherwise announced that existing Spanish laws
would remain in force. The legality of this provisional government was
challenged in the little-known case of Neely v. Henkel,1419 which involved the
extradition of a U.S. citizen to Cuba to stand trial under the U.S. military
government for crimes committed in Cuba. Neely argued that the United
States government lacked authority to try a U.S. national for violating laws
promulgated by the United States in territory subject to U.S. sovereignty
without affording him the Constitution's criminal procedural protections.
1420
The case thus involved a variation on both In re Ross and Fleming v. Page,
since a treaty of peace had been ratified and sovereignty formally
relinquished to the temporary occupation of the United States. 1421
In an opinion for the Court which cited no legal authority, Justice
Harlan rejected Neeley's claim. Harlan reasoned that because the United
States had disclaimed any permanent occupation of the territory, Cuba
remained a "foreign" country within the meaning of the extradition act,
although Cuba was to be treated as conquered U.S. territory by the outside
world. 1422 Harlan accordingly concluded that constitutional criminal pro-
tections did not apply, because "those provisions have no relation to crimes
committed without the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a
foreign country." 14 23  Harlan observed that the United States could
constitutionally extradite a U.S. national to stand trial in a foreign state, and
simply ignored the facts that Cuba was subject to exclusive U.S. authority,
that Neely was being tried for violating a U.S. law, and that the trial would
be conducted by the U.S. military.
Neely undermined the limited government approach to the
Constitution's territorial application in several ways that proved important to
the Insular decisions. First, the case (like Jones) expressly recognized that
territories could be subject to complete U.S. sovereignty (at least
temporarily) without being part of the United States. 424 Second, the decision
recognized that the United States could conduct criminal proceedings in such
territories without being subject to constitutional constraint. 1425 And finally,
1419. 180 U.S. 109 (1900).
1420. Id. at 122.
1421. Treaty of Paris, supra note 1406, art. I, at 1755.
1422. Neely, 180 U.S. at 119-20 ("Cuba is a foreign territory. It cannot be regarded, in any
constitutional, legal, or international sense, a part of the territory of the United States.").
1423. Id. at 122.
1424. Id. at 119-20.
1425. Id. at 122.
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as in In re Ross, the decision held that U.S. citizenship was irrelevant to the
Constitution's applicability, although Harlan accomplished this through the
fiction that Neely was being tried by a foreign state. 1426  The primary
difference presented by the Insular Cases was that Puerto Rico and the
Philippines had been formally annexed by the United States.
1. De Lima, Dooley I, and American Diamond: U.S. Law Applies to the
Territories.-Seven of the Insular Cases were considered by the Court in
1901. The Court's initial foray into the status of the new territories affirmed
the principle, established since Cross v. Harrison, that U.S. law applied
automatically to the territories upon their cession. De Lima v. Bidwell,
1427
Dooley v. United States (Dooley J),1428 and The Diamond Rings,1429 all
addressed the question whether the new Insular territories remained "foreign
countries" such that goods traded between the new territories and the United
States were dutiable under U.S. tariff laws. 1430  Writing for a five-member
majority in De Lima,1431 Justice Brown held that upon the ratification of the
treaty with Spain, Puerto Rico "became a territory of the United States" and
had ceased to be a foreign country whose goods were subject to U.S. import
tariffs. 43 2 Other than the dicta in Fleming v. Page, Brown reasoned, there
was no support since the Louisiana Purchase for the proposition "that a
district ceded to and in the possession of the United States remains for any
purpose a foreign country.' ' 1433 A foreign country was "one exclusively with-
in the sovereignty of a foreign nation, and without the sovereignty of the
United States,"' 1434 and no affirmative legislation was necessary to make the
region domestic territory once it was ceded to the United States.' 435 Without
resolving the source of Congress's power over the territories, 1436 Brown
1426. Id. at 123 ("When an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country he cannot
complain if required to submit to such modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of that
country may prescribe .... ").
1427. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901) (presenting the question whether sugar imported
from Puerto Rico into New York was dutiable as an import from a foreign country under the
existing U.S. tariff laws).
1428. Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901) (Dooley 1) (addressing whether goods
shipped from New York to Puerto Rico were subject to export duties).
1429. The Diamond Rings, 183 U.S. 176 (1901) (applying De Lima to conclude that the
Philippines were not "foreign" for the purposes of U.S. tariff laws).
1430. See The Tariff (Dingley) Act of July 24, 1897 ch. 11, 30 Stat. 151 (providing that certain
duties "shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all articles imported from foreign countries").
1431. Justice McKenna was joined by Justices Shiras and White. Justice Gray dissented
separately on the grounds that the opinion contradicted the reasoning in Fleming v. Page.
1432. DeLima, 182 U.S. at 196.
1433. Id. at 194.
1434. Id. at 180.
1435. Id. at 198.
1436. Id. at 196 (noting Congress's uninterrupted exercise of the authority arises "not
necessarily from the territorial clause of the Constitution, but from the necessities of the case").
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concluded that "once acquired by treaty, [a territory] belongs to the United
States, and is subject to the disposition of Congress.,
1437
In Dooley I, which was handed down the same day as De Lima, Justice
Brown similarly concluded that upon the ratification of the treaty, Puerto
Rico became a part of the United States and thus New York was no longer
"foreign" such that its goods could be subject to foreign import duties in
Puerto Rico.1438 Prior to the treaty of peace, U.S. governance of Puerto Rico
had been controlled by the international laws of war, rather than the
Constitution. 1439 Upon the treaty ratification, however, "the United States
ceased to be a foreign country with respect to Porto Rico," and such goods
were entitled to free entry "until Congress otherwise constitutionally
directed."'
1441
De Lima and Dooley I foreshadowed a major division in the Court over
the ability of a treaty to bring new territories within the ambit of U.S. laws
absent action by Congress, and, conversely, of the power of Congress to
govern ceded territories outside the terms of the Constitution. In a division
that would become familiar in the Insular Cases, Justices White, Gray,
Shiras, and McKenna dissented in both cases. Writing in De Lima, Justice
McKenna rejected the majority's analysis as overly simplistic. Puerto Rico,
he argued, was neither foreign nor domestic, but enjoyed an intermediate
status as an unincorporated territory subject to U.S. sovereignty, and was still
subject to the tariff laws. 144' As Justice White put it in Dooley I, the treaty
had brought Puerto Rico under U.S. sovereignty, but had not made it
"domestic" for purposes of the U.S. tariff laws. 1442 McKenna relied upon
Taney's dicta in Fleming v. Page and Justice Johnson's circuit opinion in
American Insurance v. Canter to conclude that "the government and laws of
the United States do not extend to such territory by the mere act of
cession."'
1443
As in the debates over the Louisiana Purchase, the dissenters argued
from nativist and social contract principles that only Congress enjoyed the
power to extend U.S. laws to a new territory and populace. The overriding
question, they argued, was whether or not a particular populace was
1437. Id. at 197.
1438. Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 234 (1901) (Dooley]).
1439. Id. at 230-31 ("We... do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the
conqueror for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession,
during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are
regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws of war... in
fine, from the law of nations.") (citing 2 HALLECK, supra note 56, at 444).
1440. Id. at 235.
1441. De Lima, 182 U.S. at 201 (McKenna, J., dissenting).
1442. Dooley/, 182 U.S. at 237 (White, J., dissenting).
1443. De Lima, 182 U.S. at 210 (McKenna, J., dissenting).
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sufficiently "civilized" to be incorporated into the American polity. 1444
Justice McKenna viewed this question as a political one, dedicated to the
legislative department:
There may be no ready test of the civilized and uncivilized, between
those who are capable of self-government and those who are not,
available to the judiciary .... Upon what degree of civilization could
civil and political rights under the Constitution be awarded by courts?
The question suggests the difficulties, and how essentially the whole
matter is legislative, not judicial. 1
445
Thus, the dissenters objected to the contention that "by the self-operating
force" of the treaty, 1446 the status of the ceded territories could have changed
without action by Congress.1 447 They argued that the majority's expansive
reading of the treaty power violated the constitutional role of the House of
Representatives in establishing revenue laws 1448 and ran the "danger" that
"savage tribes" would be "nationaliz[ed]" without congressional approval. 1449
The dissenters also stressed that the United States' plenary power to
determine the legal status of the territories was essential to the country's
equal and independent status among states. The majority's analysis in
DeLima, McKenna wrote, would "bind[] and cripple[]" the country's ability
to make war and peace. 1450  By contrast, the dissenters' theory would
"vindicate[] the government from national and international weakness" and
make the United States equal among nations. 1451 Invoking the language of
the Declaration of Independence, McKenna observed that the dissenters'
vision
enable[d] the United States to have-what it was intended to have-an
''equal station among the Powers of the earth," and to do all "Acts and
Things which Independent States may of right do." And confidently
do, able to secure the fullest fruits of their performance. All powers of
government, placed in harmony under the Constitution; the rights and
liberties of every citizen secured-put to no hazard of loss or
impairment; the power of the nation also secured in its great station,
enabled to move with strength and dignity and effect among the other
nations of the earth to such purpose as it may undertake or to such
destiny as it may be called.
1452
1444. Id.
1445. Id. at 219 (McKenna, J., dissenting).
1446. Dooley 1, 182 U.S. at 238 (White, J., dissenting).
1447. Id. at 237-38 (White, J., dissenting).
1448. Id. at 238 (White, J., dissenting).
1449. De Lima, 182 U.S. at 219 (McKenna, J., dissenting).
1450. Id. at 218 (McKenna, J., dissenting).
1451. Id. at 220 (McKenna, J., dissenting).
1452. Id.
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2. Downes v. Bidwell: Limiting the Constitution's Application.-The
conclusion that U.S. laws were immediately applicable to the new territories
proved very short-lived. By the time the Court decided De Lima and Dooley
I, Congress had mooted the future impact of those holdings by passing the
Foraker Act, which imposed a special duty on all goods traded between
Puerto Rico and the United States. 453 The tariff was quickly challenged as
violating the constitutional requirement in the Uniformity Clause that "all
duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States.'454  Downes v. Bidwell thus presented the question whether Puerto
Rico was part of the "United States" for purposes of the Uniformity
Clause. 455 This question had been answered in the affirmative with respect
to the District of Columbia in Loughborough and to the California territory in
Cross v. Harrison. The tariff was supported by U.S. industry, which argued
in an amicus brief before the Court that the power to impose special duties on
goods from the new territories was necessary to protect domestic industry.4 56
The briefs of the United States and the amici industrialists sought to
justify denying constitutional protections to the new territories by arguing
that the "United States" encompassed only the states, despite the
Constitution's well-established application to the existing western
territories. 145 7 As a sovereign nation, the government contended, the United
States possessed all the powers of acquiring and governing territory enjoyed
by other nations,1458 and the Constitution did not operate beyond the states
absent its extension there by Congress. 1459 The government claimed that the
Framers of the Constitution had intended to authorize the United States to
govern subject colonies 460 and that the statesmen who oversaw the Louisiana
1453. (Foraker) Act of Apr. 12, 1900, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77. Section 3 of the Act taxed goods
traded between the United States and Puerto Rico at 15% of the duty imposed on foreign commerce.
The duty was statutorily defined to expire in 1902 or upon the enactment of a local system of
taxation by the Puerto Rican legislative assembly, whichever came first, and revenues from the
statute were earmarked to support the Puerto Rican government. Id. § 4. The Act also imposed
U.S. import tariffs on goods being imported into Puerto Rico from countries other than the United
States. Id. § 2.
1454. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
1455. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901).
1456. Amicus Brief of Industrial Interests in the States at 1, Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S.
221 (1900) (No. 340).
1457. Brief for the United States at 11, Goetze (No. 340) ("'The People' referred to [in the
Constitution were] not the people of the Territories or of the outlying possessions of the United
States, but the people of the several States, who ordained and established for themselves and their
posterity the Federal Constitution.").
1458. Id. at 15, 58.
1459. Id. at 5. "The power of the United States to make by treaty the stipulations upon this
subject common to other nations is one flowing out of its national sovereignty, and is not restrained
by any implication from any provision contained in [the Constitution]." Id. at 66. "We search in
vain through the Constitution and the first twelve amendments to find a single phrase or word
indicating that that instrument was to have operation beyond the confines of the Union." Id. at 74.
1460. id. at 9.
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Purchase "had no doubts whatever as to the power of Congress to govern
acquired territory on the basis of a colony or province, or as territory outside
the Union., 1461 The government rejected the theory that the Constitution
applied automatically to newly acquired territories as the invention of pro-
slavery forces to "fasten[] slavery upon California and New Mexico beyond
the power of Congress to disturb or abolish it.' ' 1462 Taney's decision in Dred
Scott upholding automatic application was dismissed as the "vagary of a dis-
eased imagination,"' 1463 which the government contended had been "ignored
and completely overthrown by the subsequent decisions of the court, to say
nothing of the tremendous results of the civil war."' 1464 The government's
position, of course, ignored the Court's holdings from as early as
Loughborough that the Constitution's general clauses applied to the entire
"American Empire," as well as the Court's consistent affirmance of the
Constitution's application to territories in the four decades since Dred Scott.
The United States stressed in particular that the new inhabitants could
not be made citizens. "[T]he Government can not be made to receive people
as citizens except by its consent and cooperation; while it may acquire
territory and thereby sovereignty over the inhabitants without admitting them
to the status of citizens of the United States.' ' 1465 The power to govern new
populations as it saw fit was "one of the ordinary and necessary sovereign
powers of an independent nation,"' 1466 and led "to the exaltation of the
dignity, influence, and welfare of the Union.' ' 1467  "Why should this
Government be considered to have less freedom of action in this matter than
other nations?" the government asked. 1468 "Why should the framers of the
Constitution have wished to put shackles on the national limbs, or to strip the
nation of powers necessary to the preservation of its dignity and the
maintenance of its material interests on an equality with the nations of the
earth?"'1469 "To be called an American subject," the government argued, "is
no disgrace."'
1470
The United States relied heavily on the Indian and alien cases to support
its analysis, invoking Johnson v. M'Intosh for the proposition that sovereigns
could govern conquered populations as they saw fit,147 1 and United States v.
1461. Id. at 10.
1462. Id. at 149.
1463. Id. at 150 (quoting 2 THOMAS H. BENTON, THIRTY YEARS IN THE SENATE 713, 714
(New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1854)).
1464. Id. at 152.
1465. Id. at 63.
1466. Id. at4.
1467. Id. at 71.
1468. Id. at 59.
1469. Id. at 71-72.
1470. Id. at 72.
1471. Id. at 19-20 (citing Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589 (1823)).
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Kagama for the proposition that the United States enjoyed plenary authority
over territorial inhabitants. 147 2  The government pointed to the Indian and
alien cases as evidence that the United States long had enjoyed authority to
govern subordinate populations as subjects, 473 and that the decision whether
to bestow citizenship on any group lay in the absolute discretion of
Congress. 1474 The government concluded: "If Congress may properly define
the classes of emigrant or aboriginal inhabitants who may become
citizens... why is it unreasonable or unjust to leave to their judgment and
discretion the time, the terms, and the conditions upon which the inhabitants
of lately foreign islands may be admitted to the same high status?' ' 1475 The
United States' focus on citizenship begged the question before the Court,
which was not whether the inhabitants must be made citizens but whether the
U.S. Constitution and laws applied to the Insular possessions. The
government's argument did speak to political concerns, however, because if
the territories were part of the United States or "subject to the jurisdiction
thereof," all persons born in the territories after their transfer would be
citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The amicus brief for the U.S. industrial interests argued against
applying the Constitution to the territories in order to protect U.S. tobacco,
sugar, and other interests which could not compete with the more productive
tropical climates. 1476 The industrial interests asserted more overtly nativist
theories than the United States, 1477 stressing the "distinct" and "semi-
civilized" nature of the Insular inhabitants.1478  U.S. industrial interests
should not suffer, they argued, simply "because the United States happen[ed]
to be forced ... to take a cession of territory ... inhabited by a semi-civilized
people and hampered by conditions quite dissimilar with our own ......1479
1472. Id. at 25-26 (citing United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886)).
1473. Id. at 68 ("How is this doctrine [that the Constitution applies automatically] to be
reconciled with the exclusion of Indian tribes from citizenship, notwithstanding they are inhabitants
of ceded country?"); see also id. at 60 ("The political status of native Indian tribes within territory
acquired by the United States by treaty has been uniformly regarded as unaffected by the cession.").
1474. Id. at 71 ("It is within the undisputed power of our Government to exclude from its
territory such aliens as it may deem undesirable. Why is it not equally within its power to define
what persons may become citizens by cession of territory?").
1475. Id. at 69.
1476. Amicus Brief of Industrial Interests at 1, 60-64, Goetze (No. 340).
1477. The brief argued that, whereas prior territories had been scantily populated and easily
assimilated, "[w]e have now other and serious conditions to deal with. The Union was of States for
their protection first, and not-as too many seem to suppose, for the exercise of charity toward
inhabitants who ... come to us by war." Id. at 2. See also id. at 31 ("If all our territory is acquired
to become States, especially the Philippines, it may not be long before the downfall of the Republic
will be sounded.").
1478. Id. at 60 ("Suddenly and for the first time in our history the nation finds itself possessed
of vast and even unexplored areas of tropical territory populated by millions of people of the Latin
and Malay races, who have long been accustomed to monarchical or no governmental ideas and
either not ruled at all or with despotic power; many of them only semi-civilized.").
1479. Id. at 19.
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The position that the Constitution followed the flag would produce
"[p]remature citizenship of millions of semi-civilized people, [and] their
incorporation into the Union of States."'1480 All other colonial powers, the
amici asserted, imposed duties on colonial products to protect their home
industries. 148' They admonished the Court to protect U.S. states and
industries "even while we may be advancing to a supremacy that astonishes
the world."'
1482
In short, both the United States and the industrialists argued in favor of
extraconstitutional colonial rule of the new territories, disavowing a century
of contrary practice and adjudication. The government relied on membership
and social contract principles-that new populations could not be made part
of the populace without the people's express consent-while the indus-
trialists offered a more overtly racist and protectionist rationale.
The plaintiff in Downes v. Bidwell, who was represented by the Coudert
Brothers firm, 483 argued that because Puerto Rico was subject to complete
U.S. sovereignty, it must be part of the United States, and the Constitution
must constrain governmental action there. 1484 The plaintiff did not contend
that the Constitution had been enacted for the people of Puerto Rico, but
argued from limited government principles that the Constitution constrained
governmental authority wherever it chose to act. "The question," in other
words, was not "what newly annexed people or newly acquired territory have
a right to demand, but what the organs of the Government chartered by the
Constitution have a right to do."'' 485 Citing Pomeroy's constitutional law
treatise, the plaintiff urged: "If it were thought necessary that Congress
should be hedged around with restrictions while it is legislating for the
inhabitants of the States ... how much more necessary that the same body
should be restrained while legislating for the inhabitants of those districts and
territories over which it has an exclusive control and undivided sway."'
1486
The plaintiff dismissed the opponents' claims of expediency, noting that
nothing had forced the U.S. to acquire the territories, and that "it is not a
function of the Court to wrest the law from its true meaning in order to avoid
1480. Id. at 54.
1481. Id. at 63.
1482. Id. at 64.
1483. See VIRGINIA KAYS VEENSWIJK, COUDERT BROTHERS: A LEGACY IN LAW: THE
HISTORY OF AMERICA'S FIRST INTERNATIONAL LAW FIRM, 1853-1993 (1994). As Gerald
Neuman graciously pointed out, Frederic Coudert had rejected the Supreme Court Justiceship that
was filled by Edward Douglass White. Had he accepted the offer, Downes could have been decided
five to four the other way.
1484. Brief for Plaintiff, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1900) (No. 507).
1485. Id. at 22.
1486. Id at 18 (quoting JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 492 (New York, Hurd & Houghton, 1868)).
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the inconvenience or even the distress that may result from a careless or
wanton use or misuse of governmental powers.' 1487
The De Lima-Dooley I members now flipped positions as the Downes
Court divided five to four to hold that Puerto Rico was not part of the
"United States" for purposes of the Uniformity Clause. Writing alone to
announce the judgment of the Court, Justice Brown concluded that the
Foraker Act did not violate the Uniformity Clause, since that clause did not
apply to the territory. Puerto Rico, he reasoned, was "appurtenant to and
belonging to," but not "part of the United States." 1488 Like Taney, Brown
viewed the Territory Clause as restricted to the original territories. Brown
argued that the Constitution failed to address power over later acquired
territories because the Framers could not have anticipated that America
would grow into a vast, expansionist power. Like Taney, he also believed
the power to govern new territories arose inevitably from the power to
acquire. Brown diverged from Taney, however, in urging that the powers of
the United States over acquisition should be commensurate with those of
other nations. 1489  Arguing from narrow social contract theory, Brown
contended, "The Constitution was created by the people of the United States,
as a union of States, to be governed solely by representatives of the
States. 149° Moreover, In re Ross had established that the Constitution had
no extraterritorial application, "since it was ordained and established 'for the
United States of America,' and not for countries outside of their limits., 1491
Brown's openly nativist justification for his analysis echoed the
industrialists' brief:
It is obvious that in the annexation of outlying and distant possessions,
grave questions will arise from differences of race, habits, laws and
customs of the people, and from differences of soil, climate, and
production, which may... be quite unnecessary in the annexation of
contiguous territory inhabited only by people of the same race, or by
scattered bodies of native Indians.
1492
Picking up on the government's concerns about citizenship, Brown's analysis
was expressly designed to prevent dilution of the American birthright by
uncivilized peoples:
There seems to be no middle ground between this position and the
doctrine that if their inhabitants do not become, immediately upon
1487. Id. at 22.
1488. Downes, 182 U.S. at 287.
1489. Id. at 285-86 ("If it be once conceded that we are at liberty to acquire foreign territory, a
presumption arises that our power with respect to such territories is the same power which other
nations have been accustomed to exercise with respect to territories acquired by them.").
1490. Id. at 250.
1491. Id. at 269.
1492. Id. at 282.
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annexation, citizens of the United States, their children thereafter born,
whether savages or civilized, are such, and entitled to all the rights,
privileges and immunities of citizens. If such be their status, the
consequences will be extremely serious. 
1493
The necessary inference, Brown argued, was that Congress's power to ac-
quire new territory "was not hampered by the constitutional provisions.
1494
Brown rejected the suggestion that such extraconstitutional and
"unrestrained" power on the part of Congress would lead to despotic
government. 1495 Instead "certain principles of natural justice inherent in the
Anglo-Saxon character" would secure the territories against legislation
contrary to their interests. 1496 Thus, Brown suggested that the population of
Puerto Rico would be entitled to "certain natural rights," including the rights
to religious opinion and public expression; freedom of speech and press;
rights to liberty and property, access to the courts, due process, and equal
protection; and immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures and cruel
and unusual punishments. 1497 The fact that these protections would be en-
joyed as a matter of natural, rather than constitutional, right, and dependent
upon the discretion of Congress, did not concern him. "Large powers must
necessarily be intrusted to Congress in dealing with these problems," he
concluded, "and we are bound to assume that they will be judiciously
exercised. That these powers may be abused is possible. But the same may
be said of its powers under the Constitution as well as outside of it.,,
1498
Brown's analysis was not a model of clarity, and elsewhere in his
opinion, Brown suggested that certain constitutional provisions would apply
to the territories. Here Brown distinguished between general constitutional
prohibitions that limited Congress's power to act, "irrespective of time or
place," and those which were geographically limited. 1499 Thus, Congress's
power to act in the territories apparently was constrained by the prohibitions
against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, and possibly by the First
Amendment. 1500 Brown declined to speculate further regarding "how far the
bill of rights ... is of general and how far of local application."' 150 1  He
further acknowledged that even if regarded as aliens, under the holdings in
Yick Wo and Wong Wing, the inhabitants should enjoy rights to life, liberty,
and property.1502  They would not, however, be entitled to citizenship,
1493. Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
1494. Id. at 285.
1495. Id. at 280.
1496. Id.
1497. Id. at 282-83.
1498. Id. at 283.
1499. Id. at 277.
1500. Id.
1501. Id.
1502. Id. at 282-83.
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suffrage, and the procedural protections in the Constitution which Brown
considered "peculiar to Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence."
' 150 3
The concurring Justices were unwilling to so boldly abandon a century
of constitutional theory and jurisprudence. Joined by Justices Shiras and
McKenna, and apparently by Justice Gray,' 50 4 Justice White conceded from
the outset that "[t]he government of the United States was born of the
Constitution, and all powers which it enjoys or may exercise must be either
derived expressly or by implication from that instrument."' 50 5  Citing
Kagama, White argued that the Constitution unquestionably had conferred
upon Congress broad authority to govern territories at its discretion, 50 6 and
that whether this power was implied from the power to acquire territory or
derived from the Territory Clause, "in either case the right is founded on the
Constitution."' 50 7  White thus began from enumerated powers principles,
while recognizing the Constitution as the source of a very broad power over
territories.
As White recognized, the appropriate question accordingly was not
whether the Constitution was applicable to the new territories, but whether
any particular constitutional constraint applied1508-a question that White
believed turned on "the situation of the territory and its relations to the
United States.' ' 50 9 White's solution to this question distinguished between
"incorporated" and "unincorporated" territories, and fundamental and non-
fundamental constitutional rights. According to White, if a territory had not
been expressly "incorporated" into the United States by treaty or by
legislation, only fundamental constitutional protections applied. 1510 White
concluded that the Uniformity Clause was not fundamental, and thus
Congress's power to impose taxes on Puerto Rico was not limited by the
clause unless the territory had been "incorporated" into the United States.
Although White started from the premise that the Constitution applied
to the territories, he ultimately concluded, like Brown, that U.S. authority
over unincorporated territories was largely unlimited. Citing Chief Justice
Marshall in American Insurance v. Canter, White urged that international
law gave a sovereign authority to govern conquered territories as it saw
1503. Id.
1504. Justice Gray concurred separately, but indicated that he agreed in substance with Justice
White's opinion.
1505. Downes, 182 U.S. at 288 (White, J., concurring).
1506. Id. at 289-90 & n.4 (White, J., concurring).
1507. Id. at 290 (White, J., concurring).
1508. Id. at 292 (White, J., concurring).
1509. Id. at 293 (White, J., concurring).
1510. White distinguished between provisions of the Constitution which merely regulated a
granted power and those absolute protections of liberty which "withdraw all authority on a
particular subject." Id. at 295 (White, J., concurring). The latter, he believed, applied regardless of
the status of a particular territory. Id. at 298.
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fit. 15t ' He then assumed that equivalent powers must be possessed by the
United States. 1512 The contrary view that the Constitution prevented the
United States from acquiring territory that was not subject to full consti-
tutional protections rested "on the erroneous assumption that the United
States under the Constitution is stripped of those powers which are absolutely
inherent in and essential to national existence."' 51 3 The decisions in Johnson
v. M'Intosh, American Insurance, Church of Latter-Day Saints, and others
established that "the government of the United States, in virtue of its
sovereignty.... has the full right to acquire territory enjoyed by every other
sovereign nation."' 514 In re Ross supported his analysis by holding that
Congress's power to create consular courts outside the United States derived
from the treaty power and was not otherwise constrained by the
Constitution.' 515 "Undoubtedly," White opined, "the power to carry on war
and to make treaties implies also the exercise of those incidents which
ordinarily inhere in them,"'151 6 including all the powers of sovereign nations
recognized under international law. White thus viewed the Constitution as
bestowing on the government the full international law powers of discovery
and conquest.
White's view of the constitutional constraints that applied to territories
such as Puerto Rico and the Philippines ultimately appeared almost as broad
as Justice Brown's. Although White maintained that at least fundamental
rights applied to unincorporated territories, he did not indicate what
provisions of the Constitution he considered fundamental. Moreover, like
Brown, he elsewhere suggested that the Constitution imposed no express or
implied limits on Congress's power in the territories, although the power
might be limited by "inherent, although unexpressed, principles which are
the basis of all free government which cannot be with impunity
transcended." 
517
White's desire to preserve the power of the United States to govern
territories outside of the Constitution's reach was motivated primarily by
principles of nationalism and membership. Like Justice Field in Chae Chan
Ping, White saw the power to determine U.S. membership as critical to the
United States' independence as a sovereign state. To conclude that the
United States could acquire territory peopled by "an uncivilized race" only if
that territory became fully incorporated into the United States and entitled to
citizenship, White argued, was "to admit the power to acquire and
1511. Id. at 300, 301-02 (White, J., concurring).
1512. Id. at 302 (White, J., concurring).
1513. Id. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring).
1514. Id. at 302-04 (White, J., concurring).
1515. Id. at 293-94 (White, J., concurring).
1516. Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
1517. Id. at 291 (White, J., concurring).
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immediately to deny its beneficial existence."' 1518 Such a policy would deny
the United States the sovereign right to benefit from its conquests and render
it "helpless in the family of nations."
'1 519
Arguing from membership principles, White emphasized the right of the
nation to protect the "birthright" of its citizens by denying citizenship to
those "absolutely unfit to receive it."
' 1520
If the proposition be true [that acquisition by treaty automatically
incorporates a territory into the United States], then millions of
inhabitants of alien territory, if acquired by treaty, can, without the
desire or consent of the people of the United States, speaking through
Congress, be immediately and irrevocably incorporated into the
United States, and the whole structure of the government be
overthrown. 
1521
White ridiculed the proposition that "the Constitution of the United States
has conferred upon the treaty-making power the absolute right to bring all the
alien people residing in acquired territory into the United States and thus
divide with them the rights which peculiarly belong to the citizens of the
United States."'1 522 The "evil of immediate incorporation" would wreck the
country's institutions and strip citizens of their birthright. 3  Indeed, if
anything, the Constitution precluded the possibility that, through mere
exercise of the treaty power, the United States could "incorporate an alien
people into the United States without the express or implied approval of
Congress."'1524 Such a construction of the treaty power would eviscerate the
role of the House of Representatives in determining the membership and
boundaries of the United States.' 525 White reinterpreted the history of the
Louisiana Purchase to argue that Jefferson's concern had not been that the
United States lacked power to acquire and hold territory, but that the territory
could not be incorporated into the United States by mere treaty, absent action
by Congress. 52 6 In direct contrast to the holdings in De Lima and Dooley,
White argued that "an unbroken line of decisions" from Justice Marshall to
Taney established that the treaty-making power could not bring new peoples
or territory into the United States "without the express or implied assent of
Congress."1
527
1518. Id. at 306 (White, J., concurring).
1519. Id. (citing Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 595 (1823) and Jones v. United
States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890)) (emphasis added).
1520. Id.
1521. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
1522. Id. at 324 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
1523. Id at 312-13 (White, J., concurring).
1524. Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
1525. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
1526. Id. at 322-33 (White, J., concurring).
1527. Id. at 338-39 (White, J., concurring).
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Even if the spirit of the Constitution prevented the United States from
acquiring territory that was not ultimately intended for statehood, White
reasoned, the determination of what acquisitions were appropriate was
"wholly a political question" dedicated to Congress, and not a subject for the
courts. 528 Like Brown, White concluded with the tortured formulation that
"whilst in an international sense Porto Rico was not a foreign country, since
it was subject to the sovereignty of and was owned by the United States, it
was foreign to the United States in a domestic sense, because the island had
not been incorporated into the United States, but was merely appurtenant
thereto as a possession."
' 1529
White's theory of incorporation had been borrowed from the pages of
the Harvard Law Review1530 and had never previously been articulated by the
Court. His distinction between constitutional rights that were fundamental
versus procedural, however, echoed the Court's recent decisions concluding
that only fundamental provisions of the Bill of Rights were binding on the
states through the Due Process Clause. 1531 These incorporation decisions,
however, had been grounded on the premise that the states, as separate and
independent sovereigns, were not bound by all the provisions that were
binding on the federal government. The Court had rejected the proposition
that Congress, in legislating for the territories, could abandon such "non-
fundamental" constitutional requirements as unanimous juries, even though
the successor state legislatures were fully entitled to do so.
1 532
Like Brown, then, Justice White and his fellow concurring Justices
conceived of Congress as enjoying a power over conquered peoples
coterminous with that enjoyed by all sovereign nations and limited only by
certain unidentified fundamental provisions of the Constitution. On its face,
1528. Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
1529. Id. at 341-42 (White, J., concurring).
1530. See Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions, supra note 1397 (distinguishing between
incorporated and unincorporated territories); see also Lowell, Colonial Expansion of the United
States, supra note 1397.
1531. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause does not require states to indict by grand jury in capital cases);
Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83 (1900) (same); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does not require the state of Utah to provide 12-
member juries in criminal proceedings). The Court upheld the state practices in these cases on the
grounds that the constitutional provisions at issue were not fundamental rights necessary to due
process, and Justice Harlan consistently dissented on the grounds that the Bill of Rights had been
adopted to expressly define the fundamental rights of the polity against the government. For further
discussion of the relationship between the incorporation doctrine and the Insular decisions, see
Carlos R. Soltero, The Supreme Court Should Overrule the Territorial Incorporation Doctrine and
End One Hundred Years Of Judicially Condoned Colonialism, 22 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 1
(2001).
1532. Compare Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898) (holding that the Constitution
obligated the Utah territory to provide 12-member criminal juries), with Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 581
(holding that the Constitution did not require the state of Utah to provide 12-member criminal
juries).
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White's analysis placed at least as much authority in the hands of Congress
as had Justice Brown's and differed from Brown only in the view that
Congress's authority originally derived from the Constitution, rather than
being external to it. All members of the majority relied upon concepts of
nationhood and membership to support their position, arguing that the United
States must, as a matter of necessity, be able to govern the territorial
inhabitants as subjects, since it was impossible that they should be given the
benefits of American citizenship. This claim of impossibility ignored the
alternative possibility (also presented by the alien cases) that the Constitution
itself constituted the requisite popular consent for the admission of new
inhabitants, and that if the United States did not want to extend the
Constitution to the new territories, it need not acquire and govern them.
Nothing had forced the United States to acquire the Insular territories. But
under the dominant ideology of the age, a nation which lacked authority to
acquire and govern territories as colonial subjects could not be considered a
full sovereign. The majority's facile handling of this question was all too
obvious to the dissenting Justices. As Justice Harlan wrote, "Whether a
particular race will or will not assimilate with our people, and whether they
can or cannot with safety to our institutions be brought within the operation
of the Constitution, is a matter to be thought of when it is proposed to
acquire their territory by treaty. A mistake in the acquisition of territory...
cannot be made the ground for violating the Constitution.,
1533
Justices Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham dissented on the theory
that Congress's power to tax Puerto Rico derived from the commerce power
and was limited by the Uniformity Clause. Writing for the four, Chief
Justice Fuller argued, as Marshall had in Loughborough, that the taxation
power extended "to all places over which the government extends."'1 534 In
particular, the dissenters roundly criticized the majority for asserting that
Congress possessed "unlimited power" over the territories.' 53 5 Chief Justice
Fuller noted that the majority's analysis ignored the principle articulated by
Halleck regarding the American Insurance decision that every nation holds
new territory "subject to the constitution and laws of its own government,
and not according to those of the government ceding it.'
536
Fuller found little difference between the two positions articulated by
the majority. Possibly in response to the majority's invocation of In re Ross,
Fuller argued that whatever the authority of the United States in international
relations, the governance of a U.S. territory was a matter of internal relations
which the Constitution controlled:
1533. Downes, 182 U.S. at 384 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
1534. Id. at 353 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
1535. Id. at 358 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).




[I]n all international relations, interests, and responsibilities the United
States is a separate, independent, and sovereign nation; but it does not
derive its powers from international law .... The source of national
power in this country is the Constitution of the United States; and the
government, as to our internal affairs, possesses no inherent sovereign
power not derived from that instrument, and inconsistent with its letter
and spirit. 537
Criticizing White's "occult" theory of "incorporation," Fuller argued:
[T]he contention seems to be that if an organized and settled province
of another sovereignty is acquired by the United States, Congress has
the power to keep it, like a disembodied shade, in an intermediate state
of ambiguous existence for an indefinite period; and, more than that,
that after it has been called from that limbo, commerce with it is
absolutely subject to the will of Congress, irrespective of
constitutional provisions .... That theory assumes that the
Constitution created a government empowered to acquire countries
throughout the world, to be governed by different rules than those
obtaining in the original States and territories, and substitutes for the
present system of republican government, a system of domination
over distant provinces in the exercise of unrestricted power.
1 538
Harlan likewise viewed the concept of "incorporation" as an undefined,
"occult" concept, "enveloped in some mystery which I am unable to
unravel."
1539
Fuller finally rejected the majority's concerns about Puerto Rican
citizenship, noting that "[m]uch discussion was had at the bar in respect to
the citizenship of the inhabitants of Porto Rico, but we are not required to
consider that subject at large in these cases. It will be time enough to seek a
ford when, if ever, we are brought to the stream."'1 540 Fuller objected that the
Court should not be swayed by the desire of U.S. industries for trade
protection from cheap Puerto Rican products.
1541
While joining Fuller's dissent, Justice Harlan also wrote separately to
attack the Court's blanket abandonment of the enumerated powers doctrine
and the Bill of Rights. "Congress has no existence and can exercise no
authority outside of the Constitution," he wrote. 1542 The arguments of the
majority would work "a radical and mischievous change in our system of
1537. Id. at 369 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
1538. Id. at 372-73 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
1539. Id. at 391 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1540. Id. at 365 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). Fuller may have genuinely believed that some
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment could avoid bestowing natural-born citizenship on
Puerto Ricans. Or he may have assumed, like many anti-imperialists, that if the government lost the
Downes case, the prospect of citizenship for Puerto Ricans would result in Puerto Rico's
independence.
1541. Id. at 374 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
1542. Id. at 379-80 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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government," replacing constitutional liberty with "legislative
absolutism.' ' 1543 Harlan further stated:
This nation is under the control of a written constitution, the supreme
law of the land and the only source of the powers which our
government, or any branch or officer of it, may exert at any time or at
any place. Monarchical and despotic governments, unrestrained by
written constitutions, may do with newly acquired territories what this
government may not do consistently with our fundamental law. To
say otherwise is to concede that Congress may, by action taken
outside of the Constitution, engraft upon our republican institutions a
colonial system such as exists under monarchical governments ....
The idea that this country may acquire territories anywhere upon the
earth, by conquest or treaty, and hold them as mere colonies or
provinces-the people inhabiting them to enjoy only such rights as
Congress chooses to accord them-is wholly inconsistent with the
spirit and genius as well as with the words of the Constitution.
1 544
Harlan rejected both the theory that the nation could govern
extraconstitutionally and the view that the Constitution embraced absolutist
powers held by other nations.
It is said.., we may solve the question of the power of Congress
under the Constitution by referring to the powers that may be
exercised by other nations. I cannot assent to this view. I reject
altogether the theory that Congress, in its discretion, can exclude the
Constitution from a domestic territory of the United States,
acquired ... in virtue of the Constitution.1
545
Indeed, White's contention that the Constitution nominally applied to
unincorporated territories simply gave with one hand what it took away with
the other:
The admission that no power can be exercised under and by authority
of the United States except in accordance with the Constitution is of
no practical value whatever to constitutional liberty if, as soon as the
admission is made ... the Constitution is so liberally interpreted as to
produce the same results as those which flow from the theory that
Congress may go outside the Constitution in dealing with newly
acquired territories .... 1546
Harlan dismissed Justice Brown's reliance on the "Anglo-Saxon
character" as a source of governmental restraint. The drafters of the
Constitution had declined to rely on such "inherent," "natural" limitations,
and instead determined "that the only safe guaranty against governmental
1543. Id. at 379 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1544. Id. at 380 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1545. Id. at 386 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1546. Id. at 389 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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oppression was to withhold or restrict the power to oppress."' 1547 Harlan
found it equally useless to attempt, as the majority had, to parse the
Constitution into "fundamental" and local prohibitions. There was no
meaningful distinction, he argued, between the prohibition that Congress not
pass ex post facto laws and the requirement that duties be uniform
"throughout the United States." 1549 Harlan concluded, "How Porto Rico can
be a domestic territory of the United States, as distinctly held in De Lima v.
Bidwell, and yet.., not embraced by the words 'throughout the United
States' is more than I can understand."'
' 550
3. Dooley v. United States.-Dooley 111551 was a companion case to
Downes, presenting the parallel question whether the Foraker Act duties on
U.S. exports to Puerto Rico violated the constitutional requirement that "no
tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State.' ' 552 As in
Downes, the Court construed the constitutional restriction narrowly to allow
for broad, unregulated power of Congress over the new territories. Thus,
Justice Brown argued, because Puerto Rico was no longer a foreign country
under the decision in De Lima, goods delivered from the states to Puerto
Rico were not "exports" within the meaning of the clause, and Congress had
"full and paramount authority" to impose duties unlimited by that section.1
553
White argued that the holding in Downes was consistent with this ruling,
because that case had recognized that Puerto Rico was subject to U.S.
sovereignty and simply held that Puerto Rico was not part of the United
States for purposes of the Uniformity Clause. 1
554
As in Downes, Chief Justice Fuller dissented with Justices Harlan,
Brewer, and Peckham, who chastised the majority for concluding that Puerto
Rico was not domestic for purposes of the Uniformity Clause in Downes and
was not foreign for purposes of the Export Clause here. 555 The result of the
Court's decisions, the dissenters argued, was that being neither foreign nor
domestic, Puerto Rico had been placed into a deconstitutionalized zone
where Congress could act as it wished.
The Supreme Court's 1901 Insular decisions transformed U.S.
territorial law in a number of ways. Justice Taney's vision of the automatic
application of the Constitution to newly acquired territory ultimately was
replaced with the view that the United States enjoyed powers to acquire and
1547. Id. at 381 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1548. Id. at 383 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1549. Id. at 383-84 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1550. Id. at 386 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1551. Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901) (Dooley I1).
1552. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
1553. Dooley 1l, 183 U.S. at 157; accord id at 163 (White, J., concurring).
1554. Id. at 164 (White, J., concurring).
1555. Id. at 173 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
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govern territories comparable to those held by the imperial nations of
Europe. U.S. sovereignty over such territories was complete, and by the end
of 1901, it had become clear that only the fundamental provisions of the
Constitution constrained congressional action in the overseas territories.
Indeed, the doctrinal transformation was sufficiently radical to provoke Mr.
Dooley's famous observation that "no matter whether th' constitution follows
th' flag or not, th' supreme coort follws th' iliction returns."
'1 556
While Justice White had justified the concept of incorporation as
leaving the question of membership and the Constitution's application to
Congress, the Court subsequently proved extremely reluctant to conclude
that Congress had "incorporated" any of the recently acquired territories, and
it declined to find that any contested constitutional provision was sufficiently
fundamental to bind Congress in territories that the Court deemed
unincorporated. Thus, in Hawaii v. Mankichi,
1557 a five-to-four majority 5 58
held that Congress's determination in annexing the Hawaiian islands that
Hawaii was "a part of the territory of the United States and [is] subject to the
sovereign dominion thereof," and that only municipal legislation not
"contrary to the Constitution of the United States" would remain in force, 1559
was not sufficient to apply the Fifth and Sixth Amendment grand and petit
jury protections to Hawaii. The Court previously had held that these and
related constitutional provisions applied to the domestic U.S. territories,
560
and Justice Brown conceded that a literal interpretation of Congress's lan-
guage would require applying the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to Hawaii.' 561
Brown concluded that this could not have been Congress's purpose,
however, since applying these rights immediately would lead to "disastrous"
results and imperil "the peace and good order of the islands."'' 562  Without
citation support or analysis, Brown concluded that although most of the
1556. Mr. Dooley (unrelated to the Insular Cases litigant) was a fictitious saloon keeper and
political commentator created by newspaper columnist Finley Peter Dunne. See FINLEY PETER
DuNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONs 26 (Harper & Bros. 1906).
1557. 190 U.S. 197 (1903). The case involved a criminal defendant who had been judicially
indicted, convicted of first degree manslaughter, and sentenced to 20 years hard labor by a majority
of nine out of twelve jurors.
1558. The Court now included Justice Day, who had been Secretary of State in 1898 at the time
of Hawaii's annexation. Id. at 224. Chief Justice Fuller, and Justices Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham
dissented.
1559. 30 Stat. 750-51 (1898). On April 30, 1900, the Hawaiian territory was formally
incorporated into the United States, and Congress formally extended the Constitution to Hawaii,
making provision for grand jury indictments and unanimous jury verdicts. See ch. 339, §§ 5, 83, 31
Stat. 141-42, 157 (1901).
1560. See supra notes 1332-43 and accompanying text. But see In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453
(1891) (declining to apply Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections to consular proceedings abroad).
1561. Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 212.
1562. Id. at 214.
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privileges and immunities contained in the Bill of Rights had applied to
Hawaii upon annexation, the rights at issue were not "fundamental.'
1 563
Justice White concurred with Justice McKenna and continued to press
his incorporation theory. Ignoring the fact that the annexation had occurred
before the Court had bestowed significance on the concept of incorporation,
White concluded that the annexation had not incorporated Hawaii into the
United States, and Congress, in authorizing the continuance of laws not
"contrary to the Constitution," accordingly had only meant those fun-
damental provisions of the Constitution which necessarily were applicable to
Hawaii. 1564  White cited In re Ross and the state incorporation doctrine
cases 1565 for the proposition that the rights to grand and petit juries were not
fundamental. Thus, even when Congress had purported to apply the
Constitution, the Supreme Court majority refused to find its action
controlling.
Chief Justice Fuller argued for the dissenters that the plain language of
the 1898 resolution had applied the Constitution to Hawaii, and that Justice
White's reasoning to the contrary rendered the statute utterly superfluous.
1 566
Even under the Downes analysis, he argued, the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights were fundamental and applied to Hawaii upon its annexation. 567 He
further rejected Brown's argument from necessity, noting that Hawaiian
courts already possessed authority to impanel grand juries and to require
unanimous jury verdicts. 
1568
Justice Harlan dissented separately, attacking as "a new doctrine" the
suggestion that some constitutional provisions were more fundamental to
U.S. governmental action than others. 1569 The Constitution had only been
adopted, he noted, based on the promise that a Bill of Rights would be
adopted to "prevent the infringement by any Federal tribunal or agency, of
the rights then commonly regarded as embraced in Anglo-Saxon liberty.' 57 °
Harlan continued to maintain that the Constitution applied to Hawaii upon its
annexation, "without any declaration to that effect by Congress, and without
any power of Congress to prevent it,"'1571 and that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments accordingly deprived the United States of the power to
criminally convict a defendant other than in the manner prescribed. The
contrary view of the majority, he argued, "would place Congress above the
1563. Id. at217-18.
1564. Id. at 219-20 (White, J., concurring).
1565. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Bolin v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83 (1900);
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); see also supra note 1531.
1566. Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 223-25 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
1567. Id. at 226 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
1568. Id. at 223-24 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
1569. Id. at 244 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1570. Id.
1571. Id. at 248 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Constitution." 1572 Thus, he argued, the majority "assumes the possession by
Congress of power quite as omnipotent as that possessed by the English
Parliament. It assumes that Congress, which came into existence, and exists,
only by virtue of the Constitution, can withhold fundamental guarantees of
life and liberty from peoples who have come under our complete
jurisdiction."'1573 The theory that the Constitution did not apply to Hawaii
would mean that the will of Congress, not the Constitution, is the
supreme law of the land only for certain peoples and territories under
our jurisdiction .... Thus will be engrafted upon our republican
institutions, controlled by the supreme law of a written Constitution, a
colonial system entirely foreign to the genius of our government and
abhorrent to the principles that underlie and pervade the Constitution.
It will then come about that we will have two governments over the
peoples subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, one, existing
under a written Constitution ... the other, existing outside of the
written Constitution, in virtue of an unwritten law, to be declared from
time to time by Congress, which is itself only a creature of that
instrument. 
157 4
Harlan was equally unsympathetic to the majority's necessity argument,
noting that "[i]f, after the passage of the joint resolution, the local authorities
proceeded in the prosecution of crimes under municipal laws palpably
contrary to the Constitution, the fault was theirs."
'1 575
Much of the Court's concern regarding the application of the
Constitution to the new territories was motivated by the problem of the
Philippines, a concern which became express the following year. In Dorr v.
United States, 15 76 Justice White's incorporation theory was finally embraced
by a majority of the Court in an opinion holding that the constitutional right
to jury trial did not apply to the Philippines. Writing for the majority, Justice
Day attempted to reconcile the various decisions regarding the applicability
of the Constitution to the territories. The Court's decisions since the
beginning of the republic, he argued, established that (1) "the Constitution of
the United States is the only source of power authorizing action by any
branch of the federal government";1 577 (2) the United States may acquire
territory through the treaty-making and war powers, "and for that purpose
has the powers of other sovereign nations"; 1578 and (3) Congress may govern
the territories "without being subject to all the restrictions which are imposed
1572. Id. at 239 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1573. Id. at 236 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1574. Id. at 239-40 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1575. Id. at 247 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1576. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904).




upon that body when passing laws for the United States.' ' 1579 Day concluded
that the Framers, in adopting the Territory Clause, had recognized a power to
hold territory which was not incorporated into the United States or covered
by all constitutional provisions, 1580 and that the cases had "firmly established
the power of the United States, like other sovereign nations, to acquire
[additional territory] by the methods known to civilized people."'
' 58'
Applying these principles to the issue in Dorr, Day concluded that the
Philippines were not incorporated and that the treaty with Spain "reserve[d]
to Congress, so far as it could be constitutionally done, a free hand in dealing
with these newly-acquired territories.'' 582 The President had instructed the
Philippine Commission that the right to trial by jury would not apply in the
Philippines, because, according to the Court, "the civilized portion of the
islands had a system of jurisprudence founded upon the civil law, and the
uncivilized parts of the archipelago were wholly unfitted to exercise the right
to trial by jury."'1583 As in Mankichi, the Court concluded that the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment criminal protections did not apply to the Philippines and
that the existing system adequately protected the fundamental rights of the
accused. 1584 The contrary position-that "[i]f the United States, impelled by
its duty or advantage, shall acquire territory peopled by savages,. .. it must
establish there the trial by jury"--was patently unworkable, according to
Day. 1 585  "To state such proposition demonstrates the impossibility of
carrying it into practice."'
' 586
Justice Harlan now dissented alone, 1587 arguing that the majority
approach "is utterly revolting to my mind and can never receive my
sanction."'' 588 Harlan continued to argue that the constitutional protections of
life, liberty, and property were "for the benefit of all, of whatever race or
nativity" over which the U.S. government exercised its jurisdiction. 589 The
prohibition against criminal prosecution other than by grand and petit jury
was an absolute mandate "addressed to every one committing a crime
punishable by the United States."'' 590 The concept that this prohibition could
1579. Id. at 142.
1580. Id. at 143.
1581. Id. at 146.
1582. Id. at 143.
1583. Id. at 145.
1584. Id. at 146.
1585. Id. at 148.
1586. Id.
1587. Justices Peckham, Fuller, and Brewer concurred only because the decision in Hawaii v.
Mankichi that the grand and petit jury provisions of the Constitution were not fundamental was now
binding precedent. They continued to reject White's incorporation theory from the Downes
concurrence.
1588. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 156 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1589. Id. at 154 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1590. Id. at 155 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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be disregarded in the Philippines, when it could not be in the contiguous
territories of the United States, "is ... so obviously inconsistent with the
Constitution that I cannot regard the judgment of the court otherwise than as
an amendment of that instrument by judicial construction."'' 591  Harlan
concluded that the Court had rewritten the Constitution to read: "The trial of
all crimes .... except where Filipinos are concerned, shall be by jury.' 592
The fact that provision of grand and petit juries might be inconvenient was
"of slight consequence compared with the dangers to our system of
government arising from judicial amendments of the Constitution."'5 93
In Kepner v. United States,1594 decided the same day as Dorr, the Court
finally enforced the prohibition against double jeopardy in the Philippines-
not because the protection was constitutionally mandated, but because it had
been extended there by Congress. In the 1902 statute establishing a tem-
porary government in the Philippines, Congress had provided, inter alia, that
"no person for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment."'' 595 The United States nevertheless argued that the statute had
simply continued the Spanish law tradition, which prohibited jeopardy only
after all appeals (and retrials) were exhausted. 1596 The Supreme Court re-
jected this contention, finding that the 1902 Act had applied much of the Bill
of Rights to the Philippines, and declining to address whether the provision
would apply absent the legislation.
Confirming that their apparent purpose was to make as few
constitutional provisions applicable to the Philippines as possible, Justices
Brown, White, McKenna, and Holmes dissented. 597  Justice Brown em-
braced the government's argument, while Justice Holmes, who opened his
dissent warning against the danger of criminals escaping justice, denied that
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy barred someone who
had been acquitted from being retried for the same offense.
598
In contrast to the decisions relating to Puerto Rico and the Philippines,
the Court held in Rassmussen v. United States1599 that the Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial applied to Alaska, which had been incorporated into the
United States. Writing for the majority, Justice White held that the treaty
1591. Id.
1592. Id. at 156 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1593. Id. at 155 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1594. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
1595. Id. at 117 (citing Military Order No. 58 (Apr. 23, 1900) § 5, at 3).
1596. Id. at 120.
1597. Louise Weinberg, Holmes' Failure, 96 MICH. L. REV. 691, 707 (1998) (criticizing
Justice Holmes's jurisprudence for systematic failure to enforce constitutional rights).
1598. Kepner, 195 U.S. at 134 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
1599. 197 U.S. 516 (1905). The defendant had been convicted for operating a house of
prostitution by a six-member jury, as provided by the Code of Alaska, which had been adopted for
the territory by Congress.
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with Russia, which provided that Alaska's inhabitants (with the exception of
"uncivilized native tribes") "shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the
rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States,"' 60 0 had
incorporated Alaska into the United States. 160 ' The Court rejected the
government's argument that Alaska was either an unincorporated or
unorganized territory and that the Constitution therefore did not apply. 
602
Justice Brown concurred on the ground that the treaty with Russia had
affirmatively applied the Constitution to Alaska, and reaffirmed his position
from Downes that "the Constitution does not apply to Territories acquired by
treaty until Congress has so declared, and that in the meantime, under its
power to regulate the territories, it may deal with them regardless of the
Constitution, except so far as concerns the natural rights of their inhabitants
to life, liberty and property.' 1603 Although he had acquiesced in the analysis
in Dorr, Brown now strenuously objected to the Court's reliance on the
incorporation theory, arguing that the doctrine had not enjoyed a majority in
Downes, had not been urged by the parties in their arguments or briefs, and
had "never since that time received the endorsement of this court.'
16 04
Brown preferred an approach that allowed Congress to extend the
Constitution to a territory clause by clause, as it saw fit. 160 5 Brown argued
that the decisions regarding the incorporation of Alaska and Hawaii were
inherently inconsistent, and rendered the incorporation doctrine meaningless.
When is a territory incorporated so as to make the Constitution
applicable in all its provisions? ... May Congress, in organizing or
incorporating a territory, restrict the application of the Constitution to
it, or must it give it all? What is an organized as distinguished from
an incorporated territory?...
Hitherto we have been content to divide our Territories into the
organized and unorganized; but now we are asked to introduce a new
classification of 'incorporated' Territories, without attempting to
define what shall be deemed an incorporation. 606
Justice Harlan also rejected the incorporation argument and concurred on the
grounds that the Constitution became fully applicable to Alaska immediately
upon ratification of the treaty with Russia, "without any power in Congress
to add to or impair or destroy that right."'
' 60 7
1600. Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America, June 20,
1867, U.S.-Russ., art. I11, 15 Stat. 539, 452.
1601. Rassmussen, 197 U.S. at 522.
1602. Id. at 525.
1603. Id. at 531 (Brown, J., concurring).
1604. Id. at 532 (Brown, J., concurring).
1605. Id. at 536 (Brown, J., concurring).
1606. Id. at 533-35 (Brown, J., concurring).
1607. Id. at 531 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Like the alien cases, the Insular decisions ultimately reflected a
compromise between the extreme position asserted by the government that
the Constitution did not apply at all to the new possessions and the position
that extraconstitutional governance was utterly inconsistent with American
principles of enumerated powers and limited government. In the end, the
Court ultimately accepted the theory that the Constitution nominally applied,
albeit in skeletal form, while deferring almost entirely to Congress regarding
the citizenship status of the inhabitants and the constitutional protections that
they would enjoy. Unlike the Indian and alien cases, there was no dispute
regarding the public international law rule relating to state authority over
ceded territories and peoples, and international practice provided substantial
support for the Court's solution.
The result of the Insular decisions was to place the U.S. overseas
territories into a uniquely ambiguous status similar to that held by the Indian
tribes. Like the tribal members in the Indian cases, the inhabitants of the
overseas possessions were neither citizens nor foreign nationals-they were
subjects. Both the trust status of Indians and the "unincorporated" status of
territories were created, defined, and terminated at the will of Congress. As
in Indian cases, citizenship proved irrelevant in this context. The decisions
stripping the territories of constitutional protection applied equally to U.S.
citizens present in Puerto Rico and the Philippines as to the islands' local
inhabitants. As in In re Ross, a U.S. citizen tried for capital crimes in the
Insular territories was equally unprotected by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. Ironically, citizens in Puerto Rico enjoyed fewer con-
stitutional protections in the Insular territories than resident aliens in the
United States, who, under Yick Wo and Wong Wing, were entitled to full
constitutional protection of their persons and property.
The insignificance of citizenship and the infinite malleability of the
incorporation doctrine were underscored by the Court's 1922 decision in
Balzac v. Porto Rico, which again raised the application of the Article III
right to criminal jury trial to the island. 1608 In the 1917 Jones Act organizing
the Puerto Rican government, Congress had granted U.S. citizenship to
Puerto Rican residents and adopted a "Bill of Rights" for the island, which
excluded the rights to grand and petit jury. 160 9 Despite the facts that (1)
Article III expressly applies beyond the states; 1610 (2) the right to jury trial
already existed in Puerto Rico for felonies and, before the case was decided,
1608. Balzac, 258 U.S. 298; accord Porto Rico v. Tapia, 245 U.S. 639 (1918) (per curiam);
Porto Rico v. Muratti, 245 U.S. 639 (1918) (per curiam).
1609. Organic (Jones) Act of Porto Rico of Mar. 2, 1917, 38 Stat. 951 (1918); see also Balzac,
258 U.S. at 305-08 (noting that the Jones Act's Bill of Rights included "substantially every one of
the guarantees of the federal constitution" except those relating to a right to trial by jury).
1610. U.S. CONST. art. III ("The trial of all crimes.., shall be by jury; and.., when not




had been applied to all crimes by statute;' 611 and (3) the Court had found that
less specific language incorporated Alaska in Rassmussen, the Court declined
to infer incorporation. 612 As in the Indian decision in Sandoval, the Court
concluded that citizenship was "entirely consistent with non-incorporation"
and limited constitutional protection. 1613 Implicitly arguing from ter-
ritoriality, the Court reasoned, "It is locality that is determinative of the
application of the Constitution, in such matters as judicial procedure, and not
the status of the people who live in it.' ' 1614 The Court noted that Alaska had
"involved none of the difficulties which incorporation of the Philippines and
Porto Rico present(ed],"'' 615 and that the fact that incorporation was a step
toward statehood urged caution with respect to "distant ocean communities
of a different origin and language" than America.' 616 Thus, as in the Indian
cases, neither citizenship nor presence in territory subject to full U.S.
sovereignty was sufficient for the Court to bestow full constitutional
protections on this "subordinate" group.
The later Insular Cases ultimately rooted Congress's authority in both
the Territory Clause and inherent powers, and thus did not rely solely on
extraconstitutional sources of national authority. However, the powers that
were attributed to the Territory Clause derived from theories of inherent
sovereign powers and authority under international law. The Court's
conclusions-that the status of the territories was largely a political question
dedicated to Congress and that only fundamental constitutional protections
applied-along with its failure to identify any protections deemed
"fundamental," left the governance of U.S. overseas territories largely in an
extraconstitutional zone whose boundaries were governed by inherent
sovereign powers.
The treatment of U.S. territories in the Insular Cases also contrasted
sharply with the Supreme Court's approach to territorial conflicts between
Congress and the states. In a 1907 dispute between Kansas and Colorado re-
garding Colorado's diversion of non-navigable waters, 161 7 the United States
sought to intervene, citing the government's alleged duty to legislate
nationally "for the reclamation of arid lands," including large tracts of federal
territory. 1618 The government based its authority on the Territory Clause and
"the doctrine of sovereign and inherent powers," arguing that "[a]ll
1611. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 302-03.
1612. Id. at 309.
1613. Id. at 308.
1614. Id. at 309.
1615. Id.
1616. Id. at311.
1617. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
1618. Id. at 86.
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legislative power must be vested in ... the National Government."'1 619 The
Court unanimously dismissed this contention, finding that none of the enu-
merated powers of Congress "by any implication [refers] to the reclamation
of arid lands,"'1620 and that "the proposition that there are legislative powers
affecting the Nation as a whole which belong to, although not expressed in
the grant of powers, is in direct conflict with the doctrine that this is a
government of enumerated powers." Writing for the Court, Justice
Brewer noted that the contention that all powers not held by the States must
rest in the national legislature ignored the Constitution's express reservation
of all non-enumerated powers to the people. "Its principal purpose was not
the distribution of power between the United States and the States, but a re-
servation to the people of all powers not granted." 1622 Brewer acknowledged
that the Framers had not anticipated the need for arid land reclamation, but
that, "as our national territory has been enlarged, we have within our borders
extensive tracts of arid lands which ought to be reclaimed, and it may well be
that no power is adequate for their reclamation other than that of the National
Government. But, if no such power has been granted, none can be
exercised."' 1623 Congress's power to legislate regarding arid lands, the Court
found, was limited to the territories, where "Congress has full power of
legislation, subject to no restrictions other than those expressly named in the
Constitution." 1624 "No independent and unmentioned power" passes to the
national government.
1625
H. The Modern Territorial Doctrine
As in the Indian and alien contexts, the doctrines established during the
inherent powers era have continued to govern U.S. authority over territorial
possessions. Of the territories acquired between 1898 and 1900, only
Hawaii, which began petitioning for statehood in 1903,1626 was ultimately
granted statehood in 1959. None of the Insular territories have ever been
incorporated into the United States. Puerto Ricans were allowed to adopt a
constitution, form their own government, and were given commonwealth
status between 1950 and 1952, although their constitution remained subject
to amendment by Congress. Residents of the Philippines were restricted by
quotas from traveling to the United States in 1934,1627 and the Philippines
1619. Id. at 89.
1620. Id. at 88.
1621. Id. at 89.
1622. Id. at 90.
1623. Id. at 91-92.
1624. Id. at92.
1625. Id. at 88.
1626. See LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1149, at 76.
1627. See id. at 28.
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were granted independence in 1946. The inhabitants of American Samoa
still have not been granted citizenship, but remain U.S. "nationals,"',
628
though at least the political elites of Samoa appear to prefer their non-citizen,
unincorporated territorial status.
The Supreme Court remains reluctant to constrain congressional power
in the territories. The Court, for example, has recognized broad authority for
Congress to discriminate against territorial citizens in bestowing government
benefits. In Califano v. Torres1629 and Harris v. Rosario,1630 the Court
summarily upheld the authority of Congress to deny disability and welfare
benefits to Puerto Ricans against right-to-travel and equal protection
challenges. The Court expressly relied on the Territory Clause to hold that
"Congress ... may treat Puerto Rico differently from States so long as there
is a rational basis for its actions."' 63 1 Although the Court presumed that the
relevant constitutional provisions applied in both cases, the Court accepted
the federal justification for the discrimination without analysis in brief per
curiam opinions. 1632 Thus, the Court has essentially applied a rational basis
standard to federal actions in the territories that are alleged to violate
fundamental individual rights.
1633
Courts also have expanded plenary power over territories to recognize a
broad executive authority over the territories, generally stemming from the
strategic function of U.S. overseas possessions and the Commander in Chief
power. 1634 Guam and Samoa, for example, were governed exclusively by the
U.S. Navy until Congress finally legislated for them following World War
1628. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 50, at 75.
1629. 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (rejecting a right-to-travel challenge to discrimination in SSI benefits).
1630. 446 U.S. 651 (1980) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to discrimination in Social
Security benefits).
1631. Id. at 651-52; accord Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 3 n.4 (1978) ("Congress has the
power to treat Puerto Rico differently, and... every federal program does not have to be extended
to it.").
1632. The Court simply recited the government's justifications in a footnote. Califano, 435
U.S. at 5 n.7.
1633. Harris, 446 U.S. at 654 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Heightened scrutiny under the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment, the Court concludes, is simply unavailable to
protect Puerto Rico or the citizens who reside there from discriminatory legislation, as long as
Congress acts pursuant to the Territory Clause."). But see Case Comment, The Right To Travel-
Residence Requirements and Former Residents: Fisher v. Reiser, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1585, 1587
n.26 (1980) (suggesting that Califano stands for the more modest proposition that "[c]ourts
traditionally have accorded a rebuttable presumption of constitutionality to statutes providing for the
allocation of monetary benefits").
1634. See United States v. Angcog, 190 F. Supp. 696, 699 (D. Guam 1961) ("The President is
the Commander in Chief of the United States Armed Forces... and it was in this capacity that [he]
possessed his authority to govern Guam."). Cf Feliciano v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 1356
(D.P.R. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 422 F.2d 943 (1st Cir. 1970). See also D. Michael Green,
America's Strategic Trusteeship Dilemma: Its Humanitarian Obligations, 9 TEX. INT'L L.J. 19
(1974); Note, Executive Authority Concerning the Future Political Status of the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1277 (1968).
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11.1635 Even then, courts upheld the authority of the President to bar travel by
U.S. citizens and territorial inhabitants to areas within these islands
designated as militarily sensitive. 1636 As in the alien context, national self-
preservation and security concerns have contributed to the plenary power
doctrine's endurance.
Some inroads on the doctrine have been made, however. Although the
concept of inherent powers played an important role in the construction of
the Insular doctrine, the rhetoric of inherent powers has largely disappeared
from judicial analysis, and modern courts have assumed that the authority
derives from the Constitution. 1637 Moreover, in the latter half of the twen-
tieth century, federal courts gradually expanded the range of constitutional
protections that applied to the territories. Despite the textual limitation of the
Republican Guarantee Clause to states, the Supreme Court has held that local
voting rights are fundamental rights that apply to the territories,' 638 and has
suggested, without deciding, that the right to travel
1639 and habeas corpus 1640
also apply. Because many constitutional provisions have been extended to
the territories by statute, however, it is often difficult to determine the extent
to which the courts view the extension as constitutionally mandated. In
1989, for example, the Court invalidated a Virgin Islands residency
requirement for bar membership based on Congress's affirmative extension
1635. See 25 Op. Att'y Gen. 292 (1904) ("The political status of... [Guam] is anamolous.
Neither the Constitution nor the laws of the United States have been extended to... [it], and the
only administrative authority existing in... [it] is that derived.., from the President as
Commander in Chief .. "), cited in Angcog, 190 F. Supp. at 699. Congress finally exercised its
territorial authority over Guam in 1950. Organic Act of Guam, 64 Stat. 384 (1950).
1636. See LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1149, at 16. Between 1950 and 1962, the United States
prohibited travel by U.S. citizens to Guam and parts of Puerto Rico and American Samoa on
national security grounds. The restrictions reportedly were lifted when Governor John Connally of
Texas was barred from traveling to Guam in 1962 and personally called President Kennedy to
complain. Id. at 16 n.46.
1637. E.g., Harris, 446 U.S. at 651 (deriving congressional power from the Territory Clause);
Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (same). For further discussion of post-Insular
developments and modem constitutional implications of the doctrine, see Sanford Levinson, Why
the Canon Should be Expanded to Include the Insular Cases and the Saga of American
Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241 (2000); Neuman, supra note 54, at 182; Aleinikoff,
supra note 54; LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1149, at 26-27; David M. Helfeld, How Much of the Federal
Constitution is Likely to be Held Applicable to Puerto Rico?, 39 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 169 (1970).
1638. Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 8 (1982) (holding that "the voting
rights of Puerto Rico citizens are constitutionally protected to the same extent as those of all other
citizens of the United States").
1639. Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. at 4 n.6 (1977) ("For purposes of this opinion we may
assume that there is a virtually unqualified constitutional right to travel between Puerto Rico and
any of the 50 States of the Union.").
1640. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (suggesting that non-enemy aliens held on
U.S. territory may be entitled to habeas protection). But see Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55
(D.D.C. 2002) (appeal pending) (holding that Eisentrager bars aliens held outside sovereign U.S.
territory from seeking habeas corpus).
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of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause to the territory.' 641 The
Court did not address whether the clause was sufficiently fundamental (or
whether the territory was sufficiently analogous to a "State") to apply absent
that congressional action.1 642 The Court has recognized since Balzac that the
First Amendment applies to Puerto Rico, but because the 1917 Organic Act
extended First Amendment free speech protections to the territory, the Court
has never addressed the Amendment's independent application. 1643 In Torres
v. Puerto Rico, the Court likewise held that Fourth Amendment protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures applied to Puerto Rico, without
indicating whether it was relying on congressional extension of the clause or
constitutional mandate.'
1 644
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that principles of due process
and equal protection apply to Puerto Rico, though it has declined to root the
protection in any specific constitutional provision. In Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., the Supreme Court suggested that these
principles applied as a matter of fundamental law, asserting that "there
cannot exist under the American flag any governmental authority
untrammeled by the requirements of due process of law as guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States." 1645 In Examining Board of Engineers v.
Flores de Otero, the Supreme Court struck down a Puerto Rican statute
restricting civil engineering licenses to citizens as violating equal protection
and due process. 646 Without deciding whether the constitutional prohibition
derived from the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, the Court applied strict
scrutiny principles that the Court has employed for state laws discriminating
on the basis of alienage. 1647 The Court's unwillingness to identify the source
1641. Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 559 (1989).
1642. Id. (discussing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.")).
1643. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 331 n.1 (1986) (citing Balzac v.
Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 314 (1922)) (upholding territorial statute against commercial speech
challenge). See also El Vocero de P.R. v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 (1993) (per curiam) (freedom
of press).
1644. Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 470-71 (1979). The Court noted that Congress had
applied Fourth Amendment rights to Puerto Rico by statute since 1917, that the protection was
preserved in Puerto Rico's constitution, and that application of the clause to Puerto Rico would not
involve "danger to national interests or risk of unfairness." Id. at 470. The Court then suggested
that the constitutional provision applied ex proprio vigore, noting that "[a]s in [Flores], we have no
occasion to determine whether the Fourth Amendment applies to Puerto Rico directly or by
operation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 471 (citation omitted).
1645. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 669 n.5 (quoting Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d 377, 382 (1st Cir.
1953)).
1646. Examining Bd. ofEng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
1647. Id. at 601-02. Cf Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 618-19 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that
the Fifth Amendment applies to Micronesia regardless of its status as a trust territory, because "it is
settled that 'there cannot exist under the American flag any governmental authority untrammeled by
the requirements of due process of law"').
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of the constitutional protection, however, raised a number of cognitive
difficulties. Applying equal protection to the territory through the Fourteenth
Amendment would have required a finding that the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico was the equivalent of a "State" for purposes of that Amendment. On
the other hand, concluding that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
applied to Puerto Rico would require viewing that government as the con-
tinuing instrument of Congress, thus undermining Puerto Rican sovereignty.
This approach might also suggest that the Court should have applied, not the
strict standard of scrutiny applicable to state discrimination against aliens,
but the more lenient rational basis scrutiny applied to congressional
measures, in deference to Congress's plenary authority over aliens.
1 648
The lower courts have found a number of additional provisions
applicable to the territories, including the Eighth Amendment protection
against cruel and unusual punishment'
649 and the Eleventh Amendment. 650
The Fifth Amendment double jeopardy provisions have been applied to
actions by both the federal and local governments in the territories, 65'
though the lower courts have divided over whether territorial governments
constitute separate sovereigns for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 652  Despite the fact that the Supreme Court held in 1968 that the
right to jury trial for serious criminal offenses applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, 653 the lower courts are divided regarding
whether the right to criminal jury trial similarly applies to the territories. 1654
1648. It might be possible, however, to argue under Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong that even
under the Fifth Amendment, local Puerto Rican legislation is not entitled to the more lenient rational
basis test. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (holding that the federal
government must assert an overriding national interest, and requiring a legitimate basis for
presuming that a rule was actually intended to serve that interest, in order to justify a rule barring
aliens from federal employment that would not be acceptable if adopted by a state).
1649. Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F. Supp. 14, 33 (D.P.R. 1979).
1650. Fernandez v. Chardon, 681 F.2d 42, 59 n.13 (1st Cir. 1982) ("The Commonwealth enjoys
the full benefits of the eleventh amendment."). The Eleventh Amendment's application appears to
derive from the assumption that Puerto Rico enjoys a sovereign's common law authority to avoid
suit. See Salkin v. Puerto Rico, 408 F.2d 682 (lstCir. 1969).
1651. Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 264 (1937).
1652. Compare United States v. Sanchez, 992 F.2d 1143, 1152 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (holding that
"[t]he authority with which Puerto Rico brings charges as a prosecuting entity derives from the
United States as sovereign," and double jeopardy bars a second prosecution), with United States v.
Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1167-68 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that Puerto Rico is a separate sovereign,
and double jeopardy does not bar prosecution).
1653. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
1654. Compare Torres v. Delgado, 391 F. Supp. 379, 383 (D.P.R. 1974) (holding that the right
to jury trial is fundamental and applicable to Puerto Rico), with King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11, 17
(D.D.C. 1977) (holding that the right to criminal jury trial applies to American Samoa because it is
not "impractical and anomalous"), and Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig,
723 F.2d 682, 689-90 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the right to jury trial is fundamental to the
"Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty," but not fundamental to free government in the




Where constitutional provisions do apply, the courts often have
restricted the scope of the rights protected, either by concluding that the
particular protection is not available, or by applying a deferential standard of
review. In recent years, these decisions have been based, in part, on a desire
to accommodate cultural differences and self-determination among the
territorial inhabitants. In the spring of 2000, for example, the Supreme Court
summarily affirmed a decision that the "one-person, one-vote" requirements
of the Equal Protection Clause did not apply to the U.S. citizens of the
unincorporated Northern Mariana Islands. The court found that, while equal
protection generally applied to the territory, the specific equal protection
right at issue was not one of "those fundamental limitations in favor of
personal rights" which are "the basis of all free government."' 1655  Lower
courts have applied a similar analysis to uphold the decision of the Northern
Mariana government not to afford a right to jury trial 1656 and to conclude that
even if the right to criminal jury trial applies, it does not include a right to
unanimous verdicts. 65 7  In Wabol v. Villacrusis, 658 the Ninth Circuit
likewise held that while the Equal Protection Clause applied to the territories,
it would be impractical and anomalous to apply equal protection to invalidate
a race-based restriction on land sales that was intended to protect traditional
island culture. The court therefore concluded that equal protection analysis
did not apply in this context.1659 And Banks v. American Samoa Government
upheld a race-based employment preference for American Samoans, finding,
under the Insular Cases, that the relevant equal protection principles were
not fundamental to all free and civilized societies and thus not applicable in
American Samoa, "at least when they would tend to be destructive of the
traditional culture."' 1660  Finally, like the benefits decisions in Califano and
Harris, lower courts have held that race-based classifications satisfied
traditional strict scrutiny analysis, albeit without scrutinizing the alleged
compelling interest or requiring that measures be narrowly tailored. 1
661
1655. Torres v. Sablan, 528 U.S. 110 (2000), aff'g Rayphand v. Sablan, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1133
(D. N. Mar. 1. 1999) (quoting Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1904)).
1656. Atalig, 723 F.2d at 689-90.
1657. Delgado, 391 F. Supp. at 383 ("The requirement of unanimity is not fundamental to the
right of trial by jury and, as such, is not applicable to the jury trials in the courts of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.").
1658. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1461 n.19 (9th Cir. 1992) ("It is the specific right of
equality that must be considered for purposes of territorial protection, rather than the broad general
guarantee of equal protection.").
1659. Id. at 1460-61 (rejecting an equal protection challenge to land alienation as not
implicating a fundamental right in the international sense).
1660. Banks v. American Samoa Gov't, 4 Am. Samoa 2d 113, 125 (1987).
1661. See Craddick v. Territorial Registrar of Am. Sam., 1 Am. Samoa 2d 10, 14 (1980)
(applying strict scrutiny to uphold restrictions on the sale of privately held land to non-Samoans,
finding, without requiring evidentiary support, that a compelling state interest in preserving island
lands and culture justified the measure); see also Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426
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Thus, as in the Indian and alien contexts, courts have tolerated overt
race-based discrimination by territories under federal authority that would
not be tolerated if enacted by states.1662 And, as in the Indian cases, the lack
of full constitutional application to the territories has had some benefits.
Territories, like Indian tribes, are excluded from federal tax laws, though the
constitutionality of these measures in the territories has not been considered.
Territorial laws discriminating in favor of territorial inhabitants on the basis
of race or ethnicity have been upheld under highly deferential equal
protection analysis, with the result that territorial residents and Native
Americans may become the only groups in America who may lawfully
continue to carry out and benefit from affirmative action programs. 1663
While some additional constitutional protections have been recognized
in the territories, the basic holding of the Insular Cases that only fundamental
rights apply has endured. In the 1950 case of Johnson v. Eisentrager, the
Supreme Court combined alienage and territoriality principles to hold that
aliens who actively assisted the enemy during wartime and were tried and
detained by the U.S. military outside of sovereign U.S. territory were not
entitled to habeas review regarding the legality of their sentences. 1664 Both
the majority and dissenters cited Downes in support of their positions.1661 In
1957, the Supreme Court held in Reid v. Covert that the right to jury trial
applied to the capital trial of U.S. civilians on military bases abroad.1666 A
four-member plurality of the Court narrowly cabined the Insular Cases
1667
U.S. 572, 605-06 (1976) (invalidating discrimination based on alienage under traditional strict
scrutiny analysis).
1662. Cf. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 524 (2000) (striking down state voting preference for
persons of Hawaiian ancestry).
1663. See, e.g., Banks, 4 Am. Samoa 2d at 124 n.4 (noting that "in the absence of [the Insular
Cases], the constitutionality of the Samoan preference as an affirmative action plan would be
problematic"); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (upholding the constitutionality of an
"Indian preference" statute for employment in the Bureau of Indian Affairs). The differential
treatment of both Indians and territorial inhabitants is justified on the grounds of their semi-
sovereign status and the United States' trust obligation towards them.
1664. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950) (Jackson, J.) ("[T]hese prisoners at no
relevant time were within any territory over which the United States is sovereign, and the scenes of
their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of any court of the United States."). The decision, as Justice Black criticized in dissent,
allowed the executive branch to decide whether constitutional protections and judicial review of its
actions would be available merely "by deciding where its prisoners will be tried and imprisoned."
Id. at 795 (Black, J., dissenting). But see In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1945) (holding that the
executive branch may not, short of a suspension of the writ of habeas, deny the Court power to
examine the authority of a military commission to try an enemy alien overseas).
1665. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784-85 (Jackson, J.); id. at 797 (Black, J., dissenting). This
decision remains in force and is the government's primary precedent for the legal status of the
enemy aliens currently detained on Guantanamo.
1666. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
1667. Id. at 14 (Black, J., plurality opinion) ("It is our judgment that neither the [Insular] cases
nor their reasoning should be given any further expansion. The concept that the Bill of Rights and
other constitutional protections against arbitrary government are inoperative when they become
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and rejected In re Ross as "a relic from a different era.' 1668  Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan, in concurrence, sought to distinguish and narrow the
holdings in In re Ross and the Insular Cases16 6 9 but did not entirely deny
their continued vitality. Frankfurter accordingly argued that the application
of constitutional provisions abroad was to be decided on a case-by-case
basis,' 670 and Harlan argued that constitutional rights applied to U.S. actions
abroad when they were not "impractical and anomalous."'' 671 In 1979, a four-
member plurality in Torres followed Reid to conclude that given "the
particular historical context in which they were decided," the Insular Cases
were "not authority for questioning the application of the Fourth
Amendment-or any other provision of the Bill of Rights-to the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico .... ,,1672 Nevertheless, the imperial era cases
have retained vitality, and, when read in combination with Reid, have simply
modified the analysis of the Constitution's application from whether a partic-
ular provision is "fundamental" to free government to a case-by-case analysis
regarding whether the application of the right would be "impractical and
anomalous" in any particular country.
The resulting tension in analysis was evident in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, in which the Court followed the Insular Cases, In re
Ross, and the Reid plurality to conclude that the Fourth Amendment did not
apply to the seizure of a nonresident alien's property abroad. 673 Writing for
a bare majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued, in a social contract analysis
reminiscent of Chief Justice Taney, that the Fourth Amendment's reference
to "the people" excluded aliens lacking substantial contacts with the United
States. 1674 Justice Kennedy's concurrence, which provided the critical fifth
inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to
flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution.").
1668. Id. at 12 (Black, J., plurality opinion). The holding in Reid was extended to non-capital
cases in Kinsela v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960), and McElroy v.
Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
1669. See, e.g., Reid, 354 U.S. at 56 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Insofar as [In re Ross]
expressed a view that the Constitution is not operative outside the United States ... it expressed a
notion that has long since evaporated."); id. at 67 (Harlan, J., concurring) (asserting that "we were
mistaken [last term] in interpreting In re Ross and the Insular Cases as standing for the sweeping
proposition that the safeguards of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments automatically
have no application to the trial of American citizens outside the United States, no matter what the
circumstances").
1670. Id. at 54 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("This Court considered the particular situation in
each newly acquired territory to determine whether the grant to Congress of power to govern
'Territory' was restricted by a specific provision of the Constitution.").
1671. Reid, 354 U.S. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
1672. Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 475-76 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment).
1673. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (1990). See id at 277 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (relying on the Reid plurality and noting that the Court has not invalidated the
Insular Cases or In re Ross).
1674. Id. at270-71.
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vote, distanced itself from this analysis and instead concluded that applying
the warrant requirement to aliens abroad would be "impractical and
anomalous.' '1675  Although Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in dicta that the
Court has emphatically rejected any extraterritorial application of the Fifth
Amendment, 1676 a majority of the Court, including Justice Kennedy, did not
embrace that analysis.
The United States continues to assert in litigation that aliens outside the
United States enjoy no constitutional protection. Thus, in Haitian Centers
Council v. McNary,1677 the United States maintained that Haitian political
asylum applicants being indefinitely detained on the U.S. naval base in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were not entitled to due process protection,' 678 and
in Miller v. Albright, the United States contended that an alien outside the
United States seeking to challenge a naturalization statute had no substantive
rights under the Fifth Amendment.' 679 More recently, in Rasul v. Bush, the
United States has contended that even friendly aliens detained outside the
United States have no protection under the Fifth Amendment and no access
to habeas corpus.
680
Despite the confusion in the doctrine, however, lower federal as well as
state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches of
aliens with some voluntary attachments to the United States168' and U.S.
citizens abroad, 1682 and that the Fifth Amendment Takings 1683 and Due
1675. Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also id. at 276 ("The restrictions that the United
States must observe with reference to aliens beyond its territory or jurisdiction depend.., on
general principles of interpretation, not on an inquiry as to who formed the Constitution or a
construction that some rights are mentioned as being those of 'the people."').
1676. Id. at 269 (citing Johnson v. Eisenstrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950); Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244, 284 (1901)).
1677. Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992).
1678. The refugee plaintiffs claimed that they had a Fifth Amendment right not to be forcibly
returned to Haiti without due process in the asylum proceedings being conducted on Guantanamo.
The United States attempted to portray the cause as one involving a right to enter the United States,
and contended that aliens had no constitutional rights in their request for admission. See Brief for
Appellants at 29-33, McNary (No. 92-6090).
1679. See Brief for the United States at 11-12, Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (No. 96-
1060) (positing that "such an alien has no substantive rights cognizable under the Fifth
Amendment").
1680. See Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's First Amended Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus at 20-21 & n.9, Rasul v. Bush, No. CV: 02-0299 (CKK) (D.D.C. 2002) (arguing
that the decision in Johnson v. Eisenstrager applies to all aliens abroad, and urging that "[n]either
the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in
respect of our own citizens" (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Co., 299 U.S. 304, 318
(1936))).
1681. Riechmann v. State, 581 So. 2d 133, 138 (Fla. 1991).
1682. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 270-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that
no warrant is required for foreign intelligence collection).
1683. Ramirez v. Weinberger, 788 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc) (reviewing U.S.
confiscation of an American citizen's property in Honduras for a military base); Turney v. United
States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 464 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (addressing the U.S. confiscation of military goods in
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Process Clauses 684 constrain some U.S. actions overseas. On the other hand,
two federal district courts recently affirmed the Johnson v. Eisentrager
holding, finding that alleged Al Qaeda and Taliban members deemed "enemy
combatants" by the executive, who had no contacts with the United States
and were held indefinitely on Guantanamo Naval Base, were not entitled to
habeas corpus.
685
The evolution of territorial status also has altered the constitutional
analysis to some degree. Although none of the Insular possessions have been
"incorporated" and placed on the road to statehood, several U.S. possessions
(most notably Puerto Rico and the Northern Marianas) have been granted
self-government and commonwealth status by mutual consent. This
devolution of power to the territorial governments has led some courts to
conclude that constitutional rights apply, not because they are fundamental,
but because the territories are the functional equivalents of states. The
Supreme Court has concluded that "the purpose of Congress in the 1950 and
1952 legislation was to accord to Puerto Rico the degree of autonomy and
independence normally associated with States of the Union, ' 1686 and courts
have suggested that Puerto Rico may enjoy the status of a "state" for
purposes of the Fifth, 1687 Eleventh, 1688 and Fourteenth Amendments. 1689 The
Supreme Court also has held that the Puerto Rican Commonwealth is
sufficiently sovereign to be considered a state for purposes of certain federal
the recently independent Philippines). The Turney court distinguished In re Ross on the grounds
that the Takings Clause could be applied "without inconvenience or practical difficulty." Id. at 464.
1684. Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that Haitian
refugees detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base raised a serious question regarding entitlement to
due process protection), vacated as moot, 509 U.S. 918 (1993); Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Sale, 823 F.
Supp. 1028, 1041-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that Haitians detained on Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base were entitled to due process protection), vacated by Stipulated Order Approving Class Action
Settlement Agreement (Feb. 22, 1994). See also Wang v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808, 817-18 (9th Cir.
1996) (finding that an alien paroled into the United States was protected by due process). But see
Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1427 (11 th Cir. 1995) (finding that
Cubans and Haitians provided safe haven at Guantanamo lacked a liberty or property interest to
trigger due process); Harbury v. Deutsch, 233 F.3d 596, 604 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Christopher v. Harbury, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (2002) (concluding that Verdugo's dicta
was binding and precluded extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment).
1685. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (appeal pending); Coalition of Clergy
v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Remarkably, the court in Rasul concluded that
Johnson v. Eisentrager applied not only to enemy combatants, but to all "aliens outside territory
over which the United States was sovereign." Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
1686. Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 594 (1976) (citing Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 671 (1974)).
1687. See Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d at 1168 ("Puerto Rico is to be treated as a state for purposes
of the double jeopardy clause.").
1688. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Chardon, 681 F.2d 42, 59 n.13 (1st Cir. 1982) (noting that the
Eleventh Amendment applies to Puerto Rico).
1689. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at 594; Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 671. See also Mora v.
Mejias, 206 F.2d 377, 382 (1st Cir. 1953) (finding that Puerto Ricans are entitled to due process
protection under the Commonwealth Agreement).
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jurisdictional statutes.'69 ° The analogy to statehood is not complete,
however. Territorial residents remain unable to elect voting members of
Congress or participate in the Electoral College because the applicable
constitutional provisions are textually limited to the "States.' 691 Territorial
residents also apparently are not entitled to citizenship under the Fourteenth
Amendment's provision for persons "born in the United States."'
' 692
Furthermore, a serious question remains whether territorial sovereignty
has "vested," as state sovereignty does when granted, or whether the legal
status of the territories remains subject to repeal by Congress. Some courts
have suggested that Congress's devolution of power to the territories is
irreversible, 693 while others have observed that "Congress may unilaterally
repeal the Puerto Rican Constitution ... and replace [it] with any rules or
regulations of its choice."' 16 94 As the Sanchez court put it:
Congress has simply delegated more authority to Puerto Rico over
local matters. But this has not changed in any way Puerto Rico's
constitutional status as a territory, or the source of power over Puerto
Rico. Congress continues to be the ultimate source of power pursuant
to the Territory Clause of the Constitution.' 
695
The Court distinguished territorial residents from inhabitants of later
admitted states, which although originally created by-and subject to-the
territorial authority of Congress, became permanent separate sovereigns,
protected by the Tenth Amendment, upon their formal admission to the
Union. 1696 The Supreme Court also has distinguished the sovereignty held by
1690. See Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at 597 (federal civil rights jurisdiction); Calero-Toledo,
416 U.S. at 670-76 (Three-Judge Court Act). But see Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41, 42
n.l (1970) (noting that a Puerto Rican statute is not a state statute within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §
1254(2), which permits Supreme Court review of Court of Appeals decisions holding state statutes
unconstitutional).
1691. See Iguarta De La Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8 (ist Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (noting
that only a constitutional amendment or grant of statehood could provide Puerto Rican residents
such voting rights).
1692. Valmonte v. INS, 136 F.3d 914, 918 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the Insular Cases
establish that persons born in the Philippines while it was a U.S. territory were not born within the
"United States" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).
1693. See United States ex rel. Richards v. Guerrero, 4 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that
the Northern Marianas covenant is legally binding on Congress); United States v. Andino, 831 F.2d
1164, 1168 (lst Cir. 1987) ("Puerto Rico, like a state, is an autonomous political entity.") (internal
citation omitted); United States v. Quinones, 758 F.2d 40, 42 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting that authority
in Puerto Rico flows from a compact which Congress cannot unilaterally amend).
1694. United States v. Sanchez, 992 F.2d 1143, 1152-53 (11 th Cir. 1993) (finding that Puerto
Rico remains subject to ultimate U.S. sovereignty). See also Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S.
253, 264 (1937) ("Both the territorial and federal laws and the courts, whether exercising federal or
local jurisdiction, are creations emanating from the same sovereignty.").
1695. Sanchez, 992 F.2d at 1152 (quoting Andino, 831 F.2d at 1176 (Torruella, J., concurring)).
1696. Id. at 1149 n.4.
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territorial governments from that enjoyed by Indian tribes,1697 reasoning that
while Indian tribes, like territorial governments, retain limited sovereignty
"only at the sufferance of Congress and.., subject to complete
defeasance,"' 1698 Indian sovereignty did not originate from Congress, as does
territorial sovereignty, but derived from a separate source of inherent
authority. 169 9 If territories indeed remain subject to ultimate congressional
power, this potentially would mean that Congress could rescind their
constitutions and withdraw all but the most fundamental constitutional
protections at will. And if territorial citizenship exists only at the behest of
Congress, then territorial inhabitants, like Indians, potentially remain
vulnerable to certain forms of expatriation.
700
VI. Inherent Powers and Constitutional Faith
In the period between 1886 and 1903, the Supreme Court embraced an
inherent powers theory to uphold broad federal authority in a series of cases
over Indians, aliens, and territories. The decisions in Kagama (1886), Chae
Chan Ping (1889), Church of Latter-Day Saints (1890), Jones (1890), In re
Ross (1891), Nishimura Ekiu (1892), Fong Yue Ting (1893), Stephens
(1899), Cherokee Nation (1902), Lone Wo/f(1903), the Insular Cases (1901-
1905), and others all invoked inherent authority that derived from
international law concepts of sovereignty and that was only tangentially con-
nected to the constitutional text. Both the decisions and the political actions
which they upheld reflected an approach to national sovereignty radically
different from the concepts of enumerated powers and limited government,
with powers reserved to the states and the people, that inspired the
Constitution. Within the boundaries of the organized states, and with respect
to full-fledged citizens, constitutional constraints of federalism, separation of
powers, and individual rights were fully operative. Yet, in its external affairs
and relations with non-members, the cases viewed the United States as a
complete sovereign in the international law sense. The result was a
bifurcated Constitution which had little more to say about U.S. actions
expelling aliens, or governing Indians and non-Anglo-Saxon peoples abroad,
than it said about the actions of any country in Europe. In the most extreme
1697. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (holding that double jeopardy does not bar
retrial between the United States and Indian tribes, because tribes are separate sovereigns within
their jurisdiction); cf Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding that constitutional provisions
do not apply to actions of Indian tribes, which enjoy original sovereignty not derived from
Congress).
1698. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
1699. See id. at 328 ("None of these laws created the Indians' power to govern
themselves....").
1700. See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971);
Vance v. Terrazas, 440 U.S. 910 (1980). See also LEIBOWITZ, supra note 1149, at 28 & n. 112;
supra note 540.
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late-nineteenth-century vision, these governmental actions were entirely
extraconstitutional, with the only constraints coming from international law.
The degree of disconnect between the Court's domestic and external
constitutional analysis is startling. During the 1890s and 1900s, the Court's
domestic jurisprudence focused on enforcing a formalistic vision of the
federal government and strictly applied concepts of federalism and separation
of powers to constrain national authority. The powers of both the states and
the national government were viewed as limited, either in relation to each
other or in their relation to the body politic. In the areas of antitrust,
interstate commerce, and labor regulation, to name a few, the Court engaged
in a searching exploration of the limits of governmental power. Thus, in
United States v. E.C. Knight,170 1 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
170 2
and Adair v. United States,'70 3 the Court invalidated federal efforts to
regulate monopolistic behavior, the federal income tax, and labor rights
legislation as exceeding the federal commerce authority. 170 4 "Commerce,"
Chief Justice Fuller famously pronounced in E.C. Knight, "succeeds to
manufacture, and is not a part of it.' 170 5 Domestically, the Court repeatedly
rejected the contention that the national government enjoyed some general
authority to legislate for the public welfare, since this authority had been
reserved to the states. But the Court's hostility toward governmental power
was broader than mere federalism concerns-it extended to the scope of
governmental authority as a whole. The decisions in Reagan v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co.170 6 and Lochner v. New York 17 0 7 invalidated state
legislation as violating the Fourteenth Amendment property and contract
rights of individuals. In these cases the Court's emphasis was on monitoring
the boundaries between individual constitutional rights and governmental
authority and preventing the government's accretion of "all-pervading
power."'
708
1701. 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (invalidating the Sherman Act).
1702. 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (invalidating the federal income tax).
1703. 208 U.S. 161, 179 (1908) (invalidating federal law banning anti-union practices by the
railroad industry).
1704. Despite the fact that the law applied to railroad transport, a classic vehicle of interstate
commerce, the Adair Court concluded that the promotion of labor unions did not facilitate
commerce. Id. See also The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 499 (1908) (striking down
a labor statute that banned common-law defenses to occupational injuries); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (invalidating a congressional measure to ban interstate movement of
goods made with child labor).
1705. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 12.
1706. 154 U.S. 362 (1894) (invalidating state-imposed railroad rates as denying railroads a fair
rate of return under the Equal Protection and Takings Clauses).
1707. 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) ("[T]here is a limit to the valid exercise of the police power by the
State .... Otherwise the Fourteenth Amendment would have no efficacy and the... States would
have unbounded power .... ").
1708. Id at 59. See also Reagan, 154 U.S. at 399 (Brewer, J.) ("This ... is a government of
law, and not a government of men, and it must never be forgotten that under such a government,
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In strictly limiting governmental authority in these cases, the Court
repeatedly rejected any appeal to inherent powers or necessity. Thus, in
invalidating the federal income tax in Pollock, Chief Justice Fuller stressed
the "delegated" nature of federal authority and expressly rejected the
argument that the taxation power was a necessary concomitant power of
sovereignty:
[I]t is said that the United States as "the representative of an
indivisible nationality, as a political sovereign equal in authority to
any other on the face of the globe... ," would be "but a maimed and
crippled creation after all," unless it possesses the power to lay a tax
on the income of real and personal property ....
[W]e are thus invited to hesitate in the enforcement of the mandate of
the Constitution ... lest a government of delegated powers should be
found to be, not less powerful, but less absolute, than the imagination
of the advocate had supposed.
170 9
Justice White, in dissent, complained that the majority had deprived the
government "of an inherent attribute of its being, a necessary power of
taxation.'' 1710  Justice Harlan, in his dissents in both Pollock.7 . and E.C.
Knight, similarly argued from necessity to attack the Court for stripping the
national government of an essential power. 1712 Finally, in the territory case
of Kansas v. Colorado, the Court unanimously dismissed the government's
theory that "the doctrine of sovereign and inherent power" justified a national
authority to reclaim eroding lands or to interfere with water use by states.1
713
Thus, the Court's domestic decisions affirmed the existence of a "late-
nineteenth-century orthodoxy" in which the Court viewed its role in domestic
cases as enforcing the social contract by policing the boundaries of
governmental power.' 
714
with its constitutional limitations and guarantees, the forms of law and the machinery of
government, with all their reach and power, must, in their actual workings, stop on the hither side of
the unnecessary and uncompensated taking or destruction of any private property .... ").
1709. Pollock, 158 U.S. at 634. The Constitution could be amended if the delegated powers
proved unworkable. Id. at 635.
1710. Id. at 715 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
1711. Id. at 680, 685 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1712. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 45 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the authority of
the national government "should not be so weakened by construction that it cannot reach and
eradicate evils that, beyond all question, tend to defeat an object which that government is entitled,
by the Constitution, to accomplish"). Harlan emphasized that the power to regulate the American
Sugar monopoly must exist in the Commerce Clause, because sugar was a necessity of life and the
national government was the only sovereign authority powerful enough to regulate such conduct.
Id. at 44-45.
1713. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89 (1907). The only domestic case of the era which
arguably relied on an inherent powers analysis was the 1884 decision in the Legal Tender Cases,
which, as discussed above, can be attributed to authority claimed by the national government
through exercise of the taxation power. See supra notes 846-54.
1714. Id. at 89-90 (affirming the Court's obligation to defend powers reserved to the people).
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The stark contrast between the Court's domestic and foreign affairs
jurisprudence raises two questions for the inherent powers cases. First, why
was the Court willing to authorize such sweeping, unrestrained federal power
in the foreign affairs realm? Why, for example, was it "necessary" to uphold
the subjugation of the Philippines, but not a federal income tax or state labor
legislation? Why, in particular, was the power upheld in nearly as complete
and unqualified a form as the powers held by autocratic European states?
And second, once the Court decided to uphold this broad authority, why was
it willing to locate the source of authority in international, inherent powers,
rather than in the constitutional text?
As discussed below, the answer to these questions appears to lie in a
complex convergence of racial and ascriptivist impulses, imperialist
ambitions, and concerns about dual federalism in the domestic sphere.
Arguments derived from international law, social contract theory,
territoriality, necessity, and the underdevelopment of individual rights were
offered as doctrinal explanations for the Court's decisions, but did not
compel the resort to inherent powers. Nativism and imperialist ambitions
explain the substantive results the Court reached as well as the Court's desire
to uphold sweeping national authority, but do not fully explain the Court's
willingness to resort to the anomalous doctrine of unenumerated, inherent
powers. The late-nineteenth-century Court's obsession with dual federalism,
by negative implication, justified the resort to inherent powers by
establishing (in the Court's mind), a protected sphere in which plenary
foreign affairs powers would not infringe upon state authority in the domestic
sphere. In the end, it was federalism, combined with the late-nineteenth-
century Court's authoritarian desire to uphold an expansive foreign affairs
authority, which created the inherent powers doctrine.
A. Doctrinal Justifications for an Anomalous Doctrine
The Court explained the legal conclusions it reached through theories of
international law, territoriality, social contract, necessity, and limited
individual rights protections. But the Court's doctrinal justifications for the
holdings ultimately are unsatisfying as an explanation for the resort to
inherent powers. Substantive principles of international law regarding state
power in the Indian and alien contexts were in conflict, and nothing in
international law required that Congress should be free of ordinary
constitutional constraints. International law simply had nothing to say about
the extent to which domestic law might constrain governmental power.
Social contract theories based on citizenship also were not ultimately
controlling, because even after Congress bestowed citizenship on Indians and
territorial inhabitants, the Court continued to uphold plenary federal power.
Nor did territoriality fully explain the Court's conclusions. Indians, of
course, were present in U.S. territory, and that very presence was used to
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justify plenary power over them. Aliens in exclusion proceedings were
located either on boats in San Francisco harbor or on the mainland, and
aliens in deportation proceedings were all physically present in the United
States. Territoriality could justify the lack of constitutional constraint in this
context only if the Court fictitiously "deemed" that these actions occurred
outside the United States. The Insular territories indisputably were U.S.
sovereign territory. In Ross, on the other hand, the United States was acting
extraterritorially, pursuant to the treaty power.' 71 5 But Japan had consented
to the operation of U.S. law, and the vessel at issue was subject to U.S.
jurisdiction, so neither territoriality nor comity logically barred the
Constitution's application.
Individual rights objections received scant consideration in the inherent
powers cases, 17 16 and some commentators have suggested that the
underdeveloped state of individual rights jurisprudence explains the lack of
constraint on federal power in these areas. This was the age of Plessy v.
Ferguson,1717 in which common-law and state-law protections, rather than
the Constitution, often formed the primary defenses of the individual. Due
process did not enjoy the robust meaning it would later acquire, and equal
protection did not apply to the national government. 71 8 Even if the Plessy-
era Court had adjudicated an equal protection claim, moreover, a reason-
ableness standard would have applied, and Justice Field, at least, thought
exclusion of the Chinese was reasonable. Thus, there would have been little
basis for the Chinese in Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting to challenge
national action under the Equal Protection Clause.
Nevertheless, the apologia for the cases based on weak individual rights
protections should not be overstated. The decisions in Chy Lung, Yick Wo,
Wong Wing, and numerous cases from the western territories, as well as the
decisions in Reagan, Lochner, and Adair, invalidated a range of
governmental actions as infringing on individual rights. Litigants in the
inherent powers cases repeatedly asserted such rights, many of which, such
as the right to jury trial, were well established in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.
Congressional opponents repeatedly invoked basic constitutional protections
to condemn the exercise of broad national power. The opinions of jurists
such as Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, and Field, and the persistent willingness of
the lower federal courts to afford due process protections to aliens in habeas
1715. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
1716. See, e.g., Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 294 (1902); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); In re
Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891); The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); and the later Insular Cases, supra note 45.
1717. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
1718. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause applies basic equal protection principles against the federal government).
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corpus proceedings, also demonstrate that a competing approach was
available to the Court in the form of the enumerated powers-limited
government doctrine which the Court was energetically applying in the
domestic realm.
The concept of necessity also appeared repeatedly throughout the
evolution of the inherent powers doctrine. Madison and Jefferson resorted to
the language of necessity to explain the Northwest Ordinance and the
Louisiana Purchase, respectively. In Johnson v. M'Intosh, Chief Justice
Marshall upheld the discovery doctrine as "indispensable to that system
under which the country has been settled,"' 1719 and Kagama upheld the Indian
power on the grounds that the authority "must exist" and "can be found
nowhere else." 1720 Justice Field in Chae Chan Ping invoked "necessit[ies]"
as urgent as "war" to uphold the exclusion of aliens, 1721 and "the necessities
of the case" were repeatedly asserted to support the Insular decisions. 
1722
Learned Hand described the doctrine of necessity as the process of
"interpolat[ing] into the text such provisions, though not expressed, as are
essential to prevent the defeat of the venture at hand." 1723 Hand viewed this
doctrine as applying "with [special] force to the interpretation of con-
stitutions, which, since they are designed to cover a great multitude of
necessarily unforseen occasions, must be cast in general language, unless
they are constantly amended."' 1724 And it would seem that on some level,
arguments from necessity in constitutional interpretation may be justified.
Like Voltaire's God, if the war power did not exist in the Constitution, would
it not be necessary to invent it? Once Louisiana was purchased, the reality
was that these lands would have to be governed. Similarly, when the need
arose, it made sense that some governmental power must exist to regulate the
influx of aliens. And as a structural matter, having once concluded that the
power must exist, the Court plausibly vested power over Indians,
immigration, and new territories in the national government due to "some
sense of the inevitable fitness of things."'
1725
Necessity, however, can mean many things and serve many purposes.
Jefferson invoked necessity not to justify the Louisiana Purchase's
1719. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 591 (1823).
1720. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886).
1721. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
1722. See, e.g., De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 196 (1901).
1723. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 14 (1958).
1724. Id. at 14-15.
1725. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 195-96 (1963); see also CHARLES BLACK,
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 (1964) (addressing arguments drawn
from "inference[s] from the structures and relationships created by the constitution"); PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 4 (1982); PHILIP BOBBITFr,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 16-17 (1991).
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constitutionality, but to explain the constitutional violation.1726  Necessity
could be invoked, as Justice Harlan did in E.C. Knight, to demonstrate why a
power should exist in a particular enumerated provision. 172 7  And the
extended debate over the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause sug-
gests that the mere invocation of necessity should not justify an action under
our constitutional structure. In the inherent powers decisions, however,
necessity was invoked in place of any enumerated powers analysis to justify
the power's legality.' 728 Moreover, the Court rarely, if ever, made any effort
to demonstrate that its reliance on necessity was warranted. Was an
unlimited power to exclude returning, lawful permanent residents in Chae
Chan Ping even plausibly as essential as the power to wage war? Resort to
necessity does not explain why the Court felt justified in relying on
extraconstitutional sources of authority, nor does it explain why the powers
were not subject to constitutional limits. And again, it does not explain why
the Court was willing to invoke necessity to uphold extratextual authority
over foreign relations but rejected the argument in domestic cases such as
Pollock and E. C. Knight.
In sum, the doctrines derived from international law, social contract
theory, territoriality, individual rights, and arguments from necessity
provided a framework for the Court to articulate the inherent powers theory,
but ultimately did not determine the outcome of the inherent powers cases.
These were doctrinal justifications offered for outcomes reached for other
reasons. In the end it was not doctrine that tipped the balance in favor of
inherent powers, but the nativist, authoritarian, and imperialist aspirations
and federalism concerns that uniquely characterized the Gilded Age.
B. The Will to Power: Nativist Authoritarianism and the Gilded Age
The Gilded Age was a period of audacious, relentless industrial
expansion and feverish exploitation of the nation's human and natural
resources which transformed America into an industrial giant by 1900.
1726. As Jefferson put it, "A strict observance of the written law is doubtless one of the high
duties of a good citizen but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, or self-preservation, of
saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation." 1810 letter to John Colvin, quoted in
DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 252 (1994). For
further discussion of the relationship between necessity and constitutional analysis, see BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 1725, at 17-18 (noting that prudential arguments in
constitutional interpretation are most likely to be decisive in times of national emergency).
1727. See supra note 1711.
1728. E.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (discussing the
necessity of self-preservation arising from "vast hordes ... crowding in upon us"). Justice
Campbell argued in Dred Scott that "the powers of Congress [over the territories] originated from
necessity, and arose out of and were only limited by events, or, in other words, they were
revolutionary in their very nature. Their extent depended upon the exigencies and necessities of
public affairs." Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 505 (1856) (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 232 (1796) (Chase, J., seriatim opinion)).
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Railroad and mining interests fueled the era's hunger for Indian lands, while
industrialists craved immigrant labor in America's cities. Capitalist growth
also fed the search for cheap resources and new markets abroad as
industrialists, having completed their conquest of America, turned outward.
But the Gilded Age also was a period of tremendous insecurity for the
American people. 1729 Industrialization produced rapid urbanization, the in-
flux of millions of new immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe and
Asia, and the emergence of urban poverty, all of which transformed
American cities. Growing economic stratification between rich and poor
resulted, by 1890, in one percent of the populace controlling more than half
of the country's wealth. 1730 Severe economic depressions in the 1870s and
1890s, along with class struggle and labor agitations such as the Haymarket
Riot of 1886 and the Pullman strike of 1894, challenged conceptions of
American equality, while the 1890 closing of the western frontier prophesied
the end of America's golden era. 1731 The resulting insecurity was reflected in
many of the cultural and intellectual movements of the day. Edward
Bellamy's popular 1887 novel Looking Backward examined the era's social
and economic inequities, and cataclysmic thought was a common theme in
contemporary literature. 1
73 2
Beyond U.S. borders, pressures and insecurities were generated by the
rise of European industrialization, nationalism, and colonial "jingoism." The
late 1800s were the era of high imperialism in Europe, as European states
such as Germany and Italy, which had not previously held colonies, saw
colonial expansion as a way to assert their equality in the face of British
industrial hegemony. The 1884 Berlin Conference, the ensuing scramble for
Africa, and the partition of China all reflected imperial industrial impulses.
Britain also reinvigorated its colonial project in an effort to secure its empire
against European rivals and to reassure itself of its own international
supremacy. Having formalized political control over India in 1858, Britain
invaded Egypt in 1882, reconquered the Sudan, and gained supremacy over
southern Africa in the Boer Wars of the 1890S. 173 3  These European
imperialist conquests were conducted unhindered by American liberal
1729. See, e.g., JOHN TOMSICH, A GENTEEL ENDEAVOR: AMERICAN CULTURE AND POLITICS
IN THE GILDED AGE, 1877-1920 (1971); ROBERT WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER (1967); PAUL
CARTER, SPIRITUAL CRISIS OF THE GILDED AGE (1971).
1730. SMITH, supra note 95, at 348.
1731. See, e.g., FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FRONTIER IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (1893).
1732. Predictions of pending catastrophe were expressed in writings such as Brooks Adams's
Law of Civilization and Decay (1893) and Mary E. Lease's The Problem of Civilization Solved
(1895). See FREDERIC COPLE JAHER, DOUBTERS AND DISSENTERS: CATACLYSMIC THOUGHT IN
AMERICA, 1885-1918 (1964).
1733. See, e.g., RONALD ROBINSON & JOHN GALLAGHER, AFRICA AND THE VICTORIANS (2d
ed. 1981); A.P. THORNTON, THE IMPERIAL IDEA AND ITS ENEMIES (2d ed. 1985); THOMAS
PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA 1876-1912 (199 1).
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republican ideologies regarding citizenship and self-government-a fact
noted with envy by U.S. expansionists. International law likewise was
shaped and molded during the era by the desire to justify the colonial
project.1
734
All of these forces combined to create a sense of alienation, instability,
and paranoia among traditional Anglo-Saxon Protestant American elites in
the last decades of the 1800s. The radical transformation of American
society and competitive pressures from authoritarian European expansionism
made the egalitarian impulses of the Reconstruction era and traditional
liberal republican ideology seem naive, antiquated, and quaint. Many legal
and political elites responded by attempting to preserve traditional Anglo-
Saxon values through the forging of a deeply racialized and hierarchical
social and legal order. Thus, the 1880s and 1890s saw the "repudiation of
Reconstruction egalitarianism and inclusiveness in favor of an
extraordinarily broad political, intellectual, and legal embrace of renewed
ascriptive hierarchies. '735  Nativist xenophobia and imperialist, nation-
building impulses became the touchstones of a general cultural project to
reinvigorate the old WASP elites in the face of new challenges and to fashion
a more openly hierarchical, authoritarian, and racial ordering of American
citizenship and nationhood. 173 6  The result was a peculiarly illiberal and
authoritarian era in American life. 1
737
1. Nativist Ideology.-Theories of the manifest destiny of the white
race had been common in both Europe and the United States throughout the
nineteenth century and historically had competed with more egalitarian,
caste-free democratic visions of American society. By the end of the
century, however, this impulse combined with new pseudo-scientific theories
1734. See, e.g., Anghie, supra note 136.
1735. SMITH, supra note 95, at 347. See also William Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal
Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 51 (1999) (noting the destruction of the Populist movement's
commitment to multiracial democracy in the face of "the increasingly virulent racism of white
America in the first decades of the twentieth century").
1736. The racist impulse was not limited to the nation's elites, of course. Within the labor
movement during the same period, the inclusive Knights of Labor, which had welcomed women,
blacks, and immigrants, were supplanted by Samuel Gompers's more conservative and exclusive
American Federation of Labor, which enthusiastically supported the restrictive Chinese immigration
policies. See generally ALEXANDER SAXTON, INDISPENSIBLE ENEMY: LABOR AND THE ANTI-
CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1971); SAXTON, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE
REPUBLIC (1990). Indeed, working class support for the Chinese exclusion policies may have been
critical in galvanizing a previously regional issue into a national cause. See GYORY, supra note
770, at 237-38 (recalling the political targeting of the American working class to gain support for
the Chinese exclusion laws).
1737. For further discussion of racial attitudes at the turn of the century and their impact on
national politics, see MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN
IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 203-20 (1998); NELL IRVIN PAINTER, STANDING AT
ARMAGEDDON: THE UNITED STATES 1877-1919 (1987).
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of racial superiority to justify the exclusion of other peoples from democratic
governance. Charles Darwin's The Descent of Man and Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics purported to provide scientific support for Anglo-Saxon
superiority.' 738 Andrew Carnegie invoked Darwinian evolutionary theories
to justify industrial inequities, 1739 while eugenicists such as Francis Galton
and Charles Davenport gave scientific credence to the view that gov-
ernmental control was necessary to prevent the genetic spread of inferior
races. 1740  Historians, social theorists, and politicians attributed America's
democratic promise and political values to characteristics uniquely inherent
in Anglo-Saxon blood.1741  Henry Cabot Lodge, who championed in
Congress both race-based immigration restrictions and imperial control over
the Insular possessions, warned against mongrelization of the Anglo-Saxon
1742
race.
In this context, American birthright and the capacity for democratic
governance came to be viewed by many as synonymous with white, Anglo-
Saxon, Protestant, male descent. Non-Anglo-Saxon groups were considered
biologically and intellectually inferior, carriers of disease, and populations
that would dilute American blood and institutions. Charles Carroll's popular
book, The Negro Beast, published in 1900, portrayed blacks as biologically
similar to apes. 1743 Indian social ethnologists such as Lewis Henry Morgan
and John Wesley Powell, while contending that all humans were capable of
progress, considered Indians to be in a barbarian stage of development.
1744
Forcible assimilation policies reflected views of Indians as racially inferior
groups whose culture was incapable of survival in the face of the inexorable
advance of white civilization. Those who adequately abandoned their
1738. CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN (1871); HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS
(1892). It was Spencer who transformed Darwin's evolutionary theories into a social doctrine of
"survival of the fittest."
1739. See Andrew Carnegie, Wealth, 148 N. AM. REV. 653 (1889), reprinted in A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 172-79 (Richard D. Heffner ed., 12th ed. 1965)
(arguing that competition insures survival of the fittest, even in the industrial context).
1740. See Daniel Kevles, Annals of Eugenics: A Secular Faith, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 8,
1984, at 5. The term "eugenics" was coined in 1883 by Charles Darwin's cousin, Francis Galton,
who sought to use Darwinian science to improve human stock "by giving the more suitable races or
strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable." Id. at 51.
1741. See THOMAS F. GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 73-122 (1963)
(exploring race theories in early America and the "Teutonic origins" theory); RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 172-77 (rev. ed. 1955) (labeling
Anglo-Saxon dogma as a key ingredient in American racism); SALYER, supra note 769, at 11
(describing the supposed biological and cultural superiority of Americans). See generally Edward
Norman Saveth, Race and Nationalism in American Historiography: The Late Nineteenth Century,
54 POL. SCI. Q. 421, 423-30 (1939) (tracing the roots of the Anglo-Saxon mindset of superiority).
1742. GLENN C. ALSCHULER, RACE, ETHNICITY, AND CLASS IN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT,
1865-1919, at44 (1982).
1743. Id. at 21.
1744. SMITH, supra note 95, at 391.
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cultural traditions and assimilated were to be rewarded with U.S. citizenship.
Those who failed were deemed destined for annihilation.
The new Catholic and non-Christian immigrants likewise were seen as
biologically and culturally inferior "alien races," who were racially unfit for
U.S. citizenship.1 745 Policymakers of the day attempted to assimilate "non-
white" European immigrants, but Asian immigrants came to be viewed as
incapable of adopting Anglo-Saxon values or participating in democratic
governance. As early as 1862, works such as Dr. Arthur Stout's Chinese
Immigration and the Physiological Causes of the Decay of the Nation were
embraced to emphasize the incompatibility of non-European immigrants with
American political institutions. 1746  The Republic was imperiled by
unrestricted immigration, and the new immigrants were corrupting both the
U.S. bloodstream and U.S. politics. 1
747
The solution of the national elites was to exclude unfit groups from the
full benefits of constitutional membership. Given the era's assumptions
about the inferiority of non-Anglo-Saxon peoples, and the conception of the
Constitution as a compact based on Anglo-Saxon principles, citizenship
alone was insufficient to establish full membership. The blessings of con-
stitutional liberty were largely secured only to those citizens who were the
true inheritors of the Anglo-Saxon constitutional compact. Legislation and
judicial rulings defined and enforced a tier of second-class citizens who were
substantially excluded from full constitutional protections. Female citizens
were legally excluded from political and professional life and relegated to a
separate domestic "sphere" through policies that were upheld in decisions
excluding women from jury duty, 7 4 8 bar membership,
1749 and the vote. 1750
Southern blacks were segregated from political life as the federal
Reconstruction effort was abandoned in favor of the Jim Crow policies of
Southern whites. The Supreme Court facilitated this process by invalidating
much of the Reconstruction civil rights agenda 175' and then upholding de jure
1745. See JACOBSON, supra note 1737 (examining the racialization of American immigration
law and the new immigrants' dubious fitness for American citizenship).
1746. SALYER, supra note 769, at II (characterizing Stout's work as one of several that alerted
Americans to the alleged dangers of the Chinese).
1747. Id.
1748. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
1749. In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130
(1872).
1750. France v. Connor, 161 U.S. 65, 69 (1896). See also Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 162, 178 (1874). For further discussion, see Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women's
Citizenship in the United States, 1830-1934, 103 AM. HIST. REV. 1440-74 (1998).
1751. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (invalidating the Civil Rights Act of
1875); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882) (striking down section two of the Klan Act,
which made it criminal for two or more persons to conspire to deprive any person of equal
protection or their privileges and immunities); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)
(invalidating indictments for conspiracy to interfere with black voting rights in state elections on the
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segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson. 1752 Elites of the day regularly drew
comparisons between blacks, Indians, Chinese, Filipinos, and other groups to
determine their relative inferiority in the racial hierarchy. And many
members of the late-nineteenth-century elite acknowledged the links between
the "problems" of ruling blacks in the southern United States and the non-
white inhabitants of the new territories. 1753 The United States' authoritarian
policies also extended to the aggressive suppression of the despised Mormon
Church, whose dismemberment the Supreme Court upheld in the name of
suppressing polygamy and preserving Christian civilization.' 754  The per-
ceived helplessness of women, children, Indians, colonized peoples, and
other "inferior" groups was also used to justify greater state intervention over
them. In striking down protective labor legislation for bakers in Lochner v.
New York, 755 for example, Justice Peckham reasoned that the bakers seeking
relief were "in no sense wards of the State" or otherwise in need of its special
protection. 1756 In short, all citizens were equal, but some citizens were more
equal than others. The policies of the day directly contradicted the
Fourteenth Amendment's purpose of providing equal citizenship and
preventing a permanent subordinate caste in the United States.
2. Nation-Building and Imperial Expansion.-Vigorous American
expansionism abroad was also a direct response to the insecurity of national
elites and views of racial superiority. The Civil War had been fought to
reaffirm the strength, unity, and supremacy of the national government. By
the late 1800s, the wounds of the war had sufficiently healed, and northern
ground that they did not involve rights protected by the Constitution); United States v. Reese, 92
U.S. 214, 220-21 (1875) (striking down sections three and four of the Force Act as overbroad and
thus failing to enact "appropriate legislation" to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment); The Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (restricting interpretation of the Reconstruction
Amendments).
1752. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Brown, J.).
1753. A. Lawrence Lowell, the Harvard government professor whose theory of territorial
incorporation was embraced by the Court in the Insular Cases, advocated disenfranchisement of the
Chinese, African Americans, and Filipinos, among others, because only the "Anglo-Saxon race"
was prepared for self-rule. See Lowell, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, supra note 1397, at 149-54. As a
junior member of Congress from 1901 to 1903, George Sutherland, who became the Supreme
Court's author of Curtiss-Wright, advocated continuing the Chinese Exclusion Act on the grounds
that "[w]e already have one race problem in the South with the negroes, and to open our doors to the
unrestricted immigration of Mongolians would be to invite another and more serious race problem
in the West." PASCHAL, supra note 47, at 41 (quoting SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Nov. 14, 1901).
1754. The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136
U.S. 1 (1890) ("The organization of a community for the spread and practice of polygamy is, in a
measure, a return to barbarism. It is contrary to the... Civilization which Christianity has
produced in the Western world.").
1755. 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
1756. Id. at 57. Cf Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (upholding a restriction on the
working hours of women because women, as wards of the state and outsiders of the constitutional
community, were subject to greater legislative intervention). See FISS, supra note 668, at 177-78.
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and southern white elites had sufficiently reconciled over the subject of black
political rights, that the nation was able to unite to assert itself internationally
as a fully sovereign state. The United States, as an emergent industrial
power, shared the imperialist ambitions of its European neighbors. Colonial
control, however, by definition, required governance of an inferior foreign
populace under distinctly different legal rules than those prevailing in the
metropole. Thus, conviction in the superiority and manifest destiny of the
white race, and a desire to assert the United States' position as an equal
among nations, led the United States to seek colonies in the far-flung reaches
of the globe. Nationalist sentiment inspired plenary power as the United
States sought "a place among the world Powers and a share in the colonial
game."
1757
The acquisition of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines during the
Spanish-American War provided this opportunity. Both nation-building and
xenophobia pervaded the ensuing debate over the legal status of these
islands. While the application of the Constitution to Guam, Puerto Rico, and
the Philippines was bitterly fought, all participants in the debates of 1898-99
agreed on the racial and cultural inferiority of the islands' Hispanic and
Asian inhabitants. 7 58 Proponents of colonial rule relied on this inferiority to
conclude that authoritarian U.S. control was morally required. Anti-
imperialists, conversely, contended that the Constitution must apply to
Filipinos and Puerto Ricans, knowing that the obvious unfitness of the
"ignoran[t] and inferior[]" "mongrels of the east" for democratic governance
would render the imperial adventure untenable.'
1 759
Rudyard Kipling's poem The White Man's Burden, which was drafted
in 1899 to encourage the United States to govern and civilize the
Philippines, 1760 vividly illustrates the convergence of nation-building and
racial superiority in the colonial enterprise. The poem admonished the
United States to "Take up the White Man's burden-" over "those ye better,"
"Your new-caught, sullen peoples, Half devil and half child." It concluded
by urging that in so doing, the United States would join the realm of mature
nations:
Take up the White Man's burden-
Have done with childish days-
The lightly proffered laurel,
The easy, ungrudged praise.
Comes now, to search your manhood
1757. Pitman B. Potter, The Nature of American Territorial Expansion, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 189,
194 (1921).
1758. See supra Part V(G).
1759. SMITH, supra note 95, at 431.
1760. See STANLEY KARNOW, IN OUR IMAGE: AMERICA'S EMPIRE IN THE PHILIPPINES 17
(1989). See also 56 CONG. REC. 2621, 2629-30 (1900) (statement of Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge).
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Through all the thankless years
Cold, edged with dear-bought wisdom,
The judgment of your peers! 
1761
Mark Twain took a different approach to the Philippine conquest, concluding
that the United States, now that it was militarily powerful, had chosen to
"wipe its feet on the Declaration [of Independence] and look around for
something to steal."'
1762
3. Nativism, Imperialism, and Inherent Powers.-The racist and
nationalist views of the day go far in explaining the substantive outcomes
reached in the inherent powers decisions, such as the Court's willingness to
restrict the constitutional protections of Indian, immigrant, and territorial
groups, and to legitimate sweeping national power. The policies upheld in
the inherent powers cases were the direct product of these authoritarian,
nationalist, and segregationist impulses. The period between 1880 and 1900
saw the aggressive and unprecedented exertion of national power by
Congress over Indians, immigrants, and territorial inhabitants. Following the
termination of treaty-making with the tribes in 1871, Congress extended
federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian tribes in 1885, allotted Indian lands
in the Dawes Act of 1887, and by the 1890s claimed the unilateral right to
dissolve Indian land claims and to dismantle tribes. In 1882, Congress both
stripped Mormon polygamists of the right to vote and reversed a hundred-
year open door immigration policy to exclude an entire class of aliens based
expressly on race. Congress followed the Chinese exclusion acts of 1882-88
by limiting non-Chinese immigrants' right to judicial review of exclusion
proceedings, and in 1892 authorized the summary deportation of resident
aliens for the first time since the notorious Alien Act. After flexing its
muscle by forfeiting the Mormon Church property in the 1880s, Congress in
the 1890s acquired overseas territories with inhabitants whom it expressly
intended to govern as non-citizen subjects.1 763 The policies adopted in each
of these areas had been advocated by some minority voices for much of the
century. But it was not until the last decades of the nineteenth century that a
majority of the national political elites were willing to assent to such
extraordinary power.
It was precisely to affirm these exclusionary and hierarchical policies of
Indian dissolution, Chinese exclusion, and colonial governance that the
1761. RUDYARD KIPLING, The White Man's Burden (1899), reprinted in THE COMPLETE
VERSE 261-62 (1990).
1762. MARK TWAIN, The Secret History of Eddypus, the World Empire, in MARK TWAIN'S
WEAPONS OF SATIRE 81, 85 (Jim Zwick ed., 1992); see also TWAIN, To The Person Sitting in
Darkness, in MARK TWAIN'S WEAPONS OF SATIRE, supra, at 22; TWAIN, Review of Edwin
Wildman 's Biography ofAguinado, in MARK TWAIN'S WEAPONS OF SATIRE, supra, at 86.
1763. See discussion of the Insular Cases, supra Part V(G).
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Supreme Court adopted the inherent powers doctrine. 7 64 And in all three
areas, the Court acted in response to clear directives from Congress. The
inherent powers doctrines in Kagama and Chae Chan Ping were adopted
after the Court attempted to moderate existing congressional legislation,
1 765
and Congress expressly reversed the Court. In the Insular Cases, the ques-
tion of U.S. authority to acquire and govern possessions was bitterly fought
both in Congress and in the presidential election of 1900. After Congress
rejected citizenship for the territories in the Foraker Act and William
McKinley was re-elected on a pro-imperial platform, the Court declined to
find anything in the Constitution that barred the action. Even the Court's
decisions regarding the effect of Indian citizenship were dictated by
Congress. Congress responded to the Court's 1905 ruling that citizenship
removed Indians from federal guardianship by suspending Indian citizenship,
and the Court retreated to hold that citizenship was irrelevant to ward
status. 1766
The executive branch also contributed significantly to the development
of the inherent powers doctrine. Although the Court independently devel-
oped the inherent powers theory in Kagama, in both the alien and territories
cases, the executive branch expressly urged an inherent powers rationale
before the Court embraced it. And in both of these areas, the United States
pressed for broader authority than the Court ultimately proved willing to
grant-authority that would have left both aliens and territorial inhabitants
utterly without constitutional protection from national power. In short, the
Supreme Court's embrace of inherent powers substantially reflected its
acquiescence in the authoritarian policies of Congress and the executive.
The Court did indeed follow the "iliction returns," and if anything only
modified the authoritarian impulses of the political branches.
Thus, it was the felt "necessities" of the day that inspired the substantive
results reached in the inherent powers cases as well as the Court's desire to
articulate an extremely broad national foreign affairs power. The Court's
decisions fully embraced the pervasive xenophobic and nationalist
sentiments of the time. The decisions are rife with attitudes of racial
1764. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (upholding the Major Crimes Act of
1885); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (upholding the Chinese Exclusion
Act); The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1
(1890) (upholding the dissolution of the Mormon Church); The Insular Cases, supra note 45
(upholding colonial governance of the Insular possessions).
1765. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (construing a federal statute as not
authorizing federal prosecution of a murder between two Indians); Chew Heong v. United States,
112 U.S. 536 (1884) (reading the Chinese Exclusion Act as consistent with the treaty to authorize
entry of aliens).
1766. See supra notes 521-23 and accompanying text.
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hierarchy, 767 which ultimately prevailed even over citizenship in the Court's
analysis.1768 The nationalist impulses of the era were also reflected in the
Court's vision of the post-Civil War national government as a powerful and
effective sovereign in its sphere, which enjoyed all the powers held by other
sovereign states. 1769 And although one might assume that the Court's attitude
toward the foreign affairs cases was motivated by a Hobbesian concern about
the lawless nature of international relations, the Court's rhetoric, at least, had
much more to do with the aggrandizement of national power.
1767. The major Indian decisions frequently relied on the Indians' status as an "unfortunate,"
vice-ridden, subordinate race to justify the assertion of paternalistic federal authority. See, e.g.,
United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 570-72 (1846). Justice Van Devanter's 1913
opinion in United States v. Sandoval expressly invoked pseudo-scientific theories of Indians as
"ignoran[t]," "degraded," "primitive," "crude," "simple," "inferior," and prone to "superstition and
fetishism," to neutralize the citizenship claims of the Pueblo Indians. 231 U.S. 28, 45, 39 (1913).
Justice Field's decision in Chae Chan Ping portrayed Chinese immigrants as "strangers in the land"
and apparently embraced the position of the California Constitutional Convention that immigrants
were "an Oriental invasion" and a "menace to our civilization" who were incapable of assimilation.
Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595.
1768. See Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 48 ("[C]itizenship is not in itself an obstacle to the exercise by
Congress of its power to enact laws for the benefit and protection of tribal Indians as a dependent
people."); United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 290 (1909) (holding that the political question
doctrine barred judicial consideration of a challenge by an Indian who had become a citizen);
United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 598 (1916) ("Citizenship is not incompatible with tribal
existence or continued guardianship, and so may be conferred without completely emancipating the
Indians or placing them beyond the reach of congressional regulations adopted for their
protection."); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 307-11 (1922) (holding that citizenship did not
grant constitutional rights); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915) (holding that marriage to
a foreigner strips a female national of citizenship). Even Anglo-Saxon male citizens were not
entitled to full constitutional protection if they ventured beyond the borders of the United States. In
re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891); cf Balzac, 258 U.S. at 309.
1769. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 605 ("[T]he United States is not only a
government, but it is a national government, and the only government in this country that has the
character of nationality.") (quoting The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 555 (1871) (Bradley, J.,
concurring)). Dissenting in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., Justice White contended:
It is, I submit, greatly to be deplored that after more than one hundred years of our
national existence, after the government has withstood the strain of foreign wars and
the dread ordeal of civil strife, and its people have become united and powerful, this
court should consider itself compelled to go back to a long repudiated and rejected
theory of the constitution, by which the government is deprived of an inherent attribute
of its being, a necessary power of taxation.
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 715 (1895) (White, J., dissenting). The role of
the Civil War in cementing the national union was later eloquently set forth by Justice Holmes in
Missouri v. Holland:
[The Constitution] called into life a being the development of which could not have
been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to
realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost
their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case
before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in
that of what was said a hundred years ago.
252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). For further discussion, see JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN
AND THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION 131-52 (1990); Gerald L. Neuman, The Nationalization
of Civil Liberties, Revisited, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1646 (1999).
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The nativist and nationalist impulses combined particularly powerfully
in the Insular Cases. The Court's decisions here appear largely motivated by
an expansionist desire to acquire territory in the far reaches of the earth and a
xenophobic desire to deny the inhabitants of those regions participation in the
American birthright. The dissenters in De Lima v. Bidwell, who later formed
the Insular majority, contended that a pro-colonial ruling would give the
United States "an 'equal station among the Powers of the earth.""
1770
Defense of the American birthright also became a sovereign national goal as
the Court expressly sought to exclude from American citizenship those
"absolutely unfit to receive it."' 177 1 As Justice White argued in Downes:
To concede to the government of the United States the right to acquire
[new territories], and to strip it of all power to protect the birthright of
its own citizens ... is, in effect, to say that the United States is
helpless in the family of nations. 
1772
Absolute control of birthright and national sovereignty went hand in hand.
The power to conquer foreign peoples, and to exclude them from the national
polity, was the very essence of a civilized state. Justice Brown, who was
both the author of Plessy and a self-avowed member of the old Anglo-Saxon
race, 1773 concluded his opinion in Downes v. Bidwell with a clarion call for
white supremacy and American expansionism:
A false step at this time might be fatal to the development of what
Chief Justice Marshall called the American empire. Choice in some
cases, the natural gravitation of small bodies towards large ones in
others, the result of a successful war in still others, may bring about
conditions which would render the annexation of distant possessions
desirable. If those possessions are inhabited by alien races, differing
from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation, and modes of
thought, the administration of government and justice, according to
Anglo-Saxon principles, may for a time be impossible; and the
question at once arises whether large concessions ought not to be
made .... We decline to hold that there is anything in the
Constitution to forbid such action.1
774
Racial hierarchy and authoritarianism had become central to the American
national identity. As Chief Justice White later commented in reflecting on
1770. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1,220 (1901).
1771. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 306 (1901) (White, J., concurring).
1772. Id.
1773. Justice Brown opened his autobiography with the statement, "I was born of a New
England Puritan family in which there has been no admixture of blood for 250 years." Henry B.
Brown, Memoranda for Biographical Sketch, in MEMOIR OF HENRY BILLINGS BROWN I (Charles
A. Kent ed., 1915).
1774. 182 U.S. 244, 286-87 (1901) (emphasis added).
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the Insular Cases, "Why, sir, if we had not decided as we did, this country
would have been less than a Nation!'
' 775
Nativist authoritarianism helps explain both why the Court felt
compelled to uphold the policies of the Gilded Age and why it felt that the
exercise of federal power should be relatively unconstrained. The nation's
expansionist and authoritarian concerns, in particular, help explain why the
Court wished to ensure that national power would be so completely
unconstrained in the international sphere. These concerns do not fully
explain, however, why the Court resorted to the inherent powers doctrine as
the means of achieving the desired results. It remains unclear, for example,
why it was more palatable for the Court to embrace an extratextual approach
than to locate the powers at issue in an enumerated clause. Why, given the
availability of plausible textual origins for the powers being asserted, such as
the Migration, Foreign and Indian Commerce, and Territory Clauses, didn't
the Court simply locate the authority there? Deriving broad implied powers
from an enumerated clause would seem to be more consistent with traditional
modes of constitutional interpretation than stepping outside the Constitution
altogether. Resort to an extraconstitutional source of authority thus seems to
have been unnecessary.
Furthermore, although the Court's desire for an unlimited foreign affairs
authority was certainly served by the inherent powers doctrine, which
trumped most other constitutional constraints, resort to inherent powers was
not clearly necessary to eliminate meaningful individual rights constraints on
governmental power. The Court's domestic decisions repeatedly demon-
strated the Court's ability to withhold constitutional protections from
disfavored groups within the traditional enumerated powers-limited govern-
ment framework. Decisions such as Plessy v. Ferguson, Bradwell v. Illinois,
and others denying the constitutional claims of African-Americans and
women established that a restrictive view of the Constitution's individual
rights provisions was readily available that did not depend on inherent
powers analysis. 1776 And as Reva Siegel has demonstrated, traditional prin-
ciples of federalism were used in the latter nineteenth century to justify the
denial of suffrage to women. 1777 Thus, traditional doctrines of enumerated
powers and existing individual rights jurisprudence would seem largely, if
perhaps not completely, adequate, for achieving the robust foreign affairs
authority the majority desired to reach.
1775. WARREN, supra note 244, at 710-11.
1776. See supra notes 1748-52 and accompanying text.
1777. See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REv. 947, 997-1006 (2002); see also id. at 948 (noting
that opponents invoked "understandings of federalism that placed family relations beyond the reach
of the national government").
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C. Dual Federalism and Foreign Affairs
Ultimately, it appears that federalism provided the Court's greatest
motivation for resorting to a theory of inherent powers. Resort to an inherent
source of authority, derived from international principles of sovereignty,
allowed the Court to adopt an expansive interpretation of national power
while honoring federalism concerns by avoiding the possibility that
expansive interpretations of enumerated powers would spill over into the
domestic sphere.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the original vision of an imperfect
and limited national government, with powers reserved to the states and the
people, had been reorganized by the Court to emphasize a dual system of
federally divided powers. As Owen Fiss has observed, domestic juris-
prudence reflected "the limited character of the central government, as a
government among governments.,, 1778 Two sovereigns operated in the do-
mestic context-the national government and the states-which together
were viewed as possessing all sovereign powers. 1779 The Court viewed its
primary function as policing the line between these sovereigns. Thus, the
domestic decisions restricting federal authority such as E.C. Knight and
Pollock were motivated in large part by a concern for maintaining the proper
boundaries of federalism and preventing national encroachments on state
power.
Federalism's emphasis on dual sovereignty contributed to the inherent
powers doctrine in two ways. First, the assumption that all sovereign powers
were held by either the national or state governments facilitated the
conclusion that a power was held by the national government whenever state
authority was inappropriate. This approach ignored classical concepts of
divided sovereignty by eliminating the possibility that power had been
reserved to the people. Second, by focusing on protecting states from
national encroachments, dual sovereignty eliminated concerns about limiting
national power where state authority was not implicated. Here again,
classical American political doctrine still would have obligated the Court to
consider whether a power had been delegated to the federal government or
was otherwise constrained by the Constitution. But the Court was much less
interested in constraining national power where conflicts with state authority
were not implicated. In cases involving territories outside the organized
states or populations (Indians, immigrants, or nationals outside U.S.
boundaries) whose governance the Court had placed exclusively in the hands
1778. FISS, supra note 668, at 116.
1779. See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1888) ("[T]he supreme authority in this
country is divided between the government of the United States, whose action extends over the
whole Union, but which possesses only certain powers enumerated in its written Constitution, and
the separate governments of the several States, which retain all powers not delegated to the Union.")
(citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
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of the national authorities, federalism exerted no constraint on national
power. The Court was not required to intervene to protect the states, nor was
any other government available to exercise the power. The Court instead
shifted its attention to the potential for conflict with foreign sovereigns and
focused on the authority provided by international law.1
780
The Court's retreat from the Commerce Clause in the Indian and
immigration cases vividly illustrates the relationship between federalism and
the inherent powers decisions. In the three years between 1886 and 1889, the
Court distanced itself from Commerce Clause analysis in both areas in
Kagama and Chae Chan Ping. The move was particularly striking in the im-
migration context, because the Court for fifteen years prior had unanimously
upheld the immigration power as foreign commerce. Developments in
domestic Commerce Clause jurisprudence, however, may have rendered the
Commerce Clause inhospitable for these purposes. In the latter 1800s,
Congress began to exercise its interstate commerce power through the
adoption of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act in 1890. The Court responded by attempting in earnest to rigidly
demarcate the boundaries between federal and state powers. Decisions such
as Coe v. Town of Errol, 781 and Kidd v. Pearson,1782 both upheld state laws
over Commerce Clause objections by narrowly confining the range of
commerce that was subject to federal power. In both cases, the Court
affirmed that mere production for the purpose of sale in interstate commerce
did not take a commodity out of the realm of state power. The contrary view,
the Kidd Court warned, would yield the result "that Congress would be
invested, to the exclusion of the States, with the power to regulate, not only
manufacturers, but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic
fisheries, mining-in short, every branch of human industry.' ' 7 83 The Court
was approaching the height of its formalistic effort to demarcate the
boundaries between the state police power and the federal commerce power.
In this context, it is not surprising that the Court was unsympathetic to the
government's argument in Kagama that the federal Indian commerce power
allowed regulation of all aspects of Indian affairs, unconstrained by the
Constitution. Justice Miller's conclusion that allowing Congress to enact an
entire criminal code for the Indian tribes would "strain[]" the Indian
Commerce Clause was an understatement at best."784
1780. Interestingly, separation of powers questions are entirely absent from the cases. The era
was one of weak Presidents, and the vast majority of the cases involved congressional power. Even
when executive action was at issue, as in Cross v. Harrison and Neely, however, no question was
raised regarding whether the executive was the appropriate branch of government to exercise the
power.
1781. 116 U.S. 517 (1886) (upholding a local tax of logs intended for export).
1782. 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (upholding a state ban on production of alcoholic beverages).
1783. Id. at 21.
1784. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886). This theory is supported by the
fact that where the Court could comfortably rely on the Indian Commerce Clause, as in Cherokee
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Even if one were willing to disregard Chief Justice Taney's conclusion
that the Territory Clause applied only to the original U.S. territory, broad
interpretations of the Territory Clause were also threatening to the domestic
balance of power if applied to the organized, white-settled territories which
were destined for statehood. In Dooley II, Justice Brown dismissed the
possibility that Congress's relatively unlimited power over the Insular
territories could spill over into federal-state relations, noting that "[t]here is a
wide difference between the full and paramount power of Congress in
legislating for a territory in the condition of Porto Rico and its power with
respect to the states."'' 785 The Court became willing to rely on the Territory
Clause only in the late Insular Cases, at which point the Court had developed
a separate mechanism-the concept of incorporation-to restrict plenary
congressional power to the Insular possessions.
The Court's dual sovereignty approach is clearly visible in the inherent
powers cases. In Kagama, Justice Miller reasoned that "[t]here exist[s]
within the broad domain of sovereignty but these two [the national
government and the states],' 786 and that the exclusion of Indians from state
power subjected them by default to national authority. 787 In Chae Chan
Ping, Justice Field bootstrapped the idea that the national government
enjoyed exclusive power over immigration vis-a-vis the states, which had
been established in the Court's earlier decisions, into a conclusion that the
national government's power was unlimited. 1
788
The influence exerted by federalism is also visible in the few Indian,
alien, and territory cases that did implicate state authority. In Worcester and
in immigration decisions such as Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 17 89 Chy
Lung, and Yick Wo, the Court applied traditional constitutional analysis,
rooting federal authority in enumerated provisions (such as the Indian and
Foreign Commerce Clauses) to exclude interference by the states. Where
national power over territories conflicted with state authority, such as in
Kansas v. Colorado,1790 the Court likewise rejected inherent powers claims to
emphasize the limited and delegated nature of the national government. The
Court's 1905 decision in In re Heff, addressing the impact of Indian
citizenship on federal authority, was clearly motivated in part by the fact that
the Court was choosing between the operation of federal and state power.
Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1890), it did so. See also supra notes 913-19
and accompanying text (discussing the Court's retreat from the Commerce Clause in Chae Chan
Ping).
1785. Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151, 157 (1901).
1786. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379.
1787. Id. at 383-84.
1788. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
1789. 92 U.S. 259 (1875) (invalidating under the Commerce Clause a requirement that ships
entering New York either supply a bond or pay a fee for each passenger).
1790. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
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The Court invoked dual sovereignty to conclude that the grant of citizenship
had dissolved the federal government's rights and placed Indian citizens
under state jurisdiction. "9' The Court was also more willing to enforce
constitutional individual rights protections against state actors than against
federal authority, as demonstrated by its rejection of arbitrary state power
over aliens in Chy Lung and Yick Wo and its tolerance of arbitrary national
power in Nishimura Ekiu.1792 On the other hand, in the exclusion and depor-
tation cases, where no state authority was implicated, the Court did not
attempt to root the national power in any particular constitutional provision
and rejected individual rights claims to uphold broad inherent national
power. Yick Wo and Kagama were decided on the same day, and the striking
difference in their approaches to constitutional interpretation may be
attributable to the fact that Yick Wo involved the exercise of state power,
while in Kagama, federal-state relations were not implicated.1
793
Given the Court's evident concern about broadly construing enumerated
federal provisions that might have implications for the balance of federal-
state authority, the Court could have concluded either that the power did not
exist in the national government-a proposition that it apparently found
unpalatable by the end of the century, for the reasons discussed above-or
that it could seek some other source for the authority. Rooting the authority
in inherent sovereign powers under international law insulated the grant of
broad authority from spillover into the states, since the states were not
understood to exercise such powers. Indeed, where an enumerated clause
such as the treaty power did not implicate state authority, the Court was
equally willing to recognize unlimited federal powers. 1794 The Court's focus
on dual federalism thus allowed the Court to detach even the constitutional
text over foreign affairs from traditional enumerated powers and limited
government analysis. Thus the Court's inherent powers analysis supplied
sufficiently broad national authority to embrace the aspirations of the Gilded
Age without concern that the power would alter the delicate domestic
constitutional balance.
1791. In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 505 (1905) ("In this Republic there is a dual system of
government, National and state. Each within its own domain is supreme, and one of the chief
functions of this court is to preserve the balance between them, protecting each in the powers it
possesses, and preventing any trespass thereon by the other.").
1792. The Court's approach was not perfectly uniform, of course. In Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), the Court enforced Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections against the
national government's effort to imprison deportees at hard labor. No question of state power was
presented. The Court's resort to traditional enumerated powers analysis may be attributable to
theories of constitutional territoriality.
1793. Kagama was decided the same day that the Court upheld application of the Fourteenth
Amendment to aliens in Yick Wo and to corporations in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
1794. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (holding that the United States can act
extraterritorially pursuant to the treaty power without constitutional constraint).
2002]
Texas Law Review
In sum, by the late 1800s, federalism combined with nativist hostility
toward non-Anglo-Saxon peoples and nationalist ambitions abroad to form a
new constitutional doctrine in which the Constitution's limits on
governmental power were confined, not merely to citizens, but to the
"inheritors of [male] Anglo-Saxon civilization" in the domestic sphere. As
George Canfield wrote:
Those who established the Union were opposed rather to a strong
government as against themselves than to a strong government in the
abstract; indeed.... they constructed a government with full sovereign
power, that is, with absolute and unlimited authority, as against other
nations, and with qualified and restricted powers as against
themselves, and the object of the restrictive clauses was the protection
of those privileges and institutions which were dear to them as
inheritors of Anglo-Saxon civilization, and not the protection of other
peoples and nations to whom these privileges and institutions were
foreign and perhaps wholly unknown. 1
795
Xenophobic, ascriptivist nationalism, of course, was not the only vision
of American identity operative during the late nineteenth century.
Throughout the period, a vocal minority of American politicians, judges, and
lawyers attempted to assert a more egalitarian vision of American society,
rooted in the universal principles of the Constitution and the Declaration of
Independence, and in the anti-caste impulse behind the Reconstruction
Amendments. This minority invoked due process, equal protection, and
racial equality to oppose the Chinese Exclusion laws 1796 and argued that
America's imperialist adventures were fundamentally contrary to republican
governance. The egalitarian, limited-government impulse was asserted
repeatedly throughout the inherent powers decisions in dissents by Chief
Justice Fuller and Justices Field, Harlan, and Brewer. In particular, a number
of the notable immigration and territory decisions were not unanimous but
provoked bitter dissents. Fong Yue Ting was decided by a five-to-three
majority, for example; the early Insular Cases upheld the equal treatment of
the new territories, and Downes v. Bidwell was decided by a sharply divided
five-to-four Court.
The minority vision also scored a few notable victories during the
inherent powers era. The decisions in Yick Wo and Wong Wing recognized-
over the U.S. government's strenuous objection-that immigrants present in
the United States were entitled to constitutional protections in their social and
1795. Canfield, supra note 304, at 27 (emphasis added).
1796. See GYORY, supra note 770, at 223-28 (discussing the effects of this egalitarian
minority); SMITH, supra note 95, at 359-60 (highlighting the opposition led by Massachusetts
Republican Senator George Hoar and Tennessee Republican William Moore, who invoked natural
rights principles of the Declaration of Independence).
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economic activities. The decision in Wong Kim Ark concluded (over the
dissent of Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Harlan) that Chinese immigrants
were entitled to birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment. In
the territorial decisions, the minority view ultimately prevented the Court
from embracing an entirely extraconstitutional status for Puerto Rico and the
Philippines, and instead led it to hold that the most fundamental
constitutional rights did apply. However, the minority vision made little
headway in the Indian cases or decisions relating to the admission and
expulsion of aliens. And with respect to the territories, the Court never found
a constitutional provision during this period that it considered sufficiently
fundamental to limit federal action. The lack of federalism constraints, as
well as broad nationalistic and xenophobic impulses, radically modified the
Constitution's operation in these contexts.
The inherent powers era thus reflected a struggle for the soul of the
Constitution. And while the inherent powers doctrine prevailed in many
areas, it did so despite the presence of both historically available and cogent,
contemporary arguments that the inherent powers doctrine was incompatible
with American constitutional governance.
VII. Curtiss-Wright Revisited
The decisions in the Indian, alien, and territory cases do much to
explain, though not to justify, the inherent powers analysis of Curtiss- Wright.
At first blush, Justice Sutherland's theory of expansive federal power over
foreign affairs appears oddly modem in light of Sutherland's role as one of
the "four horsemen" of the pre-1937 Court and his formalistic approach to
domestic issues. Two terms before, the Court had decided Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan 797 and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,1798 the only two
cases in which the Court had ever invalidated legislation as an unconstitu-
tional delegation of congressional authority. Curtiss-Wright's deferential
approach to national power accordingly has been viewed as foreshadowing
the Court's 1937 revolution. The decisions of the nineteenth century,
however, indicate that much of Curtiss-Wright's inherent powers analysis
was strikingly nostalgic. Sutherland's introduction of executive hegemony
over foreign relations unquestionably was a radical innovation. But his
reliance on a theory of inherent sovereign powers, his view of strict
constitutional territoriality, and his overarching emphasis on federalism all
derived directly from late-nineteenth-century doctrines developed in the
Indian, alien, and territory cases.
1797. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating the section of the National
Industrial Recovery Act which authorized the President to prohibit transportation of petroleum
produced in excess of amount permitted by state).
1798. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down provisions
of the National Recovery Act which authorized the President to create "codes of fair competition").
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Sutherland's conception of the national government holding powers
"equal to the right and power of the other members of the international
family" was a recurrent theme throughout the late-nineteenth-century
cases. 179 9 Sutherland himself cited the powers to acquire territory by dis-
covery and to expel aliens as examples of inherent sovereign powers, "none
of which is expressly affirmed by the Constitution," but which "nevertheless
exist as inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality.' 800
Sutherland's assertion that "[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in
pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory" was also a familiar
articulation of strict territoriality principles. 80'
In particular, Sutherland's distinction between internal and external
powers and his conclusion that the enumerated powers doctrine does not
apply to foreign relations both derive from late-nineteenth-century concepts
of federalism. Sutherland emphasized constitutional constraints on national
authority in striking down federal labor legislation in Carter v. Carter Coal,
but he simultaneously asserted that constitutional limitations were irrelevant
in the foreign relations context. That approach, which appears facially incon-
sistent, can be understood once it is recognized that Sutherland's formalism
derives from his overriding view of the Constitution as protecting states from
federal encroachment. Sutherland noted in Carter v. Carter Coal that
since every addition to the national legislative power to some extent
detracts from or invades the power of the states, it is of vital moment
that, in order to preserve the fixed balance intended by the
Constitution, the powers of the general government be not so extended
as to embrace any not within the express terms of the several grants or
the implications necessarily to be drawn therefrom. 1
802
This is the classic late-nineteenth-century vision of dual sovereignty.
Sutherland contended that "the primary purpose of the Constitution" was to
carve out certain powers from the states to be vested in the federal
government. 180 3 In the foreign affairs realm, where states were not operative,
the need for vigilant policing of the boundaries of governmental power was
not present. 180 4 Sutherland's analysis simply ignored the prominence of for-
eign affairs among the enumerated powers of the national government. And
like the Court's late-nineteenth-century cases, it utterly eliminated the
1799. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
1800. Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893)). In each of these areas, he maintained, the Supreme Court had
"found the warrant for its conclusions not in the provisions of the Constitution, but in the law of
nations." Id.
1801. Id.
1802. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294-95 (1936).
1803. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316.
1804. See also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937).
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concepts of enumerated national authority, separation of powers, individual
rights, and sovereignty reserved to the people.
Indeed, Sutherland's commitment to the demarcation between foreign
and domestic relations was sufficiently rigid that he was not concerned that
national foreign relations decisions might adversely affect reserved state
powers. Sutherland joined Justice Holmes' decision in Missouri v. Holland
which rejected the possibility that the treaty power could infringe on the
states' unenumerated powers,' 80 5 and he authored the decision in United
States v. Belmont, which reaffirmed the distinction between internal and
external powers to uphold the ability of a sole executive agreement to violate
state public policies.18 0 6 "Plainly," Sutherland wrote in Belmont, "the ex-
ternal powers of the United States are to be exercised without regard to state
laws or policies .... In respect of our foreign relations ... the State of New
York does not exist."
' 180 7
The Court's reliance on federalism as the bellwether of national power
was underscored by United States v. Butler, decided the same year as
Curtiss-Wright. In that case, the Court emphasized that
[t]he federal union is a government of delegated powers. It has only
such as are expressly conferred upon it and as such are reasonably to
be implied from those granted. In this respect we differ radically from
nations where all legislative power, without restriction or limitation, is
vested in a parliament or other legislative body subject to no
restrictions except the discretion of its members.
80 8
The debt that Justice Sutherland owed the nineteenth century inherent
powers decisions and ideology becomes even more explicit if the origins of
his theory are examined. As noted in the introduction, Sutherland first
articulated his theory of extraconstitutional foreign affairs powers in 1909, at
the height of the inherent powers era.1809 Sutherland's resulting article en-
titled The Internal and External Powers of the National Government offered
a near-complete explication of the theory that would become Curtiss-Wright.
The article opened by distinguishing the United States' internal and external
powers, only the former of which, according to Sutherland, were delegated
and limited by the Constitution. This distinction was expressly inspired by
federalism. Sutherland viewed "the primary purpose" of enumerating the
national government's powers as "to preclude any encroachment" upon the
1805. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
1806. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
1807. Id. at 331. As Sutherland noted in his 1910 article, "the boundaries of the State
governments are confined to their own boundaries, hence ... [the Tenth Amendment] can have no
reference to any power to be exercised externally." Sutherland, Internal and External Powers,
supra note 47, at 374.
1808. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63 (1936).
1809. See supra note 47.
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states. 1 08 Because states were "not competent to deal" with foreign affairs,
the national government must possess these powers in toto, or no
governmental authority would be capable of acting upon them. 8 "
Sutherland then cited James Wilson for the proposition that inherent external
powers had been contemplated at the Constitution's founding.""12 In lan-
guage that could have been drawn directly from Chae Chan Ping or the
Insular Cases, Sutherland urged that the Framers
knew that in the eye of international law every sovereign nation was
ipso facto equal to every other sovereign nation, and that the highest
law of every nation was that of self-preservation [citing Vattel] ....
The government they instituted and contemplated was that of a fully
sovereign nation, possessing and capable of exercising in the family of
nations every sovereign power which any sovereign government
possessed or was capable of exercising under the law of nations;
unless prohibited or contrary to the fundamental principles upon
which the Constitution was established .... It is time we realized ...
that the Government of the United States is perfect in all its limbs, and
not a cripple among the full-grown governments of the world. 1
813
Sutherland had been a member of Congress when the Insular Cases
were decided, and as a freshman congressmember from 1901 to 1903, he had
actively advocated renewing the Chinese Exclusion Act and the destruction
of the Indian tribal system, which he viewed as "contrary to the genius of our
civilization."'' 8 14  Other than citing the Legal Tender Cases, Sutherland's
1910 article relied exclusively on the Indian, alien, and territory cases as
doctrinal support for his theory of inherent power. The Louisiana Purchase,
he contended, had been justified in part on an "inherent right" to acquire
territory, 81 5 and the guano island decision of Jones v. United States,18 16 had
been based solely on "extra-constitutional" powers "recognized by the
principles of international law as belonging inherently to every sovereign
nation."' 81 7 Although the constitutionality of the Alien Act had not been re-
1810. Sutherland, Internal and External Powers, supra note 47, at 375.
1811. Id. at 375. See also id. at 386 ("While maintaining the power of the general government
to adequately meet and deal with every external situation which affects the general welfare of the
United States, it is no less essential to maintain the supreme power of the State governments to deal
with every question which affects only the domestic welfare of the several States."). Sutherland's
belief in the distinction between federal and state authority in foreign affairs was so complete that
he viewed the scope of the foreign commerce power as significantly broader than the interstate
commerce power, which was limited by the interests of the states. Id at 374.
1812. Id. at 377. See also supra note 27 (discussing the pre-ratification views of James
Wilson).
1813. Sutherland, Internal and External Powers, supra note 47, at 381-82.
1814. See PASCHAL, supra note 47, at 44.
1815. Sutherland, Internal and External Powers, supra note 47, at 383.
1816. 137 U.S. 202 (1890).
1817. Sutherland, Internal and External Powers, supra note 47, at 384.
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solved, Nishimura Ekiu and Fong Yue Ting had upheld the right to exclude
and expel aliens as powers "inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-
preservation." 1818 Sutherland next cited United States v. Kagama for the
proposition that federal power arose from "the right of exclusive sovereignty
which must exist in the National government.0 81 9 Sutherland concluded by
quoting his Michigan law professor, Judge Campbell, for the late-nineteenth-
century inversion of the enumerated powers doctrine. Under the system of
dual sovereigns, Campbell had written, "if that which is essential to
government is prohibited to one [government] it must of necessity be found
in the other, and the prohibition in such case on the one side is equivalent to
a grant on the other."
' 1820
Sutherland's 1919 variation on this essay largely tracked the same
argument, though it asserted that the Territory Clause provided no power to
govern territories (e.g., the power must be inherent) and updated the
argument to include the Insular Cases.' 82 ' He concluded that the various
decisions established "that the powers to be exercised externally are not ex-
clusively derived from, and are, consequently, not limited to, the grants and
implications of the Constitution, but may find their warrant outside the terms
of that instrument in the accepted rules of international law."'
182 2
Thus, Sutherland's theory was distinctly not the product of the pre-
World War II pressures that surrounded the decision in Curtiss-Wright, and
was neither modernist nor originalist. Instead, it was retrospective, and was
rooted directly in the principles of dual federalism and the peculiarly
unattractive and illiberal view of national power that characterized the late-
nineteenth-century inherent powers cases. This high positivist vision of
American sovereignty had little to do with the constitutional structure as
originally conceived, was unsupported by the Constitution's text, and was
inconsistent with fundamental tenets of American political thought. Indeed,
by the time Justice Sutherland articulated his theory of executive hegemony
in Curtiss-Wright, the Court was edging toward new concepts of individual
rights, due process, and the role of courts in adjudicating such rights, all of
which were fundamentally incompatible with the inherent plenary power
decisions of the 1890s.
VIII. Conclusion
Since the decisions in the inherent powers cases, both the assumptions
of American constitutional doctrine and international law have changed in
1818. Id. at 385 (quoting Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892)).
1819. Id. (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886)).
1820. Id. at 386 (quoting Van Husen v. Kanouse, 13 Mich. 303, 313-14 (1864)).
1821. SUTHERLAND, supra note 47, at 64-69.
1822. Id. at 58.
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many fundamental ways. Concepts of citizenship and membership-and the
constitutional protections that accompany them-have been expanded in the
postwar years to be much more egalitarian and inclusive. 823 Jurisprudence
regarding individual rights has become much more robust. Many of the era's
decisions regarding other disfavored groups have been abandoned, and
principles of due process and equal protection now prohibit the exclusion of
women and minorities from political life. Strict territoriality conceptions of
the Constitution also have been transformed as both domestic and inter-
national law have recognized the authority of states to regulate
extraterritorial conduct by noncitizens which has effects within their
borders. 182 4 Nor does international law continue to recognize the authority of
states to rule aboriginal peoples and conquered territories as subjects. To the
contrary, the doctrines which justified the colonial subjugation of aboriginal
and conquered peoples have been replaced with international human rights
principles mandating protection for national minorities and respect for
cultural rights and self-determination. And the authority of states over aliens
is now limited by international law protections regarding the rights of
refugees, including the fundamental prohibition against forcible return. The
concept of inherent powers itself has been repudiated as American consti-
tutional doctrine has been reunited with its liberal political traditions.
Nevertheless, despite the dismantling of the premises that gave birth to
the inherent powers doctrine, the era's decisions regarding national power
over Indians, aliens, and territories remain largely intact. The Supreme Court
has spent much of the past century repackaging the inherent powers doctrines
into traditional enumerated categories without significant change to the
underlying holdings. Rationales that allowed the exercise of governmental
power based on doctrines of inherent powers and international law now
parade as enumerated text without any recognition either of the international
law origins of the principles or the racist, illiberal ideology on which they are
based. Precepts of sovereign powers continue to exert a powerful influence
over judicial decisions, with the result that courts continue to deny other
constitutional protections and defer expansively to federal action in all three
areas.
The first question that might be asked about the modem implications of
the doctrines is whether it makes any significant difference that the doctrines
originally derived from inherent powers concepts. If the modem Foreign
Commerce Clause is sufficiently broad to embrace the immigration power,
1823. See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 50.
1824. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 280-81 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (discussing "[t]he enormous expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction outside our
Nation's boundaries" through the extraterritorial application of antitrust and securities laws and
other criminal statutes).
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for example, does it matter that the Commerce Clause was not the power's
original basis? The answer is that it does matter for at least two reasons.
First, deriving the power exclusively from the Commerce Clause would at
least indicate what branch of the national government possesses the power.
It would answer the separation of powers question, which has taken on
increasing significance with the expansion of the modern executive. Rooting
the authority in inherent powers leaves this question open, however, with the
result that modern courts have interpreted the nineteenth century immigration
decisions plus Curtiss-Wright to conclude that the President also enjoys
inherent authority over immigration.' 825 Under this approach, the failure of
Congress to authorize an action does not bar the President from ordering it.
Second, rooting the power in sovereignty also continues to leave open
the question of what constitutional limits, if any, constrain the power.
Deriving a power from an enumerated source at least brings the authority
within traditional enumerated powers analysis and makes it more likely that
constitutional constraints, such as individual rights protections and judicial
review, would also apply. Since Gibbons v. Ogden, the federal commerce
power has been recognized as "plenary," at least with respect to federal-state
relations. Yet Congress may not constitutionally exercise its authority under
the commerce power to discriminate overtly on the basis of race, to deny
basic First Amendment rights, or to violate other fundamental constitutional
protections which are routinely waived in immigration cases. As the Court
noted in Buckley v. Valeo, "Congress has plenary authority in all cases in
which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction,... so long as the exercise of
that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction."' 1826 The
concept of "plenary power" in the inherent powers context, however, remains
detached from this basic assumption.
The Rehnquist Court in many ways has resurrected the approach of the
inherent powers era. The decision in Verdugo employed a social contract
analysis reminiscent of that adopted by the late-nineteenth-century Court and
purported to reaffirm the decisions in the Insular Cases and In re Ross.
1 82 7
The Court has also resurrected the dual sovereignty approach of that era,
engaging in searching scrutiny of federal-state relations in Commerce Clause
1825. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)); see supra
notes 1101-02 and accompanying text. See also Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 747-48 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (upholding reporting requirements for Iranian students); United States Supreme Court
Official Transcript, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., Mar. 2, 1993, at 10-11, No. 92-344,
available at 1993 WL 754941 (argument for United States) (citing Knauff in support of executive
immigration authority).
1826. Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1975) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819) (emphasis added)).
1827. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 268; id. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("We have not overruled
either In re Ross or the so-called Insular Cases.").
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and Eleventh Amendment cases while broadly deferring to the national
government in the foreign affairs area. 1828 The Court's deferential approach
to domestic and foreign relations is entirely consistent with a jurisprudence
that elevates federalism over other principles of enumerated powers and
individual rights. Indeed, the Rehnquist Court's increasingly restrictive ap-
proach to national authority in the domestic sphere raises interesting
questions regarding the extent to which the Court will continue to authorize
expansive national authority over foreign relations. Both the late-nineteenth-
century Court and Justice Sutherland relied on the complete absence of any
state interest in the foreign affairs area to justify broad federal power. The
years since those decisions have demonstrated, however, that foreign
relations and state interests cannot always be so hermetically separated. A
state's interest in local taxation may conflict with international rules.182 9 A
state's valid interests in free speech and acting as a market participant may
conflict with national economic policies.18 30  And a state's interest in
enforcing its criminal laws by imposing capital punishment on a foreign na-
tional may provoke retaliation from abroad. 831 It remains unclear how the
current Supreme Court's enthusiasm for protecting both state autonomy and
the foreign affairs powers will be reconciled in these areas.
The international law origins of the inherent powers decisions also raise
complex challenges for modern constitutional approaches. First, if the
government's constitutional authority derives from customary international
law, should not the authority likewise be limited by customary international
law constraints? One could argue that the nineteenth century Court looked
to international law only for guidance regarding the normative principles it
might embrace. But the inherent powers cases appeared to invoke
international law in place of enumerated constitutional authority and viewed
the powers as sufficiently powerful to exempt or override other constitutional
limitations. The Court repeatedly utilized international law as a source of
authority for U.S. governmental action but did not recognize it as a source of
constraint. Thus, in the immigration context, the Supreme Court upheld the
government's authority under international law to exclude and deport aliens
but rejected the contention that international rules regarding denizens limited
1828. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
1829. See Barclay's Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (upholding
California's worldwide combined reporting requirement over strenuous international objection).
1830. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (invalidating state
sanctions against Burma as preempted by federal statute).
1831. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (rejecting Paraguay's request for a stay of
execution based on the state's violation of defendant's right to consular notification and the
International Court of Justice's request for provisional measures). For further discussion of the
tension between state authority and U.S. foreign relations jurisprudence, see Sarah H. Cleveland,
Crosby and the "One Voice" Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975 (2001); Ernest
Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 139 (2001).
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the government's ability to deport or banish long-term lawful residents. But
if the government's constitutional authority over aliens is based on
international law definitions, then the government's constitutional authority
logically also should be limited by the constraints that international law
imposes.
Equally importantly, the constitutionalization of international law norms
raises the question whether those norms should be frozen in time. If U.S.
authority derived from international law, should those powers evolve as
international norms develop? Where clauses of the Constitution have been
read as incorporating common-law principles, originalists have argued that
the provisions must be read according to common-law rules that prevailed
when the Constitution was adopted. Originalism makes little sense in the
inherent powers context, however, since neither the inherent powers ap-
proach nor many of the international norms on which it relied were principles
that had prevailed in 1787. An interpretation that did not allow the authority
to evolve over time would freeze U.S. constitutional analysis in a peculiarly
racist and imperialist moment of the late nineteenth century. If the authority
is not fixed, however, then the government's constitutional authority should
evolve with international law and recognize the developments in interna-
tional law over the succeeding century. For example, although international
law generally continues to recognize the authority of states to exclude or
expel aliens, today the U.N. Convention and Protocol on the Status of
Refugees, the Torture Convention, and other international law instruments
and rules of customary international law prohibit states from expelling aliens
to countries where they will suffer persecution.1 832 If, indeed, the national
government's constitutional authority to exclude aliens derives from inter-
national law, then this power simultaneously should be limited, as a
constitutional matter, by customary international law constraints such as the
duty of nonrefoulement.1833 International law norms regarding the rights of
indigenous peoples and colonial inhabitants raise similar questions regarding
doctrinal evolution. 834  As Professor Frickey has argued, should what is
constitutional sauce for the goose be sauce for the gander in this context?1835
There does not appear to be any principled basis on which the Court can pick
and choose among international law doctrines in this manner.
Finally, any continued reliance on the Court's nineteenth century
decisions may call for a reexamination of modem understandings of the
1832. United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force on Apr. 22, 1954), art. 33; 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No.
6577 (Jan. 31, 1967); Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987).
1833. Cf Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (holding that the U.S.
statutory and treaty obligation not to return refugees does not apply to extraterritorial U.S. actions).
1834. See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996).
1835. Phillip H. Frickey, Domesticating, supra note 52, at 74.
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relationship between constitutional and international law. Contemporary
scholars have attacked the authority of the federal courts to interpret and
apply international law, contending that the current approach to customary
international law is constitutionally illegitimate. 836 Yet, as the cases of the
last century demonstrate, the Court historically has relied on international
law as an important source of federal constitutional authority. It would be
logical for the Framers to look to international law in defining the country's
enumerated foreign affairs powers, and the constitutionalization of inter-
national law was common in the early years of the republic, 837 when the law
of nations was considered coterminous with natural law.' 838 Resort to inter-
national law in many respects continued throughout the nineteenth century.
The decisions of that century thus portray the Court as significantly more
receptive to international law norms than is widely understood at present.
The Spanish-American War, which produced the Insular Cases, also
produced The Paquete Habana1839-in which the Court famously pro-
nounced that "international law is part of our law"-as well as a number of
other important international law cases.' 840  And while scholars hostile to
international law approaches have attempted to marginalize The Paquete
Habana, the Court's monistic approach to international law in that case is
entirely consistent with the nineteenth century decisions.
One may argue that reliance on international law brings with it the
unsavory practice of withholding other constitutional constraints. But
nothing in the Court's reliance on international law compelled the Court's
separate conclusion that ordinary constitutional constraints and judicial
1836. See generally sources cited supra note 21.
1837. Chief Justice Marshall noted in Gibbons v. Ogden that the foreign commerce power
derived "from those laws whose authority is acknowledged by civilized man throughout the
world .... The Constitution found it an existing right, and gave to Congress the power to regulate
it." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824); see also Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v.
Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815) (Marshall, C.J.) ("The law of nations is the great source
from which we derive those rules, respecting belligerent and neutral rights, which are recognized by
all civilized and commercial states throughout Europe and America. This law is in part unwritten,
and in part conventional. To ascertain that which is unwritten, we resort to the great principles of
reason and justice .... ").
1838. As Vattel famously observed, "the law of Nations is originally no other than the law of
Nature applied to Nations." VATTEL, supra note 56, Preliminaries, at lvi. Vattel nevertheless also
recognized the existence of positive international law.
1839. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
1840. See The Adula, 176 U.S. 361 (1900) (noting the difference between the legality of a
simple or actual blockade and a public or presidential blockade in international law and relying on
foreign admiralty case law); The Panama, 176 U.S. 535 (1900) (holding that international law does
not exempt mail ships from capture as war booty); The Benito Estenger, 176 U.S. 568 (1900)
(relying on international law for the proposition that the general rule in war is that the citizens or
subjects of the belligerents are enemies to each other, that political status determines enemy
ownership, and explaining the principle offlagrante bello); The Pedro, 175 U.S. 354 (1899) (relying
on foreign case law to support the holding that the ship in question must be deemed Spanish); The
Buena Ventura, 175 U.S. 384 (1899) (interpreting an executive proclamation laying down rules for
the treatment of merchant vessels during a time of hostility).
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review would not apply, and I would argue that the Court's approach to these
latter questions was fundamentally illegitimate. However, the Court's will-
ingness to consider international law in defining the enumerated foreign
affairs powers is both longstanding and legitimate. This dialogue between
international and constitutional law principles has been largely lost to
modern constitutional jurisprudence. The modern Supreme Court has ap-
plied the doctrine of plenary power over foreign relations with enthusiasm
while simultaneously rejecting the very international law principles from
which that power derived. 184' An accurate historical understanding of U.S.
constitutional doctrines in this area suggests that U.S. authority over foreign
relations should be applied with greater sensitivity for international law.
The foregoing discussion is intended to raise questions more than to
provide answers, and a full exploration of the contemporary implications of
the inherent powers decisions is beyond the scope of this Article. The
historical review of the decisions and the context in which they arose,
however, demonstrates unequivocally that not only do they lack support in
the Constitution's text, structure, and original understanding, but they rely on
both doctrinal approaches and assumptions about the social good that have
been fundamentally rejected. The decisions raise very hard questions
regarding the territorial and popular scope of the Constitution and our under-
standing of who we are as a nation. They pose fundamental questions about
whether the Constitution establishes a government whose powers are limited
with respect to all persons over whom it acts, or whether it is simply an
affirmative grant of positive rights to a specific, identifiable population-
"We the People"-with unconstrained, inherent powers outside of that zone.
Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott and Rogers held that "we the people"
obviously did not include African Americans or Indians. A decade ago,
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Verdugo resurrected a similar analysis and applied
the Insular Cases to hold that "we the people" did not include nonresident
aliens outside the United States.
Since the Second World War, the United States has adopted
significantly more inclusive and pluralistic views of national membership
and a robust jurisprudence of individual rights. Our concepts of territoriality
have been revolutionized to the point that extraterritorial actions by the
1841. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992) (declining to
consider customary international law in holding that the respondent's forcible abduction from
Mexico did not violate the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty). The question of the relevance of
international law to constitutional analysis has been particularly hotly contested in the Eighth
Amendment context. Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 2249 n.21 (2002) (Stevens, J.)
(holding that execution of the mentally retarded is cruel and unusual punishment and considering
international practice), with Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (Scalia, J.)
(rejecting a claim that the execution of persons who were over 15 at the time of the crime
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and "emphasiz[ing] that it is American conceptions of
decency that are dispositive" over the dissent's contention that international practice is relevant).
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United States are routine, and colonialism no longer is respected as a
hallmark of nationhood, but is condemned as a violation of national self-
determination. The United States, and the international community, are now
in very different places than they were when these cases were decided. The
Court's continued application of these anomalous doctrines does ongoing
damage to the fabric of the Constitution and to the United States' relationship
to international law. The centennial of these decisions is an appropriate time
to reexamine the doctrines developed at the end of the last century, and to
question whether they accurately reflect our understanding of who we are as
a nation. If we can agree that the worldview on which the decisions were
based is unattractive today, we should cease relying on doctrines that are
avowedly and fundamentally inconsistent with America's liberal political
traditions.
